Introductory
summary by Ted Honderich of Simon Blackburn’s Royal Institute of Philosophy
Annual Lecture
THE MAJESTY
OF REASON
Back in the 1950's, there was still
the old idea about moral judgements and reasons for them, and talk of right and
wrong and moral language generally, that they are a matter of truths -- if somehow intuited truths
rather than ones got in plain ways, say by just the meanings of words or the
evidence of your eyes. There were also the ideas, with less past, that moral
judgements and so on are only a matter of the expressings of emotion or desire,
related to Boo! and Hurrah! and Shut the door!, which ideas were subsequently included in what is
called expressivism. In the course of time the first idea of
morality as truths, intuited or otherwise, acquired from elsewhere in
philosophy the name of being realism.
And so the opposed expressivism became anti-realism.
To this bundle were then added
marriages or anyway cohabitations, one of being the formidable work of
Professor Simon Blackburn. It was carried forward in the course of his learning
in Cambridge and then his teaching in Oxford, the University of North Carolina,
and Cambridge. He is also the maker of the best short philosophical dictionary,
and has been the editor of the leading philosophical journal Mind, and is a humanist.
The lecture is original work, if
maybe prompted by what it mentions, David Hume's opinion in the 18th Century
that our moral carry-on, what he called our sense
as distinct from our reason, is or
has 'a productive faculty'. This faculty, in 'gilding and staining all natural
objects with...colours, borrowed from internal sentiment, raises in a manner a
new creation'. At least part of this seems to be that in thinking about our
feelings we are committed to accepting the existence of some sort of fact out
in the world, a causal disposition to our feelings, something of which there
are truths.
Blackburn's quasi-realism, like so much else in new philosophy, is such that
there is disagreement as to what it does come to or has to come to, not to
mention claims that it is inconsistent. It also has adversaries of each of its
factual or realist side and its expressive side. In his Royal Institute
lecture, he concerns himself with the latter adversaries.
They are philosophers resistant to
the role assigned to emotion, desire and the like -- say attitudes in general. These adversaries depend instead on the role
of what they take to be facts in morality expressed by reasons. With morality, for Blackburn, this supposed majesty of reason is denied. Things are
a lot more complicated. Slavery is wrong
is at least more a matter of what are called movements of the mind rather than
facts, despite the facts in the world to which the attitudes are related.
There are more particular
propositions. We are reassured that the given account of reasons has the
upshot, denied by some adversaries, that dogs have reasons. There is
examination of the relevance of the superior view that an attitude taken as a
disposition to do something is not in itself a reason for the thing. There is
consideration of the objection that what seems to be the identification of
reasons with attitudes faces the fact that we can always open the question of
whether an attitude is defensible or the like. There is close examination of
the idea that the rationality of means-end reasoning, choosing an effective and
not self-defeating means to an end, is separate from the play of attitudes.
There is acute examination of a supposed paradox about murdering someone gently.
I myself have been forcefully
reminded by the lecture that of course both attitudes and factual beliefs enter
into my carry-on about right and wrong, my actual judgements. Still, are there
things that can be called moral truths, anyway one, this being the principle of
humanity? It incorporates or rests on fundamental human desires, great goods,
our shared human nature. Against this brave tendency about a moral truth, it is
clear that quasi-realism is a challenge.
This kind of fecund uncertainty is a
common-enough experience in good lecture halls. Most lectures worth sitting
through add questions to your life, questions about the lecture. In this case,
as others, get the lecturer's books -- in this case Essays in Quasi-Realism, 1993, and Ruling Passions, 1998, and Being
Good, 2003.