Online Appendix

Majority Perceptions of Minority Groups:
Economic Inequalities, Their Causes, and Policy Solutions*

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1   Additional Questions

For completeness, we collate additional results for survey questions not discussed in the main text. We continue to focus on the perceptions of the sample of White British respondents.

1.1   Perceptions Towards Minorities as a Whole

We consider how perceptions of minorities as a collective whole are shifted by the narratives. The results in Table D1 demonstrate that: (i) narratives do not shift attitudes towards ethnic diversity being positive for life in the UK, but they do shift views on discrimination as a big/moderate problem, and support for policies addressing ethnic inequalities; (ii) relative to controls, the negative narrative is more impactful than the positive narrative; (iii) differential responses to narratives are statistically significant for three out of four outcomes – exposure to the negative relative to the positive narrative shifts forward the view that discrimination is a cause of ethnic inequalities ($p = .014$), that policy should aim to reduce differences between White British and minority households ($p = .095$), and weakens the view that immigration should be reduced ($p = .043$).

Table D2 shows that White British respondents slightly overestimate the minority share of the population (34% versus 26% as calculated from the 2021 census), and that this belief nudges slightly forward in response to the negative narrative.

1.2 Economic Outcomes

We explored perceptions of economic outcomes over a third dimension (by gender): group ranking of income. Responses are coded so that a rank of 1 (6) means the group is perceived to have the highest (lowest) average income. Figure D1 summarizes evidence from controls, where we find the perceived income rank of White British (and Polish) men and women tend to be overestimated, while for some minorities they are underestimated. Table D3 shows treatment effects on this outcome. The positive narrative significantly shifts down the perceived ranking of the majority population (so towards being ranked 6), while the negative narrative pushes perceptions in the opposite direction. The lower panel shows perceived income ranks of women across groups. We find a slight tendency to shift down the perceived income rank of the minority groups named in the negative narrative when exposed to it.

1.3 Other Domains of Discrimination

We extend the analysis to perceptions of discrimination faced across domains: at work, in contact with the police, in housing, in medical care, at school, and in public spaces, as reported in Table D4. Respondents were randomly assigned to answer questions for three of these six domains. We find: (i) among controls, around 20% to 40% perceive minorities to 'often' face discrimination across domains, while around 7% perceive the ingroup to often face discrimination in most domains; (ii) perceptions of discrimination faced at work significantly increase for respondents exposed to the negative narrative – with the magnitudes of impact being of economic significance; (iii) on the whole, neither treatment impacts perceptions of discrimination faced in other domains.

1.4 Policy

Given that attitudes to immigration and ethnic diversity are typically inter-related, and that immigration was salient in public debate around the time of our survey, we asked respondents their views on immigration policy. In line with always providing factual information, we first informed respondents of the five origin countries with the greatest current inflows into the UK: India, Nigeria, China, Pakistan and Zimbabwe. Two of these origins relate to minority groups with long histories of migration to the UK, and which we use in our narratives – India and Pakistan. For each of the five origin countries, we asked respondents their view on what should happen to the levels of immigration. We focus here on responses that numbers should be reduced, or numbers should be increased (rather than kept the same or don't know). The results are in Table D5. The majority of White British respondents think immigration numbers should be reduced irrespective of migrants' country of origin. For any given origin, support for immigration numbers being reduced is around ten times higher than for immigration flows to be increased.

Narratives nudge these views. Exposure to the positive narrative – that minorities are perform-

ing well in education – increases the view that immigration numbers should be reduced – perhaps because it triggers concerns over competition with migrants; exposure to the negative narrative nudges support the other way – perhaps laying such concerns to rest. As a result, there are differential effects of the positive and negative narratives on the view that immigration numbers should be reduced from Pakistan ($p = .048$), Nigeria ($p = .054$), China ($p = .004$) and Zimbabwe ($p = .046$). The only exception is for immigration numbers from India, the group explicitly named in the positive narrative (and not in the negative one).[1]

We also asked questions on policy unrelated to ethnic inequalities, to capture broader orientations towards the state and public spending. Table D6 details views of the aims of government policy. As expected, these are not impacted by the treatments. Table D7 details views of policy priorities, again unrelated to ethnic inequalities. The positive narrative increases support for spending on defence/national security, and transport infrastructure, while the negative narrative reduces support for polices to provide decent housing for all.

2   Other Dimensions of Heterogeneity

Given the correlates of attitudes towards ethnic inequalities in Table 1, we describe findings on the heterogeneous impacts of primes along other pre-specified dimensions: gender and education. As described below, we generally find muted differential responses to primes along either dimensions, but with two consistent exceptions: (i) perceptions of graduate shares; (ii) attitudes towards non-targeted policies to address ethnic inequalities.

2.1   Gender

We find little evidence of heterogeneous responses to the narratives by gender for: (i) whether groups are considered to be minorities; (ii) perceptions of whether bad luck or a lack of effort determine the economic success of groups; (iii) the extent of labor market discrimination faced by men across groups at the point of recruitment in labor markets; (iv) the extent to which equal opportunities policies have gone too far or not far enough across groups. On other margins we find more substantive evidence of differential responses to narratives by gender. Specifically, women respond significantly more in relation to perceived graduate shares of Indian, Pakistani and Black Caribbean men (Table D8), but this does not apply to perceived employment shares.

We also find some differential responses to narratives by gender on views over immigration – Table D9 shows womens' views on immigration from different origin countries are for example generally more inflexible than those of men (who become less supportive of immigration from Pakistan and China in response to the positive prime). The other margin along which gender

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[1]This differential impact is interesting given that studies of attitudes towards immigration typically finds those who are seen as being less likely to be in work are strongly penalized [Hainmueller and Hopkins 2015].

plays an important role for responses to narratives is in terms of non-targeted policies to reduce ethnic inequalities. As Table D10 shows, mean and women have relatively similar views over each policy in the control group (Columns 1 and 4), but women become significantly more in favor of investing in education/training in response to either narrative, with the differential magnitudes of response by gender being economically important. We do not see robust differential treatment effects to other policies by gender.

2.2   Education

We consider heterogeneous responses to the narratives between those with and without a university degree. We find little evidence of heterogeneous responses to narratives for: (i) whether groups are considered to be minorities; (ii) perceptions of whether bad luck or a lack of effort determine the economic success of groups; (iii) the extent of labor market discrimination faced by men across groups at the point of recruitment in labor markets; (iv) the extent to which equal opportunities policies have gone too far or not far enough across groups. On other margins we find more substantive evidence of differential responses to narratives by education. Specifically, in response to the positive narrative, more educated respondents revise upward their belief on graduate shares of both the White British ingroup, and Pakistani and Black Caribbean outgroups (Table D11). There is no such differential response to perceptions on employment shares.

The other margin along which education plays an important role for responses to narratives is in terms of non-targeted policies to reduce ethnic inequalities. As Table D12 shows, more and less educated individuals differ over their support across the four policies (Columns 1 and 4): more educated individuals are significantly more in favor of investing in education/training and financially supporting families with children, and are less in favor of teaching children about British values (with the groups not differing in terms of increasing penalties for discriminatory behavior). The magnitudes of these difference are far smaller than by political leaning. However, in response to the positive narrative, educated individuals become significantly more in favor of increasing penalties for discriminating against groups. We do not see robust differential treatment effects to other policies by respondent's education.

References

[1] HAINMUELLER.J AND D.J.HOPKINS (2015) "The Hidden American Immigration Consensus: A Conjoint Analysis of Attitudes toward Immigrants," *American Journal of Political Science* 59: 529-48.

Table D1: Attitudes Towards Minorities as a Whole

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses
p-values in brackets

	(1) Control Mean	(2) Δ Positive Narrative	(3) Δ Negative Narrative	[2 = 3]
Do you think ethnic diversity generally has a positive or negative impact on life in the UK?				
Positive	.447	.006	.023	[.492]
	(.017)	(.024)	(.024)	
Do you believe that racial discrimination in the UK is...				
Big or moderate problem	.632	-.006	.051**	[.014]
	(.017)	(.024)	(.024)	
In the UK, the government should aim to reduce the economic differences between White British and ethnic minority families?				
Agree	.487	.011	.052**	[.095]
	(.017)	(.024)	(.025)	
Do you think the number of immigrants coming to the UK nowadays should be…				
Reduced	.682	.020	-.025	[.043]
	(.016)	(.022)	(.023)	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile, and robust standard errors are reported. For the question, *do you think ethnic diversity generally has a positive or negative impact on life in the UK?*, the outcome includes those that report 'very positive' or 'fairly positive'. For the question, *in the UK, the government should aim to reduce the economic differences between White British and ethnic minority families?*, the outcome includes those that report 'strongly agree' or 'agree'. For the question do you think the number of immigrants coming to the UK nowadays should be…, the outcome includes those that report 'reduced a lot' or 'reduced a little'.

Table D2: Minority Share

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses
p-values in brackets

	(1) Control Mean	(2) Δ Positive Narrative	(3) Δ Negative Narrative	[2 = 3]
Out of every 100 people living in the UK, how many do you think belong to an ethnic minority?				
Ethnic Minority Population Share	.337 (.007)	.015 (.010)	.018* (.011)	[.793]

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. We report OLS regressions results of each outcome, a constant and treatment dummies. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile, and robust standard errors are reported.

Table D3: Actual and Perceived Income Ranks

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses
p-values in brackets

	(1) QLFS	(2) Control Mean	[1 = 2]	(2) Δ Positive Narrative	(3) Δ Negative Narrative	[3 = 4]
In the UK today, which of the following groups of men/women do you think earns the most on average? Drag and drop items to rank from earns most to earns least.						
Men						
Indian	1.00	2.52	[.000]	-.051	.082	[.032]
		(.045)		(.063)	(.062)	
Pakistani	3.00	3.73	[.000]	-.111	.107	[.002]
		(.049)		(.071)	(.069)	
Black Caribbean	6.00	4.61	[.000]	.003	.019	[.800]
		(.047)		(.063)	(.064)	
White British	2.00	1.64	[.000]	.121**	-.136***	[.000]
		(.039)		(.057)	(.050)	
Polish	5.00	3.51	[.000]	.170**	-.039	[.003]
		(.051)		(.070)	(.072)	
Black African	4.00	4.45	[.000]	-.005	.056	[.353]
		(.047)		(.065)	(.067)	
Women						
Indian	1.00	3.00	[.000]	.059	.121*	[.408]
		(.048)		(.072)	(.072)	
Pakistani	6.00	4.24	[.000]	-.109	.195***	[.000]
		(.053)		(.074)	(.074)	
Black Caribbean	2.00	4.56	[.000]	-.033	-.007	[.669]
		(.046)		(.063)	(.064)	
White British	3.00	1.78	[.000]	.075	-.114*	[.002]
		(.044)		(.063)	(.059)	
Polish	4.00	3.50	[.000]	.082	-.070	[.034]
		(.053)		(.073)	(.073)	
Black African	5.00	4.38	[.000]	-.062	.043	[.104]
		(.048)		(.065)	(.067)	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. We report OLS regressions results of each outcome, a constant and treatment dummies. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile, and robust standard errors are reported. The minority groups in the positive (Indian, Pakistani) and negative (Pakistani, Black Caribbean) narrative are highlighted. A reported higher rank (smaller absolute number) indicates a higher perceived level of income. Column 1 reports minority group estimates, by gender, constructed from the Quarterly Labour Force Survey from April 2023-March 2024.

Table D4a: Discrimination Across Domains

How frequently do you think that people from the following groups experience discrimination or harassment in … because of their ethnicity?

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets

		(1) Control Mean	(2) Δ Positive Narrative	(3) Δ Negative Narrative	[2 = 3]	(4) Control Mean	(5) Δ Positive Narrative	(6) Δ Negative Narrative	[5 = 6]
			Never				**Often**		
At work	Indian	.056	.008	.010	[.924]	.219	.020	.086***	[.032]
		(.010)	(.016)	(.018)		(.021)	(.029)	(.031)	
	Pakistani	.054	.007	.004	[.899]	.270	.023	.075**	[.102]
		(.010)	(.016)	(.018)		(.022)	(.030)	(.032)	
	Black Caribbean	.050	.020	.014	[.757]	.258	.029	.078**	[.121]
		(.010)	(.017)	(.018)		(.021)	(.030)	(.032)	
	White British	.344	-.028	.018	[.157]	.068	-.007	.021	[.173]
		(.023)	(.032)	(.033)		(.012)	(.016)	(.020)	
By the police	Indian	.141	.003	-.013	[.501]	.125	-.000	.039	[.096]
		(.017)	(.025)	(.024)		(.016)	(.022)	(.024)	
	Pakistani	.114	.004	.013	[.681]	.190	.020	.036	[.568]
		(.016)	(.022)	(.023)		(.019)	(.027)	(.028)	
	Black Caribbean	.076	-.008	-.011	[.859]	.400	-.003	.007	[.778]
		(.013)	(.017)	(.018)		(.024)	(.034)	(.034)	
	White British	.344	-.031	-.030	[.975]	.068	.015	.022	[.716]
		(.023)	(.032)	(.032)		(.013)	(.019)	(.019)	
In getting housing	Indian	.145	.025	-.010	[.178]	.200	-.017	-.020	[.929]
		(.017)	(.025)	(.025)		(.019)	(.026)	(.026)	
	Pakistani	.165	.018	-.022	[.132]	.217	-.018	.004	[.412]
		(.018)	(.026)	(.026)		(.020)	(.027)	(.028)	
	Black Caribbean	.152	.030	-.024	[.033]	.214	-.012	-.005	[.791]
		(.018)	(.026)	(.025)		(.019)	(.027)	(.027)	
	White British	.259	.026	.059*	[.292]	.173	.019	.008	[.693]
		(.021)	(.030)	(.031)		(.018)	(.027)	(.028)	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. We report OLS regressions results of each outcome, a constant and treatment dummies. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile, and robust standard errors are reported. The minority groups in the positive (Indian, Pakistani) and negative (Pakistani, Black Caribbean) narrative are highlighted. In the often outcome we combine respondents that answered 'very often' and 'often'. Respondents could also answer 'sometimes' and 'don't know'.

Table D4b: Discrimination Across Domains Continued

How frequently do you think that people from the following groups experience discrimination or harassment in … because of their ethnicity?

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets

		(1) Control Mean	(2) Δ Positive Narrative	(3) Δ Negative Narrative	[2 = 3]	(4) Control Mean	(5) Δ Positive Narrative	(6) Δ Negative Narrative	[5 = 6]
				Never				**Often**	
In getting mdeical care	Indian	.255	.018	-.027	[.139]	.181	-.040	-.006	[.173]
		(.021)	(.031)	(.030)		(.020)	(.026)	(.027)	
	Pakistani	.244	.032	-.028	[.047]	.225	-.065**	-.024	[.115]
		(.021)	(.030)	(.029)		(.021)	(.028)	(.029)	
	Black Caribbean	.237	.023	-.026	[.103]	.235	-.049*	-.020	[.272]
		(.021)	(.030)	(.029)		(.021)	(.028)	(.029)	
	White British	.460	.005	-.082**	[.010]	.065	.003	.021	[.308]
		(.024)	(.034)	(.034)		(.012)	(.016)	(.018)	
At school	Indian	.038	.002	-.003	[.715]	.375	-.016	.051	[.042]
		(.009)	(.013)	(.014)		(.023)	(.032)	(.034)	
	Pakistani	.045	-.005	-.010	[.749]	.420	-.030	.064*	[.005]
		(.010)	(.015)	(.015)		(.024)	(.033)	(.034)	
	Black Caribbean	.044	.007	-.010	[.305]	.392	-.044	.046	[.006]
		(.010)	(.016)	(.015)		(.023)	(.032)	(.034)	
	White British	.289	-.003	.040	[.178]	.112	-.023	-.013	[.621]
		(.022)	(.031)	(.032)		(.015)	(.020)	(.023)	
On the street or in a public setting	Indian	.040	.017	-.011	[.028]	.298	-.019	-.027	[.773]
		(.011)	(.015)	(.013)		(.022)	(.031)	(.031)	
	Pakistani	.038	.020	-.008	[.029]	.373	-.053*	-.008	[.167]
		(.010)	(.015)	(.013)		(.023)	(.032)	(.033)	
	Black Caribbean	.030	.026*	.009	[.212]	.364	-.030	-.030	[.992]
		(.008)	(.013)	(.012)		(.023)	(.033)	(.033)	
	White British	.302	.041	.007	[.290]	.061	.020	.027	[.728]
		(.021)	(.031)	(.031)		(.011)	(.018)	(.018)	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. We report OLS regressions results of each outcome, a constant and treatment dummies. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile, and robust standard errors are reported. The minority groups in the positive (Indian, Pakistani) and negative (Pakistani, Black Caribbean) narrative are highlighted. In the often outcome we combine respondents that answered 'very often' and 'often'. Respondents could also answer 'sometimes' and 'don't know'.

Table D5: Immigration

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets

	(1) Control Mean	(2) Δ Positive Narrative	(3) Δ Negative Narrative	[2 = 3]	(4) Control Mean	(5) Δ Positive Narrative	(6) Δ Negative Narrative	[5 = 6]
The top five countries of origin of recent UK immigrants are India, Nigeria, China, Pakistan and Zimbabwe. For each of these countries, do you think the number coming to the UK should be…								
		Reduced				**Increased**		
India	.556	.014	-.021	[.136]	.056	-.016	.003	[.055]
	(.017)	(.024)	(.024)		(.008)	(.010)	(.011)	
Pakistan	.601	.024	-.023	[.048]	.056	-.017*	-.002	[.125]
	(.017)	(.023)	(.024)		(.008)	(.010)	(.011)	
Nigeria	.612	.007	-.039	[.054]	.057	-.010	-.005	[.578]
	(.017)	(.023)	(.024)		(.008)	(.011)	(.011)	
China	.585	.035	-.033	[.004]	.063	-.020*	.006	[.016]
	(.017)	(.023)	(.024)		(.008)	(.011)	(.012)	
Zimbabwe	.576	.021	-.027	[.046]	.062	-.014	-.003	[.318]
	(.017)	(.023)	(.024)		(.008)	(.011)	(.011)	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. We report OLS regressions results of each outcome, a constant and treatment dummies. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile, and robust standard errors are reported. The minority groups in the positive (Indian, Pakistani) and negative (Pakistani, Black Caribbean) narrative are highlighted. In the reduced outcome we combine respondents that answered 'Reduced a lot' or 'reduced a little'. In the increased outcome we combine respondents that answered 'increased a lot' or 'increased a little'. Respondents could also answer 'don't know'.

Table D6: Role of Government

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets

	(1) Control Mean	(2) Δ Positive Narrative	(3) Δ Negative Narrative	[2 = 3]	(4) Control Mean	(5) Δ Positive Narrative	(6) Δ Negative Narrative	[5 = 6]
	Strongly Agree/Agree				**Strongly Disagree/Disagree**			
In the UK, the economic differences between the rich and poor are unfair	.734	-.001	.030	[.153]	.087	-.002	-.010	[.576]
	(.015)	(.022)	(.022)		(.010)	(.014)	(.013)	
The government should redistribute income from the better-off to those who are less well off.	.468	-.001	.028	[.238]	.285	-.007	-.048**	[.052]
	(.017)	(.024)	(.024)		(.015)	(.022)	(.021)	

In the UK, the government should aim to reduce the economic differences...

	Strongly Agree/Agree				Strongly Disagree/Disagree			
Between rich and poor families?	.685	.011	.036	[.272]	.097	.010	-.010	[.184]
	(.016)	(.023)	(.023)		(.010)	(.015)	(.014)	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. We report OLS regressions results of each outcome, a constant and treatment dummies. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile, and robust standard errors are reported. Respondents could also answer 'don't know'.

Table D7: Policy Priorities

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets

	(1) Control Mean	(2) Δ Positive Narrative	(3) Δ Negative Narrative	[2 = 3]	(4) Control Mean	(5) Δ Positive Narrative	(6) Δ Negative Narrative	[5 = 6]
Here are several things that the government might spend more on. Please indicate if you would support or oppose increased spending in each of these areas. Please keep in mind that increasing spending in one area would decrease it in others or would mean raising taxes.								
			Support				**Oppose**	
Increasing income support programmes for the poor?	.594	-.025	-.014	[.646]	.162	.024	-.016	[.031]
	(.017)	(.024)	(.024)		(.013)	(.019)	(.018)	
Spending more money on schools in poor neighbourhoods?	.752	-.004	.016	[.367]	.053	-.011	-.006	[.644]
	(.015)	(.021)	(.022)		(.008)	(.011)	(.012)	
Providing decent housing for those who cannot afford it?	.725	.016	.027	[.617]	.094	-.012	-.042***	[.022]
	(.016)	(.022)	(.022)		(.011)	(.015)	(.014)	
Improving the conditions of the poorest neighbourhoods?	.776	.020	.028	[.696]	.052	-.009	-.019*	[.312]
	(.015)	(.020)	(.021)		(.008)	(.011)	(.011)	
Spending more on defence and national security?	.512	.077***	.024	[.029]	.189	-.022	.001	[.202]
	(.017)	(.024)	(.025)		(.014)	(.019)	(.020)	
Spending more on infrastructure such as roads and railways?	.744	.043**	.003	[.058]	.063	-.017	-.016	[.932]
	(.015)	(.020)	(.022)		(.010)	(.012)	(.013)	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. We report OLS regressions results of each outcome, a constant and treatment dummies. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile, and robust standard errors are reported. Respondents could also answer 'don't know'. The support outcome includes those that report 'strongly support' or 'tend to support'. The oppose outcome includes those that report 'strongly oppose' or 'tend to oppose'. Respondents could also answer 'neither support or oppose'.

Table D8: Perceived Graduate Shares

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses
p-values in brackets

	(1) Controls	(2) Δ Positive Narrative	(3) Δ Negative Narrative	[2 = 3]
Out of 100 men above the age of 25 in the UK from each of the following groups, roughly how many do you think have a university degree?				
Indian				
Baseline	.335	.005	-.019	[.152]
	(.011)	(.015)	(.017)	
x Female	.040***	.056***	.043*	[.542]
	(.015)	(.021)	(.023)	
Pakistani				
Baseline	.241	.007	-.035**	[.004]
	(.010)	(.014)	(.015)	
x Female	.037***	.060***	.040**	[.315]
	(.014)	(.020)	(.020)	
Black Caribbean				
Baseline	.184	-.004	-.018	[.232]
	(.007)	(.011)	(.011)	
x Female	.055***	.031**	.024	[.661]
	(.011)	(.016)	(.016)	
White British				
Baseline	.332	-.021*	-.023*	[.865]
	(.009)	(.012)	(.013)	
x Female	.058***	.022	.035*	[.485]
	(.013)	(.018)	(.018)	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile. All estimates are derived from OLS regressions of the corresponding response variable on a treatment dummy variable fully interacted with a categorical variable for gender. Robust standard errors are reported. The minority groups in the positive (Indian, Pakistani) and negative (Pakistani, Black Caribbean) narrative are highlighted.

Table D9: Immigration

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets

	(1) Control Mean	(2) Δ Positive Narrative	(3) Δ Negative Narrative	[2 = 3]	(4) Control Mean	(5) Δ Positive Narrative	(6) Δ Negative Narrative	[5 = 6]
The top five countries of origin of recent UK immigrants are India, Nigeria, China, Pakistan and Zimbabwe. For each of these countries, do you think the number coming to the UK should be…								
		Reduced				**Increased**		
India								
Baseline	.556	.048	.017	[.391]	.068	-.035**	-.014	[.175]
	(.025)	(.034)	(.037)		(.013)	(.016)	(.018)	
x Female	.001	-.066	-.070	[.932]	-.026	.038*	.035	[.881]
	(.034)	(.047)	(.049)		(.016)	(.020)	(.022)	
Pakistan								
Baseline	.609	.067**	.018	[.162]	.063	-.029*	-.003	[.103]
	(.024)	(.033)	(.036)		(.013)	(.016)	(.019)	
x Female	-.017	-.084*	-.073	[.808]	-.015	.024	.003	[.305]
	(.033)	(.046)	(.048)		(.016)	(.020)	(.022)	
Nigeria								
Baseline	.635	.037	-.021	[.102]	.070	-.030*	-.015	[.337]
	(.024)	(.033)	(.036)		(.014)	(.017)	(.018)	
x Female	-.045	-.058	-.028	[.528]	-.025	.039*	.021	[.379]
	(.033)	(.046)	(.048)		(.016)	(.022)	(.022)	
China								
Baseline	.584	.082**	-.006	[.015]	.078	-.035**	.003	[.040]
	(.025)	(.034)	(.037)		(.014)	(.018)	(.021)	
x Female	.002	-.092**	-.049	[.374]	-.031*	.030	.009	[.357]
	(.034)	(.047)	(.049)		(.017)	(.022)	(.025)	
Zimbabwe								
Baseline	.593	.056*	-.021	[.031]	.070	-.027	-.005	[.186]
	(.024)	(.034)	(.037)		(.013)	(.017)	(.019)	
x Female	-.036	-.068	-.006	[.201]	-.015	.026	.004	[.300]
	(.034)	(.047)	(.049)		(.017)	(.022)	(.023)	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile. All estimates are derived from OLS regressions of the corresponding response variable on a treatment dummy variable fully interacted with a categorical variable for gender. Robust standard errors are reported. The minority groups in the positive (Indian, Pakistani) and negative (Pakistani, Black Caribbean) narrative are highlighted. Respondents could also answer the question with 'about right' or 'don't know'.

Table D10: Effectiveness of Policies in Reducing Ethnic Inequalities

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets

	(1) Control Mean	(2) Δ Positive Narrative	(3) Δ Negative Narrative	[2 = 3]	(4) Control Mean	(5) Δ Positive Narrative	(6) Δ Negative Narrative	[5 = 6]
How much difference do you think the government could make in reducing inequalities between ethnic groups from the following actions?								
	Great deal/fair amount				**Not much/none**			
Investing more in education and training								
Baseline	.720	-.033	-.062*	[.431]	.200	.033	.043	[.775]
	(.023)	(.033)	(.035)		(.020)	(.030)	(.031)	
x Female	-.034	.107**	.141***	[.462]	-.028	-.046	-.080**	[.401]
	(.032)	(.045)	(.046)		(.027)	(.039)	(.039)	
Teach children more about British values								
Baseline	.528	.079**	.015	[.077]	.376	-.034	-.026	[.815]
	(.025)	(.035)	(.037)		(.024)	(.034)	(.036)	
x Female	-.025	-.016	.016	[.515]	-.028	.015	-.004	[.677]
	(.034)	(.048)	(.049)		(.033)	(.045)	(.047)	
Supported families with children more financially								
Baseline	.489	-.035	.004	[.285]	.398	.029	-.021	[.161]
	(.025)	(.035)	(.037)		(.024)	(.035)	(.036)	
x Female	.013	.091*	.075	[.742]	-.074**	-.050	-.023	[.568]
	(.034)	(.048)	(.049)		(.033)	(.046)	(.046)	
Increasing penalties for discriminating against groups								
Baseline	.443	-.044	-.006	[.296]	.445	.069**	.010	[.110]
	(.025)	(.034)	(.037)		(.025)	(.035)	(.037)	
x Female	.065*	.059	.031	[.560]	-.118***	-.057	-.013	[.347]
	(.034)	(.048)	(.049)		(.033)	(.046)	(.047)	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile. All estimates are derived from OLS regressions of the corresponding response variable on a treatment dummy variable fully interacted with a categorical variable for gender. Robust standard errors are reported. The minority groups in the positive (Indian, Pakistani) and negative (Pakistani, Black Caribbean) narrative are highlighted. Respondents could also answer 'don't know'.

Table D11: Perceived Graduate Shares

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses
p-values in brackets

	(1) Controls	(2) Δ Positive Narrative	(3) Δ Negative Narrative	[2 = 3]
Out of 100 men above the age of 25 in the UK from each of the following groups, roughly how many do you think have a university degree?				
Indian				
Baseline	.345	.025*	-.002	[.050]
	(.009)	(.013)	(.014)	
x University Degree	.035**	.037	.027	[.680]
	(.016)	(.023)	(.023)	
Pakistani				
Baseline	.256	.025**	-.020*	[.000]
	(.009)	(.012)	(.012)	
x University Degree	.014	.051**	.031	[.382]
	(.014)	(.022)	(.021)	
Black Caribbean				
Baseline	.210	.002	-.012	[.159]
	(.007)	(.010)	(.010)	
x University Degree	.003	.042**	.035**	[.733]
	(.011)	(.017)	(.017)	
White British				
Baseline	.363	-.020*	-.009	[.338]
	(.008)	(.011)	(.012)	
x University Degree	-.010	.040**	.026	[.479]
	(.012)	(.018)	(.019)	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile. All estimates are derived from OLS regressions of the corresponding response variable on a treatment dummy variable fully interacted with a categorical variable for education (distinguishing between those with and without a university degree). Robust standard errors are reported. The minority groups in the positive (Indian, Pakistani) and negative (Pakistani, Black Caribbean) narrative are highlighted.

Table D12: Effectiveness of Policies in Reducing Ethnic Inequalities

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets

	(1) Control Mean	(2) Δ Positive Narrative	(3) Δ Negative Narrative	[2 = 3]	(4) Control Mean	(5) Δ Positive Narrative	(6) Δ Negative Narrative	[5 = 6]
How much difference do you think the government could make in reducing inequalities between ethnic groups from the following actions?								
		Great deal/fair amount				**Not much/none**		
Investing more in education and training								
Baseline	.658	.020	.008	[.663]	.207	.016	.012	[.870]
	(.020)	(.028)	(.029)		(.017)	(.024)	(.025)	
x University Degree	.155***	.018	.018	[.987]	-.073***	-.033	-.049	[.667]
	(.031)	(.043)	(.045)		(.027)	(.038)	(.037)	
Teach children more about British values								
Baseline	.564	.080***	.025	[.051]	.299	-.032	-.031	[.989]
	(.021)	(.028)	(.030)		(.019)	(.026)	(.027)	
x University Degree	-.170***	-.056	-.009	[.360]	.220***	.042	.003	[.436]
	(.035)	(.050)	(.051)		(.035)	(.050)	(.050)	
Supported families with children more financially								
Baseline	.460	.005	.035	[.296]	.380	.011	-.027	[.184]
	(.021)	(.029)	(.030)		(.020)	(.028)	(.028)	
x University Degree	.122***	.038	.035	[.954]	-.067*	-.035	-.036	[.982]
	(.036)	(.051)	(.052)		(.034)	(.048)	(.048)	
Increasing penalties for discriminating against groups								
Baseline	.469	-.053*	-.010	[.135]	.379	.080***	.014	[.024]
	(.021)	(.029)	(.030)		(.020)	(.028)	(.029)	
x University Degree	.020	.155***	.081	[.153]	.026	-.156***	-.059	[.052]
	(.036)	(.051)	(.052)		(.035)	(.050)	(.050)	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile. All estimates are derived from OLS regressions of the corresponding response variable on a treatment dummy variable fully interacted with a categorical variable for education (distinguishing between those with and without a university degree). Robust standard errors are reported. The minority groups in the positive (Indian, Pakistani) and negative (Pakistani, Black Caribbean) narrative are highlighted. Respondents could also answer 'don't know'.

Figure D1: Perceived Income Ranks

A. Men

B. Women

Notes: Each panel reports means for respondents in the Control arm and estimates constructed from the Quarterly Labour Force Survey from April 2023-March 2024. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile. A reported higher rank (smaller absolute number) indicates a higher perceived level of income.