SENSIBLE APPEARANCES

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The problems of perception feature centrally in work within what we now think of as different traditions of philosophy in the early part of the twentieth century, most notably in the sense-datum theories of early analytic philosophy together with the vigorous responses to them over the next forty years, but equally in the discussions of pre-reflective consciousness of the world characteristic of German and French phenomenologists. In the English-speaking world one might mark the beginning of the period with Russell’s *The Problems of Philosophy* (Russell 1912) and its nemesis in Austin’s *Sense and Sensibilia* (Austin 1962 – published posthumously, but given originally as lectures at the end of our period in 1947). On the continent, a corresponding route takes us from Husserl’s *Logical Investigations* (Husserl 1900/1) to Merleau-Ponty’s *Phenomenology of Perception* (Merleau-Ponty 1945).

While the structure of the problems is recognisably the same in both traditions, over this chapter I elaborate and comment on some of the differences in these treatments. It is easy to feel at home with the alleged attachment to common sense and obvious truths that the analytic tradition from the outset avows. But when one looks at the topic of perception, a concern as central to the development of early analytic philosophy as is the study of logic and analysis of meanings, early analytic theories look strange and idiosyncratic. Much of what the phenomenologists have to say, on the other hand, strikes more of a chord with contemporary English-speaking philosophers than their analytic forebears. But the development of early-twentieth-century discussions shows that the parallels and differences among these thinkers, and the echoes with the way that we now conceive of these problems, are somewhat more elusive than one might expect.

1. THE SENSE-DATUM THEORY

The question of realism is intertwined with the discussion of sense perception in much early-twentieth-century English-speaking philosophy. Different varieties
of realist insist that we have cognition of a world independent of this cognition at the same time as worrying about how sense perception can put us, at least in part, in contact with this world. For example, some philosophers who dubbed themselves critical realists emphasise both the reality of a world apart from us, and also the problematic nature of our sensory contact with it (see Drake et al. 1920). In Oxford, at the turn of the century Harold Prichard follows his teacher John Cook Wilson in throwing off idealism (Prichard 1909). From then on, his work on the theory of knowledge is dominated by discussion of perception and the topic of perception remains a favourite one among Oxford philosophers of succeeding generations – H. H. Price, Gilbert Ryle, A. J. Ayer, G. A. Paul and J. L. Austin. Nonetheless, the dominant strand within the English-speaking tradition is a peculiarly Cambridge development: sense-datum theories of appearance and perception.

The term ‘sense-datum’ was coined for use in this discussion by G. E. Moore in 1909 (see Moore 1909) but put first into the public sphere by Bertrand Russell in The Problems of Philosophy (Russell 1912), though the term was in fact first used in relation to perception in the late nineteenth century in Royce and James. Along with Moore and Russell we can count two other figures as important in developing this tradition: C. D. Broad, one of Russell’s pupils (his preferred term, though is ‘sensum’ – see Broad 1914) and H. H. Price (see Price 1932). Price was an Oxford philosopher who studied with Moore before returning to Oxford, where in due course he taught Wilfrid Sellars, son of the Critical Realist Roy Wood Sellars and a fierce and influential critic of the ‘myth’ of the given (i.e. the sense-datum) that Price had helped to promulgate.

Sense-data are much discussed by many philosophers in the first half of the twentieth century, though few actually advocated the theory. Later in the century, in discussions of sense-datum theories, we find A. J. Ayer’s name added to the list. Ayer certainly uses the term ‘sense-datum’ in outlining his views (see Ayer 1940), and J. L. Austin (with an obvious Oxford bias) identifies Ayer along with Price as a representative of the sense-datum tradition. As we shall see below, though, Ayer has a rather different view of these matters and should not be included among the sense-datum theorists simply because he also employs the term they used.

Sense-datum theorists claim that when someone senses, he or she is ‘given’ a sense-datum in their experience. Within these terms, the problem of perception then becomes that of determining what the relation is between the sense-datum and any material object of perception. Note that the term ‘sense-datum’ is introduced as standing for whatever is given to the mind in sense perception. As introduced, the term is not intended to be prejudicial between physical objects, parts of physical objects, or non-physical objects. Nonetheless, in using the term
the sense-datum theorists implicitly make two further assumptions which are hardly commented on in their presentations, but which we should now view as highly controversial. First, Moore, Russell, Broad, and Price all assume that whenever one has a sensory experience – when one perceives an object or when at least it appears to one as if something is there – then there must actually be something which one stands in the relation of sensing to; indeed they assume there must be something which actually has the qualities which it seems to one the object sensed has. So if it now looks to me as if there is a brown expanse before me as I stare at the table, then an actual brown expanse must exist and be sensed by me. This is so even if we consider a case in which I am misperceiving a white object as brown, or even suffering an hallucination or delusion of the presence of brown tables when none are in the vicinity.

If one made a similar proposal about the objects of psychological states such as belief or desire, few would find the idea compelling. If James wants Santa Claus to visit, we do not assume that there is an actual being, Saint Nicholas, of whom James has the desire that he should visit. We all accept that such psychological states can have merely ‘intentional’ objects, that they are seemingly relations to objects, but no such appropriate object need actually exist for us to be in such psychological states. One popular diagnosis of the key error made by sense-datum theorists is therefore that they have become confused about this point: they ignore the intentionality of perception and fail to note that the objects of sensing may be merely intentional objects, not actually existing (see, for example, Anscombe 1965 and Searle 1983: ch. 2). This is also one aspect in which the early analytic tradition seems strikingly different from the phenomenological school, which precisely emphasises the intentionality of perception. However, as we shall see, the relation between sense-datum theories and intentionality, and consequently the contrast between the sense-datum tradition and phenomenology, is more complex than this suggests.

The second questionable assumption at play is that there is a theoretically interesting unity to the category of things which can be given to us in sensing. Only given this assumption would we suppose that there is any point in talking about sense-data and having a sense-datum theory. One could introduce the term ‘stomachum-datum’ for whatever is placed in one’s stomach, but it does not follow that stomacha-data constitute a theoretically useful kind of thing to debate about. That the sense-datum theorists suppose that we can debate in general about sense-data reflects the further assumption not only that things are given to us, but that an important species of thing is so given.

This said, sense-datum theorists do not immediately assume that what is given must be something other than a physical object. Although they almost invariably believe that sense-data are non-physical, this is normally a conclusion
that they argue for. In Russell’s *The Problems of Philosophy*, the argument is swift and its brevity unsatisfactory – he merely appeals to the fact that we can have conflicting appearances of one stable object, namely a table, as we view it from different perspectives (Russell 1912: ch. 1). Russell’s discussion is almost definitely intended to echo the (equally brief and unsatisfactory) argument to similar conclusions in Hume’s *Enquiry concerning Human Understanding*. Moore, on the other hand, tends to agonise protractedly over the matter, repeatedly so in paper after paper (see Moore 1914, 1925). On the whole, he sets out to establish the conclusion through some variant of the argument from illusion (that is, appealing to the fact that an object can appear to be other than it really is) and the same is true in Broad and Price.

For these authors, we first identify a case which we would agree is one of something looking brown to one, even if no physical candidate for perception is brown. Following the assumption highlighted above, the sense-datum theorist concludes that in this case one senses some non-physical brown object of sense. Then, they employ some generalising move to show that even in cases in which we thought there could be no illusion there must still be some such non-physical entity present to the senses. The grounds for this generalising move are not always made explicit, though in general it seems to be taken as offering us the best explanation of the data, even though the philosophical theories on offer are not intended to replace a psychological or neurophysiological study of perceiving.

On the whole, these authors propose non-physical sense-data as the direct objects of sense without denying that we also sense physical objects. In Moore’s case, throughout his writings, the sense-datum theory is combined with a robust and common-sense realism about the ordinary world (see especially Moore 1925). Russell at different times flirts with phenomenalism, according to which the physical world is a construction out of sensory elements and facts (see Russell 1914), and with neutral monism, according to which both the world, and then the mind, are constructions out of a common basis in sensory acts (see Russell 1921). While Price’s account of the perceptual act echoes Moore in many of its details, when it comes to metaphysics he is much more drawn to phenomenalism, though his eventual final position is not quite phenomenalistic in form.

In both England and the United States, these original sense-datum theorists were greatly influential, but principally as a target of criticism. What is of interest in them is how the problems as they conceive them form a framework for discussion, rather than the ways in which others adopted their approach and elaborated on it. Before tracing out the various lines of criticism, though, I want
first to contrast this theoretical framework with a seemingly radically different one from the same period within the German-speaking world.

2. PHENOMENOLOGY AND PERCEPTION

In the late nineteenth century, Franz Brentano reintroduced into philosophical usage the term ‘intentionality’ from scholastic philosophy, in order to designate the problem of how the mind can be related to objects in thought (see Brentano 1874 [1973: 84]). Edmund Husserl, a student of Brentanian psychology, founded Phenomenology as a philosophical discipline which has the task of describing how the various phenomena of the world can be given to the mind and be the objects of psychological states. Husserl placed as much emphasis on the problems of perception as on those surrounding the case of thought. In this he parallels the concerns of the sense-datum theorists. Much of the second part of Husserl’s Logical Investigations is given over to an account of perceptual consciousness. This focus is continued in later works as well, for example Ideas, his major treatise elaborated after the key turn in phenomenology where he introduced the idea of the ‘phenomenological reduction’ according to which the phenomenologist needs to bracket his or her ontological presuppositions in theorising and simply focus on an exact description of consciousness and its objects (Husserl 1913).

In the terms of Ideas, Husserl distinguishes the psychological act of perceiving, the noesis, from its content, the noema, which directs itself onto an object as presented in the act of perceiving. An act with this content can occur in the absence of its object. In this way Husserl affirms the intentionality of perception – the possibility that perceptual acts, no less than thoughts, can be seemingly directed on objects where no actual object exists to be perceived (Husserl 1913 [1982: 213–14]). At the same time, though, Husserl does not suppose that only intentional objects are involved in sense perception. He also affirms the presence of sensational aspects, or in the terms of Ideas, hule, the matter of an act of sensing (Husserl 1913 [1982: 203ff.]).

Husserl’s thought is developed and radically criticised in Heidegger (Heidegger 1927) and in the works of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty; his views on perception are particularly addressed and elaborated by the latter two. Sartre’s most Husserlian text is The Psychology of Imagination (Sartre 1940) and here one finds an emphasis also present in Husserl’s lectures – the contrast within consciousness between sensing objects and imagining them. The thought that this introduces a difference within consciousness rather than a difference in the kinds of objects of consciousness contrasts strikingly with Moore’s and Price’s
affirmations that any variation in consciousness is just a variation in the objects of consciousness. In Sartre’s later *Being and Nothingness* (Sartre 1943), the focus is rather on the idea that pre-reflective consciousness is empty in itself, a vessel for the presentation of the world to the subject. Here Sartre joins Merleau-Ponty in being critical of Husserl’s commitment to a passive aspect of experience in the form of *hyle* (Sartre 1943 [1956: xxxv]).

One problematic question within both the phenomenological tradition and later interpretations is whether the phenomenologists can, or do, embrace realism about the perceived world. Raised as a question purely of phenomenology, the question of the reality of the object of sense is focused on how an object is given in sensation as real rather than imaginary. It is a matter of further and delicate debate whether these philosophers allow one to raise the external question whether the subject genuinely is related to an object independent of them in perception of the real. One line of interpretation sees Husserl, from *Ideas* on, as endorsing a transcendental idealism which avoids one raising this external question. Sartre’s discussion of the objects of sensory consciousness in *Being and Nothingness* also has an idealistic flavour – as if the existence of a world for me is a matter of actual and potential course of sensory encounters. But for both authors there is a vocal line of interpretation which seeks to reconstruct a realist reading of their discussion of perceptual intentionality.

Merleau-Ponty’s views indicate how delicate some of these questions are. First in *The Structure of Behaviour* (Merleau-Ponty 1942) Merleau-Ponty develops a phenomenology of perception which both exploits and is critical of Gestalt psychology. In part IV of that work he emphasises the thought that there is a conflict between ‘naïve realism’ as reflected in the phenomenology of perception – that we are given objects whose nature extends beyond what is given in perceptual consciousness – and the thought that our experiences are an upshot of causal processes in the natural world. This is a familiar theme within the analytic tradition as well. But it is notable that the early analytic tradition did not rely on this form of argument to any great extent. One reason for this is that much of the analytic discussion is done as a form of ‘first philosophy’, entirely prior to any empirical knowledge and hence scientific knowledge of the working of the senses.

Merleau-Ponty’s attitude to empirical work on perception contrasts strikingly with this attitude. In his later *Phenomenology of Perception* (Merleau-Ponty 1945) Merleau-Ponty discusses the critical status of the body as phenomenally given in experience, partly appealing to neurological evidence in support of the claims he makes. Nonetheless, transcendental idealism is not rejected: experience is still a transcendental condition of empirical science. The key move here is rather
that the transcendental ego is replaced as a precondition of experience by the
phenomenal body acting as a condition of experience, so that nothing stands
outside of consciousness as a condition of it.

Within both the analytic tradition and the phenomenological school there is
the recognition that the objects of sense can present different, and even conflict-
ing, appearances. Both allow for a contrast between mere momentary appearance
and reality. Both recognise that the causal underpinnings of perception are open
to empirical study, and both contrast such empirical work with philosophical
reflection on the status of experience. Still the resulting philosophical discus-
sion of these common problems is markedly different. And, strikingly here,
the sense-datum tradition seems much, much further from us than the detailed
phenomenological observations of Husserl, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty, despite
its claims to rest philosophical method on common-sense truths and analysis.
Wherein lies the difference?

3. COMPARISONS AND CONTRASTS

Where Husserl emphasises the intentional object of perception and affirms that
the ordinary world is given to us in sensory consciousness, Moore worries
whether even the surfaces of objects or even something entirely distinct from
the objects of the ordinary world can be present to us in vision. If Moore’s
anxieties seem to be at odds with naïve reflection on our experience, it may
be tempting to follow recent analytic critiques of sense-datum theories and
to suppose that their key mistake is to deny or ignore the intentionality of
perception. And it is tempting to see this as the fundamental contrast between
the development of the two discussions.

Yet the contrast is more elusive than this, and echoes down the analytic tradi-
tion beyond the limited and idiosyncratic commitments of the early sense-datum
theorists. It is best to see them not as ignoring the phenomenon of intentionality,
but rather questioning its centrality when one’s concern is perception. Moore
and Russell discussed the nature of judgement as they did the nature of sensing.
In developing theories of judgement they did not suppose that when one makes
a mistaken judgement there must be an entity which appropriately corresponds
to what one judges about. When they treat sensing differently from judging, as
they go on to do, this is presumably because they suppose that there is some-
thing distinctive about sensing which requires that an object be present to the
mind.

Even if Moore seems to deny any intentionality to sense perception, the same
is not true of all sense-datum theorists. Broad employs a distinction between
the ontological and epistemological objects of sense which may be interpreted
as admitting intentionality to sense perception (Broad 1937: 141–2). Price more
clearly affirms this, and in doing so explicitly alludes to Husserl, in his account of
perceptual acceptance; according to which, in being conscious of a non-physical
sense-datum one is also under the impression of being presented by some aspect
of a physical object (Price 1932: 151ff.).

Even in the context in which sense-datum theories were initially proposed,
alternative approaches were offered which insisted that objects can appear other
than they are. Critical Realists insisted that we are sensorily related to the world
itself, but to account for appearances we need to recognise that objects have
properties of appearing bent, or appearing red, as well as the more familiar
intrinsic properties of actual shape and colour (see, for example, Dawes Hicks
1917). It is sometimes suggested that sense-datum theorists fail to note that
there is no logical route from a claim about how things appear to how anything
actually is. But if one looks at Broad’s careful discussion of the critical realists,
under the heading of the ‘multiple relation theory of appearing’, one can see
that he is keenly aware of this alternative to his view, but thinks it explanatorily
inadequate (Broad 1937: 178ff.). Sense-datum theorists do not assume that the
truth of their view follows as a matter of logic. Nor do they need to insist
that all aspects of how things appear to us need correspond to some property
a sensed object actually has. The key assumption – undefended but constantly
asserted – is that sensing involves the presentation of observable properties which
must be instantiated for one to be appeared to as one is. This is consistent with
supposing that there are other aspects of appearance which are to be explained
differently. Again, this helps to underline that the sense-datum tradition could
allow for intentional aspects to sense perception. So the explanation of why they
emphasise what they do needs to look elsewhere.

These theorists are not subject to a general confusion about the phenomenon
of intentionality. Rather, they seem to think that there is something distinctive
about the case of sensing. However they seem ill prepared to offer any argu-
ment in support of this differential treatment. When Price comes to justify the
assumption of the necessary existence of an object of sense, he claims it to be an
indubitable principle that is just self-evident to us (Price 1932: 3ff.). On the
whole, then, these various theorists suppose that there is an important difference
between sensing proper and mere thinking, treating the two very differently.

At the same time, as we noted above, Husserl does not deny a role for sensation
in perceptual consciousness and he emphasises the role of sensory matter, hule,
in consciousness as well as noema. It cannot be said that the phenomenological
tradition need insist that all that there is to sensory consciousness is the intentional
object as given – although, Sartre did go on to affirm this, and Merleau-Ponty
resisted any role for sensation in the phenomenology of perception. The contrast,
therefore, seems to be more muted: the phenomenological tradition emphasises the intentionality of perception, while in some cases allowing for sensational aspects as well; with the sense-datum tradition the emphasis is on non-intentional aspects of sensing, and the contrast between it and thought, yet not all sense-datum theorists deny intentionality a role in perception.

To get at the essence of the opposition here, we need really to look to the aspects of the sense-datum theory which contemporaries reacted against. The essential contrasts stand out once we look at two further criticisms of the sense-datum theories, objections focused on elements of the approach which we now tend to play down. Recall that Moore insists that despite being non-physical sense-data are also mind-independent (Moore 1914). Broad is more cautious, carefully considering the various arguments for and against supposing mind-dependence, before settling on the same conclusion: that all sensa are (probably) mind-independent (Broad 1923 ch: XIII). Now, in claiming that non-physical sense-data are mind-independent, these theorists make their positions much more problematic than if they conceived as sense-data as akin to something sensational, subjective, or mind-dependent as many now conceive of mental images.

As Austin complains, in his scathing attack on the sense-datum tradition in *Sense and Sensibilia*, neither term of the sense-datum/material object dichotomy takes in the other's washing. Public objects of perception are not without exception material or physical: tables and trees may be composed of matter, but what of rainbows or shadows, sounds or smells? All of these belong among the shared objects of perception (Austin 1962: lect. VII). But if one can find no property in common among the material objects of sense, sense-datum theorists rule out finding an easy candidate for what sense-data are to have in common. For the only plausible such candidate would be that sense-data universally are dependent on our awareness of them in contrast to material objects; and this claim the sense-datum theorists denied. Of course, they still claimed that sense-data were 'private': a given sense-datum can be an object of awareness for one subject only. But this cannot operate as a definition of what a sense-datum is, since something's being private in this sense needs an explanation and the simple explanation of this in terms of mind-dependency is ruled out. Instead it must be claimed that the laws of nature are such that when a subject is in a position to have a sense experience, there must be some suitably placed sense-datum available, and that such a sense-datum would not thereby be available to anyone else. One gets no account of the intrinsic nature of sense-data from being told that they have the function of acting as the immediate objects of awareness. So the sense-datum theorists appear to commit themselves to there being a science of sense-data, dedicated to both the manner in which sense-data are correlated
perfectly with our states of awareness and the underlying nature they have to allow for this.

When one looks to the early reactions to sense-datum theories, it is this picture of the nature of sense-data, the idea that there really is a substantive matter of disagreement about them and the nature of sense perception which needs to be settled by investigation, albeit one beyond any natural science, which provokes the most disagreement. C. I. Lewis, for example, who otherwise defends a notion of the given, criticises sense-datum theories for supposing that something substantial and independent of the subject can be given in a simple, single act of sensing. His preferred account of sensing (in terms of the instantiation of qualia, qualities as sensed) gives a role to our conceptual powers in bundling up qualia in different ways: one way as substantial objects to be perceived, the other way as acts of a perceiver apprehending such objects (Lewis 1929: appendix D).

Similarly, the core of the disagreement between Ducasse and Moore is that Ducasse denies that it is obvious to us that the objects of sense must be substantial mind-independent objects (Ducasse 1942; Moore 1942). Again, G. A. Paul's puzzlement about the individuation and persistence conditions for sense-data is a matter of keen interest (in a way that the parallel question about mental acts would not be), precisely because it presses the question how substantial are we to suppose the realm of appearances to be (Paul 1936).

In fact it is here that one should also locate Ayer's theory of perception, which Austin lumps together with Price as an example of a sense-datum theory. Ayer takes over from Carnap and the logical positivists the thought that there can be no genuine metaphysical disputes – so what is at issue in debate about perception must surely be a disagreement about the choice of scheme to depict the facts which are agreed in common through empirical investigation. Sense-datum theorists cannot be concerned with the existence of controversial entities. Instead, Ayer suggests that we should see talk of sense-data as just offering us an alternative way of talking about facts that all parties already agree – that appearances can conflict and that illusions are possible (Ayer 1940: 55–7). Few philosophers at the time thought Ayer's reconstruction adequate. W. H. Barnes, for example, dismisses Ayer's suggestion as inaccurate to the debates he discusses, and his complaint seems to prefigure Wilfrid Sellars's later objections in ‘Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind’ about Ayer's proposal that we simply have a novel language of sense-data (Barnes 1945, Sellars 1956 [1963: 135–9]).

Yet, if Ayer is not faithful to the debate and problems which preceded him, he does offer us a significant move in the development of this debate. For with the rejection of a substantive metaphysics of the non-physical objects of perception, the focus of the debate comes to both the argument from illusion and the need for an incorrigible basis for empirical knowledge. In turn, it is these elements
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that become the target for Austin’s critique, even though incorrigibility is not central to the early sense-datum theorists.

Leaving these later developments aside for a moment, why should sense-datum theorists have insisted on the mind-independence of sense-data, given that this claim left them open to such attack? The answer is simple: they were concerned with realism. Moore’s earliest forays into the area take place in his would-be refutation of absolute idealism. In his ‘Refutation of idealism’ he claims that in sensing we are aware of something independent of the mind, and hence through sensing we have a clear example of the falsity of idealism (Moore 1903). From then on we have the assumption that sensing is a form of knowing – for Russell it is the prime, but not sole, example of knowledge by acquaintance (Russell 1912: 72ff.). With this, we have the endorsement of the doctrine that knowledge is only of things independent of the knowing of them. The thought is echoed in Price too. Nor is this central element of the tradition overlooked by critics. In an early reaction to Russell, Harold Prichard accuses him of a ‘sense-datum fallacy’ (Prichard 1950: 200ff.). This is not, as one might expect from later criticisms, a focus on the invalidity of the argument from illusion. Rather, Prichard complains that the sense-datum theorists suppose that we know the objects of sense but that this is patently not so, since these objects cannot be mind-independent, as revealed by the argument from illusion.

And it is here that we get the hint of how the early analytic school developed so differently from the phenomenological tradition. When C. I. Lewis affirms the existence of an ineffable given, his target is in part the sense-datum approach (Lewis 1929: 53). He is critical of the idea that one can know anything without the mediation of concepts to bind together different instances into a common kind. That is to reject a key element of the sense-datum tradition: sensing as an example of a simple, primitive, or unanalyzable state of knowing which relates the knower to something independent of the mind, where the subject’s grasp of what is known is pre-conceptual.

This aspect of the sense-datum approach does contrast fundamentally with the phenomenological tradition. Although Husserl allows a role for the matter of episodes of perceiving, such aspects are not given to a subject as objects of awareness – they are not candidates for knowledge in the way that sense-data are supposed to be. In taking the most basic element of sensing to be knowledge of something preconceptual, the sense-datum tradition downplays any intentional aspect of experience, as if the intentionality of experience would result from the conceptual capacities of the thinker and so would not be a clear example of knowledge of a mind-independent realm.

Given the dominance of Moore’s and Russell’s work, discussion of perception within the analytic tradition tended to treat sensible appearances as
predominantly a non-intentional phenomenon. But as Moore’s and Russell’s idiosyncratic preoccupations fell away, the motivation for such theories of perception shifted. As suggested above, Ayer is motivated more clearly by epistemological concerns, an interest in finding a proper foundation for empirical knowledge. Later in the century, the sense-datum approach is presented as combining suspect epistemological preoccupations with a controversial response to the argument from illusion. In fact, the common element in both the analytic and phenomenological tradition is a respect for the argument from illusion and problems of conflicting appearances – sense-data and the intentionality of perception are appealed to in different ways to solve these concerns. The peculiar development of the analytic tradition led to critiques in the works of Wilfrid Sellars and J. L. Austin at the mid-point of the century in the former’s attack on the myth of the given and the latter’s mocking rejection of the terms of the debate, which question even the force of the argument from illusion.

From the second half of the twentieth century, the analytic tradition is dominated by physicalism. Consequently the ontology of non-physical sense-data becomes increasingly unfashionable. Austin’s attacks, begun at just the end of the period which concerns us here, mark the high point of interest within the English speaking world with perception. By the time the subject is of general interest again, the concern with illusion makes the idea of the intentionality of perception more attractive. Yet before one takes this to show a common concern with the phenomenological tradition, one should reflect that that tradition has a strikingly different, and more circumspect, attitude towards the natural sciences than does contemporary analytic work.