

Party Financing Regimes and Emergence of New Parties in Latvia and Estonia

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Abstract. The paper addresses the question on the impact of party financing regulations on party systems in the post-communist Central and Eastern European democracies. It proposes a formal theoretical model of party financing regime restrictiveness vis-à-vis new political parties and analyses the Estonian and Latvian experience with new parties in the light of the countries' party financing regimes. Estonian system of advanced public financing has inhibited the success of new actors better than in Latvia, where the parties receive no subsidies from state budget. However, the last elections saw significant success of new parties (Res Publica and New Era) in both countries. The paper analyses how new parties have been operating in the context of party financing regimes, relying on specific combinations of resources in achieving success. Finally, the potential effects of recent amendments in party financing regulations of regulations will be considered.

Public Party Financing and New Parties

The cartelization hypothesis put forward by Richard Katz and Peter Mair (1995) has been one of the principal theoretical developments in party system literature of the last decade, while being also subject to significant criticism with regard to Western European party systems (i.e. Koole 1996, Kitschelt 2000, Pierre et al 2000). The alleged persistence of party systems (also called the 'petrification hypothesis') is one of the central elements of cartelization theory and therefore restricted emergence and success of new parties would be one of the principal implications of it. According to the cartelization theory, public party financing can in a sense be considered a functional equivalent of electoral thresholds (as it is a certain barrier, Katz & Mair 1995: 23-24). Whereas thresholds benefit stronger parties by punishing smaller ones, public financing discriminates against extra-parliamentary (i.e. new) vis-à-vis parliamentary (i.e. established) parties, the effect being additionally dependent on the allocation rules¹ and to greater or lesser extent balanced by societal funding (the dichotomous categorization into state and societal funding is borrowed from van Biezen & Kopecký 2001). Still, if the petrification hypothesis holds, the most principal impact of public financing on party systems is similar to electoral thresholds – to consolidate them at some expense of representation and equity between contestants.

Empirical tests of the petrification hypothesis have analysed the implication and for the most part rejected it in Western European democracies (Koole 1996: 516). Public party financing has even been claimed to play a fundamental role in the consolidation of new parties (Pierre et al 2000: 16).² The emergence of Green parties (Nassmacher & Nassmacher 2001: 191-192) and Scandinavian progress parties (Pierre et al 2000: 22) in particular have been mentioned as significant disproof of the theory.

The emergence of cartelistic institutions in Central and Eastern Europe has often been pointed out (Klíma 1998, Szczerbiak 2001, Ágh 1998: 109). Public party financing, one of the pivotal features, has been introduced in most of the countries in the region and constitutes an important source of income for parties here (Ikstens et al 2001, Lewis 2003: 169, Lewis 1998: 145-149, van Biezen & Kopecký 2001). However, the petrification hypothesis has largely remained untested.³ There are good reasons for that. While many of the countries had introduced public party financing by mid-90s, it obviously takes time to have observable impacts. The volatile nature of electoral politics in the region (Rose et al 1998: 118-119)

¹ It has been argued that public party financing can even be beneficial for new parties given it is based on rules that are non-exclusionary and tolerant of political pluralism (Jenson 1991).

² That, however, does not imply public financing to be conducive to the *emergence* of new parties.

³ Meanwhile, there is some empirical evidence on public financing holding back extra-parliamentary parties in the younger Mediterranean democracies (Gillespie 1998: 81-84).

instantly seems to refute the hypothesis. However, cartelization (regarding the limited success of new parties) can conceivably occur simultaneously with high levels of volatility – the system might allow for fluctuations in the support for established parties while being inhospitable to the success of new parties. It has been shown that the two phenomena are far from perfectly associated in Central and Eastern Europe (Sikk forthcoming). Still, high levels of volatility suggest high ‘availability’ of electorates in the region that increases the significance of campaigns and resources for the electoral performance of parties. The importance of *money* in campaigning can be considered higher in Central and Eastern Europe than in many Western democracies as other potential resources are supposedly scarcer – voluntary labour is limited due to relatively low membership levels of political parties and free advertising on public television is overshadowed by extensively used freedom to purchase airtime.⁴

While *new parties*⁵ have not been a rarity in Eastern and Central Europe, many of those that seem new are not necessarily genuinely that. It has been argued that many of the new contenders even in Western European elections lack genuine novelty (Mair 1999). For example, Simon Hug (2001) in his study on the emergence of new parties in Western democracies does not consider mergers and electoral alliances, focusing solely on genuinely new parties that “emerge without any help from members of existing parties” (p. 13) and splits from old parties. In post-communist countries, the problems with novelty are multiplied due to the frequency of such organizational changes – from splits and mergers to electoral alliances of temporary and more permanent kind to merely name changes of parties. Arguably, no party that directly stems from parliamentary parties can be considered effectively breaking a party cartel. Often, they are in fact escapees in fear of electoral backlash or personalities who have lost intra-party power struggle and search for new opportunities. In this paper I have defined (genuinely) new parties as parties the ones that are *not successors of any previous parliamentary parties, have a novel name as well as structure, and do not have any important figures from past democratic politics among its major members* (the last condition excluding participation by prime ministers and significant portions of cabinet ministers and members of parliament).⁶ Such distinction between ‘genuinely new’ and ‘essentially old’ parties is very clear-cut, disregarding the continuum between the polar opposites. However, as the empirical part of the paper is focused on only two countries, it leaves room for reflections on parties that narrowly disqualify from being genuinely new.⁷

⁴ Paid political ads are much more widespread in Central and Eastern Europe (only prohibited in Slovakia) than in Western Europe (prohibited in the majority of the countries; see Ikstens et al 2001: 6 and Norris 2002: 144).

⁵ Here, a ‘party’ is defined as an organization participating in elections under a distinctive name (following the definition from Sjöblom 1968).

⁶ For a more detailed discussion on the definition, see Sikk (forthcoming).

⁷ In this paper the terms ‘established’/‘new’ and ‘parliamentary’/‘extra-parliamentary’ are used interchangeably. Even though ‘established’ might suggest some additional qualities of the parties, the first pair of terms seems simply more convenient and is not at odds with the central argument.

The Model of Restrictiveness of Party Financing Regimes towards New Parties

Money is arguably just one of the necessary factors (resources in broader sense) for the success of new parties, the other including membership/organization, a political project, media exposure, political opportunity structure etc. (Lucardie 2000). Different resources can be considered to some extent interchangeable, e.g. a party that can rely in campaigning activities on abundant free labour of its numerous rank-and-file or volunteers, presumably needs less ‘hard’ money. Parties formed around strong and charismatic leaders have an advantage in relation to exposure in mass media and presumably need to pay less for publicity. New parties relying on primitive and populist demands are in a comparatively advantageous situation as well, as it is relatively easy and inexpensive to communicate such messages to the electorate. For instance, it is easier to advocate substantial tax cuts than fine-tuned restructuring of taxes, even if the latter might in the end turn out to be more beneficial to many voters – the costs of ‘message transfer’ are lower in the former case. The aforementioned success of Green and Progress parties can be hypothesized to have benefited in different degrees from these factors.

In Central and Eastern Europe, we might in general expect higher relevance of money for activities of political parties because of several factors. First, the parties are smaller. The smaller party membership in relation to its electorate, the less important is the position of money in its resource structure. Second, as civil society has often been claimed to be underdeveloped in the region, even the party members might be less likely ready or able to contribute to party activities. Third, all parties are relatively new in post-communist countries, and the voters (and their families, contrary to their Western counterparts) lack the habit of voting for particular parties and thus it is more imperative for parties to exhibit their identity and persuade the electorate anew in each election. These matters are worsened by the frequency of organizational innovations (splits, mergers, electoral coalitions and their break-ups) in Central and Eastern Europe.⁸

The above discussion highlights that the share of public subsidies in total party income used for testing the petrification hypothesis (e.g. Pierre et al 2000: 14) only tells part of the whole story. It is also necessary to take into account the general significance of money in party activities in a given country. The model below uses the most straightforward measure for assessing the importance of money in party politics of a country – the total income of all political parties.⁹ Also, as noted above, the allocation rules of public party financing matter as well. It can be exclusively aimed at parliamentary parties or be more inclusive (see Table 1). Therefore, the model modifies the traditional notion of share of public subsidies in total party income and considers the part of it going to established parties.¹⁰

⁸ In addition to the need of promotion of a new identity in general, such new parties face other problems. In case of a split, two or more new parties need to convince the voters of being the genuine successor or the virtuous faction from an otherwise vicious party. Mergers and electoral coalitions have to make sure the past supporters of its constituent parts are not driven away due to being hostile to other components.

⁹ Obviously, in comparative studies it is necessary to adjust it for the number of eligible voters and additionally to per capita GDP (Nassmacher & Nassmacher 2001: 183).

¹⁰ Even though subsidies going to extra-parliamentary parties are normally very small, the distinction is theoretically important when considering the position of new versus established parties in the light of public financing.

Table 1 Thresholds for Receiving Public Financing in CEE (around 2000)*

Country	Threshold (% votes)
Bulgaria	1
Hungary	1
Romania	2
Lithuania	3
Slovakia	3
Czech Republic	3
Poland	3**
Estonia	Representation in the parliament
Slovenia	Representation in the parliament***

* the rules of distribution among parties vary, in most cases discriminating against the smaller parties.

** 6% for parties running in electoral coalitions.

*** 1% of votes from 2002.

Sources: van Biezen & Kopecký 2001: 421, Gaube 2002, Ikstens et al 2001 and Sikk 2003: 12.

The following model of restrictiveness of party financing regimes towards new parties is based on analysis through imaginable extreme situations, rather than classification of party financing regimes based inductively on Weberian ideal types that is more common in the literature on party financing regimes (see i.e. Nassmacher 2003: 10-13). The analysis here is deductive in nature and uses the method of logical extremes (for the clarification of the approach see Taagepera 2002; here the approach is used exclusively for deriving implications, not for actual quantitative modelling of any phenomena).


The first logical extreme is a situation where there is no public financing, but the party incomes total is very high. That seems a somewhat absurd situation where all the money in a given society is in the party coffers, and a more reasonable (but a one defying strict quantification) extreme is a situation where there is no spare dollar (or any other currency unit) that has the potential of going to party financing (corner A in Figure 1). Clearly, under the assumption that a new party would need at least some money to emerge, the only possibility for its rise is some redistribution of the party finances. Another logical extreme (B) is a similar situation where all of the money is additionally channelled to established parties through state budget, the rise of new parties being perfectly restricted. If, any additional funds for party financing become available (a move down from the corners), the situation close to the logical extreme A is less restrictive to new parties, as the additional private money may benefit either established or new parties. Under our assumption, all situations between B and D remain perfectly restrictive for new parties.

Logical extremes C and D denote (as abstract) situations where party politics is money-less, (thus the position on line CD being undefined). In a situation marginally above C, the new parties are potentially best off as all party funds are freely available (e.g. for both established and new parties) and easily expandable (as there is plenty of 'excess' money in the society). Moving straight up from corner D theoretically does not open competition, as still there is no money (that is necessary under assumption) available for extra-parliamentary parties. Moving towards the centre enhances the prospects of new parties.

While money can be an important resource for political parties (at least some of it is probably necessary), it is under no circumstances the only possible resource. It would be reasonable to assume that the importance of *other resources* (media exposure, attractive political project, voluntary labour) increases as the total of money in party politics decreases (moving downwards on Figure 1). Put differently, the other resources can more easily counterbalance the financial resources – for instance a party would need many more volunteer workers, publicity spots in TV or more catchy electoral pledges to fight a 100 million \$ campaign than

a 100 \$ campaign. Thus the restrictiveness of party financing regimes towards new parties decreases as we move from sector 1 to 3 (fundraising possible in 1, but easier and less relevant in 3) and from sector 2 to 4. On the other hand, restrictiveness towards new parties increases as the share of public financing for established parties increases (1 to 2 and 3 to 4).

Figure 1 Restrictiveness of Party Financing Regimes towards New Parties



TF – total (potential) party financing in a given country
 $\frac{PUF_{Est}}{TF}$ – share of public financing for established parties in TF

The model presented above is clearly a very simple one. First, it lacks the sophistication present in most studies of party financing and hides most of the nuances by placing party income only under two categories, while it can be meaningfully divided at least into 17 items (as listed in Burnell 1998: 11-12). Still, it is more nuanced compared to only focusing on the share of party financing in total income of parties (as in Pierre et al 2000) and thus captures better the essence of the question of restrictiveness towards new parties in party financing regimes. The model also provides a certain baseline for analysing restrictiveness and allows us to modify it by other explanatory factors.

The model is essentially based on actual funding – if we would like to present real cases there, we would need data on how much the parties have been using in total and how much have they received in public donations. However, authentic data on party financing is very difficult, if not impossible, to obtain. In many countries, no reporting on behalf of the parties is required. In those, where parties are subject to providing declarations, the truth-value of these can often be called into question.¹¹ Even the actual extent of public financing can be called into question as it is difficult to account for in-kind subsidies (free airtime etc)¹², support for parliamentary factions (e.g. the state provides free office-space and other facilities) and all kinds of unauthorised use of public money (van Biezen & Kopecký 2001: 416-417). In this paper, the model will not be used very strictly due to limitations on data and their accuracy. Rather, it will be used from a comparative and dynamic perspective by analysing the

¹¹ More so regarding the sources, but probably less so regarding the total numbers.

¹² In-kind subsidies are disregarded in this paper, as they can be considered to be relatively level in Estonia and Latvia and remained so over time. For example, the countries provide some free airtime for pre-electoral debates, but there is also evidence from both countries of slight discrimination against smaller parties with regard to time allocation (Sikk 2003: 13, ‘Latvian TV...’ 2002). However, these would have to be taken into account if the countries under study differed considerably in this regard (e.g. one provides generous free airtime for parties and another provides none).

differential impact of Estonian and Latvian party financing regimes and developments of regimes in the countries over time and contrasting it with the general implications derived from the model.

The model presented above works under the assumption that there are no legal restrictions on private (i.e. not public) financing whatsoever. More precisely, effective restrictions would have the effect on limiting the total amount of available (i.e. potential) money. At the same time, most party financing regimes are not particularly effective in restricting private donations to parties, political money being often compared to water, that always finds the way to flow. Both in Estonia and Latvia the restrictions on party financing have been relatively lax or at least ineffective until now. The countries present good cases for comparison as they are similar in many respects (PR electoral systems, shared recent history, similarities in party systems, notably the lack of strong ex-communist party¹³) but significant differences in party financing regimes.

Party Financing Regimes in Estonia and Latvia¹⁴

The party financing regimes in Latvia and Estonia have been relatively similar with regard to regulations concerning private donations. Both have been relatively lax concerning donations. Even though the countries have introduced incremental bans on donations from certain kinds of sources and put limits to individual donations (see Table 2), there is a widespread belief that parties have often found ways to circumvent the restrictions.¹⁵ In Estonia, reporting on campaign revenues and expenditures was introduced before 1995 parliamentary elections and quarterly declarations on contributions in 1999. In Latvia, declarations on campaign financing (both before and after elections) were introduced first in 2002, until then the annual financial reports also covered election-related accounts. While Estonian parties have been relatively law-abiding in submitting the declarations and their content has been relatively detailed (especially after 1999, when the taxonomy of expenditures and sources of income was specified), reporting in Latvia has lacked behind (Čigāne 2002). However, the accuracy of financial statements has been called into question in both countries (Čigāne 2003, Sikk 2003: 12).

The party financing regimes regarding public subsidies have been almost as divergent as possible in the two countries. Latvia is the only country in Central and Eastern Europe that has not introduced public subsidies to political parties. In contrast, Estonia introduced public financing already in 1996, and the outlays to political parties from state budget have increased more than tenfold since (see Table 3). Only parties surpassing the 5% electoral threshold have been eligible for subsidies. While many countries in Central and Eastern Europe have chosen to subsidise political parties through campaign reimbursements, public party financing in

¹³ The ex-communist countries are in many Central and Eastern European countries distinctive from other parties with respect to their relatively broad membership base and income structure, where both membership fees and proceeds from party property (rents etc) are relatively significant (see Lewis 1998).

¹⁴ Party financing regimes will be discussed below in two dimensions only – private and public financing. Sources of income like membership fees or business proceeds from party property that are significant for some of the Central and Eastern European parties (i.e. in Poland and Czech Republic, see Lewis 1998: 138-139), are relatively insignificant in Latvia and Estonia. Additionally, membership fees can in principle be anyway classified together with donations under a broad category of ‘societal’ funding (as opposed to ‘state’ funding, see van Biezen & Kopecký 2001).

¹⁵ For instance, by mediating donations. Nassmacher, making a more general point, argues that detailed regulations on political finance in Central and Eastern Europe have often proved to be a “legal fiction” (2003: 18).

Estonia is exclusively based on routine transfers from state budget according to the votes on last national parliamentary elections. Even though thorough reports on party spending are not available, the parties probably use much of the money on routine operations rather than actual campaigning – also the share of public subsidies in reports on electoral campaign income is often low. However, it is not clear whether the campaign reports are accurate on that, as there is no distinction between submissions (public or private) for campaign or other purposes. In comparative perspective, subsidies to political parties have not lacked behind wealthier Central and Eastern European countries such as Czech Republic and Hungary, where the average annual subsidies were respectively 0.93 and 0.91 dollars per registered voter in mid-1990s (van Biezen & Kopecký 2001: 408-410, the Czech figure is a weighed average of election and non-election years).

Table 2 Party Financing Regimes – Legal Provisions

	Estonia	Latvia
Public financing	<p><i>From 1994:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Donations to parliamentary parties from state budget (operational from 1996). <p><i>From 2004:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Additionally: 150,000 (250,000) kroons a year for parties winning at least 1% (4%) votes in parliamentary elections.* 	No public financing
Restrictions on donations	<p><i>From 1994:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Banned: publicly owned companies and (local) government institutions, and donations from foreign (local) governments (incl public ownership companies); <p><i>From 2003:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Private persons may not donate more than 10,000 kroons** per year in cash (void from 2004). <p><i>From 2004:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Only legitimate sources of income: public subsidies, private endowments and proceeds from party property. 	<p><i>From 1995:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A single benefactor can contribute up to LVL 25,000† per year per party; • Banned: stateless persons, foreign sources, anonymous, religious organisations, state & municipal institutions (incl majority ownership corporations); • Ban on foundations for the purpose of political party financing. <p><i>From 2002:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The limit reduced to LVL 10,000. <p><i>From 2004:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Only donations from private persons allowed limited by legally acquired income during last 3 years.
Limits on campaign expenditures	No***	<p><i>From 2004:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • LVL 0.2 per eligible voter (maximum campaign spending LVL 280,000).††
Reporting	<p><i>From 1995:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In one month after each election, parties have to submit reports of their campaign incomes and expenditures to the Electoral Commission. 	<p><i>From 1995:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Annual financial declarations (amount and sources of income)††† <p><i>From 2002:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Additional declarations before and after elections (on planned and real expenditures).

Sources: Estonia: Erakonnaseadus 2003, Sikk 2003; Latvia: Ikstens et al 2001: 26-27, Snipe 2003, 'Финансирование...' 2004.

* In state budget for 2004 increased threefold. USD 11,700, USD 19,500.

** USD 780.

*** Draft amendment of electoral law proposes a very high limit (30 million kroons, 2.34 million USD per party).

† USD 41,700.

†† USD 0.37, USD 519,000.

††† Sanctions have been weak and ineffective: although it has been possible to dissolve the party for not complying, none has faced the fate even though the reporting has been far from perfect (Snipe 2003: 25).

Table 3 Total Donations from State Budget to Parties, Estonia 1996-2004

	<i>1996</i>	<i>1997</i>	<i>1998</i>	1999	2000	2001	<i>2002</i>	2003	2004
Millions of dollars	<i>0.41</i>	<i>0.72</i>	<i>0.91</i>	0.56	0.98	1.08	<i>1.27</i>	1.47	4.79
\$ per registered voter*	<i>0.52</i>	<i>0.91</i>	<i>1.15</i>	0.65	1.14	1.26	<i>1.48</i>	1.71	5.57

Note: National election years in bold, local election years in italic

Sources: Mikser 2001, State Budget Law 2003, 2004, exchange rate from Bank of Estonia (www.eestipank.info/frontpage/et/, accessed 28.03.2004).

* – as of 1995, 1999, 2003.

Electoral campaign costs have been relatively high compared to many countries both in Estonia and Latvia (claimed to be highest among the enlarged EU member states, see Auers 2003). Exact comparisons are difficult as campaign expenditures should not be considered proportional to the number of voters (per voter costs are expected to be higher the smaller the country), and in many post-communist countries there are maximum limits on campaign spending (Walecki 2003: 72). Still, the level of total campaign spending in last elections clearly exceeded the campaign expenditures in relatively small, but affluent European democracies: Sweden and Netherlands, where the campaign costs per registered voter have been respectively 2.25 (in 1991) and 0.47 dollars (1998, Gidlund & Koole 2001: 114-115).

As is apparent from Table 4, the campaign costs have increased considerably in Estonia since 1995, more than doubling after each electoral term. The figures for the last elections can in fact even be considered slightly downplayed, as the 2003 parliamentary elections took place just few months after local elections (also with rather costly campaigns), the opposite (parliamentary elections taking place before the local ones) applying for 1999. The level of campaign expenditures per voter was even higher in Latvia in 2002 (see Table 5) compared to last Estonian national elections. Even though reporting has been less satisfactory in Latvia, it is evident from annual financial declarations (see Table 6) that both campaign costs and total party income have considerably increased in Latvia since 1995. Total party income has more than doubled on consecutive election years (both regarding national and local elections), but has also increased substantially in non-election years.

Table 4 Self-reported Expenditures on Electoral Campaign, Estonia

	<i>millions of dollars</i>	1995	1999	2003
Centre Party		0.090	0.523	1.502
Reform Party		0.209	0.339	1.256
Country People's Party / People's Union			0.194	0.492
Coalition Party		} 0.133	0.253	-
Pro Patria Union		0.111	0.311	0.314
The Moderates		0.076	0.239	0.214
Res Publica		-	-	1.343
The Right Wingers		0.109	-	-
Our Home is Estonia / United People's Party		0.052	0.067	0.077
Total*		0.881	2.014	5.244
Per registered voter		1.12\$	2.35\$	6.10\$

Source: Electoral Commission, exchange rate from Bank of Estonia (www.eestipank.info/frontpage/et/, accessed 28.03.2004).

* – including parties and individual candidates not listed here.

Table 5 Self-reported Expenditures on Electoral Campaign, Latvia

	<i>millions of dollars</i>	2002
New Era		0.85
For Human Rights in a United Latvia		0.54
People's Party		2.54
Latvian First Party		0.99
Green and Farmers Union		0.93
Fatherland & Freedom / LNNK		0.89
Latvian Way		1.37
Latvian Social-Democratic Workers' Party		0.72
Total*		9.75
Per registered voter		6.99\$

Source: Čigāne 2003: 15.

* – including parties not listed here.


Table 6 Total Reported Party Income, Latvia 1995-2001.

	1995	1996	<i>1997</i>	1998	1999	2000	<i>2001</i>
Millions of dollars	2.21	0.87	<i>0.96</i>	5.12	1.27	2.78	<i>2.84</i>
\$ per registered voter	1.66	0.66	<i>0.73</i>	3.88	0.96	2.11	<i>2.04</i>

Note: National election years in bold, local election years in italic

Source: Ikstens 2003: 83


In Estonia, a problem is posed for the calculation of share of public financing in total party income by the fact that their share in campaign finance reports is very low. Some parliamentary parties have not listed state budget there as a source of income at all. Thus, the post-electoral financial reports do not reflect the extent of public donations very well. Therefore, Figure 2 compares the increases in total campaign expenditures and total public subsidies for political parties in Estonia. It is evident that total campaign expenditures have been increasing more rapidly than public subsidies before 2003 elections. Furthermore, even though the campaign expenditures in 1999 were higher compared to 'year zero' than public donations, parts of campaign activities already started in 1998, when the public donations were exceptionally high (the elections themselves take place in beginning of March).

Figure 2 Campaign Expenditures and Public Donations to Political Parties, Estonia, 1995-2004 (1995, 1996=100)

Source: Table 3 and Table 4 and X. Elections took place in March 1995, 1999 and 2003.

As noted above, the total amount of money in campaigns has been roughly level in Estonia and Latvia. It is interesting to note that the relationship between campaign expenditures of individual parties and their performance in elections has been much stronger lately in Estonia than in Latvia (see Figure 3 to Figure 6), but the finding is difficult to interpret. On one hand, that might indicate the importance of money-based campaign. On the other, it may just reflect that Estonian parties spend more according to their expected popularity or just that in Latvia there are some parties that have relied much more on money-based campaigning than others (that being in turn close to assertion that the relevance of money in Estonian party politics is higher or at least more uniform among the parties).


Figure 3 Parties’ Share of Total Electoral Expenditures and Votes, Latvia 2002*



* – parties receiving less than 1 per cent of vote excluded

Notes: JL: *Jaunas laiks* (New Era), LC: *Savienība “Latvijas ceļš”* (Union Latvia’s Way), LPP: *Latvijas Pirmā Partija* (Latvia’s First Party), LSDSP: *Latvijas Sociāldemokrātu Stradnieku Partija* (Latvian Social-Democratic Workers’ Party), PCTVL: *Par cilvēka tiesībām vienotā Latvijā* (For Human Rights in a United Latvia), SDS: *Sociāldemokrātu savienība* (Social-Democratic Union), TB/LNNK: *Apvienība “Tēvzemei un Brīvībai”/LNNK* (Alliance Fatherland and Freedom-LNNK), TP: *Tautas partija* (People’s Party), ZZS: *Zaļo un Zemnieku savienība* (Green and Farmers Union).


Figure 4 Parties’ Share of Total Electoral Expenditures and Votes, Estonia 1995*



* – parties receiving less than 1 per cent of vote excluded

Notes: ETRE: *Eesti Talurahva Erakond* (Farmer’s Party), I&ERSP: *Isamaa ja ERSP Liit* (Pro Patria and ERSP Union), KESK: *Keskerakond* (Centre Party), KMÜ: *Koonderakond ja Maarahva Ühendus* (Coalition Party and Rural Union), MKOE: *Meie Kodu on Eestimaa* (Our Home is Estonia), MÕ: *Mõõdukad* (Moderates), Õ: *Õiglus* (Justice), PAREM: *Parempoolsed* (The Right-Wingers), PEEK: *Parem Eesti/Eesti Kodanik* (Better Estonia/Estonian Citizen), REF: *Reformierakond* (Reform Party), TEE: *Tuleviku Eesti Erakond* (The Future’s Estonia Party).


Figure 5 Parties’ Share of Total Electoral Expenditures and Votes, Estonia 1999*



* – parties receiving less than 1 per cent of vote excluded

Notes: Labels same as Figure 4, except: IML: *Isamaaliit* (Pro Patria Union), KO: *Koonderakond* (Coalition Party), EME: *Eesti Maarahva Erakond* (Country People’s Party), EÜRP: *Eestimaa Ühendatud Rahvapartei* (United People’s Party), KRP: *Kristlik Rahvapartei* (Christian People’s Party), SIN: *Sinine Erakond* (Blue Party), VEE: *Vene Erakond Eestis* (Russian Party in Estonia).

Figure 6 Parties’ Share of Total Electoral Expenditures and Votes, Estonia 2003*



* – parties receiving less than 1 per cent of vote excluded

Notes: labels same as Figure 5, except: RP: *Res Publica* (Res Publica), ERL: *Eestimaa Rahvaliid* (People’s Union).

Recently, both Latvia and Estonia have amended the legislation on party financing substantially. The most important change in both countries was the introduction of a ban on corporate donations (as well as other “organizational” contributions, such as those from foundations and associations).¹⁶ While the reasoning behind these restrictions has been to

¹⁶ Similar restriction has recently also been introduced in Poland (see Walecki 2003: 84).

limit decisively the influence of “plutocratic funding” (as was the case in Poland, see Walecki 2003: 75), it may have crucial effects on the restrictiveness of party financing regimes. First, such laws will likely be enforced more enthusiastically on extra-parliamentary parties than on established ones, especially under the Estonian system where the latter are granted substantial subsidies from state budget. Donations that can go unnoticed in the backdrop of vast total party budgets are much more visible in case of less affluent extra-parliamentary parties. Second, such regulations do not grant that “plutocratic funding” will disappear. Legal and declared donations might just turn illegal and undeclared or, in other words, into bribes. These are almost by definition targeted to established and especially governmental parties. Third, the new parties will just face difficulties gathering money for organizational and campaign purposes, as private persons have been less ready to contribute until now. That applies especially for Latvia that has additionally established a limit on private donations (see Table 2). The limit is at the same time counterbalanced in Latvia by setting a substantial limit to parties’ total electoral campaign budgets – the limit being lower than the campaign costs of all of the successful parties in 2002 elections (compare Table 2 and 5). Proposal for limiting campaign expenditures has also recently been made in Estonia, but quite contrary to their southern neighbours, the proposed upper limit surpasses all the actual campaign costs in 2003. However, the effectiveness of such limits remains to be seen.¹⁷

With regard to public subsidies to political parties, the situation in Latvia remains unchanged – parties still do not receive any support from the state budget. Even though the option has been discussed, the parties are afraid of the enormous unpopularity of the move (Antonevičs 2003, ‘Partiju finanses...’ 2003). In Estonia, the threshold for receiving public support was lowered. From 2004 on, parties winning at least 1 per cent of vote in parliamentary elections, will receive from 11,700 to 19,500 USD annually.¹⁸ However, that does not significantly change the situation of extra-parliamentary parties vis-à-vis parliamentary ones as the total amount of money received by two parties that won over 1 per cent of votes in 2003 parliamentary elections, constitutes only 0.5 per cent of the subsidies going to parliamentary parties.

In sum, the Estonian party financing regime can be considered to have been theoretically more restrictive than its Latvian counterpart both due to established system of public subsidies. In dynamic perspective, the relevance of money has increased in Latvia. While the absolute relevance of money has also increased in Estonia, there is some indication (see Figure 2) that the share of public donations in total financing of Estonian parties decreased before 2003 parliamentary elections.

¹⁷ It has been argued that the introduction of public subsidies for political parties in Western Europe has partly been the result of a diffusion effect (Nassmacher 2001: 17). The recent changes in Latvia have likely been influenced by Estonian developments as its party financing regime has been considered a positive example before (Čigāne 2002: 7-8).

¹⁸ While subsidies for parliamentary parties are decided annually in state budgets, the level of subsidies for extra-parliamentary parties is set down in the law on political parties. The amendments also slightly changed the rules of subsidy allocation for parliamentary parties – from 2004 half of the sum is distributed according to their vote shares on local elections (Erakonnaseadus 2003).

Success of New Parties in Estonia and Latvia

The implications of the theoretical model presented above will lead to following hypotheses on the success levels of new parties in Estonia and Latvia:

- The model would predict more successful new parties in Latvia, as the party financing regime has been less restrictive than in Estonia (no public donations, significance of money being more less equal)
- The level of success of new parties in both countries should be diminishing, as the significance of money has increased, increasing restrictiveness.

Table 7 Main Genuinely New Parties in Estonia and Latvia (over 1% of votes)*

			votes %	seats %	
Estonia	1995	Our Home is Estonia	5.9	5.9	
		Justice	2.3	0.0	
		Farmers' Party	1.5	0.0	
	1999	Christian Peoples' Party	2.4	0.0	
		The Blue Party	1.6	0.0	
	2003	Res Publica	24.6	27.7	
		Christian Peoples' Party	1.1	0.0	
			Average	13.1	11.2
	Latvia	1995	Latvian Unity Party	7.2	8.0
			Labour & Justice	4.6	0.0
Russian Citizens of Latvia			1.3	0.0	
Latvian Popular Front			1.2	0.0	
Association of the Underprivileged & Latvian Independence			1.0	0.0	
1998		Social Democratic Alliance	12.8	14.0	
		New Party	7.3	8.0	
2002		New Era	23.9	26.0	
		Life of Latgale	1.6	0.0	
		Social Democratic Welfare Party	1.3	0.0	
		Average	20.7	18.7	

* – parties gaining representation in bold.

The genuinely new parties receiving more than 1 per cent of votes in national elections in both countries are listed in Table 7. The clearly higher average success both in terms of votes and seats won in Latvia confirms hypothesis 1. In Estonia, only two genuinely new parties have made it to the parliament, while Latvia has witnessed the success of four extra-parliamentary parties. Additionally, Latvia has had two cases of electorally successful parties that only narrowly do not qualify as genuinely new – the new People's Party in 1998 elections (winning the elections with 21.2% of the vote) was formed by ex-prime minister Andris Škele and Popluar Movement for Latvia in 1995 (coming second with 15%) formed by a few rebel-MP's. In Estonia, there have not been any marginal cases.

However, hypothesis 2 is not supported by evidence. The level of success of genuinely new parties has been on a steady increase in Latvia. In both countries, the last elections in the series analysed witnessed both the highest total vote shares going to genuinely new parties and the unprecedented success of new parties – Res Publica in Estonia and New Era in Latvia. In addition to electoral success, both parties also accomplished to put together cabinets claiming the prime ministers posts for their respective leaders (Juhan Parts and Einars Repše).¹⁹ The success of Res Publica can perhaps partially be explained by the

¹⁹ Repše had to resign due to tensions in the coalition in the beginning of 2004. For a more thorough analysis of the successful new parties in the Baltics, see Sikk 2004.

aforementioned increase in total campaign expenditures not fully complemented by the increase in public subsidies to parliamentary parties in Estonia (see Figure 2). It is possible in the Estonian case, however, that relatively abundant money is a necessary condition for new party success. None of the unsuccessful new parties have used much money here.²⁰ Analysing the two latest success stories closer reveals how the new parties have relied not only on money, but on a particular mix of resources in ensuring their success.

First, the success of Res Publica and New Era highlights the importance of a political “project” (Lucardie 2000) or an “issue” that the new parties take up (Hug 2001). In addressing the emergence of new parties in traditional democracies, the strategic behaviour of both new and old parties has been analysed in the course of emergence of new ones, considering the possibility that the established parties accommodate the issue tackled by new parties in their own policies thus inhibiting their emergence or success (Ibid.: 40-41, Kitschelt 2000: 173). It is noteworthy, that the major issue represented by both New Era and Res Publica was probably novelty itself (Sikk 2004), and obviously that could not have easily been accommodated by old parties.²¹

Second, both parties made use of other resources besides money. Res Publica had built up an extensive membership base and was emphasizing the role of its rank-and-file through experiments with (genuine) internal democracy previously unseen in Estonia.²² By the time of elections (15 months after its founding congress) its membership (around 4,000) had clearly surpassed that of some parliamentary parties.²³ New Era in Latvia, on the other hand has been very much relying on the popularity of its leader, former Central Bank president, Einars Repše. It is fair to say that the leader existed before the party.²⁴ Also, New Era (and to much lesser extent also Res Publica) relied more than its parliamentary counterparts on unusual campaign techniques, especially canvassing, that is reflected in its relatively modest total campaign expenditures (see Table 5).

Reliance on highly visible leadership has also been apparent in previous genuinely new parties in Latvia. The success of Latvian Unity Party in 1995 and both Social Democratic

²⁰ ‘Our Home is Estonia’ did not spend very much in 1995 (however, its share of total campaign expenditures was equal to its vote share, see Figure 4). However, the coalition is a particular case, see below.

²¹ The use of word “new” in in Baltic party politics has been frequent – in two last parliamentary elections in Latvia there has been a successful new party using “new” in its name, the same applies for the last parliamentary elections in Lithuania, where New Union came second in results. Although Res Publica did not have ‘new’ in its name, one of its main slogans was “new politics”.

²² For instance, the candidate lists for local and parliamentary elections have been subject to internal primaries. Also, cabinet ministers from the party are to pass confidence vote on annual party congresses. However, there have been accusations that the internal democracy has not been entirely authentic as the central party office has been interfering with both primaries and elections to the party council (Ideon 2003).

²³ In respect to membership, New Era is a completely different case. Even though the parties in general have lower membership rates in Latvia compared to Estonia, New Era with its 320 members in 2003 is a small party even by Latvian standards (Auers 2003).

²⁴ Repše announced plans of forming a new political party in August 2001, slightly more than a year before the parliamentary elections. Before September 2001, when Repše introduced half a couple of his upcoming team in national television, very little was known either of the party’s programme or any other members bar Repše. Most of the attention concentrated on the financial matters and sponsors of the party, with Repše’s notorious claim for a huge fee to change the job at the Central Bank for the leadership in the party being the centre of attention. He suggested on several occasions that if not enough funds would be gathered, the party might not be formed and Repše will retain his central banker’s job. Thus, he ensured that the party was going to be successful based on the reasoning that if people are willing to support it financially, they are also ready to vote for it in elections; on the other hand the donations also guaranteed the sustainability of campaign, not to mention his personal well-being being ensured. The party was actually established only thereafter.

Alliance and New Party in 1998 was to large extent based on the popularity or media attention gained by their leaders. The leaders of the two former parties were in fact not allowed to run for the parliament themselves due to their former connections to Soviet repressive organs: Alberts Kauls of the Latvian Unity Party had supported the 1991 coup in Moscow while Juris Bojars of Latvian Social Democratic Alliance was a former KGB employee turned independence activist. The New Party was led by a famous popular songwriter Raimonds Pauls, who was the most popular politician in Summer before the parliamentary elections of 1998 ('New Party's Head...' 1998).²⁵ The genuinely new party entering the Estonian parliament in 1995, 'Our Home is Estonia', is a special case: it was a debuting electoral coalition of different Russian parties and its rise can clearly be attributed to the substantial increase in the number of Russophone citizens (and electorate) between 1992 and 1995.

However, the parties mentioned above as narrowly disqualifying to be genuinely new relied much on extensive campaigning in securing their success: Snipe [2003: 38] notes the giveaway of bananas and medicine in Riga by the Siegerists (the Popular Movement, after the name of its leader Joachim Siegerist) and the People's Party broke among others the Latvian records of poster size with the 18 by 12 meters portrait of its leader Andris Škele in Riga central railway station ('Gigantic portrait...' 1998, 'Latvian People's Party Received...' 1998). However, some parties have not experienced success despite spending considerable sums on campaigning, like the Right Wingers' and Coalition Party in Estonia (see Figure 4 and Figure 5), and especially Latvia's Way in 2002, who was left behind the 5% electoral threshold despite (declaring) spending more than 1.3 million dollars on pre-election campaign (see Figure 3). These examples clearly highlight the fact that while some money could be considered to be a necessary condition for success, even vast amounts of it obviously is not sufficient.

Discussion and Conclusion

So far, the party financing regimes in Estonia and Latvia have not been thoroughly effective in inhibiting the success of new parties. The recent changes in party financing rules, however, clearly suggest that restrictiveness is on the rise, especially if the bans on corporate donations prove more effective than total campaign budget limitations. On one hand, that might lead us to expect fewer new parties. On the other, Hug has found some empirical support for his (counterintuitive) hypothesis that increasing electoral thresholds should increase the initial strength of new parties (2001: 141). Restrictive party financing regimes can also be considered a barrier and therefore, we might perhaps expect *fewer* moderately successful new parties, but the rise of *strong* new parties is probably does not impeded in the longer run. Res Publica in Estonia presents an example that if a new party already gathers a momentum even in a relatively restrictive system, it can become very popular.

While the new regulations cannot exclude the new parties completely, it will probably lead them to try relying more on alternative resources as the amount of 'utilizable' money decreases and (in the Estonian case) the parties will need much of that to compete with the incumbents. There are three main potential strategies or mixtures of them that can be hypothesized to become more attractive (that were all partly used whether by New Era or Res Publica already):

²⁵ In addition, due to his enormous popularity all over the Soviet Union at the time, he is likely the best recognized Latvian politician in Estonia and in all CIS countries.

- *Strong membership* (the ‘positive scenario’). It is probably unlikely that traditional mass parties will form, but the parties might be based on the use of innovative techniques (e.g. possibilities created by internet).
- *Visible (strong) leader* (the ‘neutral scenario’ as the leader can be either democratic or authoritarian). This strategy makes it easier to rely on (free of charge) media exposure, and has been used before (as in the case of New Era).
- *Populism* (the ‘negative scenario’). If the availability of money decreases for potential new parties, relying on the political project gains appeal, but as it is more difficult to communicate sophisticated messages with limited campaign budgets, the likelihood of simple and populist messages increases (as also argued by Klíma 1998: 87). It can be argued that the Progress Parties in Scandinavia (used as examples rejecting the petrification hypothesis, see Pierre et al 2000: 22) were able to tackle the cartel especially by using the populist leader and visible leader strategies. Also, both New Era and Res Publica used mildly authoritarian rhetoric in their campaigns and afterwards. During campaign, doubts were cast on Repše’s democratic credentials, for example based on demands that prime minister in Latvia should have the right to sack any civil servant (Birzulis 2002) and accusations of authoritarian inclinations were brought up among reasons that eventually led to the downfall of his government (Kuzmina 2003). Res Publica’s main election slogan was somewhat controversial “Vali kord!” with a double meaning in Estonian – on one hand ‘Choose order!’ and on the other ‘Strict order!’.

The recent rise of successful new parties in Estonia and Latvia seems to suggest nice prospects for new parties; even in Estonia, where until recently the restrictiveness of the party financing regime seemed to have worked well against new actors on the political scene. Nevertheless, recent changes in party financing regimes can counterbalance potential hopes. Interestingly, the changes were perhaps even most enthusiastically backed and pushed by Res Publica and New Era, who had themselves used the opportunity to collect corporate donations.²⁶ Part of the reason for that might lie in their mission to be the purifiers of the political life in the countries, but given the restricting potential of the changes regarding new parties, one might speculate that the attractiveness also lies in the hope of being the last ones to ‘catch the train’ and make it harder thereafter for future new contenders for power to enter the political scene.

Considering the success of Res Publica and New Era in last national elections, it seems that the formula of success in Estonia has been much more based on high campaign expenditures (different kinds of private contributions) to make up for inequitable position regarding public financing. New Era used very different approach to campaigning, spending less money and using different campaign techniques from most established parties. The effect of recent amendments to party financing regimes is to be seen. The paper has proposed a substitution hypothesis arguing that if the future new contenders will lack sufficient access to money, they will have to turn to other resources to make up for it.

The theoretical model proposed gets only partial empirical support. The level of public financing for established parties seems to have had a partial restrictive effect in Estonia. The second dimension (total of party finances) seems not to have any observable effect in the countries studied. That may be due to limited number of cases and shortness of the time period under study, but the total level of party income in a country might after all not be a

²⁶ In case of Res Publica, corporate donations very likely made the rise of the party possible at all.

very good indicator of relevance of money for party activities, especially considering the adverse effect of restrictions on party financing on the dimension. In future applications covering more countries (or longer time periods), careful improvement of the dimension in the model should be considered.

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Appendix: Elections in Estonia and Latvia 1992–2003

Estonia - Riigikogu Elections

		20 Sept 1992			5 March 1995			7 March 1999			7 March 2003		
		Turnout			68.9			57.4			58.2		
		V%	S	S%	V%	S	S%	V%	S	S%	V%	S	S%
1	National Independence Party	8.8	10	9.9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2	Pro Patria	22.0	29	28.7	7.9	8	7.9	16.1	18	17.8	7.3	7	6.9
3	Coalition Party	13.6	17	16.8	32.2	41	40.6	7.6	7	6.9	-	-	-
4	Centre Party	12.2	15	14.9	14.2	16	15.8	23.4	28	27.7	25.4	28	27.7
5	Moderates	9.7	12	11.9	6.0	6	5.9	15.2	17	16.8	7.0	6	5.9
6	Independent Royalists	7.1	8	7.9	0.8	0	0.0	-	-	-	-	-	-
7	Better Estonia/Estonian Citizen	6.9	8	7.9	3.6	0	0.0	-	-	-	-	-	-
8	Pensioners' and Families' League	3.7	0	0.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
9	Farmers' Assembly	2.9	0	0.0	w 3	w 3	w 3	0.5	0	0.0	-	-	-
10	Greens	2.6	1	1.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
11	Entrepreneurs' Party	2.4	1	1.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
12	Left Alternative	1.6	0	0.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
13	Reform Party	-	-	-	16.2	19	18.8	15.9	18	17.8	17.7	19	18.8
14	United People's Party *	-	-	-	5.9	6	5.9	6.1	6	5.9	2.2	0	0.0
15	Right Wingers' Party	-	-	-	5.0	5	5.0	-	-	-	-	-	-
16	The Future's Estonia Party	-	-	-	2.6	0	0.0	-	-	-	-	-	-
17	Justice	-	-	-	2.3	0	0.0	-	-	-	-	-	-
18	Farmers' Party	-	-	-	1.5	0	0.0	-	-	-	-	-	-
19	Country People's Party/People's Union	-	-	-	w 3	w 3	w 3	7.3	7	6.9	13.0	13	12.9
20	Christian People's Party	-	-	-	-	-	-	2.4	0	0.0	1.1	0	0.0
21	Russian Party in Estonia	-	-	-	w 14	w 14	w 14	2.0	0	0.0	0.2	0	0.0
22	Blue Party	-	-	-	0.4	0	0.0	1.6	0	0.0	-	-	-
23	Res Publica	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	24.6	28	27.7
24	Independence Party	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.5	0	0.0
25	Social Democratic Labour Party	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.4	0	0.0
	Others	2.1	0	0.0	1.3	0	0.0	0.4	0	0.0	-	-	-
	Independent candidates	4.3	0	0.0	0.3	0	0.0	1.5	0	0.0	0.4	0	0.0
	Total	100.0	101	100.0	100.0	101	100.0	100.0	101	100.0	100.0	101	100.0

* – in 1995 electoral coalition with 21 under name “Our Home is Estonia”

Latvia - Saeima Elections

		5-6 June 1993			30 Sept 1995			3 October 1998			5 October 2002		
		Turnout			72.6			71.9			71.5		
		V%	S	S%	V%	S	S%	V%	S	S%	V%	S	S%
1	Alliance Latvia's Way	32.4	36	36.0	14.7	17	17.0	18.4	21	21.0	4.9	0	0.0
2	National Conservative Party	13.4	15	15.0	6.3	8	8.0	w 6	w 6	w 6	-	-	-
3	Popular Harmony Party	12.0	13	13.0	5.6	6	6.0	14.2	16	16.0	18.9	25	25.0
4	Farmers' Union	10.7	12	12.0	-	-	-	2.5	0	0.0	w25	w25	w25
5	Equal Rights Movement	5.8	7	7.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
6	For Fatherland and Freedom	5.4	6	6.0	12.0	14	14.0	14.7	17	17.0	5.4	7	7.0
7	Christian Democratic Union	5.0	6	6.0	-	-	-	2.3	0	0.0	-	-	-
8	Authentic Democratic Party	4.8	5	5.0	15.2	18	18.0	1.6	0	0.0	-	-	-
9	Popular Front	2.6	0	0.0	1.2	0	0.0	-	-	-	-	-	-
10	Green List	1.2	0	0.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
11	Russian Citizens of Latvia Party	1.2	0	0.0	1.3	0	0.0	-	-	-	-	-	-
12	Popular Movement for Latvia - Siegerists	-	-	-	15.0	16	16.0	1.7	0	0.0	-	-	-
13	Latvian Unity Party	-	-	-	7.2	8	8.0	0.5	0	0.0	-	-	-
14	United List - Farmers, Christian Democrats	-	-	-	6.4	8	8.0	-	-	-	-	-	-
15	Labour and Justice	-	-	-	4.6	0	0.0	-	-	-	-	-	-
16	Socialist Party	-	-	-	5.6	5	5.0	w 3	w 3	w 3	-	-	-
17	Political Union of Economists	-	-	-	1.5	0	0.0	-	-	-	-	-	-
18	Union of Latvian Farmers	-	0	0.0	1.4	0	0.0	-	-	-	-	-	-
19	Association of Underprivileged & Independence Party	-	0	0.0	1.0	0	0.0	-	-	-	-	-	-
20	People's Party	-	-	-	-	-	-	21.2	24	24.0	16.7	20	20.0
21	Social Democratic Alliance	-	-	-	-	-	-	12.8	14	14.0	4.0	0	0.0
22	New Party	-	-	-	-	-	-	7.3	8	8.0	-	-	-
23	New Era	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	23.9	26	26.0
24	Latvia's First Party	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9.6	10	10.0
25	Green and Farmers Union	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9.5	12	12.0
	Others	5.7	0	0.0	1.1	0	0.0	2.8	0	0.0	7.1	0	0.0
	Total	100.2	100	100.0	100.1	100	100.0	100.0	100	100.0	100.0	0	0.0