Introductory
summary by Ted Honderich of Christine Korsgaard’s Royal Institute of Philosophy
Annual Lecture
ON HAVING A
GOOD
Christine Korsgaard was a student of
Philosophy and English Literature in Illinois, then a philosophy graduate
student at Harvard of the esteemed social contract theorist John Rawls. She
taught at other universities including Chicago, and then returned to a
professorship at Harvard, where she has also served as Head of Department. She
has the further distinction of being the first woman to give the John Locke
lectures in Oxford.
God, you may suppose, could have
created a completely happy universe, all that ever exists, with everybody and
every animal in it happy -- or he could have created a completely miserable
universe, everybody and every animal in it miserable. But forget about religion
if you want. You can as well just imagine and compare for yourself the
completely happy universe and the completely miserable universe. You agree,
don't you, that the first one would be an awful lot better, that it would be
right to choose it if you could? But you will hear there is a problem or
question about this choice.
It is not the usual sort of choice
or judgement having to do with happiness, misery and the like. With respect to
this choice or judgement, in favour of the happy universe, all there ever is,
there is nobody better off. The
choice is not the usual choice between the same people or animals being either
happy or instead miserable. It is between people and animals existing and being
happy or miserable and those people not existing at all. You could say that in
a certain sense nobody at all would be being deprived of happiness by the second choice. In a sense there is no
comparison here.
And, moreover, there is the same
situation with respect to the first choice. In short, nobody's life would be made better by that choice of the happy
universe.
Further, there is the same kind of
situation, it seems, about choosing between a universe of greater equality and
a different universe of lesser equality. The question here, as in the first
case, to put it differently, is why the first world would be better. Here too,
you can say, there exists no one to whom it matters.
Korsgaard agrees that the first
choices are right. So does she then agree that there is what can be called impersonal good? And, further, that what
it means to say something is good for you, say, is that you have some impersonal good, that you
stand to impersonal good in that way? She argues, on the contrary, that to begin
with impersonal good is to make it impossible to say what the having consists
in, what relation it names.
This leads to a discussion of what
we can mean by saying that something
is good for someone, how these are related to each other. Also to a discussion
of what sorts of entities can be in this relation. The answer to the latter
question depends on a particular way of thinking or philosophizing about coming
to answers to questions about right and wrong -- thinking of an imagined
contract, thinking in or near the way proposed by Rawls in his A Theory of Justice. Thus in the end we
are vindicated in thinking a world full of happy people is better than a world
full of miserable ones, even if the people are different in the two cases, even
if nobody and no animal is better off.
Questions arise about this thinking,
one about desires or reasonable or natural desires -- and hence about actually
conscious beings, existing beings. Are these grounds of right and wrong, the
stuff of a principle of humanity for example, conceivably an immediate means to rejecting the idea of
impersonal goods? There is also the older question of whether imagined
contract-making is not really an argument for right principles but rather
something written into the contract-making tacitly from the start.
Korsgaard's is original work, work
that depends on new assumptions and asks its own new questions. They may become
familiar. Conceivably the new assumptions and questions may become as settled
as those of earlier philosophers of whom we already know that they gave rise to
the philosophical concerns to come. Who knows? Certainly the lecture is
reminiscent of the progress of a Platonic lecture, otherwise known as a
Platonic dialogue.