Actual Consciousness By Ted Honderich A review by Janna Thompson, LaTrobe University, Australia Our perceptual world is rich in
colour and sound. We think and imagine. We experience repugnance and longing.
Meanwhile in our brains neurons are firing and chemical reactions are taking
place. Conscious experience and brain events are obviously related. Reputable
Australian philosophers insist that they are one and the same. But how can
events with such different qualities fit together? This is the problem of the
relation between mind and body. It has been with us since Descartes and
philosophers and scientists have been grappling with it for almost four
centuries. Some conclude that it is unsolvable. Noam Chomsky believes that its
solution requires a scientific revolution in our conception of the physical. In
this book Ted Honderich claims that he can clear up much of the mystery by
paying attention to actual consciousness: our ordinary experiences of
perceiving the furniture of a room, thinking our thoughts and making decisions. When we see the contents of a
room we encounter them; they are right there, close and real. Honderich thinks
that these features of perceptual consciousness are sufficient to eliminate
some influential ideas in the philosophy of mind. When we perceive a chair or
another person we are not encountering a mere representation or a collection of
sense data. There is no veil of mental constructions between us and reality. We
are not trapped in an inner world with no exit. Honderich thinks that the
widespread view that objects of perception are in the mind is due to a failure
to distinguish perception from thought or a failure to distinguish actual
consciousness from other things in the mind – from mental dispositions or the
activities of a self. The room we see is out there and
real. But it is also a product of our brains and nervous system. Honderich
believes that close attention to actual consciousness leads to the conclusion
that when we look at the furniture in our room or the trees of a forest we are
perceiving a subjective physical world. This world does not exist in the mind.
It is physical; it is in space and time. But it is also subjective. Your
subjective physical world is not the same as mine. Thoughts and desires, by
contrast, are internal to our minds. They are essentially interpretative; they
are the constructions that we impose on the world of our experience. Descartes’ belief that the
contents of the mind cannot be physical has been responsible for insuperable
problems in philosophy and science. So it is especially important to
Honderich’s project that the subjective world you perceive belongs to the
physical world and is in causal relations with other physical things. This
requires attention to what it means to be physical. Honderich concludes that
being subject to the scientific method is sufficient to make something physical
and he points out that scientists have no trouble studying the way we perceive
objects and events in the objective physical world. Honderich has thought long and
hard about consciousness and he intends the results to be available not merely
to philosophers but to anyone who has ever wondered about the nature of mind.
Before you take up his invitation be warned that your journey through this book
is going to take time and patience. On the way to the
view about consciousness that Honderich favours you will have to work your way
through thickets of philosophical argument and counterargument. The going is
not made easier by a prose style that piles clause upon clause or by
typographical mistakes that should not have been tolerated by a reputable
publisher. Honderich is like a loquacious and sometimes obscure Virgil who is
intent on guiding his readers through circles of philosophical hell and
purgatory – rising from those views that are flawed beyond redemption to those
that have some redeeming features and finally to the enlightenment offered by
his own approach. In the course of this journey he cajoles, prods, reminds,
encourages, warns and even admonishes his reader. The effect is oddly engaging.
If the world of your subjective experience is similar to mine you will be
motivated to struggle on; you will want to reach the journey’s culmination. Is the effort
worthwhile? Few, if any, will think that Honderich has the answers to all
problems of mind and body and neither does he. But his focus on the data of
consciousness is a good start for a theory of consciousness and his approach
makes sense of what most people assume when they take the reality of their
experience for granted. Any
self-respecting philosopher is likely to come up with a quibble or two. Some
may complain that Honderich is too quick to dismiss reasons for thinking that
perceptual experience must be in the mind. How about the illusions to which
perception is subject? How about the pink elephant in the drunkard’s room?
Especially questionable is his elimination of the self from actual
consciousness. The self may not be an object encountered in the subjective
physical world, but its presence is evident from the way that desire and
thought is related to perception and action. Honderich explains
how scientific progress is possible in the study of the relation of mind and
brain. But does he clear up the mystery of how neural firings become for us
experiences of colour and sound, joy and sorrow? To this question the answer is
‘no’. The mind body problem awaits its Einstein. |