|
Introduction to it by Ted Honderich John Searle attended the University
of Wisconsin-Madison and went to Oxford as a Rhodes Scholar. In and away from
his base in the University of California at Berkeley, he has been the greatest
adversary, surely a victorious adversary, of the philosophy and science of
consciousness associated with the computer. Its general expression as you have
heard before now, is in the philosophical doctrine of functionalism. In sum
that is that your now being perceptually conscious or your thinking something
or your wanting something is in its nature only and nothing more than an effect
and cause of other things of which only such causal propositions are relevantly
true. Searle's lucid books expounding an opposed philosophy include Speech Acts; Intentionality; The
Rediscovery of the Mind; Mind,
Language and Science; Freedom and
Neurobiology: Reflections on Free Will, Language and Political Power. In his lecture he brings the
traditional problem of determinism and freedom together with his developed
theory of mind and in particular consciousness. The lecture, which fully
rewards the attention it requires, brings together at least the following ten
propositions, several seemingly inconsistent, as he allows. (1) Freedom is indeed a problem to
be considered within responses to the large problem of the nature of
consciousness. It was not adequately treated as a free-standing problem or a
problem within morality, let alone religion. (2) Consciousness like all else is
somehow physical. A principal reason
for saying so is that it has physical effects, say arm movements. (3)
Consciousness is different from the
rest of the physical. In Searle's own view, it is a higher level or systemic
biological feature, related to its constituent neural facts in something like
the way in which a wheel is related to its constituent molecules. (4)
Epiphenomenalism, denying that consciousness itself has effects, such as the
arm movements, is incredible. (5) Both our tendency to
determinism, our tendency to take it that there is complete evidence that every
event has a sufficient or necessitating cause, that all events are caused in
this way, and our contrary tendency to what is called psychological
indeterminism, a sensing or experiencing or feeling that our decisions and
choices could have been otherwise, that they were not effects -- both of these
tendencies are somehow to be explained. (6) As assumed by Searle here without
discussion, we in our lives understand freedom to be origination, uncaused choices and decisions, often spoken of as
free will, rather than voluntariness,
choices and decisions not compelled or the like, which are quite consistent
with determinism. (7) Quantum physics proves an
indeterminism is right -- there are standardly uncaused events down in the
microworld. There are gaps between
events. So there is at least the possibility of our having the freedom of
origination. (8) Our reasoning processes, true to our experiencing of them, in
fact have those gaps in them, but they can explain our actions anyway -- the
gaps do not make for epiphenomenalism. There is rational explanation of our actions. (9) Our reasoning is bound up
with our having or being entities that are selves or egos or rational agents in
what is sometimes called a metaphysical sense, not unities of perceptions,
thoughts and feelings, as supposed by Hume and others, including the lecturer
next to come in this volume. (10) The philosophical problems of determinism and
freedom now dealt with, despite further questions and mysteries, leave us with
only the problems of freedom in the science of neurobiology, which are far
harder. Determinism has in the
past been a principal concern of mine. So I make bold to report my own
continuing convictions about the above propositions of the lecture, some of
which are thereby thrown into sharper relief. (1) What is assumed
about freedom and consciousness and (2) what may be believed about
consciousness as somehow physical, are both true. With respect to (3),
consciousness is indeed really different somehow or other, but not in being a
higher-level or systemic property, which is not its essential or principal
distinction. Plainly there are other higher-level or systemic properties. (4)
Epiphenomenalism is indeed incredible. (5) We do need to
accomodate to some extents both determinism and our contrary tendency. (6)
Surely we must not ignore the freedom of voluntariness in thinking of our human
condition. Doing so is a little benefit to Searle's thinking, but does not much
affect his particular propositions about origination. (7) An attitude
contrary to Searle's is that interpretations or applications of the mathematics
of quantum theory to reality are an admitted mess, including contradictions
etc, and there is no macroworld evidence of real randomness. (8) So I myself
remain unpersuaded of gaps inconsistent with determinism. (9) Selves of some
kind, or anyway a fact of subjectivity or individuality, but not originating
selves or egos or the like, must enter into an adequate theory of our existence.
(10) I too suppose that the freedom problem is now one for science, but as a
result of what can initially be clarified as actual consciousness. I doubt that the scientific problem is
harder. Is philosophy a little more
passionate than science, with more pique in it? I end here by saying that I am
now dismayed by a journal article of mine against a predecessor of Searle's
lecture, another journal article. I have learned more since, above all from a
book I especially recommend to you. Searle's recent Rationality in Action, Searle in action again, enlarges greatly on
the lecture. |