

General Reading for Bodily Sensation

Bodily Sensations as Subjective

- *Jackson, F. (1977). *Perception*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Ch. 3. (A defence of the view that there are inner objects of awareness.)
- Langsam, H. (1995). 'Why Pains are Mental Objects.' *The Journal of Philosophy*, 92(6): 303–313.

The Location of Sensation

- Anscombe, G.E.M. (1957). *Intention*, Oxford: Blackwell, esp. 13-14, 49-51.
- . (1962). 'On sensations of position', *Analysis*, 22: 55-8. Reprinted in her (1981) *Metaphysics & The Philosophy of Mind: Collected Papers, Vol. 2* Oxford: Blackwell. (Anscombe rejects the view that we observe our sensations, and suggests a dispositional account of sensation location.)
- *Armstrong, D.M. (1962). *Bodily Sensations*. Section on the location of sensations. London: Routledge.
- *Wittgenstein, L. (1969). *Blue and Brown Books*, 2nd edition, Oxford: Blackwell, 49-55. (A discussion of the location and ownership of sensations.)
- O'Shaughnessy, B. (1989). 'The Sense of Touch', *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*.

Sensation as Bodily Perception

- Pitcher, G. (1970). 'Pain Perception', *Philosophical Review*, 79: 368-393. (Another defence of the view that bodily sensations are perceptions.)
- *Armstrong, D.M. (1962). *A Materialist Theory of Mind*. Section on the Representations Theory of Perception.

Sensation as Affective Awareness

- Hardcastle, Valerie Gray. (1997). 'When a Pain is Not', *Journal of Philosophy*.
- *Grahek, Nikola. *Feeling Pain & Being in Pain*, secs. 7 & 8.

Feelings and Emotions

- *Wollheim, Richard. (2000). *On the Emotions*, Yale University Press, Ch.1.
- Budd, Malcolm. (1985). *Music & the Emotions*, Routledge, Ch. 1.

Further Reading

- Murat Aydede, 'Pain', entry in Stanford Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy; to be available from <http://plato.stanford.edu/contents.html>; currently accessible at <http://web.clas.ufl.edu/users/maydede/pain/pain.sep.pdf>
- Wall, P. D. (2000). *Pain : The Science of Suffering*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Dennett, D. C. (1978). Why You Can't Make a Computer that Feels Pain. *Brainstorms* Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press
- Grahek, N. (2001). *Feeling Pain and Being in Pain*. Oldenburg, Denmark: BIS-Verlag, University of Oldenburg.
- Tye, M. (1997). A Representational Theory of Pains and their Phenomenal Character. *The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates*, N. Block, O. Flanagan and G. Güzeldere (Eds.), Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.