MA Political Philosophy

This year the MA Political Philosophy is taught in common with two half-units from UCL School of Public Policy: Contemporary Political Philosophy I and Contemporary Political Philosophy II. The first term will be taught by Jo Wolff, the second by Alex Brown.

Term 1: Distributive Justice Jonathan Wolff

Week 1: Introduction

Week 2: The Original Position

A Theory of Justice, chapter 1, sections 1-4, and chapter 3, sections 20-25.

Nagel, T. (1975) ‘Rawls on justice’, in Reading Rawls, ed. Norman Daniels.

Dworkin, R. ‘The Original Position’, in Reading Rawls, ed. Norman Daniels.

Rawls, John (1993) Political Liberalism, Lecture 1, section 4 and Lecture 5, sections 1-5.

Scheffler, Samuel (1979) ‘Moral independence and the original position.’ Philosophical Studies.

Week 3: The choice of the two principles and their ordering

A Theory of Justice sections 1-6,11,15,17,20-29, 49.

Waldron, Jeremy ‘John Rawls and the Social Minimum’ in his Liberal Rights

Barry, Brian The Liberal Theory of Justice

Week 4: The Basic Structure and Principles of Justice

Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Chapter 2.

Cohen, G. A. (2000) If you’re an egalitarian, how come you’re so rich ?, Cambridge Mass., Harvard University Press, chapter 9, or ‘Where the action is. On the site of distributive justice’ Philosophy and Public Affairs 1997.

Dworkin, Ronald (2000). Sovereign Virtue. ‘The theory and practice of equality’ Harvard University Press, chapter 2, pp. 112-119 only. (Or. article published in 1981).

Rawls, John (1993) Political Liberalism, Lecture 7.

Barry, Brian The Liberal Theory of Justice Ch.11

G.A. Cohen, ‘Incentives, Inequality and Community’ in Grethe B Peterson (ed) The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, Vol. XII, 1992 Or in Stephen Darwall ed., Equal Freedom.

Week 5:  Nozick: The Entitlement Theory

Nozick Anarchy State and Utopia, Ch 7 pp. 26-35, 149-82

Kymlicka, Will, Contemporary Political Philosophy Ch 4

Wolff, Jonathan, Robert Nozick, Chs 1, 2, 4

Locke, John, Second Treatise on Civil Government Chapter 5 ‘Of Property’

Week 6: Critics of Nozick

Cohen, G.A. Self-Ownership, Freedom and Equality Chs 1-3

Lyons, David ‘The New Indian Claims and Original Rights to Land’ in JeffreycPaul, Reading Nozick.

       Ryan, Cheyney ‘Yours, Mine and Ours’, in Jeffrey Paul, Reading Nozick

Week 7: Dworkin and Equality:

Ronald Dworkin, ‘What is Equality Part 2: Equality of Resources’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1981, reprinted as Chapter 2 of his Sovereign Virt

Ronald Dworkin, ‘What is Equality Part 1: Equality of Welfare’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1981, reprinted as Chapter 1 of his Sovereign Virtue

Will Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy, pp. 76-90

Jonathan Wolff, ‘Equality: The Recent History of An Idea’. Journal of Moral Philosophy 2007

Week 8: Responses to Dworkin

Richard Arneson ‘Equality and Equal Opportunity for Welfare’ Philosophical Studies 1989. (Reprinted in Pojman and Westmoreland Equality)

G.A. Cohen, ‘On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice’, Ethics 1989.

Symposium on Dworkin in Ethics 2003

Week 9: Sufficiency and Priority

Harry Frankfurt, ‘Equality as a Moral Idea’, Ethics 1987 (reprinted in his The Importance of What We Care About, and in Pojman and Westmoreland, Equality)

Derek Parfit, ‘Equality and Priority’, in Ideals of Equality ed A. Mason

Week 10: Social Equality

Elizabeth Anderson, ‘What is the Point of Equality?’ Ethics 1999             

Amartya Sen ‘Equality of What?’ in Contemporary Political Philosophy ed. R. Goodin and P. Pettit

Jonathan Wolff, ‘Fairness, Respect and the Egalitarian Ethos’, Philosophy & Public Affairs 1998

Samuel Scheffler ‘What is Egalitarianism?’ Philosophy & Public Affairs 2003

Norman, Richard ‘The Social Basis of Equality’ in Ideals of Equality ed A. Mason

Term2: Alex Brown

Part I: Authority and Legitimacy

The first part of the term looks at the question of political authority, or what is sometimes known as ‘the right to rule’, and the closely related issue of legitimacy.

Week 1: Authority and Power

How do we distinguish political authority from mere power? What is the connection between authority and obligation? What is the difference between de facto political authority and de jure political authority? What, if any, are the limits of authority?

Readings:
***- R. B. Friedman, ‘On the Concept of Authority in Political Philosophy’, in J. Raz (ed.), Authority (New York, 1990).
- J. Raz, Introduction, in J. Raz (ed.), Authority (New York, 1990).
- J. Raz, ‘Authority and Justification’, in his Authority.

- R. Tuck, ‘Why is Authority such a Problem?’ in Philosophy, Politics and Society (eds) P. Laslett et al. (Oxford, 1972).
- L. Green, The Authority of the State (Oxford, 1988).

- M. Oakeshott, On Human Condition.

- M. Weber, Economy and Society vol. II (Los Angeles: UCLA Press, 1963).

- R. Flathman, ‘Legitimacy’ in R. Goodin and P. Pettit (eds), A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell).

- A. J. Simmons, ‘Justification and Legitimacy’, in Ethics 109 (1999) 739-771.

- R. Dworkin: ‘The Puzzle of Legitimacy’, in his Law’s Empire (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap 1986), 190-.

- S. Lukes, Moral Conflict and Politics (Oxford, 1991), ch. 7.

- J. Sanders and J. Narveson (eds), For and Against the State: New Philosophical Readings (Rowman & Littlefield, 1996).

Week 2: The Right to Rule and the Minimal State

Most states claim a monopoly on the use of force. But what gives the state the authority to do exercise force? By what process is it possible for individuals to transfer their moral right to act as they see fit in order to defend themselves over to the state? How does Robert Nozick answer this questioning Anarchy, State, and Utopia? Is this answer convincing?

Readings:

***- Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, chapters 2 and 4.

- Robert Paul Wolff, ‘Robert Nozick’s derivation of the minimal state’, in Reading Nozick (ed) Jeffrey Paul (Oxford: Blackwell, 1981).

- Jonathan Wolff, Robert Nozick (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991) chap 3.

Week 3: Anarchism

An anarchist is someone who believes that the onus of justification is on those who defend the authority of states to rule and that the authority of states cannot be morally justified. But can the anarchists challenge be answered? What is the difference between anarchism and mere scepticism? In his book, In Defence of Anarchy, Robert Paul Wolff defends the following sophisticated version of anarchism. His argument rests on the claim that acceptance of the authority of the State to command is inconsistent with the more fundamental duty of each person to act autonomously, that is, to act only on his or her own judgement of what is right and wrong. But what is this duty based on? Can it be absolute? And what if agents autonomously give the state the authority to rule?

Readings:

***- R. P. Wolff, ‘The Conflict Between Authority and Autonomy’, in his In Defense of Anarchism (New York: Harper & Row 1970).

- H. Frankfurt, ‘The Anarchism of Robert Paul Wolff’, in Political Theory 1 (1973): 405-414.

- L. Green, The Authority of State (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), pp. 24-36.

- John Horton, Political Obligation, chap. 5.

- A. J. Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations, chap. VIII.

- A. J. Simmons: ‘Philosophical Anarchism’, in For and Against the State (ed) J. Sanders and J. Narveson (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield 1996).

- Jonathan Wolff, ‘Anarchism and Skepticism’, in For and Against the State (ed) J. Sanders and J. Narveson (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield 1996).

- M. B. E. Smith, ‘Is There a Prima Facie Obligation to Obey the Law?’, The Yale Law Journal 82 (1973) 950-976.

Part II: Obligation and Punishment

The second part of the course looks at a question that has loomed large in political philosophy for centuries: do citizens have a moral obligation to obey the law because it is the law and if so on what is this obligation is based? If political obligation is not based on consent, then what alternatives are there? We also consider whether the government has a right to punish law-breakers and at the purpose that punishment is supposed to serve.

Week 4: Consent Theories of Political Obligation

It is sometimes argued that we have an obligation to obey the law if and only if we give our consent to the authority of the state. But what is consent? Is there a difference between ‘express’ and ‘tacit’ consent? Under what conditions is tacit consent offered? Does mere residency imply tacit consent?

Readings:

***- A. J. Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations, chs. III and IV.

- John Horton, Political Obligation, chaps. 2 and 4.

- K. Greenawalt: ‘Promissory Obligation: The Theme of Social Contract’, in his Conflicts of Law and Morality (New York-Oxford: Oxford University Press and Clarendon Press 1987), 62-93.

- Harry Beran, The Consent Theory of Political Obligation (London: Croom Helm, 1987).

- Hanna Pitkin, ‘Obligation and Consent,’ American Political Science Review 59 (1965), reprinted in P. Laslett, W.G. Runciman, and Q. Skinner (eds), Philosophy, Politics, and Society, 4^th ser (Oxford: Blackwell).

- C. Pateman, The Problem of Political Obligation: a Critical Analysis of Liberal Theory (Chichester: John Wiley, 1979).

- Jonathan Wolff, ‘What is the problem of political obligation’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1990/1.

- George Klosko, Political Obligations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).

Week 5: Political Obligation and the Principle of Fair Play

Some scholars argue that it is possible to defend political obligation by appealing to a principle of fairness whereby we ought to obey the law because we receive benefits from society and ought to do our fair bit in return. But what are these benefits supposed to be? Is the principle of fairness applicable without some form of consent on the part of citizens?

Readings:

***- A. J. Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations, ch. V.

- A. J. Simmons, ‘Fair Play and Political Obligation: Twenty Years Later’, in Simmons: Justification and Legitimacy (Cambridge: The University Press 2001), 27-42.

- John Horton, Political Obligation, chap. 4.

- George Klosko, The Principle of Fairness and Political Obligation (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1992).

- J. Rawls, ‘Legal Obligation and the Duty of Fair Play’, in Rawls: Collected Papers, pp. 117-129.

- J. Rawls, ‘Principles for Individuals: The Principle of Fairness’, in his A Theory of Justice. Revised Edition, section 18.

- Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia, pp. 93−5.

Week 6: Punishment

A legitimate state is thought to possess a ‘monopoly’ on the right to punish. But does it possess such a monopoly, and on what grounds? Can a right to punish be derived from a right of self-protection? Assuming that the state possesses a right to punish, what is the legitimate purpose of punishment? Is it deterrence? To give criminals what they deserve? Or in order to reform criminals? Should completed crimes be punished more severely than mere attempts?

Readings:

***- Ted Honderich, Punishment: The Supposed Justifications (Hutchinson, 1969), chs. 1 and 2.

- Ted Honderich, Punishment: The Supposed Justifications Revisited (Pluto Press, 2005).

- R. Nozick, Philosophical Explanations. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981. Ch. 4, part 3.

- J. Hampton, ‘The Moral Education Theory of Punishment'. Philosophy and Public Affairs 13 (1984): 208-238.

- D. Farrell, ‘The Justification of General Deterrence'. The Philosophical Review 94 (1985): 367-394.

- W. Quinn, ‘The Right to Threaten and the Right to Punish'. Philosophy and Public Affiars 14 (1985): 327-373.

- D. Lewis, ‘The Punishment that Leaves Something to Chance'. Philosophy and Public Affairs 18 (1989): 53-67.

- A. J. Simmons, ‘Locke and the Right to Punish'. Philosophy and Public Affairs 19 (1991): 311-349.

Part III: Democracy

This third part of the course looks at the problem of how to justify democracy from a normative point of view as well as a well-known democratic paradox.

Week 7: The Value of Democracy

What is a democracy? Why is democracy valued? Is it valuable in itself or only instrumentally? How can we answer Plato’s criticisms of democratic rule?

Readings:

***- R. Harrison, Democracy (1993), chs. 10 and 11.

- J. Lively, Democracy.

- A. Wear, Democracy.

- W. Nelson, On Justifying Democracy.

- N. Bobbio, Liberalism and Democracy (1990).

- R. A. Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics (1989).

- Amy Gutmann, ‘Democracy’, in R. Goodin and P. Pettit (ed) A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell).

- B. Barry, ‘Is democracy special?’ in his Democracy and Power.

- Thomas Christiano, The Rule of the Many.

-Jon Elster, ‘The Market and the Forum’, in Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Anthology ed. R.E. Goodin and P. Pettit.

- Plato, Republic.

- J. Annas, Plato’s Republic.

Week 8: A Paradox of Democracy

It is said that people engage in democratic processes both to further their interests and because they believe in democracy as the right form of government. But what should they do if they find themselves among the minority of voters on some issue? If they are true democrats, they should accept the result as the right policy on the issue. Yet how can they accept what they do not prefer? Is this a paradox? If not, why not? How can we avoid it? If it is a paradox, how should we respond?

Readings:

***- Richard Wollheim, ‘A Paradox in the theory of Democracy’, in Philosophy, Politics and Society, ed. P. Laslett and W. G. Runciman (Oxford: Blackwell, 1962).

- Ross Harrison, Democracy, Routledge, London, 1993, chaps XII and XIII.

- A. Weale, Democracy, Macmillan: Houndsmills, Basingstoke, 1999, chap 7.

- Jonathan Wolff, ‘Democratic Voting and the Mixed Motivation Problem’, Analysis 1994.

Part IV: Liberalism and Communitarianism

The final part of the course looks at communitarian critiques of liberalism. Does communitarianism provide something that is otherwise missing from Anglo-American political philosophy? For example, does it provide a more plausible account of the role of culture or common goods in politics?

Week 9: Sandel’s Critique of Rawls’ Hypothetical Contract

Rawls’ hypothetical contract is designed to tease out principles of justice for the regulation of a well-ordered democratic society. We are to suppose that we are temporarily ignorant of our class, gender, religion, age, wealth and conception of the good but must select principles of justice that will regulate the basic institutions of a well-ordered society on the basis of a ‘thin theory of the good’. In his important critique of Rawls, however, Michael Sandel argues that since individuals are ‘partly constituted’ by the communities of which they form a part, it is impossible to leave one’s culture behind when selecting principles of justice. How can we select principles of justice that will be in our best interests if we do not know anything about who we are? Liberalism, in other words, presupposes a diminished conception of the self. In response to Sandel, Rawls has insisted that justice as fairness is ‘political not metaphysical’. That is, his position avoids ‘claims to universal truth’ and does not claim that ‘political values are intrinsically more important than other values’. Instead, the aim of political liberalism is to establish an ‘overlapping consensus’ between the ‘comprehensive doctrines’ by appealing only to political principles we can all accept. But is this response decisive?

Readings:

***- J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, sections 4 and 24 (The Original Position, The Veil of Ignorance).

***- M. Sandel, ‘The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self’ in Avineri and de-Shalit (eds.) Communitarianism and Individualism (Oxford University Press, 1992).

- M. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge University Press, 1982).

- R. Dworkin, ‘The Original Position’, in Daniels (ed.) Reading Rawls.

- S. Freeman, The Cambridge Companion to Rawls. Cambridge, 2002.

- J. Rawls, ‘Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1985, pp. 223-51. Reprinted in his Collected Papers (Harvard University Press, 1999).

- John Rawls, ‘The idea of an overlapping consensus’, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), Lecture IV.

- John Rawls, ‘Reply to Habermas’. The original version of this essay can be found in Journal of Philosophy 92 (1995). A revised version appears in his Political Liberalism, Lecture IX.

- Burton Dreben, ‘On Rawls and Political Liberalism’, in Cambridge Companion to Rawls (Cambridge: CUP, 1992), ch. 8.

- Patrick Neal, ‘Justice as Fairness: Political or Metaphysical?’ Political Theory 18 (1990): 24-50.

- S. Mulhall and A. Swift, Liberals and Communitarians, Part II.

- W. A. Galston, Liberal Pluralism, ch. 4.

- C. Larmore, ‘Political Liberalism’, Political Theory 18 (1990): 339-360.

- C. Larmore, Morals of Modernity (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

Week 10: Communitarianism and Political Obligation Revisited

What does it mean to be a member of a community? Is it like being a member of a family? Can this tell us anything about our political responsibilities and obligations?

Readings:

***- Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire, pp. 195-206, selection reprinted in J. Raz, ed., Authority.

***- John Horton, Political Obligation, ch. 6.

- A. J. Simmons, ch. I, §iii, and also ch. II, §ii.

- John Charvet, ‘Political Obligation: Individualism and Communitarianism’, in P. Harris (ed.) On Political Obligation.

- Leslie Green, ‘Commitment and Community’, in Raz (ed.) Authority.

- Thomas McPherson, Political Obligation (Routledge, London, 1967).

- Hannah Pitkin, ‘Obligation and Consent’, in P. Laslett, W. G. Runciman and Q. Skinner (eds.) Philosophy, Politics and Society, 4^th Series.