Ken Binmore CV
I apologize for being without an up-to-date website for so long while
suffering from a debilitating illness. The current version contains an
abbreviated CV and a list of publications. It will take me some time to
get all my available working papers into shape for downloading.
Monmouth NP25 4TY
+44 1600 860 691
Lecturer in Mathematics at Royal Holloway College, University of London, 1965-1969
Lecturer, Reader and Professor of Mathematics at LSE, 1969-1988
Professor of Economics at LSE, 1988-1990
Professor of Economics at University of Michigan, 1988-1993
Professor of Economics at University College London, 1991-2002
Emeritus Professor of Economics at London University, 2002-
Current Visiting Appointments
Visiting Professor of Economics at Bristol, 2001-
Visiting Professor of Philosophy at LSE, 2007-
Visiting Professor of Economics at Warwick, 2012-
David Hume: Grandfather of modern economics? (Lecture delivered in
Edinburgh to mark David Hume's 300th anniversary at a conference: Hume's Influence on Economics: New Perspectives.)
Ambiguity attitudes, framing and consistency, to appear in Theory and Decision (2016+). (with lead author A. Voorhoeve, A. Stefansson and L. Stewart).
Ambiguity in Game Theory?
Patrick Suppes and game theory, to appear in J of Econ Methodology (2016+).
The material has been arranged by disciplines listed alphabetically. It
is not always easy to decide to which discipline a particular piece
belongs. Decision theory has been counted as economics. All laboratory
studies have been counted as psychology. Some work published in
economics journals has been counted as philosophy. Some evolutionary
papers are counted as economics. Papers within disciplines have been
listed by date published. All book reviews and some commentaries
are excluded. Where a paper can be downloaded, it is the
Can mixed strategies be stable in asymmetric games? J of Theoretical Biology 210 (2001), 1-14 (with L. Samuelson).
Cooperation should not be assumed, Trends in Ecology and Evolution 21(9) (2006), 476-478 (with J. McNamara and A. Houston).
Bargaining in Biology, J of Evolutionary Biology 23 (2010), 1351-1363.
Sex and evolutionary stability, J of Theoretical Biology 278 (2011), 63-73 (with L. Samuelson).
Evolution and Rationality: Decisions, Cooperation and Strategic Behavior, Cambridge U Press, Cambridge (2012) (joint editor with S. Okasha).
Suicidal punishment in the ant Acromyrmex Versicolor, Evolutionary Ecology Research 14 (2012), 1-21 (with lead author G. Pollock, T. Cabrales and S. Rissing).
Sexual drift, Biological Theory 8 (2013), 201-208.
Rationality in multi-agent systems, Knowledge Engineering Review 13 (1998), 309-314.
Applying game theory to automated negotiation, Netnomics 1 (1998), 1-9 (with N. Vulkan).
An example in group preference, J of Econ Theory, 10 (1975), 377-385.
Social choice and parties, Review of Econ Studies, 13 (1976), 459-464.
Nash bargaining theory I, II and III, ICERD discussion papers 80/09, 80/14 and 80/15 (1980) published in Economics of Bargaining, editors K. Binmore and P. Dasgupta, Basil Blackwell, Oxford (1986).
Nash bargaining and incomplete information, Cambridge Econ Theory discussion paper 82/58 (1980) published in Economics of Bargaining, editors K. Binmore and P. Dasgupta, Basil Blackwell, Oxford (1986).
Perfect equilibria in bargaining models, ICERD discussion paper 82/58 (1982) published in Economics of Bargaining, editors K. Binmore and P. Dasgupta, Basil Blackwell, Oxford (1986).
Bargaining conventions, International J of Game Theory 13 (1984), 193-200.
Equilibria in extensive games, Econ J 95 (1984), 51--59.
Bargaining and Coalitions, in Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining, editor A. Roth, Cambridge U Press, London (1985).
Nash bargaining solution in economic modeling, RAND J of Econ 17 (1986), 176-188 (with A. Rubinstein and A. Wolinsky).
Economic Organizations as Games, Basil Blackwell, Oxford (1986) (joint editor with P. Dasgupta).
Economics of Bargaining, Basil Blackwell, Oxford (1986) (joint editor with P. Dasgupta).
Bargaining models, in Proc of Norwegian Conference on Natural Gas, editor M. Hoel, Cambridge U Press, London (1987).
Modeling rational players I, Econ and Philosophy 3 (1987), 179-214. (This is where Rosenthal’s Centipede Game got its name.)
Security equilibrium, Review of Econ Studies 55 (1988), 33-48 (with M. Herrero). (Rubinstein's bargaining model works with a much weaker equilibrium concept.)
Matching and bargaining in dynamic markets, Review of Econ Studies 55 (1988), 17-32 (with M. Herrero).
Modeling rational players II, Econ and Philosophy 4 (1988), 9-55.
Noncooperative models of bargaining, in Handbook of Game Theory, Volume I (1992), 181-200, editors R. Aumann and S. Hart, North Holland, Amsterdam (with M. Osborne and A. Rubinstein).
Fun and Games, D. C. Heath, Lexington MA (1991). (Textbook now replaced by Playing for Real.)
Foundations of game theory, in Advances in Economic Theory, editor J-J Laffont, Cambridge U. Press, Cambridge (1992). (An invited lecture delivered to the Sixth World Congress of the Econometric Society in Barcelona)
Evolutionary stability in repeated games played by finite automata, J of Econ Theory
57 (1992), 278-305 (with L. Samuelson). (If less complex automata are
favored when payoffs are the same, then evolution generates utilitarian
Frontiers of Game Theory, MIT Press, Cambridge MA (1993) (joint editor with A. Kirman and P. Tani). (A collection of papers from an early conference.)
An economist's perspective on the evolution of norms, J of Institutional and Theoretical Econ 150 (1994), 45-71 (with L. Samuelson).
Bargaining theory without tears, Investigaciones Economicas 18 (1994), 403-419.
Drift, European Econ Review 38 (1994), 851-867 (with L. Samuelson).
Learning to be imperfect: The Ultimatum Game, Games and Econ Behavior
8 (1995), 56-90 (with J. Gale and L. Samuelson). (Evolution does not
necessarily respect backward induction. Order of authors’ names
scrambled in the published version.)
Musical chairs: Modeling noisy evolution, Games and Econ Behavior 11 (1995), 1-35 (with L. Samuelson and R. Vaughan).
Introduction to the Essays of John Nash, in Essays on Game Theory by John Nash, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham UK (1996).
A note on backward induction, Games and Econ Behavior 17 (1996), 135-137. (It is not true that Aumann shows that Bayesian rationality implies backward induction in finite games of perfect information.}
Imperfect recall, Understanding Strategic Interaction: Essays in Honor of Reinhard Selten, editors W. Albers et al, Springer-Verlag, Berlin (1997).
Rationality and backward induction, J of Econ Methodology 4 (1997), 23-41.
Muddling through: Noisy equilibrium selection, J of Econ Theory 74 (1997), 235-266 (with L. Samuelson).
Evolutionary stability in alternating-offers bargaining games played by finite automata, J of Econ Theory 80 (1998), 257-291 (with M. Piccione and L. Samuelson).
Why Experiment in Economics? Econ J 109 (1999), F16--F24.
Equilibrium Selection and Evolutionary Drift, Review of Econ Studies 66 (1999), 363-394 (with L. Samuelson).
Treasury Auctions: Uniform or Discriminatory? Review of Econ Design 5 (2000), 387-410 (with J. Swierzbinski).
Toeholds, Takeovers and Football, European Competition Law Review 21 (2000), 142-144 (with D. Harbord).
Coordinated action in the electronic mail game, Games and Econ Behavior 35 (2001), 6-30 (with L. Samuelson). (Rubinstein’s conclusion is reversed by making the game more realistic.)
Evolution and mixed strategies, Games and Econ Behavior 34 (2001), 200-226 (with L. Samuelson).
Creativity and acclaim, Games and Econ Behavior 36 (2001), 9-10 (An appreciation of John Harsanyi).
The biggest auction ever: The sale of British 3G telecom licenses, Econ J 112 (2002), C1--C23 (with P. Klemperer).
Equilibrium selection in bargaining models, Games and Econ Behavior 45 (2003), 296-328 (with L. Samuelson and P. Young).
Bargaining over fixed-to-mobile termination rates: Countervailing buyer power
as a constraint on monopoly power, J of Competition Law and Econ 1(3) (2005),
449--472 (with D. Harbord).
Evolution of focal points, Games and Econ Behavior 55 (2006), 21-42 (with L. Samuelson).
Economic man - or straw man? A commentary on Henrich et al, Behavioral and Brain Science 28 (2006), 817-818. (It is not true that it is axiomatic in neoclassical economics that agents are selfish.)
A Very Short Introduction to Game Theory, Oxford U Press, Oxford (2007).
Playing for Real, Oxford U Press, New York (2007). (An updated version of the textbook Fun and Games,
but with no evolutionary game theory, which had by then grown too big
for a chapter or two. There is now a coursebook edition that comes with
a disk of teaching aids.)
Experimental economics: Where next? J of Econ Behavior and Organization 73 (2010), 87-100. (with A. Shaked). (A controversial critique of Fehr and Schmidt on “inequity aversion”.)
Experimental economics: Where next? Rejoinder, J of Econ Behavior and Organization 73 (2010), 120-121. (with A. Shaked).
Rational decisions in large worlds, Annales d'Econ et Statistique 86 (2008), 25-41.
Rational Decisions, Princeton U Press, Princeton (2009). (My plea to take Savage seriously on “small worlds”.)
Game theory and institutions, J of Comparative Econ 38 (2010), 245-252.
Nash's work in economics, Games and Econ Behavior 71 (2011), 2-5. (A birthday tribute to Nash.)
Complexity and Institutions: Markets, Norms and Corporations, Palgrave
Macmillan (2012). (Joint editor with M. Aoki, S. Deakin and H. Gintis.) (A volume in Proceedingsof 16th World Congress of the International Econ Association held at Tsinghua University, Beijing.)
Rationality, in Handbook of Game Theory: Volume 4, editors P. Young and S. Zamir, North Holland, Amsterdam (2014), 1-24.
How Werner Guth's Ultimatum Game shaped our understanding of social behavior, J of Econ Behavior and Organization 108 (2014), 292-318 (with 16 coauthors).
Institutions, rules and equilibria: A commentary, J of Institutional Econ 11 (2015), 493-496.
A minimal extension of Bayesian decision theory, Theory and Decision 80 (2016), 341-362.
A trigonometric inequality, J of London Math Soc 41 (1966), 693-696.
Some limitation theorems for Abel summability, Math Zeitschrift 98
Coefficient estimates for lacunary power series and Dirichlet series I, Proceedings of the London Math Soc 18 (1968), 36-48 (with J. M. Anderson).
Coefficient estimates for lacunary power series and Dirichlet series II, Proceedings of the London Math Soc 18 (1968), 49-68 (with J. M. Anderson).
On the coefficients of typically real functions, Duke Math J 36 (1969), 455-464 (with W. Kirwan)
Analytic functions with Hadamard gaps, Bulletin of the London Math Soc 1 (1969), 211-217. (My best paper.)
A density theorem with an application to gap power series, Transactions of the American Math Soc 148 (1970), 367-384.
On entire functions with gap power series,' Glasgow Math J 12 (1971), 89-97 (with J. M. Anderson).
Closure theorems with applications to entire functions with gaps, Transactions of the American Math Soc 161 (1971), 381-400 (with J. M. Anderson).
On Turan's Lemma, Bulletin of the London Math Soc 3 (1971), 313-317.
Interpolation, approximation and gap series, Proceedings of the London Math Soc 25 (1972), 751-768.
Boundary behavior of functions with Hadamard gaps, Nagoya Math J 48 (1972), 173-181.
The coefficients of exponential series, J of the London Math Soc 10 (1975), 19-24.
Mathematical Analysis: A Straightforward Approach, Cambridge U Press, London (1977).
Mathematics, games and society, Bulletin of Institute of Math and Apps 13 (1977), 263-271.
Zero-sum games, Learn Magazine 5 (1979).
Foundations of Analysis: Logic, Sets and Numbers, Cambridge U Press, London (1980). Reissued 2009.
Foundations of Analysis: Topological Ideas, Cambridge U Press, London (1981). Reissued 2009.
Calculus, Cambridge U Press, London (1982).
Mathematical economics, Bulletin of the Institute of Math and Apps 19 (1983), 94-95.
Guillermo Owen's proof of the minimax theorem, Theory and Decision 56 (2004), 19--23.
Why game theory “doesn't work”, in Analysing Conflict and its Resolution: Some Mathematical Contributions, editor P. Bennett, Clarendon Press, Oxford (1987).
Social contract: Harsanyi and Rawls, Econ J 99 (1989), 84-102.
Essays on the Foundations of Games, Basil Blackwell, Oxford (1990)
Social contract III: utilitarianism and evolution, Constitutional Political Econ 1 (1990), 1-26.
Social contract IV: convention and evolution, in Rational Interaction: Essays in Honor of John C. Harsanyi, editor R. Selten, Springer-Verlag, Berlin (1992).
Game theory and the social contract, in Game Equilibrium Models II: Methods, Morals and Markets, editor R. Selten, Springer-Verlag, Berlin (1991).
Algorithmic knowledge and game theory, in Knowledge, Belief and Strategic Interaction, editor C. Bicchieri, Cambridge U Press, Cambridge (1992).
DeBayesing game theory, in Studies in
Logic and the Foundations of Game Theory: Proceedings of the Ninth
International Congress of Logic, Methodology and the Philosophy of
Science, editor B. Skyrms, North Holland, Dordrecht (1993).
Bargaining and morality: Social contract II, in Rationality, Justice and the Social Contract: Themes from “Morals by Agreement”, editor R. Sugden, Simon and Schuster, Hemel Hemstead, UK (1993).
Playing Fair: Game Theory and the Social Contract I, MIT Press, Cambridge MA (1994) (The first volume of a two-volume work)
Rationality in the Centipede, in Proc of the Fifth TARK Conference on ``Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning about Knowledge'', editor R. Fagin, Morgan Kaufman, San Mateo, California (1994).
Rationalizing backward induction? IEA Conference on Rationality in Economics, Turin (1993) (with Larry Samuelson).
The game of life, J of Theoretical and Institutional Econ 151 (1995), 132-136.
Right or seemly? Kritik & Analyse 18 (1996), 67-80.
Game theory and evolution, Demos Quarterly 10 (1996), 35.
Evolution of fairness norms, Nordic J for Political Econ 23 (1997), 150-173.
Evolutionary ethics, in Game Theory, Experience, Rationality: Foundations of Social Sciences, Economics, and Ethics in honor of John C. Harsanyi, 277-283, editor W. Leinfellner et al, Kluwer, Dordrecht (1997).
Game theory and business ethics, Quarterly J of Business Ethics 9 (1999), 31-35.
Just Playing: Game Theory and the Social Contract II, MIT Press, Cambridge MA (1998) (second of two volumes).
The evolution of fairness norms, Rationality and Society 3 (1998), 275-301.
A utilitarian theory of political legitimacy, in Economic Values and Organization, editors A. Ben-Ner and L. Putterman, Cambridge U Press, Cambridge (1998).
Egalitarianism versus utilitarianism, Utilitas 10 (1998), 353--367.
Natural justice and political stability, J of Institutional and Theoretical Econ 157 (2001), 133-151.
The breakdown of social contracts, in Social Dynamics, editors S. Durlauf and P. Young, MIT Press, Cambridge MA (2001).
How and why did fairness norms evolve? Proceedings of the British Academy 110 (2001), 149-170.
Defending transitivity against Zeno's paradox, Philosophy and Public Affairs 31 (2003), 272--279 (with A. Voorhoeve). Reprinted in "Recent Work on Intrinsic Value Series" Library of Ethics and Applied Philosophy 17 (2005), editors. T. Rønnow-Rasmussen and M. Zimmerman.
Natural justice, in Fakten statt Normen? editors C. Lutge and G. Vollmer, Nomos, Bielefeld (2004), 128--152.
Reciprocity and the social contract, Politics, Philosophy and Econ 3 (2004), 5-36.
Natural Justice, Oxford U Press, New York, (2005). (a non-mathematical review of my naturalistic theory of fairness norms from the two-volume Game Theory and the Social Contract.)
Why the distinction between knowledge and belief may matter, Econ J Watch 2 (2005), 1-12.
Transitivity, the sorites paradox, and similarity-based decision-making, Erkenntnis 64 (2006), 101-114 (with A. Voorhoeve).
Why do people cooperate? Politics, Philosophy and Econ 5(1) (2006), 81-96.
Justice as a natural phenomenon, Analyse & Kritik 28 (2006), 1-12.
The origins of fair play, Proceedings of the British Academy 151 (2007), 151-193. (A lecture summarizing the book Natural Justice.)
Do conventions need to be common knowledge? Topoi 27 (2008), 17-27.
Naturalizing Harsanyi and Rawls, in Justice, Political Liberalism and Utilitarianism: Themes from Harsanyi and Rawls, editors M. Fleurbaey, M. Salles and J. Weymark, Cambridge U Press (2008).
Natural justice and political stability, in Recent Developments in Evolutionary Economics, editor U. Witt, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham UK (2008).
Wie zich groot voordoet, wordt belachelijk gemaakt. (Interview with M. aan de Burgh in the Dutch newspaper NRC Handelsblad, 30 December, 2008 (page 13).
Interpersonal comparison of utility, in Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Economic Science, edited by H. Kincaid and D. Ross. Oxford U Press (2009).
Game theory and ethics, in Handbook of Ethics and Economics, editors J. Peil and I. Staveren, Edward Elgar, (2009).
Justice as a natural phenomenon, Think: Philosophy for Everyone 22 (2009), 7-23.
Interpersonal comparison in egalitarian societies, European J of Political Econ 26 (2010), 294-302.
Social norms or social preferences? Mind and Society 9 (2010), 139-158.
Can knowledge be justified true belief? in Logic, Mathematics, Philosophy: Vintage Enthusiasms; Essays in Honor of John L. Bell, editors D. DeVidi, M. Hallett and P. Clark, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 407-412, (2011).
Interpreting knowledge in the backward induction problem, Episteme 8 (2011), 248-261.
Evolutionary game theory and sociality, in Encyclopedia of Philosophy and the
Social Sciences, editor B. Kaldis, Sage (2013).
Jeremy Bentham: Ogre or prophet? J of Bentham Studies (2011) .
Fairness in bargaining, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 111 (2014), 10781-10784. (My social contract theory reduced to eight pages.)
Life and death, Econ and Philosophy 32 (2016), 75-97.
Why all the fuss? The many aspects of the Prisoner's Dilemma, in The Prisoner's Dilemma, editor M. Peterson, Cambridge U Press, Cambridge, 2015. (The subtitle is the editor’s.)
Testing noncooperative game theory: A preliminary study, American Econ Review 75 (1985), 1178-1180 (with A. Shaked and J. Sutton).
Experimental economics, European Econ Review 31 (1987), 257-264.
Noncooperative bargaining theory: a further test: reply, American Econ Review 78 (1988), 837--839 (with A. Shaked and J. Sutton).
An outside option experiment, Quarterly J of Econ 104 (1989), 753-770 (with A. Shaked and J. Sutton).
Do people exploit their bargaining power? An experimental study, Games and Econ Behavior 3 (1991), 295-322 (with P. Morgan, A. Shaked and J. Sutton).
Rational choice theory: sufficient but not necessary, American Psychologist, July 1991, 797-799.
Focal points and bargaining, International J of Game Theory 2 (1993), 381-409 (with J. Swierzbinski, S. Hsu and C. Proulx).
Games people play, Universe Magazine 7 (1995), 25.
Hard bargains and lost opportunities, Econ J 108 (1998), 1279-1298 (with C. Proulx, L. Samuelson and J. Swierzsbinski).
Does minimax work? An experimental study, Econ J 111 (2001), 445-465 (with J. Swierzbinski and C. Proulx).
A backward induction experiment, J of Econ Theory
104 (2002), 48-88 (with J. McCarthy, L. Samuelson and A. Shaked).
(Backward induction fails, whatever utility function one attributes to
Does Game Theory Work? The Bargaining Challenge, MIT Press, Cambridge MA, (2007). (A book containing my experimental papers on bargaining, with commentaries.)
Focal points and bargaining, in Handbook of Experimental Economics Results I,
editors V. Smith and C. Plott. North-Holland, Amsterdam
(2008), 500-510 (with J. Swierzbinski). (Reprint of results.)
How much ambiguity aversion? Finding indifferences between Ellsberg's risky and ambiguous bets, J of Risk and Uncertainty
45 (2012), 215-238. (with L. Stewart and A. Voorhoeve). (Very little
ambiguity aversion in the Ellsberg paradox when the possibility of
experimenter manipulation is minimized.)
A note on the strong law of large numbers, Bulletin of the American Math Soc 74 (1968), 49-68 (with M. Katz).
A note on characteristic functions, Annals of Math Statistics 40 (1969), 303-307 (with H. Stratton).