Introduction to Moral Philosophy: Handout 2
John Stuart Mill: Utilitarianism
Extract 1: Chapter 1, Paragraph 5
On the present occasion, I shall …
attempt to contribute something towards the understanding and appreciation of
the Utilitarian or Happiness theory, and towards such proof as it is
susceptible of. It is evident that this cannot be proof in the ordinary and
popular meaning of the term. Questions of ultimate ends are not amenable to
direct proof. Whatever can be proved to be good, must
be so by being shown to be a means to something admitted to be good without
proof. … There is a larger meaning of the word proof, in which this question is
as amenable to it as any other of the disputed questions of philosophy. …
Considerations may be presented capable of determining the intellect either to
give or withhold its assent to the doctrine; and this is equivalent to proof.
Extract 2: Chapter 2, Paragraph 2
The creed which accepts as the
foundation of morals, Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle, holds that
actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as
they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is
intended pleasure, and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain, and the
privation of pleasure. … pleasure, and freedom from
pain, are the only things desirable as ends; and that all desirable things …
are desirable either for the pleasure
inherent in themselves, or as means to the
promotion of pleasure and the prevention of pain.
Extract 3: Chapter 2, Paragraph 4
It is quite compatible with the
principle of utility to recognise the fact, that some kinds of pleasure are more desirable and more
valuable than others. It would be absurd that while, in estimating all
other things, quality is considered as
well as quantity, the estimation of pleasures should be supposed to depend on quantity alone.
Extract 4: Chapter 2, Paragraph 5
If I am asked, what I mean by
difference of quality in pleasures, or what makes one pleasure more valuable
than another, merely as a pleasure, except its being greater in amount, there
is but one possible answer. Of two pleasures, if there be one to which all or
almost all who have experience of both give a decided preference, irrespective
of any feeling of moral obligation to prefer it, that is the more desirable
pleasure. If one of the two is, by those who are competently acquainted with
both, placed so far above the other that they prefer it, even though knowing it
to be attended with a greater
amount of discontent, and would not resign it for any quantity
of the other pleasure which their nature
is capable of, we are justified in
ascribing to the preferred enjoyment a superiority in quality, so far outweighing quantity as to
render it, in comparison, of small
account.
Extract 5: Chapter 2, Paragraph 6
It is better to be a human being
dissatisfied than a pig
satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool
satisfied. And if the fool, or the pig,
are a different opinion, it is because they only know their own side of the
question. The other party to
the comparison knows both sides.
Extract 6: Chapter 2, Paragraph 18
the happiness which forms the
utilitarian standard of what is right in conduct, is not the agent's own happiness, but that of all concerned. As
between his own happiness
and that of others, utilitarianism requires him to be as
strictly impartial as a disinterested
and benevolent spectator. In the golden rule of Jesus of Nazareth, we read the
complete spirit of the ethics of
utility. To do as you would be done by, and to love your neighbour as
yourself, constitute the ideal perfection of
utilitarian morality.
Extract 7: Chapter 2, Paragraph 19
They say it is exacting too much
to require that people
shall always act from the inducement of promoting the general interests of society. But this is to mistake
the very meaning of a
standard of morals, and confound the rule of action with the
motive of it. It is the business of
ethics to tell us what are our duties, or by what test we may know them; but no
system of ethics requires that the sole
motive of all we do shall be a feeling of duty; on the contrary, ninety-nine hundredths of all our
actions are done from other motives, and
rightly so done, if the rule of duty does not
condemn them.
Extract 8: Chapter 4, Paragraph 1
IT HAS already been remarked, that
questions of ultimate ends do not admit of proof, in the ordinary
acceptation of the term. To be incapable of proof by reasoning is common to all
first principles; to
the first premises of our knowledge, as well as to those of our conduct.
Extract 9: Chapter 4, Paragraph 2
Questions about ends are, in other
words, questions what things
are desirable. The utilitarian doctrine is, that happiness is desirable, and the
only thing desirable, as an end; all other things being only desirable as means to that end.
What ought to be required
of this doctrine- what conditions is it requisite that the
doctrine should fulfil-
to make good its claim to be believed?
Extract 10: Chapter 4, Paragraph 3
The only proof capable of being
given that an object is visible, is that people
actually see it. The only proof that a sound is audible,
is that people hear it: and so of the other sources of our experience. In like
manner, I apprehend, the sole evidence it is possible to produce that anything
is desirable, is that people do actually desire it. If the end which the
utilitarian doctrine proposes
to itself were not, in theory and in practice, acknowledged to be
an end, nothing could ever convince any
person that it was so. No reason can be given why the general happiness is
desirable, except that
each person, so far as he believes it to be attainable, desires his own happiness. This, however, being a
fact, we have not only all
the proof which the case admits of, but all which it is possible
to require, that happiness is a good:
that each person's happiness is a good
to that person, and the general happiness, therefore, a good to the aggregate of all persons. Happiness has
made out its title as
one of the ends of conduct, and consequently one of the criteria
of morality.
Extract 11: Chapter 4, Paragraph 4
But it has not, by this alone,
proved itself to be the sole
criterion. To do that, it would seem, by the same rule, necessary
to show, not
only that people desire happiness, but that they never desire anything else. Now it is palpable that
they do desire things
which, in common language, are decidedly distinguished from
happiness.
Extract 12: Chapter 4, Paragraph 8
there is
in reality nothing desired except
happiness. Whatever is desired otherwise than as a means to some end
beyond itself, and ultimately to
happiness, is desired as itself a part of happiness, and is not desired for itself until it has become so.
Extract 13: Chapter 4, Paragraph 9
We have now, then, an answer to
the question, of what sort of proof the principle of utility is susceptible. If
the opinion which I have now stated is psychologically true- if human nature is
so constituted as to desire nothing which is not either a part of happiness or a
means of happiness, we can have no other proof, and we require no other, that these are the only
things desirable. If so, happiness is the sole end of human action, and the
promotion of it the test by which to
judge of all human conduct; from whence it
necessarily follows that it must be the criterion of morality, since
a part is included in the whole.
Extract 14: Chapter 4, Paragraph 10
to desire
anything, except in proportion as the
idea of it is pleasant, is a physical and metaphysical impossibility.