

1. *Can I Really Only Feel Pain in My Body?*

Filling out the details in Wittgenstein's example:

Three Options

- a. What Wittgenstein describes is not only possible, it reveals that it is contingent which body one feels a pain to be located in. Perhaps it needs a seeming body part but not a body part which belongs to one's own body;
- b. Wittgenstein's description is not coherent as it is glossed here. That is because LW assumes that Brown's leg is not part of Jones. However, if Jones can really feel a pain in Brown's leg, then Brown's leg is a part of Jones's body, even if it is still a part of Brown's body too;
- c. Wittgenstein's description is not coherent as described here. That is because LW assumes that there can be genuine awareness of pain in Brown's leg. But while Jones can feel pain, and mislocate it in a body part extending to where Brown is (phantom limb), he can't be aware of Brown's leg if it is not part of his body.

What would show either that Brown's leg had to be part of Jones's body if Jones comes to be aware of it; or show that if it wasn't part of Jones's body Jones couldn't be aware of it?

*Model 1: Parts of the body are the primary objects of awareness:* Suppose that they are bodily parts such as fingers, toes, hands, legs or arms. Whether one is aware of a body part is determined by whether there is an appropriate link between how things are in that body part and one's experience of the body part. Cf. causal theories of perception. If the neurotransmitters have been set up correctly we will get such a connection between Brown's leg and Jones's experiences.

Either being aware of the limb is sufficient for it to be part of one, or not. We have (a) if the latter, otherwise (b). Why accept the sufficiency claim? Normally we think of the body as a physical thing whose limits and nature are determined independently of the scope of our awareness. However there are examples of seeming extension of awareness, say in the learned use of a prosthetic limb, where we might want to say that the limb becomes part of the body. Is awareness sufficient, though? What of the connection with action?

*Model 2: The body as unit is the primary object of awareness; its parts are objects of awareness only through being parts of it:* Two consequences: one is aware of a mere part of the body in as much as the part is a part of the body, i.e. a part of the object which is being monitored as a whole. Which object is being monitored may be determined by more than causal facts – e.g. what the function or point of bodily awareness is. This favours option (c).

2. *Where Have We Got To?*

i.) *Three Claims*

**PRIVACY:** One feels one's own pains in a way that one can feel the pains of no one else; no one else can feel one's pains in this way

**SUBJECTIVITY (In the Strong Sense):** For any given instance of pain, *o*, for some subject *S*, *S*'s feeling pain constitutively makes it the case that there is *o*

**LOCATION:**

- (a) Any location in which one feels a sensation is felt to be a location falling within one's body;
- (b) Any location in which sensation is genuinely located falls within some part of one's body

ii.) *SUBJECTIVITY & PRIVACY*

We argued from the case of the Siamese twins that:

a.) there is (possibly inconclusive reason) to believe SUBJECTIVITY based on the following two observations:

- We do not suppose that there is pain, even where there is severe bodily trauma, if a living creature feels no pain – the existence of feelings of pain is a necessary condition of the existence of pain;
- We do not suppose that pain can only exist if there is some objective condition of the body, trauma or disorder to bodily structure or tissue, which the pain indicates: in cases of trigeminal

neuralgia the patient does have genuine pain (not merely seems to have pain) despite lacking any severe tissue damage.

b.) SUBJECTIVITY explains PRIVACY

c.) Langsam seeks to explain PRIVACY and SUBJECTIVITY by reference to the claim that “pains follow one’s body around”. Langsam claims that the fact that “pains follow one’s body around” is a contingent truth (i.e. that LOCATION may be true, but is not necessarily true); he concludes that PRIVACY and SUBJECTIVITY are contingent.

Wittgenstein like Langsam agrees that LOCATION is a contingent truth but claims SUBJECTIVITY is not contingent (in his jargon it is a “grammatical truth”).

*Do you think SUBJECTIVITY is best explained as Langsam suggests by LOCATION?*

*Do you think SUBJECTIVITY is a contingent truth?*

*(Note it may be contingent that we have pain at all, yet necessary that if we have pains, i.e. sensations like the ones we have, SUBJECTIVITY is true.)*

iii.) LOCATION

*Are Wittgenstein and Langsam right to think that LOCATION is contingently true?*

We have seen ways in which Wittgenstein’s and Langsam’s descriptions of pain in others bodies can be as well described consistently with the necessary truth of LOCATION.

(Note that it may be contingent that we have sensations which have a location, while necessary that if they have a location that location is a body region.)

### 3. *The Importance of Location*

*Suppose LOCATION is true and necessarily so – what is the significance of this?*

If pains just are mental objects, why shouldn’t they be located just in any physical location, or in none? It looks as if we have to appeal to the function or role of feeling pains in order to explain the close connection with the body. Suppose that a feeling of pain takes as its object the body, or a part of the body. Then we count pains by counting the parts of the body in which we feel hurt, or the number of feelings of hurt we have. We do not need to introduce in addition any extra mental object which is felt.

*How are we to understand the idea that pain is a mode of awareness of one’s body?*

One model: pain is a mode of *perception* of one’s body.

### 4. *Sensations as perceptions*

Different varieties of sensing:

Object perception – *S* senses *o* (Ellen sees the truck)

Fact perception – *S* can sense that *p* (Brian can feel the hole in his tooth)

The appearance of objects of perception – how *o* appears to *S*, *S* senses *o* as *F* (Brian feels the cavity as large)

*What are the objects of bodily sensation?*

The explanation of the role of bodily location suggests either: option 1 or 2 above (body parts or the body as a whole). (But contrast Merleau-Ponty who denies that the body can be an object of awareness (*Phenomenology of Perception*, Part One))

*What information, i.e. what facts about the objects of perception can bodily sensation and other forms of body awareness reveal?* State of body, or of parts of the body – whether it is well or ill; what its general disposition is. (Note that all motor control, even simple movements exploit constant sensory feedback (see, e.g., Marc Jeannerod *The Cognitive Neuroscience of Action*), but an agent need not be conscious of how things appear in so acting.)

*How do body parts or the body appear to one through such sensation? What are the observable aspects in such awareness? What of the spatial properties of the body, what of the qualitative character of sensation?*

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