Introductory
summary by Ted Honderich of T. M. Scanlon’s Royal Institute of Philosophy
Annual Lecture
REASONS
FUNDAMENTALISM
Tim Scanlon teaches at Harvard,
having previously done so at Princeton. Before then he was a student of
mathematical logic and in particular proof theory as well as philosophy at
Princeton and Harvard and for a year in Oxford. He has principally been known
as a successor to John Rawls and such different predecessors as Jean-Jacques
Rousseau and Immanuel Kant, but makes his own use of the shared idea of a
hypothetical or imagined social contract, of which you heard in the previous
lecture.
For Scanlon, to speak without
qualification, an action is wrong if it would be disallowed by a set of
principles that no one could reflect on together with others and then reject as
a basis for general agreement. These principles are definitely not the general
one of utilitarianism or the general one of humanity against lives of distress
or suffering, nor fundamentally on account of inequality. Nor are the
principles the political attitudes of liberalism or conservatism. It was indeed
supposed, in my view with reason, that Rawls's method of deriving his own two
principles of justice and of allowable socio-economic differences already
presupposed those very principles. We are to accept that there is no such
circularity in Scanlon's story.
His contract line of argument is
bound up with the subject of reasons
and their weights, his concern in this lecture. But this subject is taken forward on its own, without explicit
reference to a social contract. Reasons in his wide sense include moral
judgements such as your judgement the other evening that a man was treating his
wife badly, didn't care about it, and was cruel and heartless. But reasons in
the wide sense also include reasons for actions having to do with
self-interest, and also reasons for beliefs, and reasons for anything else.
They include reasons for what is to
be done, where that final question comes after settling the questions of what
ought to be done and what is in someone's or something's interest. So reasons
have to do with all of what can be called the normative in a wide sense -- all of what has to do with standards
or instructions or decisions.
Reasons are propositions we can come
to know and whose general nature is explicable. Evidently we are to understand
that we come to understand the species that is moral judgements only by
understanding the genus of which they are a species. Reasons in this sense are
not feelings, attitudes or inclinations. Reasons in this sense are not in the category of desires and
cannot be reduced to desires. To see moral judgements as in the category of
reasons is thus to leave behind the moral philosophy of some decades ago, in
particular the metaethics that took moral judgements to be exactly of the order
of desires -- or to be imperatival utterances owed to desires. We thus also
leave behind a whole tradition including David Hume's curiously unrestrained
declaration in the 18th Century that reason is and ought to be the slave of the
passions.
Reasons are indeed truths, a special
category of truths somehow owed to thinking and living with others. They are
owed to reflection that includes others and their views and is a process that
like Rawls's issues in what can be called reflective equilibrium. Evidently
they are not in either of the traditional two categories of truths of fact,
spoken of in terms of correspondence to fact, and truths of logic or meaning,
having to do with entailment, validity and so on. Further, that these reasons
are truths rather than desires definitely doesn't stop them from their having
some special grip on us, from their being motivating, moving us to action. If
the nature of these reasons is puzzling, if their way of existing is a
question, it can be dealt with or approached, as the matter of the existence of
numbers can be dealt with but not in the same way.
This reasons fundamentalism
necessarily also includes consideration of other matters listed near the
beginning of the lecture, including the supervenience of reasons on ordinary
facts, our way of knowing reasons, and their truth being a matter of common
sense. What is said indeed brings to mind two other lecturers in this volume,
Christine Korsgaard and Simon Blackburn. The first is, so to speak, in the same
or a nearby world. The second, as you will be hearing, is not.
I find some of reasons
fundamentalism elusive, as lesser propositions offered by me and other
struggling philosophers are found elusive. Great philosophers also come to
mind, including Kant, certainly not consistently pellucid. Clearly it is
possible for us to be seized by ideas that may in fact be discoveries or
necessary constructions but also be unable to fit the rest of the world around
them clearly. Maybe great originality is always this way. In the present case
there is help in a book edited by Wallace, Kumar and Freeman -- Reasons and Recognition: Essays in the
Philosophy of T. M. Scanlon.
For other questions, and more than
questions, proceed to the next lecture. And from it, to continue your inquiry,
proceed back to this one.