Majority Perceptions of Minority Groups: Economic Inequalities, Their Causes, and Policy Solutions*

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Abstract

How does the majority population view the societal contributions, economic outcomes and opportunities available to specific ethnic minority groups, root causes of ethnic disadvantage, and policy solutions to address them? We answer these questions in the UK context, a multi-ethnic society where some minorities outperform the majority in economic outcomes, while others underperform. We use an online survey fielded to 3200 White British individuals, into which we embed a survey experiment that presents respondents with narratives about the economic success or disadvantage of specific minority groups. The experiment was purposefully implemented in the run up to the 2024 UK General Election, that saw the rise of populist anti-immigration parties. We find that even in such charged times, light-touch narratives can correct majority misperceptions of the economic outcomes of specific minorities, and shift views on policies to address ethnic inequalities. Views on the opportunities available to minorities and root causes of disadvantage, such as luck or effort, are harder to shift irrespective of the minority outgroup. By considering perceptions towards their ingroup, we document that narratives about the economic success of minorities can shift majority perceptions in ways consistent with zero sum thinking. Given strong political differences in perceptions of minorities, we examine heterogeneous responses to the narratives by political leaning. Narrative treatments can shift perceptions, including those of right-leaning individuals, with zero sum mindsets being independent of political leaning. We conclude by examining how perceptions across domains shape the reasoning behind support for policies targeted to specific minorities to address ethnic inequalities. *JEL: D8, H1, J15*.

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1 Introduction

Horizontal inequalities across racial and ethnic groups consistently rank as a leading concern among the public and policy makers in countries with long histories of immigration [Clark and D'Ambrosio 2015, Benson *et al.* 2024]. We study the perceptions of the majority population towards multiple minority groups, the root causes of economic disadvantage for each group, and support for targeted and non-targeted policies to tackle ethnic inequalities. We do so in the UK context, a society with a long history of immigration from a diverse set of countries.

Our evidence is based on an online survey we designed, and which was administered by *YouGov* to a representative sample of the White British population. The survey reveals that while the average White British respondent holds generally progressive views towards minorities and towards tackling inequalities, this masks large differences in views towards specific minorities, and enormous cleavages by political leaning. We layer on a survey experiment that presents respondents with qualitative narratives either about the economic success or failure of specific minorities. We use this pre-specified experiment to understand the malleability of perceptions of the majority towards multiple minority outgroups, perceptions towards the White British ingroup, and to understand the interplay between narratives, political leaning and perceptions of others.

Figure A1 details the ethnic composition of the UK in the 2021 census. 74% of the population identified as White British. We study the views of a representative sample of this group towards the remaining 26% of the population, that identify as part of a minority. We study majority perceptions towards some of the most prominent minorities: Poles, Indians, Pakistanis, Black Caribbeans, and Black Africans. These cover both long-settled groups, such as Indians and Black Caribbeans, and more recent inflows of foreign-borns from Poland and Sub Saharan Africa.[1]

While there is often an assumption of minorities being economically disadvantaged, the varying histories and experiences of groups in the UK means that there is actually substantial variation in outcomes across them today [Mirza and Warwick 2024]. For example, most minority children now outperform the majority in educational attainment, with rates of entry into universities exceeding those of the majority population [Britton *et al.* 2021]. Groups such as Indians have seen marked improvements in labor market outcomes through occupational mobility across generations and selective high-skilled recent immigration [Zuccotti and Platt 2023]. Yet at the same time large and persistent ethnic gaps remain in employment rates and wealth accumulation [Mirza and Warwick 2024]. This makes the UK an interesting context in which to study how narratives about the economic success or failure of specific minorities shape perceptions of the majority.

[1] The UK Office for National Statistics provides the standard question and categories for the collection of ethnic group information. These categories mix racial and national information to classify minority groups based on the most common origins. Ethnic minority groups comprise both UK and foreign-born individuals who select one of the groups other than White British. Poles are not separately classified in the official categories shown in Figure A1. However, they constitute the largest foreign-born group in the UK after Indians, making up a large share of the Other White group.

Our survey was administered online by *YouGov* to their regular panel of registered members. We collected information on a nationally representative sample of 4299 respondents. For the purposes of this paper we focus on the sample of 3205 White British respondents. Our survey was purposefully fielded in the immediate run up to the UK General Election in July 2024. That high stakes electoral campaign saw the rise of populist parties, with immigration ranked as the most pressing issue for the electorate [IPSOS 2024]. Political messaging during the election campaign provides a set of background primes that our survey respondents could have been exposed to. We examine whether in the charged atmosphere of a General Election campaign, there remains potential to shape perceptions of minorities though the provision of light-touch narratives.

Our survey experiment randomly assigned respondents to one of three arms: (i) a control group; (ii) a treatment arm in which they are informed of some positive economic circumstances of minorities, by being told: *Ethnic minorities in the UK are performing well in education. In most cases, they are getting more/higher qualifications than White British people, even when they come from poor backgrounds. This is particularly true for Indians and also for Pakistanis*; (iii) a treatment arm in which they are informed of the negative economic circumstances of minorities, by being told: *Ethnic minorities in the UK face higher unemployment rates than the White British majority. Even among those with similar levels of education, the chances of being unemployed are still higher in most cases. This is particularly true for Black Caribbeans and also for Pakistanis.*

The innovation in our work is to probe perceptions among the majority population along three interlinked dimensions, and towards *specific* minority groups: (i) Indians – explicitly referred to in the positive narrative; (ii) Black Caribbeans – explicitly referred to in the negative narrative; (iii) Pakistanis – explicitly referred to in both narratives. For each survey question we also ask respondents their perceptions of the White British ingroup, enabling us to understand whether narratives about minorities change perceptions of the ingroup in ways consistent with zero-sum mindsets [Chinoy *et al.* 2023].

Our first set of results examine perceptions towards each minority group in terms of their societal contribution, economic outcomes, opportunities, root causes of disadvantage, and attitudes towards appropriate policy solutions.

On perceived societal contribution, we find that all outgroups are perceived to provide a net positive to the UK. The ranking across outgroups is that Pakistanis are perceived to provide the lowest contribution, followed by Black Caribbeans and then Indians. All outgroups are perceived to provide a lower societal contribution than the White British ingroup. The treatments do not shift perceived contributions, suggesting these are ingrained views of others.

On perceptions of economic outcomes of minorities, we consider two outcomes linked to the narratives: graduation rates, and employment rates. Our findings line up with a body of work on misperceptions of others showing that misperceptions are widespread, asymmetric – so concentrated on one side relative to the truth, and are typically smaller with regards to the ingroup and more symmetric around the truth [Bursztyn and Yang 2022].

For example, the true graduate share for Indian men is 65%. The majority underestimate this by 30pp. For Pakistani men, the true graduate share is 42% and the majority underestimate this by 18pp. In contrast, perceptions and reality of the graduate share among White British men line up well. In fact the majority perceive their ingroup has similar graduate shares as for Indians, but do not recognize that they actually lag well behind on this outcome. Misperceptions do not however apply to all minorities: perceptions and reality line up closely for graduate shares among Black Caribbean men – the group with the lowest graduate share (20%).

Misperceptions are corrected by the narrative treatments, causing beliefs to align more closely with reality, but without altering the ranking of outgroups. The positive narrative shifts upwards perceptions of graduate shares among Indians and Pakistanis – the groups named in this narrative. The results show that even during a period of heightened political campaigning, light-touch narrative information can shift beliefs of the majority about economic outcomes of minorities. These shifts occur along the specific dimension of outcome the narrative relates to and towards the specific minority groups mentioned.

To begin to see how perceptions of outcomes relate to those along other margins, we examine perceived opportunities of minorities along dimensions linked to the narrative wording: (i) obtaining a good education; (ii) finding work; (iii) earning a decent wage. There is a widespread belief that minorities have few or no opportunities related to education, work and wages. The ranking of minorities lines up with perceptions of economic outcomes: Black Caribbeans are seen to have the fewest opportunities relative to the majority population, followed by Pakistanis and then Indians.

While the treatments have little impact on the perceptions the majority have towards opportunities faced by minorities, they have a far greater impact on how the majority perceive the economic opportunities available to their ingroup. Specifically, White British individuals assigned to the positive narrative – that informs them of the relative educational success of Indian and Pakistani groups – are significantly more likely to report that White British individuals lack opportunities for finding work or earning a decent wage. Such responses are consistent with zero sum thinking – that positive outcomes for outgroups might come at the expense of the White British ingroup. White British individuals randomly assigned to the negative narrative – that informs them of the relative disadvantage in unemployment for Pakistani and Black Caribbean groups for a given level of education – are significantly less likely to report that White British individuals lack opportunities. Again, consistent with zero sum thinking, the majority become less concerned about a lack of opportunities when told that minorities face poor labor market outcomes even conditional on education.

On perceived causes of disadvantage, we first asked respondents about the relative importance of luck and effort in driving success across groups. Among controls: (i) a lack of success for White British individuals is far more attributed to a lack of effort rather than bad luck (34% versus 7%, $p = .000$); (ii) the opposite attribution is made for Indians (13% versus 24%, $p = .000$); (iii) for Pakistani and Black Caribbeans, respondents are equally likely to attribute a lack of success to

luck and effort. Neither narrative shifts perceptions of these underlying causes.

The third cause we consider is labor market discrimination, so emphasizing systematic forces against a group rather than individual-based causes such as effort or luck. Among controls, the ranking of perceived discrimination matches with perceptions of opportunities and outcomes: Black Caribbeans are perceived to face the most discrimination, followed by Pakistanis and then Indians. Narratives shift these views towards all minorities with the exception of Black Caribbeans. However, the largest impact is again found for perceptions towards the ingroup. Specifically, the positive narrative – highlighting minorities are doing well in education – increases the perception that White British men face labor market discrimination. This is again in line with zero sum thinking: as the narrative highlights some minorities are doing well, respondents are triggered to think the ingroup is more disadvantaged.

The final dimension we consider are attitudes towards policies addressing ethnic inequalities. We distinguish between equal opportunities policies that target specific groups, and non-targeted policies. On targeted policies, we asked White British respondents whether they feel equal opportunities policies have 'gone too far' or 'not far enough' in relation to specific groups. There is an even split of views towards outgroups: around 20% of respondents state such policies have gone too far, and not far enough, with regards to Indians, Pakistanis and Black Caribbeans. However, 24% of respondents view such policies have not gone far enough in relation to the White British ingroup, and only 4% report that they have gone too far. Views of such targeted policies are shifted by the narratives: (i) the negative narrative increases the view that such policies have not gone far enough for all minority groups; (ii) both narratives increase views that policies have gone too far with regards to the White British population. Hence we do not see any evidence of zero sum mindsets when it comes to support for or against equal opportunities policies.

We then asked respondents about the use of various non-targeted policies to help reduce ethnic inequalities: investing in education/training, teaching children about British values, financially supporting families with children, and increasing penalties for discrimination. We selected these policies to capture distinctive underlying orientations of respondents. We find broad support for these non-targeted policies – far more so than for equal opportunities policies. Narratives shift support for some non-targeted polices. In particular, the positive narrative significantly increases support by 7.1pp for teaching children about British values, a policy which is often seen as a strategy to ensure the cultural integration of minorities. This suggests that anxiety about cultural integration of minorities can be raised rather than relaxed in the face of their economic success.

Our survey was purposefully fielded in the immediate run up to the UK General Election in July 2024. Our second set of pre-specified results focus on the responsiveness of perceptions to the narrative treatments by the self-reported political leaning of respondents: left-leaning, centrist or right-leaning. As in the literature studying attitudes towards racial gaps in the US [Haaland and Roth 2023, Alesina *et al.* 2024], the political leaning of respondents is far more strongly correlated than other characteristics with perceptions of minorities across the domains we examine. The

extent to which political outlooks divide perceptions is first order.

On contributions, right-leaning respondents always perceive each outgroup to provide a lower contribution to UK society than left-leaning and centrist respondents. The opposite is the case for majority views towards the societal contribution of the ingroup. On perceptions of economic outcomes, relative to left-leaning individuals, centrist and right-leaning individuals underestimate graduate shares of men among all minority groups. There are also pronounced left-right differences in perceptions of opportunities available to minorities. For example, relative to left-leaning respondents, among whom 23% view Indians as having few opportunities to earn a decent wage, only 11% of right-leaning respondents report thinking so. On perceived causes of ethnic disadvantage, relative to left-leaning respondents, centrist and right-leaning respondents are significantly less likely to attribute a lack of success to bad luck, and more likely to attribute it to a lack of effort. This is true for views towards nearly all outgroups and towards the ingroup. On labor market discrimination, centrist and right-leaning respondents perceive each minority group to be facing significantly less discrimination than left-leaning respondents. The opposite pattern holds towards the ingroup.

Unsurprisingly, we find stark differences in policy views by political leaning. Centrist and right-leaning respondents are significantly more likely to view equal opportunities policies as having gone too far with regard to all minorities. For example, 3% of left-leaning repondents believe equal opportunities policies have gone too far for Black Caribbeans, but this rises to 21% for centrists ($p = .000$) and to 49% for right-leaning respondents (that differs from centrists, $p = .000$). However, when it comes to views on such policies for White British individuals, a far greater share of respondents view these policies as not having gone far enough rather than having gone too far, irrespective of their political leaning. When considering the perceived efficacy of non-targeted policies in reducing ethnic inequalities, we find a strong gradient in support for each policy by political leaning. Centrist and right-leaning individuals are less supportive of all policies except teaching children about British values.

Narratives shift perceptions of economic outcomes of minorities across all political leanings, but the magnitude of impact among right-leaning respondents is near double the impact on left and centrist respondents, so closing some of the perceptions gap observed in controls. In line with the aggregate results, narratives have less impact in shifting perceptions of opportunities available to minorities, or the perceived root causes of ethnic disadvantage. On policies, the positive narrative increases support for teaching children about British values among centrists by 6.6pp (a 12% increase over controls), and among right-leaning respondents by 14.1pp (20%).[2]

For those outcomes that our main results suggest are consistent with zero sum thinking – on perceived opportunities and discrimination faced by the ingroup – we generally find such mindsets apply across respondents of different political leaning.

[2]The correlation with political leaning could arise because of differences in how questions are interpreted, how potential answers are understood, or differences in social desirability bias [Haaland and Roth 2023].

At a final stage of analysis, we examine how dimensions of perceptions interrelate, focusing on understanding how support for targeted policies addressing ethnic inequalities correlate to perceptions of a group's outcomes, opportunities, and causes of disadvantage. We consider how support for equal opportunities policy towards a given group g, correlates with perceptions of the societal contribution, economic outcomes, opportunities and causes of disadvantage for that group. We find support for equal opportunities policies targeted towards a given outgroup is significantly higher among those that perceive: (i) the outgroup to be providing a higher contribution to society; (ii) the outgroup to lack opportunities in earning a decent wage; (iii) disadvantage to be down to bad luck or discrimination.

Respondents display similar reasoning in support for targeted policies towards the ingroup. However, the relationship between support for targeted policies for the ingroup and outgroups differs along two margins: (i) while support for such policies for outgroups increases with the perceived societal contribution of the outgroup, when it comes to support for policies for the ingroup, their perceived societal contribution plays no role; (ii) support for policies targeted towards the ingroup is higher when the economic outcomes of the ingroup are perceived to be worse, while perceived economic outcomes of minorities do not correlate with support for policies targeted towards them (once their perceived societal contribution is conditioned on).

Given political cleavages in perceptions, we consider the extent to which differing left-right levels of support for equal opportunities policies for any given group g arise from differences in perceptions, and differences in reasoning. Across outgroups, the key perception explaining left-right differences in policy support is the extent to which the outgroup is seen to be providing a societal contribution: this explains 20-40% of the gap in support for equal opportunities policies towards outgroups. Other perceptions of the majority, such as the their economic outcomes or the extent to which discrimination is a cause of disadvantage, do little to explain left-right gaps in policy support, despite there being large cleavages in perceptions.

The reason why differences in perceived societal contributions help explain the left-right gap is because for left-leaning respondents, there is a strong partial correlation between this perception and support for policies targeted towards outgroups. In contrast, although there are large left-right differences in perceptions of discrimination faced by outgroups, there is a weak partial correlation between this and policy support among both left- and right-leaning respondents.

The results help reconcile earlier findings that while the provision of detailed quantitative information about the extent of discrimination faced by minorities can adjust majority perceptions in that domain, this does not translate into support for targeted policies to tackle racial/ethnic inequalities [Haaland and Roth 2023, Schaefer *et al.* 2024]. Our results suggest an explanation: for right-leaning individuals, shifting perceptions of discrimination faced by minorities does not actually factor strongly into their reasoning behind support for equal opportunities policies. Such individuals may be more responsive to information on opportunities that minorities face, even though this is a margin on which left-right perceptions are not very different to begin with.

We advance a long-standing literature in political science and a burgeoning literature in economics using survey experiments to understand attitudes toward racial/ethnic inequalities [Kuklinski *et al.* 1997, Haaland and Roth 2023, Alesina *et al.* 2024]. We detail how our findings extend existing evidence as we present them, as we bridge two key strands of literature – on perceptions of others [Rieck *et al.* 2006, Bursztyn and Yang 2022] and on policy preferences and the reasoning behind them [Druckman *et al.* 2013, Haaland *et al.* 2023, Alesina *et al.* 2023, Alesina *et al.* 2024, Stantcheva 2024]. Our multi-group and multi-domain design allows us to advance this literature by considering: (i) majority perceptions towards multiple minority groups and towards their ingroup – enabling us to document elements of zero sum thinking among the majority; (ii) perceptions along interlinked dimensions of outcomes of minorities, opportunities available to them, and causes of disadvantage – enabling us to shed light on reasoning behind support for targeted policies addressing ethnic inequalities. We thus move beyond the study of perceptions of others along a single divide such as Black-White, partisan, native-immigrant or native-Muslim splits [Haaland and Roth 2023, Alesina *et al.* 2024, Schaeffer *et al.* 2024], and do so in the multi-ethnic UK context, where some minorities outperform the majority in economic outcomes, while others underperform.

Sections 2 and 3 describe our data and survey experiment. Section 4 presents evidence on whether narratives shift majority perceptions. Section 5 examines treatment effects of narratives by political leaning. Section 6 sheds light on how support for targeted policies is associated with perceptions of others, and how this differs by political leaning. Section 7 discusses directions for future work. The Appendices provide additional results.

2 Data

2.1 Sample

YouGov administered our survey to their regular panel of registered members, which is designed to be representative of the UK population. Panel members frequently interact with *YouGov* and are incentivized to complete their online surveys. 4229 individuals were surveyed. For our study of majority views, we focus on the subsample of 3205 respondents who define their ethnic group as White British in demographic data previously provided to *YouGov*. After consenting to take part in the survey, respondents were shown an opening message outlining the study purpose: *This is an academic study looking at public attitudes towards inequality and ethnic diversity. It forms part of a research programme on race and ethnicity in the UK.*

The survey was fielded between the 25th and 28th June 2024, in the run up to the UK General Election on July 4th. That high stakes electoral campaign saw the rise of populist parties, notably Reform UK, which received 14% of the vote share. Immigration was a salient topic throughout the campaign. Table A1 shows the sample characteristics, comparing them to 2021 UK census

figures for the White British population. The sample is slightly older, less urban and less educated than the White British population as whole. Throughout our analysis, we use individual weights derived by *YouGov* to adjust respondents to the national profile.

Table A2 details respondents' political orientation. Panel A shows our main measure of political leaning, with 9% of respondents self-reporting being right-leaning, 48% report themselves as centrists, and 16% consider themselves to be left-leaning (the remainder being unsure/don't know). Panel B shows voting intentions in the 2024 General Election: our sample appears politically engaged – 89% reported intending to vote. Respondents reflect a spectrum of political views, with 34% planning to vote Labour, and 19% reporting considering voting for the Reform Party. Given these features we expect: (i) respondents to be sensitive to any background priming from the election campaign; (ii) the view of the median voter to be represented in our sample, with respondents reflecting views that shape policy demands.[3]

Overviews of the use of online samples for survey experiments are provided by Stantcheva [2022] and Haaland *et al.* [2023]. They discuss approaches to establishing sample validity, participant attention, and potential respondent biases. As our approach to these issues replicates existing work, we relegate most of the related discussion to the Appendix.

2.2 Preliminaries: Perceptions of Minorities as a Whole

To lay the foundations for our analysis, Table 1 describes how in the control group, respondent characteristics correlate with perceptions towards minorities as a whole, causes of disadvantage and policy responses. At the foot of each Column we report the share of respondents agreeing with each statement.

Ethnic Inequality and Diversity We start by considering whether respondents think ethnic inequalities are a big/moderate problem. Column 1 shows that 62% of respondents hold this view, and it is more prevalent among women and higher educated respondents. Column 2 also controls for political leaning. This slightly weakens the partial correlation with education, but political leaning is the characteristic most substantially and significantly correlated with perceptions, all else equal. Compared to the omitted group of left-leaning respondents, centrist respondents are 24pp less likely to view ethnic inequalities as a big/moderate problem, and right-leaning respondents are 36pp less likely to do so. Columns 3 and 4 repeat the analysis for whether the respondent agrees that ethnic diversity generally has a positive impact on life in the UK. 45% of respondents overall hold this view, and the perception is more commonly held among educated and higher

[3]The self-reported measure of political leaning is based on a standard *YouGov* question, worded as, *some people talk about 'left', 'right' and 'centre' to describe parties and politicians. With this in mind, where would you place yourself on this scale?* Left-leaning respondents are those that report being 'very left-wing' and 'fairly left-wing'. Centre-leaning respondents combine those that report being 'centre', 'slightly left-of-centre' and 'slightly right-of-centre'. Right-leaning respondents are those that report being 'very right-wing' and 'fairly right-wing'.

income individuals. We again see the strength of association with political leaning: compared to the omitted group of left-leaning respondents, centrist respondents are 36pp less likely to view ethnic diversity positively, and right-leaning respondents are 68pp less likely to do so.[4]

Causes On perceptions of causes of ethnic disadvantage, we asked respondents whether they believe that racial discrimination is a big/moderate problem. 63% of respondents think so, with this perception being more prevalent among women. Political leanings again dominate conditional on other characteristics: compared to the omitted group of left-leaning respondents, centrist respondents are 33pp less likely to view discrimination as a big/moderate problem, and right-leaning respondents are 61pp less likely to do so.

Policy Responses We asked whether individuals agreed that government should aim to reduce economic differences between White British and ethnic minority families. Columns 8 and 9 show that 49% of respondents agree with this, with younger and more educated respondents being more likely to agree. Partial correlations with political leaning are precisely estimated and substantial: compared to left-leaning respondents, centrist respondents are 26pp less likely to agree, and right-leaning respondents are 53pp less likely to agree.

Summary The views of the average White British individual are on average quite progressive. In line with existing evidence, views are more progressive among the young, women, and more educated. However, the averages mask considerable cleavages by political leaning. On each dimension, left-leaning, centrist and right-leaning respondents have significantly different perceptions from each other. As a result, on some outcomes there is almost zero support among right-leaning individuals (e.g. whether ethnic diversity has a generally positive impact on life). Table A3 shows these conclusions are robust to alternative measures of political leaning based on past or intended future voting behaviors.[5]

These results echo the literature on attitudes towards Black-White racial gaps in the US, in that the political leaning of respondents is strongly associated with perceptions of minorities [Druckman *et al.* 2013, Haaland and Roth 2023, Alesina *et al.* 2024]. Given these cleavages, after presenting our core results, we study in a pre-specified manner, the interplay between political leaning, narratives and perceptions of others.

[4]Those unsure of their political leaning (or don't knows) are included in the specifications. At the foot of each even Column we report the p-value on a Wald test of the equivalence of the coefficients on the covariates shown.

[5]For the backward-looking measure based on voting in 2019, we generally find few statistically significant differences between those that voted for the right-leaning Conservative Party and the (further right-leaning) Brexit Party. This changes when we measure political views using forward-looking voting intentions in the upcoming 2024 General Election. On that measure, for two out of four perceptions we find statistically significant different views between those intending to vote for the Conservative and Reform Parties. Views towards minorities might thus be becoming more polarized over time, an issue we return to.

3 The Survey Experiment

After an initial set of questions, respondents were randomly assigned to one of three treatment arms. In the first treatment, respondents were presented a positive narrative about the economic circumstances of minorities, by being told:

Ethnic minorities in the UK are performing well in education. In most cases, they are getting more/higher qualifications than White British people, even when they come from poor backgrounds. This is particularly true for Indians and also for Pakistanis. We want to know what you think about ethnic diversity in the UK today;

In a second treatment, respondents were presented a negative narrative about the economic circumstances of minorities, by being told:

Ethnic minorities in the UK face higher unemployment rates than the White British majority. Even among those with similar levels of education, the chances of being unemployed are still higher in most cases. This is particularly true for Black Caribbeans and also for Pakistanis. We want to know what you think about ethnic diversity in the UK today;

A third group are assigned as controls (with no placebo narrative). Political messaging during the election provides a set of background primes that respondents could have been exposed to. Any impacts of our treatments are over and above those, especially given all survey questions were framed as related to the contemporary situation in the UK.

Figure A2 shows the structure of the experiment. In each treatment, we asked individuals questions about: (i) their perceptions of the societal contributions and economic outcomes of minorities and the opportunities available to them; (ii) perceptions of the causes of disadvantage across groups – such as a lack of effort, bad luck, or discrimination; (iii) views of policies related to ethnic inequalities, such as targeted equal opportunities policies, or untargeted policies related to education/training, welfare support to families, teaching British values in school, or increasing punishments for discriminatory behavior.[6]

A central innovation of our survey experiment is to probe perceptions among the majority White British population along the three broad dimensions above, towards *specific* minority groups: (i) Indians – who are referred to in the positive narrative; (ii) Black Caribbeans – who are referred to in the negative narrative; (iii) Pakistanis – who are referred to in both positive and negative narratives; (iv) Polish and Black Africans, who are not referred to in either treatment, but as shown in Figure A1, constitute prominent minorities in the UK today, and allow us to both consider spillover effects and to assess hierarchies across minorities from different racial and

[6]In designing our survey, we drew on principles of good question design [Schaeffer and Presser 2003], aiming to maximize the neutrality of our questions and minimize their cognitive burden to help ensure valid and reliable responses. To maintain comparability with the literature, we drew some questions from existing work [Alesina *et al.* 2024, Almas *et. al* 2024, Benson *et. al* 2024], tailoring them to fit the context and study purpose. We also drew on questions or underlying logic of questions from existing polling studies within the UK to offer both benchmarking and contextual applicability of our questions [Juan-torres *et al.* 2020, IPSOS 2023, Fairness Foundation 2024].

religious categories as well as more and less recently settled ethnic groups. In addition, for each question we also ask respondents their perceptions of the White British ingroup, enabling us to shed light on dimensions of perceptions in which the majority might display zero sum mindsets as revealed by exposure to the narratives.[7]

3.1 Interpreting the Treatments

The information provided in each treatment is both general and group-specific and describes relative advantage and disadvantage, rather than actual deficits or the extent of discrimination. We provide information that respondents might be unaware of, enabling them to correct misperceptions but without the detail of quantitative information experiments where treatments are often designed to trigger respondents in a specific dimension on either the causes or consequences of gaps [Bursztyn and Yang 2022, Stantcheva 2022, Haaland *et al.* 2023, Schaeffer *et al.* 2024]. Our treatments provide qualitative narratives rather than statistically-based quantitative information.[8]

In line with ethical practice, the narratives are factually correct. They demonstrate a common base for positive and negative outcomes, namely they state some minorities are doing well even if from poor backgrounds, and that others are doing poorly independent of their educational level. The treatments are not intended to suggest that either is necessarily a cause for celebration or concern. To reinforce this, both narratives have the neutral final sentence intended to show a range of reactions could be possible. The treatments serve three purposes.

First, they shed light on the malleability of perceptions of the majority, in a time of heightened awareness about vertical and horizontal inequalities. Given their qualitative nature, exposure to the narratives is more likely to shift perceptions in a given direction, rather than towards some focal point. Second, they allow us to understand the malleability of perceptions towards specific groups – given that some, but not all, are named in the narratives. Finally, they allow us to understand whether they shift attitudes towards the White British ingroup, specifically in ways consistent with zero sum mindsets [Chinoy *et al.* 2023]. Namely, if other groups are doing better than expected, perceptions of the economic standing of the ingroup shift in the opposite direction.

As with any survey experiment, responses could be biased due to social desirability bias or experimenter demand effects. We intentionally used the neutral language of ethnic diversity,

[7] It is because we asked respondents about multiple groups that we had to limit the cognitive load on respondents by restricting the number of groups asked about. Hence we do not ask about other minorities such as Bangladeshis, Chinese or those of Mixed ethnicity (Figure A1). We are still able to examine if the narratives have spillover attitudes onto groups that are not named.

[8] Our treatments go beyond primes, that typically prompt subjects to think about specific concepts [Cohn and Maréchal 2016]. In the most closely related literature, Alesina *et al.* [2023] primed respondents to think about immigration. Haaland and Roth [2020] inform treated respondents about the labor market impact of immigration, Haaland and Roth [2023] inform treated respondents about the results from the correspondence studies, and Alesina *et al.* [2024] use three video treatments, each offering a distinct type of information: on the causes of racial gaps, on the evolution of income gaps between Black and white Americans over 50 years, and on differences in intergenerational mobility between white and Black children in the US.

language which was repeated in the last line of each narrative and intended to avoid positioning the survey in ways that might lead to such biases. The concern is further ameliorated by the fact that: (i) respondents are well used to answering surveys from *YouGov*, are incentivized to complete them, and know their answers are anonymized; (ii) the salience of similar issues during the election campaign acts as a broader contextual priming for respondents, potentially fostering greater readiness to express underlying views [Creighton *et al.* 2015, Haaland *et al.* 2023]; (iii) we assess if narratives shift attitudes towards the White British ingroup, that is more reflective of updated perceptions rather than induced experimenter demand effects. In the Appendix we discuss further underpinning evidence on the quality of data collection.[9]

3.2 Estimation and Balance

Following our pre-analysis plan, we estimate treatment effects using a standard specification for perception y of individual i towards group g:

$$y_i^g = \alpha^g + \beta_P^g T_{iP} + \beta_N^g T_{iN} + u_i^g, \tag{1}$$

where T_{iP} is equal to one if i is randomly assigned to the positive narrative, and zero otherwise; T_{iN} is analogously defined if i is assigned to the negative narrative. u_i^g is an error term. Panels A and B in Table A1 show treatment arms are well balanced. Our light touch narratives might not always measurably shift perceptions relative to controls. Hence, we also report the p-value on the null that $\beta_P^g = \beta_N^g$, to probe the hypothesis that perceptions towards group g can be shifted through differential exposure to positive and negative narratives – especially so for perceptions towards Pakistanis who are named in both treatments. We use individual weights to adjust respondents to match the national profile, and report robust standard errors. For any given perception, an individual might agree or disagree with a statement, and we also allow them to express that they don't know or are unsure of an answer. For expositional ease, we focus on the most relevant response categories, that need not always sum to one due to other potential response outcomes not being shown.

[9] Earlier work has documented limited impacts of social desirability bias or demand effects in survey experiments but this might vary across contexts [de Quidt *et al.* 2018, Cantoni *et al.* 2019, Mummolo and Peterson 2018, Bursztyn *et al.* 2020]. The concern might be more acute in the absence of truth-telling incentives, although incentives can be counterproductive in online surveys, where respondents might then seek out information to provide the correct answer when the information is publicly available [Haaland *et al.* 2023].

4 Perceptions of Specific Groups

4.1 Societal Contribution

We begin by examining majority perceptions of how specific minority groups contribute to UK life. The wording of the question is, *Do you think the following groups generally make a positive or negative contribution to the UK? Please answer on the following scale, where 0 means 'very negative' and 10 means 'very positive'.* This is designed to be a catch-all to encompass perceptions of both economic and non-economic (cultural) contributions. The results are in Table 2, where we format the table to highlight the minority groups referred to in each narrative (so making clear that Indians and Pakistanis are mentioned in the positive narrative, and Pakistanis and Black Caribbeans are mentioned in the negative narrative). Among controls, perceived contributions of all outgroups are above the mid-point of the scale, so each group is viewed to positively contribute to UK society. The ranking across outgroups is that Pakistanis are perceived to provide the lowest contribution (5.1), followed by Black Caribbeans (5.6) and then Indians (6.1), with the White British ingroup scoring 7.3. Each pairwise difference in these perceptions is statistically significant ($p = .000$). The qualitative narratives do not shift these perceptions, suggesting these views of others are somewhat ingrained within the majority.

4.2 Economic Outcomes

Perceptions We consider perceptions of White British respondents of the economic outcomes of minority groups along two dimensions linked to the wording of the narratives: (i) the share of graduates, by gender, among each group; (ii) the employment rate, by gender, among each group. For expositional ease we consider perceptions of economic outcomes of men among the three named outgroups and the ingroup. As in Haaland and Roth [2023], we measure perceptions on a quantitative scale that is comparable across respondents and has the same interpretation for all. We discuss below the similarity of results for perceptions of economic outcomes of women.[10]

To understand the accuracy of perceptions we use data from the Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS) from April 2023-March 2024 to derive true outcomes for men in each group. Panel A of Figure 1 then shows perceptions and reality for graduate shares of each group among controls. White British respondents believe around 36% of White British and Indian men are graduates, with this belief falling to 26% and 21% for Pakistani and Black Caribbean men respectively. Reality lines up well with perceptions towards White British men – there is only a 5pp overestimation of graduate shares for the ingroup. In sharp contrast, there are large misperceptions of graduate shares among Indian and Pakistani men – the underestimation of graduate shares for Indian men

[10] On employment shares, the exact wording of the question was, *Out of 100 men of working age in the UK from each of the following groups, roughly how many would you say are not working?* Respondents appear to have interpreted this not as the unemployment rate (that varies between 4% and 9% across groups), but as employment rates (among the economically active).

being 30pp and 18pp for Pakistani men, that are both around half the true share. Misperceptions do not however apply to all minorities: perceptions and reality line up closely for Black Caribbean men, the group with the lowest graduate shares.

So with regard to Indian men, the majority perceive they have similar graduate shares as their ingroup, but do not recognize they actually lag well behind on this outcome. Our evidence suggests that one of the great economic success stories of minorities in the UK that is well established among social scientists – their advancement in education and transition into university education – appears little known among the majority White British population.

To move beyond averages, the right hand side panel shows the CDF of misperceptions among controls towards various groups. Following Burzstyn and Yang [2022], we define the asymmetry of misperceptions as:

$$\text{AM} = \frac{\max\{\text{share underestimate, share overestimate}\}}{\min\{\text{share underestimate, share overestimate}\}}, \tag{2}$$

A ratio of one indicates exact symmetry, and the higher the ratio, the larger the asymmetry. Majority perceptions for graduate shares of White British men are symmetric around the truth (AM= 1.04). In contrast, misperceptions towards minorities are highly skewed: AM=5.76 for Indians, 7.30 for Pakistanis and 1.72 for Black Caribbeans. Relative to the literature on misperceptions of others across contexts and outgroups, this is a large degree of misperception.[11]

Panel B of Figure 1 repeats the analysis for employment rates of working age men. Among controls, employment rates are perceived to lie between 70 and 80% for all minorities. Using the QLFS-derived benchmark, we find the majority underestimate employment rates for White British and Indian men, and overestimate them for Pakistani and Black Caribbean men. The second panel shows majority perceptions for employment rates of White British men are again symmetric around the truth (AM=1.10). Misperceptions towards Indians are also symmetric (AM=1.19), but they are asymmetric for Pakistanis (2.05) and Black Caribbeans (2.87).[12]

As Burzstyn and Yang [2022] describe, mechanisms that generate asymmetric misperceptions about others include stereotyping, motivated reasoning [Benabou and Tirole 2016, Avdagic and Savage 2024], projection bias or pluralistic ignorance [Kuran 1997, Bursztyn *et al.* 2020]. While observed patterns of asymmetry alone do not distinguish these mechanisms, stereotyping could result in a common asymmetry about others irrespective of the outcome, whereas other mechanisms generate asymmetry under certain conditions. The fact we find misperceptions on a given economic outcome vary across minority groups, and for a given minority group they also vary

[11] Burzstyn and Yang [2022] report that 80% of papers find AM> 1.5, and half find AM> 2.5.

[12] There are a few robust predictors of perceptions of economic outcomes of men, by group (Table A4): (i) older and less educated individuals perceive lower graduate shares and employment rates across groups; (ii) women perceive higher graduate shares and lower employment rates across groups. However, the political leaning of White British respondents is again relevant for shaping perceptions of economic outcomes of minorities, conditional on observables – an issue we come back to later.

across economic outcomes, suggests stereotyping is least likely to parsimoniously explain views of the majority.[13]

Taking Stock Our findings line up with the body of evidence on misperceptions, overviewed in Bursztyn and Yang [2022], that show misperceptions of others are widespread and asymmetrically distributed around the truth, while perceptions about the ingroup are smaller and more symmetrically distributed around the truth. However, the exact patterns of misperception contrast with the US-based literature where the White population tends to underestimate the extent of racial disadvantage [Kraus *et al.* 2017, Callaghan *et al.* 2021, Haaland and Roth 2023, Alesina *et al.* 2024]. In our setting, while this is true for employment rates, it is not so for majority perceptions of graduate shares of minorities. Finally, we note that the ranking of outgroups on perceived outcomes – whether in terms of graduate shares or employment rates – do not map onto the ranking of outgroups' societal contribution, suggesting the latter measure is held independently of perceived economic outcomes.

Narratives and Perceptions Table 3 documents how perceptions are impacted by the treatments. Panel A shows results for beliefs about graduate shares. The positive narrative shifts upward perceptions of graduate shares among Indians and Pakistanis – the groups named in this treatment. The magnitude of impacts are not trivial: for example White British repondents assigned to the positive narrative increase their perceived graduate share of Indian men by 3.4pp relative to 36% among controls. There is no significant impact of the negative narrative (that was worded in terms of employment outcomes). Panel B shows treatment effects for perceived employment rates. Here we find the negative narrative significantly reduces perceived rates among Pakistani and Black Caribbean men – the groups named in this treatment.

For Pakistanis, that are named in both treatments, we find significantly differential impacts of the positive and negative narrative on perceptions of graduate shares ($p = .000$) and employment rates ($p = .003$).

We thereby show that even during a period of heightened political campaigning, light-touch narratives can shift beliefs of the majority population about economic outcomes of minorities. These shifts relate to the specific dimension of outcome the information relates to, and the specific minority groups mentioned. The direction of belief shifts is in line with respondents updating, and causing misperceptions to fall so beliefs align more closely with reality. We also note these shifts occur despite the narratives having no impact on perceptions of the societal contributions

[13] Burgess and Greaves [2013] use administrative data from the English education system to assess teacher biases in test grading and how this differs across minorities. They find that on average, Black Caribbean and Black African pupils are underassessed relative to White pupils, and Indian, Chinese, and mixed white and Asian pupils are overassessed. They argue that these observed patterns do not reflect a discriminatory viewpoint or culturally biased tests, but rather, better fits a model of stereotypes. By examining multiple margins of economic outcome, our results suggest stereotypes would need to be specific to outcomes and groups.

of outgroups (Table 2) – suggesting those perceptions of others might be more weighted towards cultural rather than economic factors of the outgroup.[14]

To delve deeper into where these shifts in perceptions of economic outcomes come from, we calculate the perception of respondents in decile d in each treatment arm and the control group. We then plot the difference in beliefs between each treatment and controls by decile (with the associated confidence interval). Panel A of Figure 2 shows these treatment-control differences in perceptions for graduate shares among men, by group. We see that the upwards updating towards Indians and Pakistanis from the positive narrative stems from different sources. Perceptions towards Indians are rather uniformly shifted upward across deciles. For Pakistanis the positive updating is largely driven by those with the highest perception of graduate shares of Pakistani men to begin with. Figure 2 also reveals that while on average the negative narrative has no impact on perceptions, it does shift upwards perceptions of graduate shares towards Indian men among those with the highest belief to begin with. For perceptions towards Black Caribbeans and the White British ingroup, we find muted impacts of either treatment across deciles (in line with the null average effects of each treatment).[15]

Panel B of Figure 2 repeats the analysis for perceptions of employment shares among men. We see: (i) relatively muted impacts towards the ingroup of either treatment across deciles (in line with the null average effects of each treatment); (ii) the null average impacts towards Indians mask impacts among those that hold the lowest beliefs – their beliefs shift upward when exposed to the positive narrative and shift downward when exposed to the negative narrative; (iii) the downward impacts of the negative narrative towards Pakistanis and Black Caribbeans are driven by those with the lowest beliefs to begin with.

These results suggest heterogeneous impacts on beliefs of narratives. In contrast to some earlier work, our narratives tend to impact those holding the most extreme beliefs, that can be those whose beliefs are closest to reality. This heterogeneity helps disentangle treatment effects arising from genuine belief updating, rather than mere priming. Our between-respondent design does not allow us to estimate the belief updating process [Haaland *et al.* 2023].

Finally, we note a strong similarity of levels of misperceptions of economic outcomes for women across groups, correlates of those misperceptions, average and distributional treatment effects on misperceptions as for those documented for men.[16]

[14]Burzstyn and Yang [2022] describe how in nearly a quarter of studies, perceptions about others are shifted by more than 50% relative to the levels of prior beliefs, and around half of the studies find changes in perceptions by at least 25%. Our impacts are smaller than these, in line with their overall finding that qualitative treatments have lower impact than the provision of quantitative information.

[15]The AM measure of perceptions of graduate shares of any group falls in each treatment relative to controls, with AM being smaller for those exposed to the positive narrative.

[16]Panel A of Figure A3 shows perceptions of graduate shares of women across groups. We again see a slight overestimation of the majority towards graduate shares among White British women, with graduate shares among minority women being severely underestimated for all outgroups. Panel B shows that among controls, employment shares are again perceived to be closer across groups, and between 60 and 75% for all minorities. The majority population underestimates employment shares for White British and Indian women, and overestimates them for

4.3 Opportunities

To begin to see how perceptions of outcomes relate to perceptions along other margins, we examine how the majority views opportunities available to minorities. We asked respondents about three kinds of opportunity linked to the narrative wording: (i) obtaining a good education; (ii) finding work; (iii) earning a decent wage. Each question was framed in the context of opportunities minorities and the majority might face in the local neighborhood of the respondent, to capture concrete impressions of what they observe rather than hypothetical views about the nation as a whole. The results are in Table 4.

Among controls there is a widespread belief that minorities lack opportunities in education, work and wages (Columns 1, 4 and 6). The ranking across outgroups lines up with perceptions of outcomes: Black Caribbeans are seen to have the fewest opportunities, followed by Pakistanis and then Indians. The remaining Columns show generally weak impacts of each treatment on the perceived lack of labor market opportunities for minorities across these dimensions. However, on perceptions of getting a good education, the positive narrative nudges down the perceived lack of opportunities and the negative narrative nudges up the perceived lack of opportunities for the specified groups. Hence there is differential impact of the narratives in perceptions towards Indians ($p = .035$) and Pakistanis ($p = .009$).

The most striking pattern that emerges, however, is in views about whether the White British population lack opportunities. Respondents assigned to the positive narrative, that informs them of the relative educational success of Indian and Pakistani groups, become significantly more likely to report that White British individuals lack opportunities in finding work or earning a decent wage. These responses correspond to 36% and 27% increases over controls respectively. This response is consistent with zero sum thinking – that positive outcomes for outgroups might come at the expense of the ingroup [Chinoy *et al.* 2023]. White British individuals assigned to the negative narrative – that informs them of the relative disadvantage in unemployment for Pakistani and Black Caribbean groups given equal education levels – become significantly less likely to report that White British individuals have few or no opportunities in obtaining a good education, the magnitude of the effect corresponding to a 39% decrease. This response again suggests a zero sum mindset – if minorities at the same level of education are faring worse, then the majority are less concerned about educational opportunities available to their ingroup.

Pakistani and Black Caribbean women. Table A5 shows that correlates of perceptions of women's economic outcomes across groups are similar to those for perceptions of men's outcomes: older individuals perceive lower graduate shares and employment rates across outgroups; (ii) women perceive higher graduate shares and lower employment shares across groups; (iii) the political leaning of White British respondents is again relevant for shaping perceptions of economic outcomes of minorities, all else equal. Panel A of Table A6 documents how perceptions are impacted by the treatments. The positive narrative shifts upward perceptions of graduate shares among Indians and Pakistanis – the groups named in this treatment. Panel B shows treatment effects for perceived employment shares. Here we find weaker impacts than for men, but there are differential impacts of the positive and negative narrative for Indian ($p = .091$) and Pakistani women women ($p = .026$). Figure A4 shows impacts by decile of beliefs that in most cases follow similar distributional patterns as to those for men.

While the literature has suggested that antipathy or antagonism to minority/immigrant outgroups is driven more by cultural than economic threats [Dustmann *et al.* 2024], the kinds of zero-sum reaction we document indicates that economic threat is still salient to the majority. A key distinction between our results and earlier work based on immigrant outgroups, is that the outgroups we consider have a long-standing presence in the UK and today constitute mostly UK-born individuals.[17]

4.4 Causes

Luck versus Effort To begin to understand how the majority perceive the root causes of disadvantage across groups, we first asked respondents about the relative importance of luck and effort in driving success: *does lack of effort or bad luck generally have more to do with whether a person from each of the following groups is unsuccessful?* The results are in Table 5.

Among controls we observe that: (i) a lack of success for White British individuals is far more attributed to a lack of effort rather than bad luck (34% versus 7%, $p = .000$); (ii) the opposite attribution is made for Indians, bad luck rather than effort is far more likely to be viewed as driving a lack of success (13% versus 24%, $p = .000$); (iii) for Pakistani and Black Caribbeans, respondents are equally likely to attribute a lack of success to luck and effort (19% versus 19%, $p = .975$, and 20% versus 17%, $p = .216$ respectively).

The remaining Columns show that neither treatment shifts perceptions of these underlying causes across groups. This reinforces the notion that perceptions of the causes of disadvantage of the White British ingroup and minority outgroups are deep rooted and not malleable to light-touch narratives. This is in line with the existing literature that suggests that even quantitative information provision does little to affect such underlying attitudes [Alesina *et al.* 2024], suggesting an insight generalizable across contexts.

Labor Market Discrimination The third cause of disadvantage we explore is discrimination: so placing emphasis on systematic forces against a group rather than individual-based causes such as effort or luck. We start by focusing on majority views of labor market discrimination faced by minorities, and then consider discrimination in other domains. On labor market discrimination, we framed questions to be group and gender specific, given large gender differentials in labor market participation across groups [Mirza and Warwick 2024]. We asked respondents, *Imagine that the following men applied for a job, which they were qualified for. Please rank them based on how likely you think they would be to be turned down for the job.* Responses are coded so a rank of 1 means the group is perceived to face the least discrimination at hiring stages in labor markets. The results towards men are in Table 6, and we discuss the similarity of results for women below.

[17] As Alesina *et al.* [2024] discuss, information treatments can lead to cognitive dissonance among the majority, when beliefs about equality of opportunity are confronted with the reality of ethnic inequalities. This is perhaps more appropriate for explaining majority responses to the negative narrative but not the positive narrative.

The ranking of discrimination faced by groups matches with perceptions of outcomes and opportunities: Black Caribbeans are perceived to face the most discrimination (rank 4), followed by Pakistanis and Indians, with White British men perceived to face the least labor market discrimination. The treatments shift views for all groups except Black Caribbean men. For minorities, the positive narrative tends to reduce perceptions of discrimination faced by that group, and the negative narrative does the opposite, so the differential impacts of the treatments are statistically significant for Indians ($p = .002$) and Pakistanis ($p = .014$).

The largest response induced by the positive narrative is to increase the perception that White British men face labor market discrimination. This is again in line with zero sum mindsets.

Similar patterns of results holds for perceptions of discrimination faced by women across groups, including elements of zero sum thinking in response to the positive narrative (Table A7).

4.5 Policy

Equal Opportunities Policy Finally, we consider attitudes towards policies to address ethnic inequalities. We start with views on equal opportunities policies – those that are targeted towards specific groups, and might include policies related to affirmative action, or ensuring equality of access through DEI initiatives. We consider whether White British respondents feel such targeted policies have 'gone too far' or 'not far enough' in relation to each minority. The results are in Table 7.

Among controls, 24% of respondents view such policies have not gone far enough in relation to the White British ingroup, and only 4% report that they have gone too far. This is very different for views toward minorities, where there is a more even split of views. With regards to Indians, Pakistanis and Black Caribbeans, around 20% of White British respondents report that such policies have gone too far, and another 20% report they have not gone far enough.

These policy views can be shifted by the treatments: (i) the negative narrative increases support for the view that such policies have not gone far enough for all minorities; (ii) the point estimates on the positive narrative are mostly negative, so that there are differential impacts of the treatments for the view that policies have not gone far enough for Indians ($p = .017$) and Pakistanis ($p = .023$); (iii) both treatments increase views that targeted policies have gone too far with regards to the White British population. Hence we see no evidence of zero sum mindsets when it comes to attitudes towards equal opportunities policies.

These results are in contrast to earlier evidence that finds more intransigent views on policy responses to racial gaps, despite information treatments shifting misperceptions of racial gaps in outcomes closer to reality [Haaland and Roth 2023, Alesina *et al.* 2024, Schaeffer *et al.* 2024].

Non-targeted Policies As an alternative to targeted policies to tackle group disadvantage, general policies targeting root causes may be as effective and/or command greater support. We

therefore asked respondents their views on the role of broader policies in reducing ethnic inequalities: investing in education/training, teaching children about British values, financially supporting families with children, and increasing penalties for discrimination. We selected these policies to capture distinctive underlying orientations of respondents. For example, investing in education and training should be more appealing to those holding meritocratic perspectives, while those more concerned with redistribution and preventing poverty would be more likely to favour supporting families with children. Increasing penalties for discrimination is more likely to appeal to those who considered inequalities to derive primarily from discrimination, and teaching about British values should appeal more to those who see group cleavages in terms of failures of cultural integration.

The results are in Table 8. We find broad support for non-targeted policies – far more so than for equal opportunities policies. Investing in education/training receives the strongest support – 70% of respondents think this can do a great deal or fair amount to reduce ethnic inequalities (while only 19% think it would do not much/nothing). Support for other policies such as teaching children about British values, financially supporting families with children, and increasing penalties for discrimination receive between 48% and 52% of support, but they also each also have a good share of respondents (between 35% and 40%) that think such policies do not much/nothing to address ethnic inequalities.

Again counter to evidence from other contexts, we find narratives can shift support for some policies. The positive narrative significantly increases support by 7.1pp for teaching children about British values. The differential impacts of positive and negative narrative decrease the view that financially supporting families with children makes little difference ($p = .076$), and increases the perception that raising penalties for discrimination is ineffective ($p = .084$).

5 Perceptions by Political Leaning

We earlier documented how majority perceptions of ethnic minorities as a whole mask considerable heterogeneity by political leaning (Table 1). We now pursue this further, following a pre-specified analysis, to consider heterogeneous treatment effects by political leaning. We define a dummy D_{ik} to equal one if respondent i is of political leaning k and extend the specification in (1) by interacting political orientation D_{ik} with T_{iP} and T_{iN} as follows:

$$y_i^g = \alpha_0^g + \sum\nolimits_k \alpha_k^g D_{ik} + \sum\nolimits_k \beta_{Pk}^g T_{iP} D_{ik} + \sum\nolimits_k \beta_{Nk}^g T_{iN} D_{ik} + u_i^g. \tag{3}$$

We report nine coefficients related to perceptions towards group g: for controls, we report the level of outcome for respondents of political-leaning $k \in \{Left,\ Centre,\ Right\}$ $(\widehat{\alpha}_L^g, \widehat{\alpha}_C^g, \widehat{\alpha}_R^g)$; in each treatment arm $j \in \{P, N\}$ we report the treatment effect for those of political-leaning k $(\widehat{\beta}_{Pk}^g, \widehat{\beta}_{Nk}^g)$ with the omitted category being those whose political leaning is missing. Table A2 shows the treatment arms to be well balanced on political leaning – either in the self-reported

measure, voting intentions in the 2024 General Election, or past voting behaviors in the 2019 General Election and the 2016 EU Referendum.[18]

5.1 Societal Contribution

Table B1 shows perceived societal contributions of outgroups by political leaning. Focusing on controls, Column 1 shows a strong gradient with political leaning, with right-leaning respondents rating the contribution of Pakistani and Black Caribbeans to be below the midpoint of the 0-10 scale, and for any given outgroup, right-leaning respondents always perceive that group to provide a lower contribution to UK society than left-leaning and centrist respondents. The opposite is the case for majority views towards the societal contribution of the ingroup.

The remaining Columns show that the narratives can nudge some these perceptions of outgroups by political leaning, while perceptions of the ingroup are unaffected.

5.2 Economic Outcomes

How do respondents' perceptions of the economic outcomes of minority vary by political leaning? Column 1 of Table B2 shows that political leaning shapes perceptions of graduate shares of minorities. Relative to left-leaning individuals: (i) centrist and right-leaning individuals underestimate graduate shares of men among all minority groups; (ii) misperceptions towards Pakistani and Black Caribbean men are even greater among right-leaning than centrist respondents ($p = .000$ and .002 respectively); (iii) perceptions of graduate shares among the ingroup also vary with political leaning, but the magnitude of left-right differences are not as large as those towards outgroups.

The remaining Columns show that the treatments nudge these perceptions of outgroups by political leaning. More precisely, the positive narrative shifts upward perceptions of Indian and Pakistani graduate shares across all respondents. Notably, right-leaning leaning respondents nudge up their perception of graduate shares of Pakistani men by 8pp, near double the impact on Left and centrist respondents, so closing half the perceptions gap. The negative narrative has far weaker impacts on shifting perceptions, and perceptions of graduate shares among the ingroup do not shift in response to either narrative.[19]

On employment rates, Column 1 of Table B3 shows that political leaning again shapes perceptions towards all minorities and the ingroup. Relative to left-leaning individuals: (i) centrist and right-leaning individuals estimate lower (and more accurate) employment rates among minorities; (ii) perceptions of Pakistani and Black Caribbean employment rates are significantly different to

[18] To examine heterogenous responses across political leaning to the same narrative $j \in \{P, N\}$ we also calculate p-values on the nulls: $\beta^g_{jL} = \beta^g_{jC}$, $\beta^g_{jL} = \beta^g_{jR}$ and $\beta^g_{jC} = \beta^g_{jR}$, and report these in the Appendix B Tables.

[19] We still find significantly differential responses among left, centrist and right-leaning respondents to the positive and negative narrative in regards to graduate shares of Pakistanis ($p = .004$, .001, .051 respectively), the outgroup named in both narratives.

centrist and right-leaning respondents ($p = .012$ and .016 respectively). Perceptions of employment rates of any outgroup are far harder to shift than for graduate shares, but centrists respond most differentially to the narratives, whether that is with regard to rates among Indian ($p = .003$), Pakistani ($p = .001$) and Black Caribbean men ($p = .048$).

5.3 Opportunities

As Table B4 shows, there are weaker gradients of perceptions of economic opportunities available to minorities by political leaning relative to those for the economic outcomes of minorities (Columns 1, 4 and 7). Perceptions of opportunities are not shifted by either treatment for respondents of any political leaning. This is despite them shifting perceptions of the economic outcomes of minorities.

We noted earlier in the aggregate results, that treatment effects on perceptions of opportunities faced by the ingroup were indicative of zero sum thinking. We see that in terms of opportunities to find work or earn a decent wage, these are driven by respondents of all political persuasion (all point estimates on the treatment effects are positive). Hence on these margins, zero sum mindsets appear not to be confined to any specific political leaning. However, the earlier finding of the negative narrative reducing the perceived lack of opportunities of White British children to get a good education appears driven mostly by centrist respondents: centrists exposed to the negative narrative reduce their belief that White British individuals can get a good education by 3.6pp, corresponding to a 55% fall relative to centrists in the control group, and this effect of the negative narrative significantly differs from that on left-leaning respondents ($p = .043$).

5.4 Causes

Luck versus Effort How do respondents of different political leaning differ in their views of the root causes of ethnic disadvantage? We start by considering views of luck versus effort. The results in Table B5 show stark differences by political leaning in views of causes of disadvantage, with this gradient being more pronounced than on other dimensions of perceptions of others. Among controls, relative to left-leaning respondents, centrist and right-leaning respondents are significantly less likely to attribute disadvantage to bad luck, and more likely to attribute it to a lack of effort. This is true for views towards nearly all outgroups and towards the ingroup. 5% of left-leaning respondents believe a lack of success for Pakistanis is due to low effort, while 44% of right-leaning respondents hold this view; 36% of left-leaning respondents believe a lack of success for Black Caribbeans is due to bad luck, while 7% of right-leaning respondents hold this view. This gradient also exists in views towards the ingroup, but is less pronounced.[20]

[20] Alesina *et al.* [2023] document that right-leaning US respondents are more likely to believe that immigrants are poor because of lack of effort, consistent with beliefs they hold about the poor in general [Alesina *et al.* 2018]. Alesina *et al.* [2024] also document a sharp divide in perceived causes of racial gaps by political leaning, with Republicans being more likely to attribute gaps to individual actions.

The positive narrative shifts some perceptions across political leanings, especially towards the named groups and with regards to bad luck explaining disadvantage. The positive narrative increases the view among centrists that disadvantage for Indians and Pakistanis is due to bad luck, and among right-leaning respondents it increases the chance of holding the same view towards Pakistanis. The negative narrative does not shift perceptions of causes across groups.

Discrimination There are also large differences by political leaning in perceptions of labor market discrimination that minority men face, as Table B6 shows, where recall a rank of 1 means the group is perceived to face the least discrimination. Column 1 shows that centrist and right-leaning respondents perceive each minority to be facing significantly less discrimination than left-leaning respondents. The opposite pattern holds for the ingroup, and here the gradient with political leaning is strong: left-leaning respondents view White British men to face less discrimination that centrists ($p = .000$), and centrists view White British men to face less discrimination that right-leaning respondents ($p = .008$). Narratives do little to shift these views towards outgroups.

In the earlier aggregate results, we found the positive narrative increased the perception that White British men face labor market discrimination, in line with zero sum thinking. The split by political leaning in Table B6 shows it is largely centrist and right-leaning respondents that drive this finding (with only the former effect being precisely estimated).[21]

5.5 Policies

Equal Opportunities Policy Finally, we consider the interplay between policy preferences, political leaning and the narrative treatments. We start by considering equal opportunities policies. Table B7 shows that among controls, there are marked differences in levels of support for such targeted polices by the political leaning of White British respondents: 3% of left-leaning respondents believe equal opportunities policies have gone too far for Black Caribbeans, but this rises to 21% for centrists ($p = .000$) and to 49% for right-leaning respondents (that differs from centrists, $p = .000$).

However, when it comes to views towards such policies targeted towards the ingroup, a far greater share of respondents view these policies as not having gone far enough rather than having gone too far, irrespective of their political leaning. Right-leaning respondents are still significantly more likely than others to view such policies as not having gone far enough to support the White British population: while 21% of left-leaning respondents agree with this view, this rises to 46% among right-leaning respondents.

[21] Figure B1 shows perceptions of discrimination across domains by political leaning. As in Alesina *et al.* [2024] we find substantial gaps in perceived discrimination faced in all domains. Among majority respondents, the share of left-leaning individuals that think any given minority group is often discriminated against in any of the settings is two to three times that among right-leaning individuals. The patterns are reversed when White British respondents are asked about discrimination faced by White British individuals.

We find no evidence that narratives shift views of equal opportunities policies targeted to any minority. In contrast, we again see evidence that the narratives increase support for the view that such policies have gone too far for the ingroup, and we cannot reject the null that the treatment effects are the same by political leaning.

Non-targeted Policies On the efficacy of non-targeted policies in reducing ethnic inequalities, there is a strong gradient in support by political leaning as expected given these policies were chosen because they likely appeal to different orientations of respondents. Table B8 shows centrist and right-leaning individuals are less supportive of all policies except teaching children about British values, consistent with them viewing ethnic inequalities in terms of failures of cultural integration. This is also the only policy for which we find evidence that the narratives shift support. The positive narrative increases support for such policies among centrists by 6.6pp (or a 12% increase over centrists in the control group), and it shifts upwards support for such policies among right-leaning individuals by 14.1pp (or a 20% increase).

In light of the earlier evidence that the positive narrative raises concerns about zero sum implications of minority success, this result indicates that the need for minorities to culturally integrate by upholding British values is felt acutely by centrist and right-leaning individuals in the face of the success of minority groups. The ensuing higher social position is likely to make any cultural cleavages feel more threatening to those already concerned about ethnic diversity.

6 Reasoning Behind Policy Support

Perceptions of the majority towards specific groups can shape support for policies targeted towards that group. We continue to exploit the key innovation in our survey design to consider how support for equal opportunities policy towards a given group g, correlates with perceived societal contribution of that group, perceptions of economic outcomes of that group, perceived opportunities for that group, and perceived causes of disadvantage for that group.

We normalize perceptions of the contribution and each economic outcome of group g against those in controls, so that each has mean zero and standard deviation one. Perceptions of opportunities (Table 4) and causes (Tables 5 and 6) naturally lie between zero and one. The resulting coefficients (and their standard error) from regressing support for equal opportunities policy towards group g on perceptions of group g in the control group are summarized in Figure 3.[22]

We first consider support for policies targeting Indians, Pakistanis and Black Caribbeans. We find similar patterns of reasoning behind support for equal opportunities policies for all three outgroups. More specifically, support for such targeted policies towards outgroup g is significantly higher among those that perceive: (i) the societal contribution of the group to be higher; (ii)

[22] When regressing support for policies on perceptions, we also condition on the set of basic individual characteristics from Table 1.

the outgroup to lack opportunities to earn a decent wage; (iii) group disadvantage to be down to bad luck. The right hand panel shows treatment effects of each narrative on these partial correlations. If we think of these partial correlations as related to the reasoning behind policy support, the narrative treatments do little to shift the reasoning for supporting policies targeted at these outgroups.

Finally, we also consider support for policies targeting the White British ingroup. Respondents display similar reasoning in support for policies targeted towards the ingroup in terms of the opportunities they face and causes of disadvantage. However, reasoning behind support for targeted policies for the ingroup and outgroups differs along two margins: (i) while support for such policies for outgroups increases with the perceived societal contribution of the outgroup, this plays no role in support for policies towards the ingroup; (ii) support for policies targeted towards the ingroup is higher when the economic outcomes of the ingroup are perceived to be worse, while perceived economic outcomes of minorities mostly do not correlate for support for policies targeted towards them (once their perceived societal contribution is conditioned on).

6.1 Left-Right Differences

Given strong political cleavages in perceptions towards minorities, we consider the extent to which differences in perceptions (X's) and differences in reasoning (β's) help explain differing support for equal opportunities policies towards group g across the left-right political spectrum. It is natural to do so using an Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition. The results are in Figure 4, where we decompose left-right differences in support among controls. We caveat these results by noting some imprecision in the estimates of reasoning given the sample size of controls being used to examine splits by political leaning, and the decomposition involving eight components as well as individual characteristics.[23]

We first consider support for equal opportunities policies towards Indians. The first panel reiterates political cleavages in perceptions ($X_L - X_R$) on nearly every dimension. The middle panel then shows how much of the difference in support is explained by each perception (evaluated at the coefficients of reasoning of left-leaning respondents, $\widehat{\beta}_L$). The key perception explaining left-right differences in policy support is the extent to which Indians are seen to provide a societal contribution: this explains almost 40% of the gap in support for equal opportunities policies towards Indians. The perception that Indians have few opportunities to earn a decent wage explains a further 10% if the gap. Other perceptions of the majority, such as the economic outcomes of Indian men or the extent to which discrimination is a cause of disadvantage, do little to explain left-right gaps, despite there being large cleavages in perceptions.

The intuition for this is made clear in the final set of bars, where we show the coefficients of

[23] We continue to condition on individual characteristics but for expositional ease, do not show their contributions to explaining left-right differences.

reasoning of left and right-leaning respondents ($\widehat{\beta}_L$, $\widehat{\beta}_R$). The reason why differences in perceived societal contributions help explain the left-right gap is because for left-leaning respondents, there is a strong partial correlation between this perception and support for policies targeted towards Indians ($\widehat{\beta}_L > 0$, $p = .000$). Similarly, there is a strong partial correlation with the perception that Indians have few opportunities to earn a decent wage ($\widehat{\beta}_L > 0$, $p = .000$). In contrast, although there are large left-right differences in perceptions of discrimination faced by Indians, there is a weak partial correlation between this perception and policy support among both left- and right-leaning respondents (we cannot reject that β_L and β_R are both equal to zero).

The panels for Pakistanis and Black Caribbeans repeat the exercise for support for equal opportunities policies towards these outgroups. These show that for both groups: (i) left-right differences are again primarily explained by differences in perceptions of the societal contribution made by the outgroup, accounting for 50-80% of the left-right gap in policy support; (ii) left-leaning respondents do place weight on the perception that the outgroup has few wage opportunities, but this does not explain much of the left-right gap in support because this perception does not differ much for respondents across the political spectrum; (iii) other margins of perception generally do less to explain left-right differences in policy support.

We observe nuanced differences in reasoning by political leaning ($\widehat{\beta}_L - \widehat{\beta}_R$). More precisely: (i) the perceived contribution of groups always increases support for targeted policies among left-leaning respondents more than right-leaning respondents for all outgroups; (ii) left-leaning respondents are more sensitive than right-leaning respondents in their perception of employment shares among Pakistanis and Black Caribbeans in determining their support for targeted policies for those groups.[24]

The final panel decomposes support for equal opportunities policies for the White British ingroup. The first panel reiterates political cleavages in perceptions of the ingroup, but that these do not go in the same direction as for outgroups. Left-right differences in the extent to which the ingroup is perceived to provide a positive contribution to society explain 35% of the gap in policy support. Beyond that, other margins of perception generally do less to explain left-right differences in policy support targeted to the ingroup.[25]

The results help reconcile earlier findings that while the provision of detailed quantitative information about the extent of discrimination faced by minorities can adjust majority perceptions in that domain, this does not translate into support for targeted policies to tackle racial/ethnic inequalities [Haaland and Roth 2023, Schaefer *et al.* 2024]. Our results suggest an explanation: perceptions of discrimination faced by minorities do not actually factor strongly into their reasoning behind support for equal opportunities policies for outgroups (in contrast, their perception of

[24] These differences in reasoning are such that the null that $\beta_L = \beta_R$ for perceived contributions has a p-value of .000 for Indians and Pakistanis, and $p = .006$ for Black Caribbeans; for employment shares, the corresponding p-values are .082 for Pakistanis and .053 for Black Caribbeans.

[25] A share of left-right differences remain unexplained for each group, suggesting there are additional perceptions or beliefs that drive policy preferences, such as attitudes towards the role of government [Stantcheva 2024].

discrimination faced by the ingroup does factor into their reasoning for support for policies targeting the ingroup). The margins of perceptions most associated with support for targeted policies for outgroups among right-leaning respondents are if they perceive outgroups to lack opportunities, even though this is a margin on which left-right perceptions are not very different to begin with.

7 Discussion

Ethnic inequalities in economic outcomes are large and persistent. Understanding how inequalities and their causes are perceived is critical for determining which policies are considered appropriate and command general support to address them. Our contribution has been to study: (i) majority perceptions towards multiple minority groups, as well as majority perceptions towards their ingroup; (ii) perceptions along three interlinked domains: economic outcomes of minorities and opportunities available to them, the root causes of ethnic disadvantage, and policies to address them; (iii) the malleability of perceptions to light-touch narratives that either emphasize minorities' success or disadvantage. We document that the majority are generally sensitive to ethnic inequalities (even if their extent is misperceived), and supportive of non-targeted policies to address them. We show that even during a period of heightened political campaigning, narratives can shift perceptions of the majority, from across the political spectrum, towards outgroups and policy solutions to address inequalities, but that majority responses sometimes indicate zero-sum thinking. Both economic and cultural threat seem to be triggered more by information about minorities' success than their disadvantage.[26]

We conclude by briefly considering three further issues that our multi-group, multi-domain design allows us to probe. Each represents a starting point for future work.

7.1 Perceptions of Minorities

A first direction is to explore the extent to which the views of minorities differ from the majority, and minority views towards other minorities. Our sample was designed to focus on the majority population but from our nationally representative sample we were able to gather sufficiently sized samples to measure the perceptions of one of the largest minorities: Indians. Table 9 considers how White British and Indian groups view themselves and each other.

Panel A shows how the groups differ in perceptions of the societal contribution and economic outcomes of their and the other group. While both groups view the societal contribution of the White British equally, Indians view their own societal contribution significantly more positively

[26]The origin of zero-sum mindsets has long been discussed in social psychology [Meegan 2010, Davidai and Ongis 2019]. Our evidence and that from the US suggests such mindsets exist across political leanings [Chinoy *et al.* 2023]. Recent work in political economy shows such views can emerge among rational voters in the presence of distributional uncertainty and asymmetric information – individuals might strategically vote against policies supported by others out of concern of what their support means for themselves [Ali *et al.* 2025].

than does the majority ($p = .000$). On economic outcomes, Indians perceive graduate shares and employment rates of both groups to be higher than the corresponding perceptions of the majority. Hence the perceptions of Indians are closer to reality for their own group than the perceptions the majority hold towards Indians.

Panel B shows the groups have relatively similar views of opportunities they themselves face, and the opportunities available to the other group. The only difference is that no Indian respondents think that White British individuals lack opportunities to earn a decent wage, while 16% of White British think this is the case for their ingroup. On causes of disadvantage, Panel C shows the groups again have relatively similar views of what drives economic success in their own and the other group. The only significant difference is that while 43% of Indians think their disadvantage is due to bad luck, only 24% of White British think disadvantage for Indians is due to the same cause. Panel D shows that the groups have the most divergent views when it comes to support for equal opportunities policies, with each thinking such policies have not gone far enough for their own group, and gone too far for the other.

We extend this in Table 10 to consider how views of non-targeted policies to address inequalities vary across the groups, and how each responds to narratives. We do using a specification analogous to (3) to explore heterogeneity by group. In order to show coefficient estimates for both White British and Indian respondents, we set the Other White group of respondents as the omitted category. Among controls, we find divergences across groups in policy preferences, with Indians being more supportive of investing in education/training ($p = .064$) and financially supporting families with children ($p = .000$). This indicates a degree of self-interested reasoning given both Indians' educational success and their greater likelihood of living in families with children.

These policy preferences also respond to narratives. Indians exposed to the positive narrative (that informs them Indians are performing well in education, even if from poor backgrounds) become significantly less supportive of financially supporting families with children, entirely closing the gap with White British individuals. As documented earlier, support for teaching children about British values significantly rises among White British respondents exposed to the positive narrative. Indian respondents do not shift their support when exposed to the same narrative. However, Indian respondents exposed to the negative narrative – that informs them that other minorities are performing poorly in the labor market given levels of education, increase support for teaching children British values by 23pp, corresponding to 48% of the control mean for Indians, and indeed overtaking support for such policies among White British respondents (and actually reaching levels of support among right-leaning White British respondents).

Given Indians are not mentioned in the negative narrative, this finding is consistent with them holding hierarchical attitudes that regard other minorities as lacking in appropriate levels of integration that might generate the sorts of economic success Indians themselves enjoy. It is also consistent with an understanding of teaching British values as being necessary to correct perceived 'deficits' in other groups, as we discussed in relation to White British responses. All

this suggests directions for future research including on how minorities view other minorities. With increasing diversity of the UK, such inter-minority attitudes may form the basis of future social and political cleavages, and further justify a move away from an emphasis purely on a majority-minority dichotomy that has dominated research on intergroup attitudes to date.[27]

7.2 Polarization Within the Majority

Political leaning is a powerful force shaping perceptions about minority outgroups and policy solutions to them. We can use our data to speculate on future contestation over policies in this area if the majority UK population becomes politically polarized. We do so measuring the movement or stability of political views of the same individual over time, by combining information on past voting behavior in the 2019 General Election and future voting intention in the 2024 General Election, that saw the emergence of new right-wing populist parties. We classify individuals into those whose political views have shifted leftward, shifted rightward, or remained stable. We then examine how attitudes towards equal opportunities policies vary across individuals, with stable views being the omitted category.

The results are in Table 11. Among controls, relative to those with stable preferences: (i) those who moved rightward are significantly more likely to view equal opportunities policies as not having gone far enough for the ingroup, and to have gone too far for all minorities; (ii) those who moved leftward have similar policy views as those with stable preferences. On responsiveness to narratives we find: (i) across treatments and groups, the view that equal opportunities policies have not gone far enough is more impacted than the view they have gone too far; (ii) those moving rightward significantly reduce their support (even further) for such policies for all minorities when exposed to the negative narrative; (iii) in contrast, those with stable preferences tend to significantly increase support for such policies towards all minorities when exposed to the negative narrative; (iv) those who moved leftward tend to be unresponsive to narratives.

7.3 Perception Spillovers

Our design allows us to study whether the treatments generate spillovers in perceptions of other groups not named in the treatments. Such spillover effects have been little studied in the literature on perceptions of others or the wider literature on ingroup-outgroup biases [Bertrand and Duflo 2017, McConnell and Rasul 2021]. We do so for Polish and Black African groups, who as Figure A1 shows, constitute prominent minorities in the UK. Spillovers to these groups are interesting because they share the same race as groups named in the narratives, yet differ in their composition

[27] To illustrate, we consider how Indian respondents view their own outcomes and those of Pakistanis: (i) 41% of Indians view a lack of success for Pakistanis to be down to a lack of effort while 26% think it is due to bad lack; (ii) they have the opposite view of themselves: 12% of Indians view that disadvantage for their own group to be due to a lack of effort and 43% think it is due to bad lack; (iii) 30% of Indians view equal opportunities policies towards Pakistanis to have gone too far, while only 2% of Indians view such policies have gone too far for their own group.

of UK-born: 19% for Poles; 70% for Black Caribbeans versus 39% for Black Africans. The results are collated in Appendix C, where we find broad evidence of spillovers of the narratives on perceptions of these other groups. Understanding the extent to which perceptions are group-specific, or involve mental bracketing of groups together, is increasingly important as UK society becomes more diverse, and in the face of individuals selecting multiple groups to identify with.[28]

A Appendix

A.1 Survey Design and Validation

We discuss some of the issues raised by Stantcheva [2022] and Haaland *et al.* [2023] on the use of online survey experiments, approaches to establishing the validity of samples, ensuring the attention of participants, and validating data quality.

Design As with other online panels, *YouGov* incentivizes respondents with survey points for completing questionnaires, that can be redeemed for rewards. Earlier work has shown the similarity of o- ine and online respondents in political opinion surveys [Grewenig *et al.* 2018], and Haaland and Roth [2023] find similar survey experiment results from a representative online panel and a probability-based sample. As described in Stantcheva [2022], the literature is replete with examples validating self-reported beliefs in surveys with real world behaviors.

Following the recommendation of Haaland *et al.* [2023], in our study, the background of the 2024 General Election campaign offers a consistent priming context across treatments. However, to capture baseline responses including any priming effects of the survey introduction, we asked respondents up front (before the treatments were implemented) their views on: (i) vertical inequalities across domains; (ii) horizontal inequalities between groups. The results in Table A8 show that views among our respondents line up closely with other online surveys conducted either earlier in 2024 prior to the General Election being announced [Fairness Foundation 2024] or those conducted in other times of uncertainty such as the pandemic [Benson *et al.* 2024]. Specifically we find that: (i) the majority of respondents are concerned over vertical inequalities along any given dimension, with the top ranked dimension being inequalities in wealth and income (80%); (ii) horizontal inequalities along ethnic lines are considered the most pressing problem, likely reflecting in part the topic priming, but again at least 40% of respondents report concern on any given dimension of horizontal inequality.[29]

[28] Even in the US, the interpretation of Black-White gaps is becoming clouded over time without finer refinements of outgroups given that flows from Africa and the Caribbean constitute some of the fastest growing immigrant groups to the US [Hamilton 2019, Bayer *et al.* 2025].

[29] A *Fairness Foundation* survey, from which we took some questions, conducted in January 2024 on 2050 adults in the UK, found that: (i) the top ranked dimension of vertical inequality was also wealth and income, considered by 75% of respondents as being a big or moderate problem; (ii) 58% of respondents considered horizontal ethnic inequalities to be a big or moderate problem, ranked above concerns over other dimensions of inequality such as

Attention The modal survey response was received on 26th June 2024, eight days before the General Election. The median survey response time was just under 20 minutes across treatment arms, with a slightly longer right tail of response times for those exposed to the negative narrative. This survey length is similar to Alesina *et al.* [2024] where the median survey completion time was 21 minutes. To check for those that either rush through the survey or are clearly attentive, we redo our main analysis in Tables 2 to 9 dropping the bottom and top 2% of survey response times. Doing so, we find near identical results both for control means and treatment effects.

Biases Survey biases include: (i) moderacy, extreme response and acquiescence bias – relating to respondents following systematic response patterns irrespective of the question; (ii) experimenter demand effects (EDE) – where treated respondents form views about the experimenter's expectations that differs from controls; (iii) social desirability bias (SDB) – that stems from respondents' desire to project a positive self-image.

To check for (i) we measure the share of responses to which an individual reports 'don't know' or 'not sure', and the share of responses for which an extreme response is given. This is reported in Table A9. Columns 1 to 3 show that among White British respondents in the control group, on average 16% of responses are don't know or not sure. This does not change much with either treatment. Columns 4 to 6 show that for White British respondents around 24% of responses are at the extremes of available options, and this is relatively stable across treatments. The next row shows that minority respondents are less likely to report don't know or not sure when exposed to the negative narrative, and are more likely to report extreme responses in each treatment arm. The second panel repeats the analysis by political leaning of White British respondents. Political leaning does not strongly correlate to the proportion of don't know or not sure responses but as expected, centrists are less likely to provide extreme responses than left- and right-leaning individuals. The final panel considers response patterns by survey duration, comparing those in the top/bottom five percentiles in response time to others. Those with the fastest response time are significantly more likely to report don't know or not sure, but response time does not relate to the incidence of extreme responses.

Solutions to EDE and SDB are often quite similar. Online surveys relieve some forms of social pressure that can arise in face-to-face surveys as respondents take the survey in private. Anonymity has been argued be a powerful guard against such biases [Hoffman *et al.* 1994]. In our study, *YouGov* inform respondents of their data privacy and anonymity. Moreover, (i) the survey methodology literature indicates lower problems with SDB in online surveys [Tourangeau and Yan 2007]; (ii) fielding the study in the build-up to the General Election not only acted as a general prime, but was a period when a wide range of views were being expressed on issues relating to immigration, diminishing the influence of one specific norm.[30]

gender, religion, age and sexual identity [Fairness Foundation 2024].

[30]The *YouGov* policy is something all users read and consent to, and contains sections on *How and why we use*

As a further check, we exploit the fact that some of our questions are drawn from existing, high-quality, representative surveys. Following the suggestion in Stantcheva [2023], we use these as benchmarks and this serves as an extra validation beyond the comparison of socioeconomic characteristics. Table A10 shows how our responses align with ones from the surveys from which we took questions. These comparisons are made for the most recent survey and we note they sometimes refer to racial groups, rather than the fine-grained ethnic groups we base our analysis on. In most cases the outside estimates and our control means are well aligned.

A.2 Spillovers

Which Groups are a Minority? We find strong spillover effects in the recognition of other groups as minorities even if they are not referred to in the treatments. Table C1 shows results for the complete set of outgroups asked about, collating groups by the broader categorization of race, and showing p-values on tests of equality of treatment effects across groups. Minority groups referred to in the narratives are significantly more likely to be recognized as minorities, irrespective of whether respondents are exposed to the positive or negative narrative. The magnitudes of impacts are non-trivial, ranging from 12% to 16% increases over controls. Somewhat surprisingly, 23% of controls view the White British ingroup as a minority. Treatments do not shift this view.

Within White groups, there is heterogeneity in the extent to which groups are recognized as minorities: 14% of respondents view the Irish as a minority, but 32% view Poles as a minority. Both treatments increase the recognition of Poles as a minority. The treatments increase the recognition of all Asian and Black groups as minorities, even those not named in the narratives. Within Asian and Black groups, a similar share of respondents recognize each specific group as a minority, and treatment effects are also similar. Hence except for White groups, there is little to suggest major divergences in how groups within the broader Asian and Black categories are perceived, despite large differences within categories in the economic standing of groups.

Societal Contribution Table C2 shows the perceived societal contributions of all groups: Poles are perceived to have a contribution closest to the ingroup. The contribution of Black Africans (5.5) is also very similar to that of Black Caribbeans (5.6). These perceptions are not impacted by the treatments.

Economic Outcomes Figure C1 shows a strong similarity of results in relation to perceptions of economic outcomes for other groups. The upper panel in Figure C1 shows the extent of (mis)perceptions of the economic outcomes for Polish and Black African men. For Poles, the misperception on each outcome is very similar to that for the White British ingroup. For Black

your personal data, *How we store and protect your personal data*, and make clear that data collected is used to produce aggregated and anonymous research. Further details are available here: https://account.yougov.com/gb-en/account/privacy-policy.

Africans, perceived graduation and employment rates are very similar to those towards Black Caribbeans, and the direction and extent of misperceptions are also similar. The lower panel in Figure A1 shows (mis)perceptions of economic outcomes for women across these other groups. There largely replicate findings for other outgroups of women, with graduation rates being more severely underestimated than for employment rates.

Table C3 shows that the treatment effects of the narratives can spillover onto other groups. Specifically, the perceived graduate shares of Black African men and women both rise in response to the positive narrative. Table C4 shows treatment effects of the narratives on perceived employment shares are weak, although there is a differential impact of the positive and negative narrative on beliefs about employment shares of Black African men ($p = .036$).

On opportunities, Table C5 shows there to be a lack of opportunities for Poles to a similar extent as for the ingroup, and that Black Africans face more limited opportunities and to the same extent as Black Caribbeans. In line with the main results, views of outgroup opportunities are not impacted by the treatments.

Causes The majority view of luck versus effort as being responsible for poor outcomes differs between outgroups. Table C5 shows that the majority think that poor outcomes for Poles are more due to bad luck rather than effort (27% versus 11%, $p = .000$). For Black Africans the reverse is true but the difference is less pronounced (17% versus 21%, $p = .036$) Hence the majority view Poles as similar to Indians, and Black Africans as similar to Black Caribbeans. As with other groups, neither treatment shifts perceptions of underlying causes.

Table C7 shows that other groups are also seen to face discrimination. We see very different treatment effects for Polish men and even more so for women – reinforcing the earlier notion of zero sum thinking, that applies to White British specifically (not to other Whites). The upper panel in Table C7 shows in response to the positive narrative, there is an increased perception of labor market discrimination that Polish men face (as for White British men), and narratives do not shift perceptions of the discrimination faced by Black African men (similar to the null impacts for Black Caribbean men). The lower panel shows null impacts on women but differences between Polish and White British women.

Policies Table C8 shows the results on equal opportunities policies for Poles are similar to those for White British in that the positive narrative increases the view that such policies have gone too far for this group. The results for Black Africans align with those for Black Caribbeans in that the negative narrative increases the view that such policies have not gone far enough for this group.

A.3 Online Appendix: Additional Questions

The online Appendix collates additional results for survey questions not discussed in the main text: https://www.homepages.ucl.ac.uk/~uctpimr/research/Polling_WebAppendix.pdf

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Table 1: Majority Attitudes Towards Minorities, Control Group

Regression estimates, robust standard errors, p-values in brackets

	Ethnic Diversity				Causes		Policies	
	Think inequalities between ethnic groups are a big or moderate problem?		Think ethnic diversity generally has a positive impact on life		Believe that racial discrimination is a big or moderate problem		Agree that government should aim to reduce the economic differences between White British and ethnic minority families?	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Age	.000	.002	-.004***	-.001	-.000	.002*	-.004***	-.002*
	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)
Female	.104***	.108***	.024	.024	.098***	.081**	.074**	.060*
	(.033)	(.034)	(.032)	(.030)	(.034)	(.034)	(.033)	(.034)
Undergraduate or higher	.119***	.072*	.223***	.148***	.098***	.047	.151***	.107***
	(.037)	(.037)	(.037)	(.035)	(.037)	(.036)	(.037)	(.037)
Gross HH Income £25K-£50K	-.048	-.055	.083*	.065	.019	.008	.034	.022
	(.050)	(.049)	(.049)	(.044)	(.052)	(.050)	(.051)	(.049)
Gross HH Income >£50K	-.022	-.036	.129**	.106**	-.013	-.023	.028	.018
	(.057)	(.055)	(.058)	(.051)	(.060)	(.054)	(.059)	(.056)
Political Leaning - Centre		-.244***		-.360***		-.325***		-.258***
		(.041)		(.037)		(.036)		(.044)
Political Leaning - Right		-.364***		-.680***		-.611***		-.527***
		(.068)		(.045)		(.056)		(.060)
Centre = Right		[.048]		[.000]		[.000]		[.000]
Mean outcome	.618	.618	.447	.447	.632	.632	.487	.487
Other control variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Test of covariates		.000		.000		.000		.000
Observations	1078	1078	1078	1078	1078	1078	1078	1078

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. We report OLS regression results for respondents in the Control arm. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile, and robust standard errors are reported. The dependent variable in Columns 1, 2, 5 and 6 is a dummy equal to one if the respondent answers either 'a big problem' or 'a moderate problem'. In Columns 3 and 4 the dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the respondent answers either 'very positive' or 'fairly positive'. The dependent variable in Columns 7 and 8 is a dummy equal to one if the respondent answers either 'strongly agree' or 'agree'. Other control variables include a dummy for being married/in a civil partnership, a dummy for residing in an urban area, and a dummy for home ownership. The omitted category for Political Leaning is respondents that report as left-leaning. Left-leaning respondents are those that report being 'very left-wing' and 'fairly left-wing'. Centre-leaning respondents combine those that report being 'centre', 'slightly left-of-centre' and 'slightly right-of-centre'. Right-leaning respondents are those that report being 'very right-wing' and 'fairly right-wing'. At the foot of Columns 2, 4, 6 and 8, the test of covariates reports the p-value on a Wald test of the equivalence of reported coefficients between the specifications with and without controlling for the political leaning of respondents.

Table 2: Contribution to Society

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets

	(1) Control Mean	(2) Δ Positive Narrative	(3) Δ Negative Narrative	[2 = 3]
Do you think the following groups generally make a positive or negative contribution to the UK? Please answer on the following scale, where 0 means 'very negative' and 10 means 'very positive'.				
Indian	6.13	-.050	.018	[.606]
	(.089)	(.128)	(.130)	
Pakistani	5.13	.078	.123	[.750]
	(.100)	(.141)	(.143)	
Black Caribbean	5.59	.068	.095	[.840]
	(.095)	(.132)	(.138)	
White British	7.33	-.119	-.186*	[.518]
	(.072)	(.100)	(.105)	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. We report OLS regressions results of each outcome, a constant and treatment dummies. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile, and robust standard errors are reported. The minority groups in the positive (Indian, Pakistani) and negative (Pakistani, Black Caribbean) narrative are highlighted. Respondents could also answer ‘not sure’. The share of respondents that answered ‘not sure’ in the top panel is .09, .11, .12 and .14 for White British, Indian, Pakistani and Black Caribbean, respectively.

Table 3: Economic Outcomes of Men

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets

A. Graduate Shares

	(1) Quarterly Labor Force Survey	(2) Control Mean	[1 = 2]	(3) Δ Positive Narrative	(4) Δ Negative Narrative	[3 = 4]
Out of 100 men above the age of 25 in the UK from each of the following groups, roughly how many do you think have a university degree?						
Indian	.645	.355	[.000]	.034***	.006	[.016]
		(.008)		(.011)	(.011)	
Pakistani	.421	.260	[.000]	.038***	-.011	[.000]
		(.007)		(.010)	(.010)	
Black Caribbean	.231	.211	[.000]	.013	-.002	[.088]
		(.006)		(.008)	(.008)	
White British	.329	.360	[.000]	-.009	-.001	[.394]
		(.006)		(.009)	(.009)	

B. Employment Rates

	(1) 1 - Unem. rate	(1b) Share working	(2) Control Mean	[1 = 2]	(3) Δ Positive Narrative	(4) Δ Negative Narrative	[3 = 4]
Out of 100 men of working age in the UK from each of the following groups, roughly how many would you say are working?							
Indian	.943	.830	.784	[.000]	.018*	-.010	[.007]
			(.007)		(.010)	(.011)	
Pakistani	.921	.709	.760	[.000]	.010	-.023**	[.003]
			(.008)		(.010)	(.012)	
Black Caribbean	.914	.645	.742	[.000]	-.008	-.019*	[.303]
			(.007)		(.010)	(.012)	
White British	.960	.789	.724	[.000]	.001	.000	[.938]
			(.006)		(.009)	(.010)	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. We report OLS regressions results of each outcome, a constant and treatment dummies. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile, and robust standard errors are reported. The minority groups in the positive (Indian, Pakistani) and negative (Pakistani, Black Caribbean) narrative are highlighted. Columns 1 and 1b report minority group estimates for men constructed from the Quarterly Labour Force Survey from April 2023-March 2024.

Table 4: Opportunities

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets

	(1) Control Mean	(2) Δ Positive Narrative	(3) Δ Negative Narrative	[2 = 3]	(4) Control Mean	(5) Δ Positive Narrative	(6) Δ Negative Narrative	[5 = 6]	(7) Control Mean	(8) Δ Positive Narrative	(9) Δ Negative Narrative	[8 = 9]
Do the following groups have few or no opportunities to...where you live?												
		Get a good education				**Get a job**				**Earn a decent wage**		
Indian	.103	-.027*	.004	[.035]	.139	-.003	-.007	[.788]	.200	.010	.007	[.869]
	(.010)	(.014)	(.015)		(.012)	(.017)	(.017)		(.014)	(.020)	(.020)	
Pakistani	.131	-.025	.019	[.009]	.175	-.015	.000	[.394]	.256	-.013	-.011	[.938]
	(.011)	(.015)	(.017)		(.013)	(.018)	(.019)		(.015)	(.021)	(.021)	
Black Caribbean	.153	-.012	.011	[.184]	.198	-.005	-.021	[.393]	.282	.015	-.014	[.185]
	(.012)	(.017)	(.018)		(.014)	(.019)	(.019)		(.015)	(.022)	(.022)	
White British	.066	.006	-.026**	[.007]	.097	.035**	-.018	[.001]	.156	.042**	-.013	[.004]
	(.009)	(.013)	(.011)		(.010)	(.016)	(.014)		(.013)	(.019)	(.018)	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. We report OLS regressions results of each outcome, a constant and treatment dummies. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile, and robust standard errors are reported. The minority groups in the positive (Indian, Pakistani) and negative (Pakistani, Black Caribbean) narrative are highlighted. Respondents could answer each question with plenty, some, few or no opportunities, or don't know. We combine few and no opportunities for each outcome.

Table 5: Luck vs Effort

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets

	Luck vs Effort Control Means [1] = [5]	(1) Control Mean	(2) Δ Positive Narrative	(3) Δ Negative Narrative	[2 = 3]	(5) Control Mean	(6) Δ Positive Narrative	(7) Δ Negative Narrative	[6 = 7]
Does lack of effort or bad luck generally have more to do with whether a person from each of the following groups is unsuccessful?									
			Bad luck				**Lack of Effort**		
Indian	[.000]	.240	-.009	.005	[.479]	.128	.005	-.015	[.229]
		(.015)	(.020)	(.021)		(.012)	(.017)	(.017)	
Pakistani	[.975]	.186	.011	.007	[.805]	.187	-.000	-.001	[.962]
		(.014)	(.019)	(.019)		(.014)	(.019)	(.019)	
Black Caribbean	[.216]	.174	-.019	.003	[.210]	.197	.010	-.005	[.448]
		(.013)	(.018)	(.019)		(.014)	(.020)	(.020)	
White British	[.000]	.074	.009	-.012	[.091]	.339	.026	-.000	[.259]
		(.009)	(.013)	(.013)		(.016)	(.023)	(.023)	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. We report OLS regressions results of each outcome, a constant and treatment dummies. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile, and robust standard errors are reported. The minority groups in the positive (Indian, Pakistani) and negative (Pakistani, Black Caribbean) narrative are highlighted. Respondents could answer the question with bad luck, a lack of effort, an equal mix of both or don't know.

Table 6: Labor Market Discrimination

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses p-values in brackets

	(1) Control Mean	(2) Δ Positive Narrative	(3) Δ Negative Narrative	[2 = 3]
Imagine that the following men applied for a job, which they were qualified for. Please rank them based on how likely you think they would be to be turned down for the job.				
Indian	3.08	-.085	.129*	[.002]
	(.049)	(.068)	(.073)	
Pakistani	3.81	-.136*	.055	[.014]
	(.059)	(.080)	(.082)	
Black Caribbean	4.00	-.060	.043	[.239]
	(.062)	(.086)	(.089)	
White British	1.96	.245***	.012	[.013]
	(.062)	(.089)	(.091)	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. We report OLS regressions results of each outcome, a constant and treatment dummies. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile, and robust standard errors are reported. The minority groups in the positive (Indian, Pakistani) and negative (Pakistani, Black Caribbean) narrative are highlighted. Respondents could also answer the question with 'not sure'. The share of respondents that answered 'not sure' is .16, .21, .22 and .23 for White British, Indian, Pakistani and Black Caribbean men, respectively.

Table 7: Equal Opportunities Policy

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets

	(1) Control Mean	(2) Δ Positive Narrative	(3) Δ Negative Narrative	[2 = 3]	(4) Control Mean	(5) Δ Positive Narrative	(6) Δ Negative Narrative	[5 = 6]
Have attempts to give equal opportunities to the following groups gone too far or not gone far enough?								
		Not far enough				**Gone too far**		
Indian	.179	-.007	.037*	[.017]	.176	.030	-.006	[.069]
	(.012)	(.017)	(.019)		(.013)	(.019)	(.019)	
Pakistani	.202	-.007	.036*	[.023]	.210	.027	-.009	[.075]
	(.013)	(.018)	(.020)		(.014)	(.020)	(.020)	
Black Caribbean	.236	.022	.045**	[.267]	.200	.018	-.015	[.099]
	(.014)	(.020)	(.021)		(.014)	(.020)	(.020)	
White British	.238	.005	.002	[.897]	.037	.020*	.023**	[.795]
	(.015)	(.021)	(.021)		(.006)	(.010)	(.010)	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. We report OLS regressions results of each outcome, a constant and treatment dummies. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile, and robust standard errors are reported. The minority groups in the positive (Indian, Pakistani) and negative (Pakistani, Black Caribbean) narrative are highlighted. Respondents could also answer the question with ‘about right’ or ‘don't know’.

Table 8: Non-targeted Policies

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets

	(1) Control Mean	(2) Δ Positive Narrative	(3) Δ Negative Narrative	[2 = 3]	(4) Control Mean	(5) Δ Positive Narrative	(6) Δ Negative Narrative	[5 = 6]
How much difference do you think the government could make in reducing inequalities between ethnic groups from the following actions?								
		Great deal/fair amount				**Not much/none**		
Investing more in education and training	.703	.021	.014	[.757]	.186	.010	-.002	[.544]
	(.016)	(.022)	(.023)		(.013)	(.020)	(.019)	
Teach children more about British values	.515	.071***	.022	[.042]	.362	-.027	-.030	[.903]
	(.017)	(.024)	(.024)		(.016)	(.023)	(.023)	
Supported families with children more financially	.495	.011	.046*	[.155]	.360	.004	-.037	[.076]
	(.017)	(.024)	(.024)		(.016)	(.023)	(.023)	
Increasing penalties for discriminating against groups	.475	-.013	.014	[.260]	.386	.039	-.003	[.084]
	(.017)	(.024)	(.024)		(.017)	(.024)	(.024)	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. We report OLS regressions results of each outcome, a constant and treatment dummies. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile, and robust standard errors are reported. The minority groups in the positive (Indian, Pakistani) and negative (Pakistani, Black Caribbean) narrative are highlighted. Respondents could also answer 'don't know'.

Table 9: Opportunities, Causes and Policies

Means, standard deviation in parentheses, p-values in brackets

		Respondent:	(1) White British	(2) Indian	[1 = 2]
A. Perceptions					
Do you think the following groups generally make a positive or negative contribution to the UK? Please answer on the following scale, where 0 means 'very negative' and 10 means 'very positive'.					
	Group asked about:	*White British*	7.33	6.99	[.293]
		Indian	6.13	8.00	[.000]
Out of 100 men above the age of 25 in the UK from each of the following groups, roughly how many do you think have a university degree?					
	Group asked about:	*White British*	.360	.453	[.007]
		Indian	.355	.582	[.000]
Out of 100 men above the age of 25 in the UK from each of the following groups, roughly how many do you say are working?					
	Group asked about:	*White British*	.724	.728	[.873]
		Indian	.784	.850	[.003]
B. Opportunities					
Do the following groups have few or no opportunities to...where you live?					
	Group asked about: White British	*Get a good education*	.066	.056	[.769]
		Get a job	.097	.101	[.938]
		Earn a decent wage	.156	.000	[.000]
	Group asked about: Indian	*Get a good education*	.103	.076	[.484]
		Get a job	.139	.148	[.872]
		Earn a decent wage	.200	.128	[.171]
C. Causes					
Does lack of effort or bad luck generally have more to do with whether a person from each of the following groups is unsuccessful?					
	Group asked about: White British	*Bad luck*	.074	.091	[.757]
		Lack of Effort	.339	.412	[.358]
	Group asked about: Indian	*Bad luck*	.240	.432	[.022]
		Lack of Effort	.128	.117	[.815]
D. Policies					
Have attempts to give equal opportunities to the following groups gone…					
	Group asked about: White British	*Not far enough*	.238	.069	[.000]
		Gone too far	.037	.247	[.002]
	Group asked about: Indian	*Not far enough*	.179	.450	[.001]
		Gone too far	.176	.023	[.000]

Notes: The sample is restricted to White British and Indian respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile. The p-values are calculated from an OLS regression for each outcome on a constant and a full set of treatment dummy interactions with ethnic group, where robust standard errors are calculated. In Panel B, respondents could answer each question with plenty, some, few or no opportunities, or don't know. We combine few and no opportunities for each outcome. In Panel C, respondents could answer the question with bad luck, a lack of effort, an equal mix of both or don't know. In Panel D, respondents could also answer the question with 'about right' or 'don't know'.

Table 10: Non-targeted Policies

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets

	(1) Control Mean	(2) Δ Positive Narrative	(3) Δ Negative Narrative	[2 = 3]	(4) Control Mean	(5) Δ Positive Narrative	(6) Δ Negative Narrative	[5 = 6]
How much difference do you think the government could make in reducing inequalities between ethnic groups from the following actions?								
	Great deal/fair amount				**Not much/none**			
Investing more in education and training								
Indian	.826	-.154	.087	[.013]	.098	.212**	-.038	[.008]
	(.065)	(.110)	(.075)		(.057)	(.105)	(.066)	
White British	.703	.021	.014	[.757]	.186	.010	-.002	[.544]
	(.016)	(.023)	(.023)		(.013)	(.020)	(.019)	
WB=I	*[.064]*	*[.119]*	*[.351]*		*[.131]*	*[.059]*	*[.600]*	
Teach children more about British values								
Indian	.470	.009	.227**	[.048]	.433	.047	-.175*	[.042]
	(.080)	(.120)	(.102)		(.083)	(.123)	(.102)	
White British	.515	.071***	.022	[.042]	.362	-.027	-.030	[.903]
	(.017)	(.024)	(.025)		(.016)	(.023)	(.023)	
WB=I	*[.580]*	*[.616]*	*[.051]*		*[.401]*	*[.551]*	*[.167]*	
Supported families with children more financially								
Indian	.768	-.302***	-.136	[.147]	.157	.248**	.113	[.205]
	(.070)	(.114)	(.099)		(.063)	(.107)	(.090)	
White British	.495	.011	.046*	[.155]	.360	.004	-.037	[.076]
	(.017)	(.024)	(.025)		(.016)	(.023)	(.023)	
WB=I	*[.000]*	*[.007]*	*[.073]*		*[.002]*	*[.025]*	*[.107]*	
Increasing penalties for discriminating against groups								
Indian	.605	.053	.160	[.318]	.298	-.041	-.113	[.469]
	(.082)	(.119)	(.103)		(.082)	(.116)	(.100)	
White British	.475	-.013	.014	[.261]	.386	.039	-.003	[.084]
	(.017)	(.024)	(.024)		(.017)	(.024)	(.024)	
WB=I	*[.123]*	*[.582]*	*[.171]*		*[.289]*	*[.502]*	*[.282]*	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. The sample is restricted to White British, Indian and Other White respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile. All estimates are derived from OLS regressions of the corresponding response variable on a treatment dummy variable fully interacted with a categorical variable for ethnic group. Robust standard errors are reported. The minority group in the positive (Indian) narrative are highlighted. Respondents could also answer 'don't know'.

Table 11: Polarization and Equal Opportunities Policy

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets

	(1) Control Mean	(2) Δ Positive Narrative	(3) Δ Negative Narrative	[2 = 3]	(4) Control Mean	(5) Δ Positive Narrative	(6) Δ Negative Narrative	[5 = 6]
Have attempts to give equal opportunities to the following groups gone too far or not gone far enough?								
		Not far enough				**Gone too far**		
Indian								
Baseline	.204	.012	.085**	[.027]	.136	.010	-.010	[.466]
	(.021)	(.029)	(.033)		(.020)	(.028)	(.028)	
x Moved to right	-.097***	-.040	-.131***	[.034]	.166***	.141**	.066	[.257]
	(.033)	(.043)	(.046)		(.043)	(.063)	(.065)	
x Moved to left	.050	.049	.028	[.783]	.006	-.043	-.067	[.621]
	(.044)	(.067)	(.071)		(.048)	(.060)	(.057)	
Pakistani								
Baseline	.223	.021	.090***	[.042]	.150	.021	-.009	[.311]
	(.021)	(.030)	(.034)		(.021)	(.029)	(.029)	
x Moved to right	-.111***	-.039	-.104**	[.171]	.232***	.095	.065	[.663]
	(.033)	(.045)	(.049)		(.046)	(.065)	(.068)	
x Moved to left	.055	.059	.040	[.794]	.038	-.073	-.112*	[.437]
	(.046)	(.069)	(.072)		(.049)	(.062)	(.058)	
Black Caribbean								
Baseline	.261	.052	.098***	[.214]	.155	.011	-.025	[.202]
	(.022)	(.033)	(.035)		(.021)	(.029)	(.029)	
x Moved to right	-.082**	-.048	-.126**	[.176]	.203***	.071	.057	[.840]
	(.039)	(.056)	(.057)		(.046)	(.065)	(.067)	
x Moved to left	.079	.029	-.009	[.624]	.009	-.053	-.071	[.719]
	(.049)	(.073)	(.075)		(.048)	(.061)	(.058)	
White British								
Baseline	.218	-.043	-.046	[.915]	.034	.038**	.027	[.605]
	(.023)	(.030)	(.031)		(.010)	(.017)	(.017)	
x Moved to right	.136***	.120*	.099	[.748]	.015	.006	-.023	[.446]
	(.047)	(.065)	(.068)		(.020)	(.037)	(.029)	
x Moved to left	.013	.011	.036	[.689]	-.000	-.050*	-.013	[.243]
	(.051)	(.067)	(.067)		(.019)	(.027)	(.031)	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. We report OLS regressions results of each outcome, a constant and treatment dummies. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile, and robust standard errors are reported. The minority groups in the positive (Indian, Pakistani) and negative (Pakistani, Black Caribbean) narrative are highlighted. Respondents could also answer the question with 'about right' or 'don't know'. We measure the drift leftward or rightward or stability of political views of individuals by combining information on past voting behavior in the 2019 General Election and future voting intention in the 2024 General Election.

Figure 1: Perceived Economic Outcomes of Men by Minority Group

A. Graduate Shares



B. Employment Shares



Notes: The left hand side of each panel reports means for respondents in the Control arm and the estimates from constructed from Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS) from April 2023-March 2024. The right hand side shows the distribution of misperception for respondents in the Control arm. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile. We calculate the degree of misperception by taking the control mean and subtracting the group estimates from the QLFS. Hence positive misperceptions imply the control mean is higher than the group estimate.

Figure 2: Distribution of Perceptions of Economic Outcomes of Men

A. Graduate Shares



B. Employment Shares



Notes: Each panel displays the difference in the distribution of perceptions between control and positive narrative arm, and control and negative narrative arm by minority group. All estimates are derived from OLS regressions of the corresponding response variable on a treatment dummy variable, and the treatment dummy variable interacted with a categorical variable for percentile which the response belongs to within the survey arm that the respondent was assigned to. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile.

Figure 3: Reasoning Behind Support for Equal Opportunities Policy



Notes: In each figure, the left panel displays the coefficient on each of the variables in the control arm and the right panel displays the corresponding treatment effect on the variable in positive and negative arms, where the outcome variable is support for whether equal opportunities policy for a given group has not gone far enough. All estimates are derived from OLS regression of the support for whether equal opportunity policies for a given group has not gone far enough on a treatment dummy variable, individual explanatory variables for the group and the treatment dummy variable interacted with the explanatory variables. The regression also includes the following controls not displayed: age, gender, education, income, home ownership and urban/rural area. Contribution, graduate shares, employment shares and discrimination: often are standardized using mean and standard errors in the control arm. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile and robust standard errors are used.

Figure 4: Decomposing Left-Right Support for Equal Opportunities Policy



Notes: The left figures in each panel shows the raw difference between left and right leaning respondents for each of the perceptions. The central and right panels show results from a Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition of support for equal opportunity policy for a group, between left leaning and right leaning respondents in the control arm. The central figure shows the share of the overall difference in support for equal opportunities policy explained by differences in each of the variables and the right figure in each panel displays the coefficients for each variable when support for equal opportunity policy is regressed on them interacted with the political leaning measure all respondents. The decomposition also includes the following other variables not displayed - age, gender, education, income, home ownership and urban/rural area. Contribution, graduate shares, employment shares and discrimination: often are standardized using mean and standard errors in the control arm. The sample is restricted to White British respondents and control arm, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile and robust standard errors are used.

Table A1: Balance on Respondent Characteristics

Means, standard deviation in parentheses, p-values in brackets

	(1) 2021 Census	(2) Control Mean	(3) Positive Narrative	(4) Negative Narrative	[1 = 2]	[2 = 3]	[2 = 4]	[3 = 4]
Observations		1078	1098	1029				
A. Demographics								
Age	43.0	50.3	51.7	50.6	[.000]	[.102]	[.747]	[.185]
		(17.7)	(17.2)	(17.4)				
Female	.509	.497	.507	.547	[.518]	[.694]	[.042]	[.097]
Married	.435	.571	.560	.573	[.000]	[.649]	[.950]	[.607]
Born in UK	.974	.951	.961	.964	[.004]	[.315]	[.208]	[.779]
Urban	.824	.739	.721	.733	[.000]	[.408]	[.785]	[.589]
Home owner	.684	.589	.575	.595	[.000]	[.562]	[.787]	[.396]
B. Education, Employment and Income								
Undergraduate or higher	.339	.287	.258	.289	[.000]	[.160]	[.893]	[.131]
Employed	.587	.393	.397	.405	[.000]	[.878]	[.626]	[.737]
Gross HH Income Below £25K	.340	.340	.330	.312	[.978]	[.697]	[.278]	[.474]
Gross HH Income Between £25K-£50K	.329	.341	.355	.359	[.509]	[.575]	[.485]	[.875]
Gross HH Income Above £50K	.331	.319	.315	.329	[.472]	[.861]	[.694]	[.574]

Notes: We report descriptive statistics for the sample of White British respondents, where observations are reweighted to fit the national profile. The p-values are calculated from an OLS regression for each outcome on a constant and treatment dummies, where robust standard errors are calculated. Undergraduate or higher includes respondents with at least a university or CNAA first degree (e.g. BA, BSc, BEd.). Column 1 reports outcomes for the White British population as estimated for the 2021 Census, unless otherwise stated. Gross Household income figures are calculated using 2022-23 Households Below Average Income (HBAI) dataset.

Table A2: Balance on Political Preferences of Respondents

Means, standard deviation in parentheses, p-values in brackets

	(1) Control Mean	(2) Positive Narrative	(3) Negative Narrative	[1 = 2]	[1 = 3]	[2 = 3]
Observations	1078	1098	1029			
A. Political Leaning						
Right	.088	.119	.102	[.029]	[.314]	[.247]
Centre	.482	.441	.455	[.087]	[.276]	[.557]
Left	.163	.169	.168	[.697]	[.736]	[.964]
B. Voting Intentions for General Election 2024						
Planning to Vote	.891	.878	.877	[.461]	[.426]	[.948]
Planning to Vote Labour	.336	.333	.325	[.911]	[.659]	[.740]
Planning to Vote Conservative	.146	.155	.139	[.600]	[.727]	[.381]
Planning to Vote Reform	.188	.193	.173	[.785]	[.473]	[.316]
Planning to Vote Liberal Democrat	.087	.086	.091	[.962]	[.784]	[.748]
Planning to Vote Green	.062	.053	.070	[.434]	[.505]	[.155]
Planning to Vote Some Other Party	.182	.180	.201	[.898]	[.353]	[.288]
C. General Election 2019						
Voted	.795	.818	.788	[.264]	[.746]	[.152]
Voted Conservative	.462	.472	.462	[.692]	[.988]	[.708]
Voted Labour	.294	.297	.278	[.902]	[.508]	[.428]
Voted Liberal Democrat	.104	.100	.123	[.833]	[.263]	[.177]
Voted Green	.021	.023	.035	[.763]	[.102]	[.188]
Voted Brexit Party	.029	.026	.011	[.739]	[.016]	[.028]
Voted Some Other Party	.090	.081	.091	[.540]	[.965]	[.523]
D. EU Referendum 2016						
Voted	.783	.800	.784	[.446]	[.988]	[.460]
Voted Leave	.537	.559	.550	[.380]	[.614]	[.725]

Notes: We report descriptive statistics for the sample of White British respondents, where observations are reweighted to fit the national profile. The p-values are calculated from an OLS regression for each outcome on a constant and treatment dummies, where robust standard errors are calculated. In Panel A, left-leaning respondents are those that report being 'very left-wing' and 'fairly left-wing'. Centre-leaning respondents combine those that report being 'centre', 'slightly left-of-centre' and 'slightly right-of-centre'. Right-leaning respondents are those that report being 'very right-wing' and 'fairly right-wing'. In Panel B, 'planning to vote for some other party' includes respondents that answered 'don't know'.

Table A3: Robustness of Majority Attitudes Towards Minorities, Controls

Regression estimates, robust standard errors, p-values in brackets

	Ethnic Diversity				Causes		Policies	
	To what extent, if at all, do you think inequalities between ethnic groups are a problem?		Think ethnic diversity generally has a positive impact on life		Believe that racial discrimination is a big or moderate problem		Agree that government should aim to reduce economic differences between White British and ethnic minority families?	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Age	.001	.001	-.003**	-.002**	.002	.001	-.003**	-.001
	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)
Female	.097***	.091***	.010	.003	.083**	.067**	.061*	.054*
	(.033)	(.033)	(.031)	(.030)	(.032)	(.032)	(.032)	(.031)
UK born	.007	-.018	-.183**	-.228***	-.014	-.064	-.101	-.138
	(.085)	(.089)	(.071)	(.075)	(.074)	(.078)	(.081)	(.085)
Undergraduate or higher	.081**	.100***	.145***	.168***	.033	.057	.068*	.097***
	(.038)	(.037)	(.037)	(.035)	(.036)	(.035)	(.036)	(.035)
Gross HH Income £25K-£50K	-.055	-.051	.071	.058	.010	.013	.028	.024
	(.050)	(.050)	(.048)	(.046)	(.051)	(.049)	(.049)	(.046)
Gross HH Income >£50K	-.023	-.027	.129**	.104*	-.012	-.024	.034	.014
	(.056)	(.056)	(.056)	(.054)	(.057)	(.056)	(.056)	(.054)
2019 General Election: Conservative	-.197***		-.345***		-.368***		-.364***	
	(.045)		(.044)		(.043)		(.045)	
2019 General Election: Liberal Democrat	-.004		-.071		-.105*		-.031	
	(.062)		(.066)		(.064)		(.065)	
2019 General Election: Brexit Party	-.213*		-.383***		-.502***		-.211*	
	(.127)		(.112)		(.112)		(.127)	
2024 General Election: Conservative		-.125**		-.245***		-.285***		-.492***
		(.058)		(.053)		(.058)		(.046)
2024 General Election: Liberal Democrat		.032		.096*		.040		-.037
		(.059)		(.057)		(.053)		(.064)
2024 General Election: Reform		-.166***		-.437***		-.381***		-.400***
		(.054)		(.044)		(.052)		(.050)
Voted Brexit = Voted Conservative	[.903]		[.726]		[.229]		[.220]	
Voted Reform = Voted Conservative		[.528]		[.000]		[.127]		[.068]
Mean outcome	.618	.618	.447	.447	.632	.632	.487	.487
Other control variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Test of covariates		.466		.391		.149		.323
Observations	1078	1078	1078	1078	1078	1078	1078	1078

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. We report OLS regression results for respondents in the Control arm. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile, and robust standard errors are reported. The dependent variable in Columns 1, 2, 5 and 6 is a dummy equal to one if the respondent answers either 'a big problem' or 'a moderate problem'. In Columns 3 and 4 the dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the respondent answers either 'very positive' or 'fairly positive'. The dependent variable in Columns 7 and 8 is a dummy equal to one if the respondent answers either 'strongly agree' or 'agree'. Other control variables include a dummy for being married/in a civil partnership, a dummy for residing in an urban area, and a dummy for home ownership. The coefficients for categories that includes respondents with missing voting information and respondents that voted some other party are not displayed in the table but were included in the regression. At the foot of Columns 1, 3, 5, and 7 we report the p-value on a test of the equality of having voted for the Brexit Party and voted for the Conservative Party in the 2019 General Election. At the foot of Columns 2, 4, 6 and 8 we report the p-value on a test of the equality of intending to vote for the Reform Party and intending to vote for the Conservative Party in the 2024 General Election.

Table A4: Correlates of Perceptions of Economic Outcomes of Minority Men

Regression estimates, robust standard errors, p-values in brackets

	Graduate Share				Employment Rate			
	(1) White British	(2) Indian	(3) Pakistani	(4) Black Carribean	(5) White British	(6) Indian	(7) Pakistani	(8) Black Carribean
Age	-.001***	-.001***	-.001***	-.001***	-.000	-.001***	-.001***	-.002***
	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)
Female	.075***	.079***	.066***	.068***	-.064***	-.025***	-.019**	-.027***
	(.007)	(.009)	(.009)	(.007)	(.007)	(.008)	(.009)	(.009)
Undergraduate or higher	.008	.038***	.026***	.022***	.042***	.046***	.047***	.036***
	(.008)	(.010)	(.009)	(.007)	(.008)	(.009)	(.010)	(.009)
Gross HH Income £25K-£50K	-.016	-.015	-.017	-.034***	.056***	.028**	.019	.015
	(.011)	(.013)	(.012)	(.010)	(.011)	(.013)	(.014)	(.013)
Gross HH Income >£50K	-.019	-.011	.007	-.025**	.058***	.047***	.040***	.018
	(.013)	(.016)	(.015)	(.012)	(.012)	(.013)	(.014)	(.014)
Political Leaning - Centre	-.003	-.015	-.040***	-.031***	-.036***	-.044***	-.068***	-.073***
	(.010)	(.012)	(.011)	(.009)	(.009)	(.009)	(.009)	(.009)
Political Leaning - Right	-.010	-.015	-.073***	-.070***	-.058***	-.074***	-.122***	-.153***
	(.015)	(.018)	(.016)	(.012)	(.017)	(.018)	(.019)	(.020)
Centre = Right	[.560]	[.971]	[.016]	[.000]	[.168]	[.082]	[.003]	[.000]
Mean outcome	.357	.368	.269	.215	.725	.787	.756	.733
QLFS	.329	.645	.421	.231	.789	.830	.709	.645
Other control variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3205	3205	3205	3205	3205	3205	3205	3205

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. We report OLS regression results for respondents in the Control arm. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile, and robust standard errors are reported. Other control variables include a dummy for being married/in a civil partnership, a dummy for residing in an urban area, and a dummy for home ownership. The omitted category for Political Leaning is respondents that report as left-leaning. Left-leaning respondents are those that report being 'very left-wing' and 'fairly left-wing'. Centre-leaning respondents combine those that report being 'centre', 'slightly left-of-centre' and 'slightly right-of-centre'. Right-leaning respondents are those that report being 'very right-wing' and 'fairly right-wing'. At the foot of each Column we report minority group estimates for men constructed from the Quarterly Labour Force Survey from April 2023-March 2024.

Table A5: Correlates of Perceptions of Economic Outcomes of Women

Regression estimates, robust standard errors, p-values in brackets

	Graduate Share				Employment Rate			
	(1) White British	(2) Indian	(3) Pakistani	(4) Black Carribean	(5) White British	(6) Indian	(7) Pakistani	(8) Black Carribean
Age	-.002***	-.002***	-.001***	-.001***	.000	-.001**	-.001***	-.001***
	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)
Female	.086***	.071***	.058***	.061***	-.052***	-.035***	-.024**	-.020**
	(.008)	(.009)	(.008)	(.007)	(.007)	(.010)	(.011)	(.009)
Undergraduate or higher	.008	.009	.008	.006	.030***	.020*	.015	.038***
	(.009)	(.010)	(.008)	(.008)	(.008)	(.011)	(.012)	(.010)
Gross HH Income £25K-£50K	-.017	-.018	-.015	-.032***	.042***	.023	.014	.000
	(.012)	(.013)	(.011)	(.010)	(.011)	(.015)	(.016)	(.014)
Gross HH Income >£50K	-.027*	-.009	-.002	-.021*	.052***	.016	.007	.002
	(.014)	(.015)	(.013)	(.012)	(.013)	(.017)	(.018)	(.015)
Political Leaning - Centre	.002	-.029**	-.044***	-.037***	-.045***	-.077***	-.093***	-.076***
	(.010)	(.012)	(.011)	(.010)	(.009)	(.012)	(.013)	(.010)
Political Leaning - Right	.011	-.007	-.076***	-.075***	-.045***	-.134***	-.183***	-.135***
	(.017)	(.020)	(.015)	(.013)	(.014)	(.020)	(.023)	(.019)
Centre = Right	[.583]	[.207]	[.009]	[.000]	[.989]	[.003]	[.000]	[.001]
Mean outcome	.380	.294	.212	.201	.702	.660	.627	.691
QLFS	.349	.605	.403	.381	.734	.705	.509	.655
Other control variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3205	3205	3205	3205	3205	3205	3205	3205

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. We report OLS regression results for respondents in the Control arm. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile, and robust standard errors are reported. Other control variables include a dummy for being married/in a civil partnership, a dummy for residing in an urban area, and a dummy for home ownership. The omitted category for Political Leaning is respondents that report as left-leaning. Left-leaning respondents are those that report being 'very left-wing' and 'fairly left-wing'. Centre-leaning respondents combine those that report being 'centre', 'slightly left-of-centre' and 'slightly right-of-centre'. Right-leaning respondents are those that report being 'very right-wing' and 'fairly right-wing'. At the foot of each Column we report minority group estimates for women constructed from the Quarterly Labour Force Survey from April 2023-March 2024.

Table A6: Economic Outcomes of Women

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets

A. Graduate Shares

	(1) Quarterly Labor Force Survey	(2) Control Mean	[1 = 2]	(3) Δ Positive Narrative	(4) Δ Negative Narrative	[3 = 4]
Out of 100 women above the age of 25 in the UK from each of the following groups, roughly how many do you think have a university degree?						
Women						
Indian	.605	.281	[.000]	.037***	.003	[.002]
		(.007)		(.011)	(.011)	
Pakistani	.403	.200	[.000]	.038***	-.003	[.000]
		(.006)		(.009)	(.009)	
Black Caribbean	.381	.199	[.000]	.014*	-.007	[.012]
		(.006)		(.008)	(.008)	
White British	.349	.380	[.000]	-.003	.003	[.532]
		(.007)		(.010)	(.010)	

B. Employment Rates

	(1) 1 - Unem. rate	(1b) Share working	(2) Control Mean	[1 = 2]	(3) Δ Positive Narrative	(4) Δ Negative Narrative	[3 = 4]
Out of 100 women of working age in the UK from each of the following groups, roughly how many would you say are working?							
Women							
Indian	.941	.705	.663	[.000]	.006	-.015	[.091]
			(.009)		(.012)	(.013)	
Pakistani	.883	.509	.629	[.000]	.011	-.018	[.026]
			(.009)		(.013)	(.013)	
Black Caribbean	.953	.655	.695	[.000]	.003	-.013	[.150]
			(.008)		(.011)	(.012)	
White British	.969	.734	.702	[.000]	-.006	.004	[.264]
			(.007)		(.009)	(.009)	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. We report OLS regressions results of each outcome, a constant and treatment dummies. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile, and robust standard errors are reported. The minority groups in the positive (Indian, Pakistani) and negative (Pakistani, Black Caribbean) prime are highlighted. Column 1 report minority group estimates constructed from the Quarterly Labour Force Survey from April 2023-March 2024.

Table A7: Labor Market Discrimination, Women

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses
p-values in brackets

	(1) Control Mean	(2) Δ Positive Narrative	(3) Δ Negative Narrative	[2 = 3]
Imagine that the following women applied for a job, which they were qualified for. Please rank them based on how likely you think they would be to be turned down for the job.				
Indian	3.22	-.066	.061	[.085]
	(.055)	(.073)	(.078)	
Pakistani	3.96	-.184**	.047	[.005]
	(.062)	(.083)	(.087)	
Black Caribbean	3.97	-.027	-.002	[.781]
	(.063)	(.087)	(.091)	
White British	1.88	.220***	.071	[.096]
	(.056)	(.083)	(.086)	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. We report OLS regressions results of each outcome, a constant and treatment dummies. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile, and robust standard errors are reported. The minority groups in the positive (Indian, Pakistani) and negative (Pakistani, Black Caribbean) narrative are highlighted. Respondents could also answer the question with 'not sure'. The share of respondents that answered 'not sure' is .20 and .22 for Polish and Black African men, respectively, and .17, .21, .22, .23, .23 and .24 for White British, Polish, Indian, Black African, Pakistani and Black Caribbean women, respectively.

Table A8: Balance on Views on Inequality

Means, p-values in brackets

	(1) Control Mean	(2) Δ Positive Narrative	(3) Δ Negative Narrative	[1 = 2]	[1 = 3]	[2 = 3]
A. Vertical Inequalities						
To what extent, if at all, do you think inequalities in the following areas are a big/moderate problem in the UK today? Inequalities of..						
Wealth and income	.795	.796	.811	[.986]	[.442]	[.450]
Health and life expectancy	.680	.662	.700	[.422]	[.385]	[.096]
Educational attainment	.634	.673	.678	[.098]	[.067]	[.837]
Political influence	.617	.635	.604	[.445]	[.593]	[.196]
Status and respect	.596	.618	.619	[.361]	[.331]	[.943]
B. Horizontal Inequalities						
To what extent, if at all, do you think inequalities between the following groups in society are a big/moderate problem in the UK today?						
People from different ethnic groups	.618	.637	.664	[.432]	[.056]	[.254]
People from different social classes	.593	.599	.615	[.803]	[.356]	[.497]
Disabled and non-disabled people	.572	.581	.616	[.702]	[.071]	[.150]
People of different religions	.547	.564	.559	[.490]	[.628]	[.846]
People living in different regions	.483	.527	.528	[.069]	[.067]	[.960]
People of different ages	.465	.468	.472	[.899]	[.768]	[.864]
Men and women	.437	.439	.470	[.919]	[.173]	[.202]
Homosexual and heterosexual people	.405	.393	.436	[.608]	[.200]	[.072]

Notes: We report descriptive statistics for the sample of White British respondents, where observations are reweighted to fit the national profile. The p-values are calculated from an OLS regression for each outcome on a constant and treatment dummies, where robust standard errors are calculated. For the questions in both panels, respondents could also answer each issue was ‘a small problem’, ‘not a problem’ or ‘don’t know’.

Table A9: Moderacy Biases and Extreme Responses

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets

		(1) Control	(2) Positive Narrative	(3) Negative Narrative	(4) Control	(5) Positive Narrative	(6) Negative Narrative
Respondent Characteristics			**Don't Know or Not Sure**			**Extreme Response**	
Ethnicity	White British	.155	.139	.147	.244	.252	.246
	Not White British	.137	.120	.112	.271	.273	.270
	WB = NWB	[.233]	[.114]	[.003]	[.005]	[.021]	[.018]
Political Leaning	White British - Left Leaning	.124	.121	.109	.258	.274	.277
	White British - Centre Leaning	.130	.115	.132	.245	.240	.230
	Left = Centre	[.718]	[.610]	[.122]	[.282]	[.001]	[.000]
	White British - Right Leaning	.103	.091	.126	.307	.328	.323
	Left = Right	[.324]	[.050]	[.482]	[.021]	[.001]	[.122]
	Centre = Right	[.148]	[.080]	[.830]	[.001]	[.000]	[.001]
Survey Response Duration	White British - Fastest 5 percentile	.202	.215	.259	.218	.245	.224
	White British - 5th-95th percentile	.120	.108	.117	.260	.264	.257
	Fastest = 5th - 95th	[.195]	[.004]	[.003]	[.112]	[.448]	[.213]
	White British - Slowest 5 percentile	.128	.094	.116	.214	.257	.234
	Fastest = Slowest	[.277]	[.004]	[.008]	[.926]	[.690]	[.771]
	Slowest = 5th - 95th	[.789]	[.478]	[.990]	[.054]	[.737]	[.330]

Notes: For each treatment arm, Columns 1, 2 and 3 report the mean of share of questions where the respondent answered "Don't know" or "Not sure" (of questions which had either of those as a response option). Columns 4, 5 and 6 report the mean of share of questions where respondents have answered with responses at either end of the spectrum (extreme response). Observations are reweighted to fit the national profile.

Table A10: External Estimates

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets

Source	Question		(1) Control Mean	(2) Outside Estimate	Year	Sample	Comment
More in Common: Common Ground and Division in 2020s Britain	How positively or negatively do you feel about each of the following groups? Please answer on the following scale, where 0 means 'very negative' and 10 means 'very positive'.	Indian	6.20	6.30	2020	UK representative	"Black people"
		Pakistani	5.33	5.80			
		Black Caribbean	5.96	6.60			
		White British	7.26	7.10			
Ipsos/British Future Immigration Attitudes Tracker	Do you think the number of immigrants coming to the UK nowadays should be…reduced?		.631	.550	2024	UK representative	
British Social Attitudes Survey (Culture Wars)	Have attempts to give equal opportunities to the following groups not gone far enough?	Indian	.211	.450	2021	UK representative	Asked for Black and Asian people, and not individual groups.
		Pakistani	.239	.450	2021		
		Black Caribbean	.278	.450	2021		
		White British	.212				
	Have attempts to give equal opportunities to the following groups gone too far?	Indian	.159	.190	2021		Asked for Black and Asian people, and not individual groups.
		Pakistani	.191	.190	2021		
		Black Caribbean	.180	.190	2021		
		White British	.060				
British Social Attitudes Survey	Do you agree, disagree or neither agree nor disagree with the following statement? "The government should redistribute income from the better-off to those who are less well off."	Strongly Agree/Agree	.471	.519	2022	UK representative	
		Strongly Disagree/Disagree	.267	.250	2022		

Notes: This table presents comparable estimates for questions in our survey, whenever the same questions had been asked from a UK sample in other surveys. We provide the source of these estimates, their year and the sample used in each of these surveys. We then provide control mean from our survey for a comparabe sample. For example, if the outside estimate is from a UK representative sample, we provide estimates using all the respondents in our survey (not just White British), weighted to fit the national profile.

Figure A1: Ethnic Diversity in the UK, 2021 Census



Figure A2: Structure of the Survey Experiment



Figure A3: Perceived Economic Outcomes of Women by Minority Group

A. Graduate Shares



B. Employment Shares



Notes: The left hand side of each panel reports means for respondents in the Control arm and the estimates from constructed from Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS) from April 2023-March 2024. The right hand side shows the distribution of misperception for respondents in the Control arm. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile. We calculate the degree of misperception by taking the control mean and subtracting the group estimates from the QLFS. Hence positive misperceptions imply the control mean is higher than the group estimate.

Figure A4: Distribution of Perceptions of Economic Outcomes of Women

A. Graduate Shares



B. Employment Shares



Notes: In both panels, each panel displays the difference in the distribution of perceptions between control and positive narrative arm, and control and negative narrative arm for specific groups. All estimates are derived from OLS regressions of the corresponding response variable on a treatment dummy variable, and the treatment dummy variable interacted with a categorical variable for percentile which the response belongs to within the survey arm that the respondent was assigned to. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile.

Table B1: Contributions

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses p-values in brackets

	(1) Controls	(2) Δ Positive Narrative	(3) Δ Negative Narrative	[2 = 3]
Do you think the following groups generally make a positive or negative contribution to the UK? Please answer on the following scale, where 0 means 'very negative' and 10 means 'very positive'.				
Indian				
Left Leaning	7.20	.135	.288	[.501]
	(.151)	(.212)	(.228)	
Centre Leaning	6.08	.287*	.180	[.500]
	(.131)	(.163)	(.183)	
C=L	*[.000]*	*[.569]*	*[.711]*	
Right Leaning	5.60	-.507	-.853**	[.429]
	(.238)	(.365)	(.414)	
R=L, R=C	*[.000, .076]*	*[.128, .047]*	*[.711, .023]*	
Pakistani				
Left Leaning	6.91	-.054	.298	[.175]
	(.163)	(.239)	(.252)	
Centre Leaning	4.98	.434**	.187	[.167]
	(.138)	(.178)	(.195)	
C=L	*[.000]*	*[.102]*	*[.727]*	
Right Leaning	3.29	.091	.101	[.981]
	(.290)	(.399)	(.419)	
R=L, R=C	*[.000, .000]*	*[.755, .434]*	*[.727, .852]*	
Black Caribbean				
Left Leaning	7.18	-.190	.294	[.044]
	(.149)	(.216)	(.236)	
Centre Leaning	5.50	.306*	.178	[.451]
	(.132)	(.168)	(.189)	
C=L	*[.000]*	*[.071]*	*[.700]*	
Right Leaning	4.32	.149	-.668	[.052]
	(.295)	(.408)	(.429)	
R=L, R=C	*[.000, .000]*	*[.464, .723]*	*[.700, .071]*	
White British				
Left Leaning	6.78	-.201	.057	[.252]
	(.148)	(.213)	(.222)	
Centre Leaning	7.36	-.127	-.155	[.836]
	(.105)	(.135)	(.149)	
C=L	*[.001]*	*[.768]*	*[.428]*	
Right Leaning	7.88	.095	.296	[.479]
	(.235)	(.308)	(.312)	
R=L, R=C	*[.000, .045]*	*[.429, .510]*	*[.428, .192]*	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile. All estimates are derived from OLS regressions of the corresponding response variable on a treatment dummy variable fully interacted with a categorical variable for political leaning. Robust standard errors are reported. The minority groups in the positive (Indian, Pakistani) and negative (Pakistani, Black Caribbean) narrative are highlighted.

Table B2: Graduate Shares

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses
p-values in brackets

	(1) Controls	(2) Δ Positive Narrative	(3) Δ Negative Narrative	[2 = 3]
Out of 100 men above the age of 25 in the UK from each of the following groups, roughly how many do you think have a university degree?				
Indian				
Left Leaning	.397	.049**	-.010	[.022]
	(.017)	(.025)	(.024)	
Centre Leaning	.348	.035**	.020	[.336]
	(.011)	(.015)	(.016)	
C=L	*[.015]*	*[.634]*	*[.306]*	
Right Leaning	.335	.050	-.010	[.093]
	(.024)	(.033)	(.037)	
R=L, R=C	*[.036, .618]*	*[.976, .678]*	*[.306, .458]*	
Pakistani				
Left Leaning	.316	.042*	-.026	[.004]
	(.015)	(.023)	(.021)	
Centre Leaning	.245	.042***	-.003	[.001]
	(.010)	(.014)	(.014)	
C=L	*[.000]*	*[.989]*	*[.382]*	
Right Leaning	.174	.084***	.021	[.051]
	(.017)	(.029)	(.028)	
R=L, R=C	*[.000, .000]*	*[.251, .187]*	*[.382, .451]*	
Black Caribbean				
Left Leaning	.259	.019	-.022	[.027]
	(.014)	(.020)	(.018)	
Centre Leaning	.194	.019*	.013	[.612]
	(.007)	(.011)	(.012)	
C=L	*[.000]*	*[.988]*	*[.094]*	
Right Leaning	.147	.023	-.004	[.207]
	(.014)	(.021)	(.021)	
R=L, R=C	*[.000, .002]*	*[.882, .866]*	*[.094, .468]*	
White British				
Left Leaning	.364	-.005	.035*	[.041]
	(.013)	(.019)	(.019)	
Centre Leaning	.355	-.014	-.008	[.648]
	(.009)	(.012)	(.013)	
C=L	*[.588]*	*[.718]*	*[.060]*	
Right Leaning	.326	.001	.013	[.700]
	(.021)	(.028)	(.032)	
R=L, R=C	*[.133, .211]*	*[.849, .629]*	*[.060, .546]*	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile. All estimates are derived from OLS regressions of the corresponding response variable on a treatment dummy variable fully interacted with a categorical variable for political leaning. Robust standard errors are reported. The minority groups in the positive (Indian, Pakistani) and negative (Pakistani, Black Caribbean) narrative are highlighted.

Table B3: Employment Rates

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses
p-values in brackets

	(1) Controls	(2) Δ Positive Narrative	(3) Δ Negative Narrative	[2 = 3]
Out of 100 men of working age in the UK from each of the following groups, roughly how many would you say are working?				
Indian				
Left Leaning	.861	.006	.006	[.988]
	(.010)	(.014)	(.014)	
Centre Leaning	.801	.021	-.017	[.003]
	(.011)	(.013)	(.015)	
C=L	*[.000]*	*[.437]*	*[.265]*	
Right Leaning	.773	.011	-.027	[.390]
	(.023)	(.031)	(.045)	
R=L, R=C	*[.000, .278]*	*[.875, .782]*	*[.265, .843]*	
Pakistani				
Left Leaning	.858	.001	-.010	[.437]
	(.010)	(.014)	(.015)	
Centre Leaning	.770	.017	-.031*	[.001]
	(.011)	(.014)	(.016)	
C=L	*[.000]*	*[.430]*	*[.361]*	
Right Leaning	.693	.032	.006	[.572]
	(.030)	(.038)	(.048)	
R=L, R=C	*[.000, .016]*	*[.456, .719]*	*[.361, .470]*	
Black Caribbean				
Left Leaning	.844	-.018	-.008	[.491]
	(.010)	(.014)	(.014)	
Centre Leaning	.748	.005	-.024	[.048]
	(.011)	(.014)	(.016)	
C=L	*[.000]*	*[.251]*	*[.455]*	
Right Leaning	.661	-.010	.010	[.661]
	(.033)	(.042)	(.050)	
R=L, R=C	*[.000, .012]*	*[.866, .731]*	*[.455, .522]*	
White British				
Left Leaning	.783	-.005	.004	[.573]
	(.012)	(.017)	(.017)	
Centre Leaning	.743	.003	-.003	[.646]
	(.008)	(.012)	(.013)	
C=L	*[.008]*	*[.706]*	*[.724]*	
Right Leaning	.729	.001	-.017	[.682]
	(.021)	(.027)	(.043)	
R=L, R=C	*[.027, .519]*	*[.858, .943]*	*[.724, .772]*	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile. All estimates are derived from OLS regressions of the corresponding response variable on a treatment dummy variable fully interacted with a categorical variable for political leaning. Robust standard errors are reported. The minority groups in the positive (Indian, Pakistani) and negative (Pakistani, Black Caribbean) narrative are highlighted. Columns 1 and 1b report minority group estimates for men constructed from the Quarterly Labour Force Survey from April 2023-March 2024.

Table B4: Opportunities

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets

	(1) Control Mean	(2) Δ Positive Narrative	(3) Δ Negative Narrative	[2 = 3]	(4) Control Mean	(5) Δ Positive Narrative	(6) Δ Negative Narrative	[5 = 6]	(7) Control Mean	(8) Δ Positive Narrative	(9) Δ Negative Narrative	[8 = 9]
Do the following groups have few or no opportunities to...where you live?												
		Get a good education				**Get a job**				**Earn a decent wage**		
Indian												
Left Leaning	.100	-.031	.053	[.014]	.134	.046	.027	[.648]	.231	.049	.053	[.933]
	(.025)	(.030)	(.039)		(.027)	(.040)	(.040)		(.033)	(.048)	(.049)	
Centre Leaning	.106	-.034*	.012	[.035]	.128	-.001	-.000	[.970]	.204	.000	-.019	[.481]
	(.014)	(.019)	(.023)		(.016)	(.023)	(.024)		(.019)	(.028)	(.027)	
C=L	*[.843]*	*[.947]*	*[.370]*		*[.831]*	*[.307]*	*[.568]*		*[.473]*	*[.379]*	*[.198]*	
Right Leaning	.066	.017	-.032	[.106]	.067	.014	.037	[.540]	.110	.034	.013	[.642]
	(.025)	(.036)	(.030)		(.024)	(.033)	(.038)	[.000]	(.031)	(.044)	(.045)	
R=L, R=C	*[.347, .181]*	*[.305, .210]*	*[.370, .250]*		*[.063, .035]*	*[.544, .696]*	*[.568, .406]*		*[.007, .010]*	*[.819, .518]*	*[.198, .546]*	
Pakistani												
Left Leaning	.150	-.042	.053	[.016]	.162	.026	.038	[.798]	.277	.065	.046	[.703]
	(.029)	(.036)	(.044)		(.030)	(.042)	(.043)		(.035)	(.050)	(.051)	
Centre Leaning	.124	-.024	.026	[.037]	.170	-.008	.013	[.445]	.276	-.038	-.039	[.978]
	(.015)	(.020)	(.025)		(.018)	(.025)	(.027)		(.021)	(.030)	(.030)	
C=L	*[.424]*	*[.661]*	*[.586]*		*[.807]*	*[.483]*	*[.625]*		*[.984]*	*[.076]*	*[.151]*	
Right Leaning	.121	-.027	-.051	[.501]	.109	-.027	.023	[.201]	.150	.012	.012	[.990]
	(.035)	(.044)	(.043)		(.034)	(.041)	(.047)		(.037)	(.049)	(.052)	
R=L, R=C	*[.525, .938]*	*[.788, .952]*	*[.586, .120]*		*[.236, .106]*	*[.362, .688]*	*[.625, .847]*		*[.013, .003]*	*[.452, .382]*	*[.151, .398]*	
Black Caribbean												
Left Leaning	.167	-.026	.067	[.024]	.188	.029	.027	[.969]	.312	.087*	.076	[.841]
	(.029)	(.038)	(.044)		(.031)	(.044)	(.045)		(.036)	(.051)	(.053)	
Centre Leaning	.156	-.002	.011	[.623]	.197	-.002	-.023	[.431]	.297	.001	-.047	[.119]
	(.017)	(.024)	(.026)		(.019)	(.027)	(.027)		(.022)	(.031)	(.031)	
C=L	*[.748]*	*[.587]*	*[.273]*		*[.804]*	*[.543]*	*[.334]*		*[.722]*	*[.152]*	*[.043]*	
Right Leaning	.134	-.019	-.059	[.283]	.144	-.013	.005	[.686]	.217	.026	-.033	[.297]
	(.037)	(.047)	(.044)		(.037)	(.047)	(.050)		(.047)	(.063)	(.060)	
R=L, R=C	*[.490, .595]*	*[.897, .749]*	*[.273, .171]*		*[.365, .203]*	*[.509, .837]*	*[.334, .624]*		*[.109, .123]*	*[.453, .720]*	*[.043, .836]*	
White British												
Left Leaning	.035	.000	.023	[.326]	.079	.021	-.017	[.230]	.166	.060	-.028	[.042]
	(.018)	(.022)	(.026)		(.022)	(.033)	(.030)		(.030)	(.044)	(.041)	
Centre Leaning	.065	.006	-.036***	[.006]	.095	.018	-.031*	[.015]	.153	.028	-.037	[.008]
	(.011)	(.017)	(.014)		(.014)	(.021)	(.018)		(.017)	(.025)	(.023)	
C=L	*[.146]*	*[.847]*	*[.043]*		*[.551]*	*[.953]*	*[.707]*		*[.698]*	*[.522]*	*[.852]*	
Right Leaning	.064	-.005	.005	[.839]	.079	.060	.044	[.785]	.133	.085	.043	[.531]
	(.026)	(.034)	(.052)		(.028)	(.045)	(.056)		(.035)	(.054)	(.063)	
R=L, R=C	*[.360, .954]*	*[.897, .779]*	*[.043, .443]*		*[.989, .625]*	*[.482, .401]*	*[.707, .205]*		*[.473, .612]*	*[.728, .340]*	*[.852, .230]*	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile. All estimates are derived from OLS regressions of the corresponding response variable on a treatment dummy variable fully interacted with a categorical variable for political leaning. Robust standard errors are reported. The minority groups in the positive (Indian, Pakistani) and negative (Pakistani, Black Caribbean) narrative are highlighted. Respondents could answer each question with plenty, some, few or no opportunities, or don't know. We combine few and no opportunities for each outcome.

Table B5: Luck vs Effort

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets

	Luck vs Effort Control Means [1] = [5]	(1) Controls	(2) Δ Positive Narrative	(3) Δ Negative Narrative	[2 = 3]	(5) Controls	(6) Δ Positive Narrative	(7) Δ Negative Narrative	[6 = 7]
Does lack of effort or bad luck generally have more to do with whether a person from each of the following groups is unsuccessful?									
			Bad luck				**Lack of Effort**		
Indian									
Left Leaning	[.000]	.381	-.041	.024	[.211]	.026	.030	.008	[.331]
		(.040)	(.053)	(.055)		(.012)	(.021)	(.018)	
Centre Leaning	[.002]	.223	.056**	.013	[.146]	.144	-.017	-.035	[.432]
		(.019)	(.029)	(.028)		(.018)	(.024)	(.025)	
C=L		*[.000]*	*[.107]*	*[.858]*		*[.000]*	*[.147]*	*[.154]*	
Right Leaning	[.934]	.230	-.047	-.035	[.825]	.224	.033	.056	[.743]
		(.048)	(.059)	(.062)		(.045)	(.063)	(.071)	
R=L, R=C		*[.015, .892]*	*[.940, .116]*	*[.858, .481]*		*[.000, .100]*	*[.962, .463]*	*[.154, .225]*	
Pakistani									
Left Leaning	[.000]	.338	-.021	.064	[.099]	.052	.011	.009	[.922]
		(.039)	(.052)	(.054)		(.016)	(.025)	(.023)	
Centre Leaning	[.060]	.169	.049*	.015	[.221]	.219	-.014	-.029	[.579]
		(.018)	(.026)	(.026)		(.020)	(.028)	(.029)	
C=L		*[.000]*	*[.230]*	*[.420]*		*[.000]*	*[.491]*	*[.299]*	
Right Leaning	[.000]	.055	.074**	.028	[.251]	.441	-.078	.034	[.124]
		(.022)	(.037)	(.034)		(.057)	(.075)	(.078)	
R=L, R=C		*[.000, .000]*	*[.138, .591]*	*[.420, .762]*		*[.000, .000]*	*[.257, .424]*	*[.299, .446]*	
Black Caribbean									
Left Leaning	[.000]	.364	-.078	.023	[.046]	.048	.035	.004	[.245]
		(.040)	(.052)	(.055)		(.017)	(.027)	(.023)	
Centre Leaning	[.000]	.140	.014	.021	[.785]	.236	.003	-.027	[.292]
		(.016)	(.023)	(.025)		(.021)	(.029)	(.029)	
C=L		*[.000]*	*[.105]*	*[.979]*		*[.000]*	*[.427]*	*[.396]*	
Right Leaning	[.000]	.069	.048	.002	[.309]	.454	-.030	.028	[.415]
		(.027)	(.045)	(.038)		(.057)	(.074)	(.078)	
R=L, R=C		*[.000, .023]*	*[.067, .510]*	*[.979, .669]*		*[.000, .000]*	*[.407, .673]*	*[.396, .506]*	
White British									
Left Leaning	[.026]	.128	-.005	.002	[.843]	.223	.075	.064	[.822]
		(.028)	(.037)	(.039)		(.031)	(.046)	(.046)	
Centre Leaning	[.000]	.058	.017	-.011	[.073]	.376	.033	-.030	[.059]
		(.012)	(.017)	(.015)		(.023)	(.033)	(.033)	
C=L		*[.024]*	*[.583]*	*[.752]*		*[.000]*	*[.465]*	*[.098]*	
Right Leaning	[.000]	.093	.019	.012	[.897]	.459	-.037	-.075	[.584]
		(.028)	(.043)	(.055)		(.057)	(.075)	(.076)	
R=L, R=C		*[.385, .256]*	*[.671, .972]*	*[.752, .688]*		*[.000, .178]*	*[.203, .389]*	*[.098, .589]*	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile. All estimates are derived from OLS regressions of the corresponding response variable on a treatment dummy variable fully interacted with a categorical variable for political leaning. Robust standard errors are reported. The minority groups in the positive (Indian, Pakistani) and negative (Pakistani, Black Caribbean) narrative are highlighted. Respondents could answer the question with bad luck, a lack of effort, an equal mix of both or don't know.

Table B6: Labor Market Discrimination

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses
p-values in brackets

	(1) Controls	(2) Δ Positive Narrative	(3) Δ Negative Narrative	[2 = 3]
Imagine that the following men applied for a job, which they were qualified for. Please rank them based on how likely you think they would be to be turned down for the job.				
Indian				
Left Leaning	3.34	-.260*	-.035	[.118]
	(.102)	(.141)	(.147)	
Centre Leaning	3.05	-.087	.120	[.037]
	(.070)	(.095)	(.104)	
C=L	*[.016]*	*[.309]*	*[.390]*	
Right Leaning	2.68	-.106	.122	[.281]
	(.149)	(.203)	(.219)	
R=L, R=C	*[.000, .028]*	*[.531, .935]*	*[.390, .992]*	
Pakistani				
Left Leaning	4.15	-.193	-.163	[.843]
	(.108)	(.149)	(.158)	
Centre Leaning	3.80	-.066	.075	[.202]
	(.081)	(.111)	(.114)	
C=L	*[.010]*	*[.493]*	*[.221]*	
Right Leaning	3.51	-.480*	.045	[.050]
	(.221)	(.270)	(.310)	
R=L, R=C	*[.010, .223]*	*[.354, .157]*	*[.221, .927]*	
Black Caribbean				
Left Leaning	4.34	.173	.084	[.596]
	(.121)	(.168)	(.171)	
Centre Leaning	4.06	-.108	.041	[.223]
	(.083)	(.117)	(.122)	
C=L	*[.053]*	*[.169]*	*[.835]*	
Right Leaning	3.67	-.128	-.239	[.702]
	(.250)	(.313)	(.333)	
R=L, R=C	*[.016, .141]*	*[.396, .953]*	*[.835, .431]*	
White British				
Left Leaning	1.46	.006	-.136	[.251]
	(.101)	(.139)	(.127)	
Centre Leaning	1.99	.249**	-.038	[.020]
	(.085)	(.120)	(.125)	
C=L	*[.000]*	*[.184]*	*[.582]*	
Right Leaning	2.69	.396	.070	[.377]
	(.248)	(.336)	(.382)	
R=L, R=C	*[.000, .008]*	*[.283, .680]*	*[.582, .788]*	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile. All estimates are derived from OLS regressions of the corresponding response variable on a treatment dummy variable fully interacted with a categorical variable for political leaning. Robust standard errors are reported. The minority groups in the positive (Indian, Pakistani) and negative (Pakistani, Black Caribbean) narrative are highlighted. Respondents could also answer the question with 'not sure'. The share of respondents that answered 'not sure' is .16, .21, .22 and .23 for White British, Indian, Pakistani and Black Caribbean men, respectively.

Table B7: Equal Opportunities Policy

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets

	(1) Control Mean	(2) Δ Positive Narrative	(3) Δ Negative Narrative	[2 = 3]	(4) Control Mean	(5) Δ Positive Narrative	(6) Δ Negative Narrative	[5 = 6]
Have attempts to give equal opportunities to the following groups gone too far or not gone far enough?								
		Not far enough				**Gone too far**		
Indian								
Left Leaning	.440	-.050	.031	[.129]	.033	.030	.027	[.915]
	(.040)	(.054)	(.055)		(.013)	(.022)	(.024)	
Centre Leaning	.155	.003	.009	[.794]	.187	.000	-.032	[.204]
	(.017)	(.023)	(.025)		(.020)	(.027)	(.027)	
C=L	*[.000]*	*[.365]*	*[.727]*		*[.000]*	*[.399]*	*[.101]*	
Right Leaning	.048	.032	-.016	[.093]	.354	.089	.023	[.373]
	(.022)	(.033)	(.027)		(.053)	(.072)	(.076)	
R=L, R=C	*[.000, .000]*	*[.195, .480]*	*[.727, .477]*		*[.000, .003]*	*[.432, .250]*	*[.101, .492]*	
Pakistani								
Left Leaning	.468	-.001	.055	[.292]	.042	.032	.020	[.686]
	(.040)	(.054)	(.056)		(.014)	(.025)	(.025)	
Centre Leaning	.180	-.001	.025	[.316]	.222	.002	-.034	[.191]
	(.018)	(.025)	(.027)		(.020)	(.028)	(.028)	
C=L	*[.000]*	*[.999]*	*[.623]*		*[.000]*	*[.422]*	*[.147]*	
Right Leaning	.040	.040	-.003	[.135]	.497	.037	-.019	[.446]
	(.019)	(.031)	(.024)		(.057)	(.075)	(.079)	
R=L, R=C	*[.000, .000]*	*[.507, .294]*	*[.623, .436]*		*[.000, .000]*	*[.952, .663]*	*[.147, .856]*	
Black Caribbean								
Left Leaning	.533	.012	.044	[.558]	.030	.018	.025	[.787]
	(.041)	(.055)	(.056)		(.012)	(.022)	(.024)	
Centre Leaning	.231	.021	.019	[.962]	.214	.009	-.034	[.124]
	(.020)	(.028)	(.029)		(.020)	(.028)	(.028)	
C=L	*[.000]*	*[.894]*	*[.697]*		*[.000]*	*[.791]*	*[.105]*	
Right Leaning	.052	.092**	.005	[.035]	.485	.000	-.019	[.787]
	(.022)	(.043)	(.030)		(.057)	(.075)	(.079)	
R=L, R=C	*[.000, .000]*	*[.251, .160]*	*[.697, .741]*		*[.000, .000]*	*[.820, .918]*	*[.105, .865]*	
White British								
Left Leaning	.208	-.014	-.044	[.458]	.063	-.011	.052	[.043]
	(.032)	(.044)	(.042)		(.019)	(.025)	(.032)	
Centre Leaning	.240	-.018	-.017	[.949]	.020	.025**	.027**	[.896]
	(.021)	(.029)	(.029)		(.006)	(.011)	(.012)	
C=L	*[.406]*	*[.937]*	*[.590]*		*[.028]*	*[.196]*	*[.467]*	
Right Leaning	.457	-.049	-.042	[.930]	.049	.061	.023	[.392]
	(.057)	(.074)	(.079)		(.025)	(.042)	(.038)	
R=L, R=C	*[.000, .000]*	*[.690, .704]*	*[.590, .759]*		*[.649, .253]*	*[.144, .410]*	*[.467, .925]*	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile. All estimates are derived from OLS regressions of the corresponding response variable on a treatment dummy variable fully interacted with a categorical variable for political leaning. Robust standard errors are reported. The minority groups in the positive (Indian, Pakistani) and negative (Pakistani, Black Caribbean) narrative are highlighted. Respondents could also answer the question with 'about right' or 'don't know'.

Table B8: Non-targeted Policies

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets

	(1) Control Mean	(2) Δ Positive Narrative	(3) Δ Negative Narrative	[2 = 3]	(4) Control Mean	(5) Δ Positive Narrative	(6) Δ Negative Narrative	[5 = 6]
How much difference do you think the government could make in reducing inequalities between ethnic groups from the following actions?								
	Great deal/fair amount				**Not much/none**			
Investing more in education and training								
Left Leaning	.915	.007	.020	[.636]	.036	.010	.013	[.919]
	(.022)	(.030)	(.030)		(.014)	(.022)	(.023)	
Centre Leaning	.735	.014	-.017	[.328]	.185	.007	.008	[.968]
	(.022)	(.031)	(.032)		(.019)	(.027)	(.028)	
C=L	*[.000]*	*[.867]*	*[.390]*		*[.000]*	*[.913]*	*[.886]*	
Right Leaning	.508	.111	.007	[.157]	.366	-.039	.034	[.318]
	(.057)	(.075)	(.079)		(.054)	(.072)	(.077)	
R=L, R=C	*[.000, .000]*	*[.198, .232]*	*[.390, .773]*		*[.000, .001]*	*[.509, .552]*	*[.886, .752]*	
Teach children more about British values								
Left Leaning	.229	.036	.033	[.947]	.697	-.020	-.040	[.686]
	(.032)	(.046)	(.047)		(.036)	(.050)	(.051)	
Centre Leaning	.568	.066**	.015	[.133]	.328	-.020	-.021	[.958]
	(.024)	(.033)	(.035)		(.022)	(.031)	(.032)	
C=L	*[.000]*	*[.598]*	*[.757]*		*[.000]*	*[.000]*	*[.757]*	
Right Leaning	.712	.141**	.008	[.019]	.213	-.097*	-.019	[.113]
	(.051)	(.061)	(.069)		(.046)	(.055)	(.061)	
R=L, R=C	*[.000, .011]*	*[.167, .275]*	*[.757, .930]*		*[.000, .025]*	*[.295, .218]*	*[.757, .976]*	
Supported families with children more financially								
Left Leaning	.770	.008	.060	[.223]	.134	-.003	-.004	[.989]
	(.033)	(.046)	(.045)		(.027)	(.038)	(.038)	
Centre Leaning	.496	-.022	.040	[.076]	.396	.032	-.048	[.017]
	(.024)	(.034)	(.035)		(.023)	(.033)	(.033)	
C=L	*[.000]*	*[.601]*	*[.718]*		*[.000]*	*[.485]*	*[.386]*	
Right Leaning	.239	.035	.053	[.767]	.637	.003	-.081	[.238]
	(.053)	(.067)	(.071)		(.056)	(.072)	(.078)	
R=L, R=C	*[.000, .000]*	*[.738, .448]*	*[.718, .862]*		*[.000, .000]*	*[.941, .716]*	*[.386, .698]*	
Increasing penalties for discriminating against groups								
Left Leaning	.686	-.014	-.005	[.856]	.220	.038	.061	[.643]
	(.036)	(.051)	(.052)		(.031)	(.046)	(.047)	
Centre Leaning	.478	-.038	-.001	[.282]	.419	.060*	-.010	[.040]
	(.024)	(.034)	(.035)		(.023)	(.033)	(.034)	
C=L	*[.000]*	*[.686]*	*[.955]*		*[.000]*	*[.700]*	*[.222]*	
Right Leaning	.182	.116*	.044	[.220]	.727	-.104	-.041	[.336]
	(.044)	(.062)	(.060)		(.050)	(.068)	(.069)	
R=L, R=C	*[.000, .000]*	*[.105, .028]*	*[.955, .520]*		*[.000, .000]*	*[.082, .030]*	*[.222, .691]*	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile. All estimates are derived from OLS regressions of the corresponding response variable on a treatment dummy variable fully interacted with a categorical variable for political leaning. Robust standard errors are reported. The minority groups in the positive (Indian, Pakistani) and negative (Pakistani, Black Caribbean) narrative are highlighted. Respondents could also answer 'don't know'.

Figure B1: Discrimination Across Domains

Do you think that people from the following groups experience discrimination or harassment in … very often/often because of their ethnicity?



A. At work



B. By the police



C. In getting housing



D. In getting medical care



E. At school



F. On the street or in a public setting

Notes: Each panel reports means for respondents in the Control arm. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile. In the often outcome we combine respondents that answered 'very often' and 'often'. Respondents could also answer 'sometimes' and 'don't know'.

Table C1: Which Group is a Minority? Extended Groups

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses p-values in brackets

	(1) Control Mean	(2) Positive Narrative	(3) Negative Narrative	[2 = 3]
Which of the following groups do you consider to be ethnic minorities?				
Asian:				
Indian	.461	.073***	.056**	[.493]
	(.017)	(.024)	(.024)	
Pakistani	.481	.076***	.065***	[.644]
	(.017)	(.024)	(.024)	
Bangladeshi	.503	.069***	.054**	[.542]
	(.017)	(.024)	(.024)	
Black:				
Black Caribbean	.504	.029	.052**	[.350]
	(.017)	(.024)	(.024)	
Black African	.493	.050**	.060**	[.675]
	(.017)	(.024)	(.025)	
BC = BA	*[.687]*	*[.572]*	*[.841]*	
White:				
White British	.228	-.027	-.027	[.974]
	(.014)	(.020)	(.020)	
Irish	.141	.014	.038**	[.163]
	(.011)	(.016)	(.017)	
WB = I	*[.470]*	*[.814]*	*[.719]*	
Polish	.318	.045**	.044*	[.959]
	(.016)	(.022)	(.023)	
WB = P	*[.461]*	*[.674]*	*[.687]*	
P = I	*[.030]*	*[.784]*	*[.962]*	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. We report OLS regressions results of each outcome, a constant and treatment dummies. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile, and robust standard errors are reported. The minority groups in the positive (Indian, Pakistani) and negative (Pakistani, Black Caribbean) narrative are highlighted.

Table C2: Contribution to Society

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets

	(1) Control Mean	(2) Δ Positive Narrative	(3) Δ Negative Narrative	[2 = 3]
On a scale of 0 to 10, do you think the following groups generally make a positive or negative contribution to the UK? Please answer on the following scale, where 0 means 'very negative' and 10 means 'very positive'.				
Indian	6.13	-.050	.018	[.606]
	(.089)	(.128)	(.130)	
Pakistani	5.13	.078	.123	[.750]
	(.100)	(.141)	(.143)	
Black Caribbean	5.59	.068	.095	[.840]
	(.095)	(.132)	(.138)	
White British	7.33	-.119	-.186*	[.518]
	(.072)	(.100)	(.105)	
Polish	6.37	-.023	.182	[.103]
	(.080)	(.121)	(.118)	
Black African	5.46	-.027	.107	[.315]
	(.094)	(.132)	(.134)	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. We report OLS regressions results of each outcome, a constant and treatment dummies. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile, and robust standard errors are reported. The minority groups in the positive (Indian, Pakistani) and negative (Pakistani, Black Caribbean) narrative are highlighted. Respondents could also answer ‘not sure’. The share of respondents that answered ‘not sure’ is .09, .11, .11, .13, .12 and .14 for White British, Polish, Indian, Black African, Pakistani and Black Caribbean, respectively.

Table C3: Perceived Graduate Shares, Other Groups

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets

	(1) QLFS	(2) Control Mean	[1 = 2]	(4) Δ Positive Narrative	(5) Δ Negative Narrative	[4 = 5]
Out of 100 men/women above the age of 25 in the UK from each of the following groups, roughly how many do you think have a university degree?						
Men						
Polish	.263	.222	[.000]	.010	.016*	[.501]
		(.006)		(.008)	(.008)	
WB = P		*[.477]*		*[.942]*	*[.952]*	
Black African	.467	.232	[.000]	.019**	-.001	[.027]
		(.006)		(.009)	(.009)	
BC = BA		*[.846]*		*[.968]*	*[.997]*	
Women						
Polish	.437	.228	[.000]	.010	.003	[.398]
		(.006)		(.009)	(.009)	
WB = P		*[.386]*		*[.957]*	*[.999]*	
Black African	.483	.209	[.000]	.024***	-.002	[.004]
		(.006)		(.009)	(.009)	
BC = BA		*[.917]*		*[.949]*	*[.970]*	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. We report OLS regressions results of each outcome, a constant and treatment dummies. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile, and robust standard errors are reported. Column 1 report minority group estimates constructed from the Quarterly Labour Force Survey from April 2023-March 2024.

Table C4: Perceived Employment Rates, Other Groups

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets

	(1) 1 - Unem. rate	(1b) Share working	(2) Control Mean	[1b = 2]	(4) Δ Positive Narrative	(5) Δ Negative Narrative	[4 = 5]
Out of 100 men/women of working age in the UK from each of the following groups, roughly how many would you say are working?							
Men							
Polish	.979	.883	.797	[.000]	.002	.005	[.770]
			(.007)		(.009)	(.010)	
WB = P			*[.670]*		*[.997]*	*[.987]*	
Black African	.908	.691	.734	[.000]	.004	-.019*	[.036]
			(.008)		(.010)	(.012)	
BC = BA			*[.932]*		*[.932]*	*[.997]*	
Women							
Polish	.978	.827	.748	[.000]	-.001	-.008	[.553]
			(.007)		(.011)	(.011)	
WB = P			*[.812]*		*[.987]*	*[.965]*	
Black African	.920	.686	.680	[.418]	.008	-.008	[.203]
			(.009)		(.012)	(.012)	
BC = BA			*[.868]*		*[.969]*	*[.963]*	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. We report OLS regressions results of each outcome, a constant and treatment dummies. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile, and robust standard errors are reported. Columns 1 and 1b report minority group estimates constructed from the Quarterly Labour Force Survey from April 2023-March 2024.

Table C5: Opportunities, Other Groups

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets

	(1) Control Mean	(2) Δ Positive Narrative	(3) Δ Negative Narrative	[2 = 3]	(4) Control Mean	(5) Δ Positive Narrative	(6) Δ Negative Narrative	[5 = 6]	(7) Control Mean	(8) Δ Positive Narrative	(9) Δ Negative Narrative	[8 = 9]
Do the following groups have few or no opportunities to...where you live?												
		Get a good education				**Get a job**				**Earn a decent wage**		
Polish	.105	.002	.025	[.139]	.132	.002	-.017	[.235]	.222	.016	-.000	[.417]
	(.010)	(.015)	(.016)		(.012)	(.017)	(.017)		(.014)	(.020)	(.020)	
WB = P	*[.792]*	*[.985]*	*[.816]*		*[.758]*	*[.846]*	*[.995]*		*[.378]*	*[.819]*	*[.910]*	
Black African	.161	-.018	.004	[.224]	.198	-.005	-.022	[.361]	.283	.008	-.011	[.375]
	(.013)	(.017)	(.018)		(.014)	(.019)	(.019)		(.015)	(.022)	(.022)	
BC = BA	*[.898]*	*[.943]*	*[.925]*		*[.995]*	*[.996]*	*[.984]*		*[.970]*	*[.887]*	*[.939]*	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. We report OLS regressions results of each outcome, a constant and treatment dummies. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile, and robust standard errors are reported. The minority groups in the positive (Indian, Pakistani) and negative (Pakistani, Black Caribbean) narrative are highlighted. Respondents could answer each question with plenty, some, few or no opportunities, or don't know. We combine few and no opportunities for each outcome.

Table C6: Luck vs Effort, Other Groups

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets

	Luck vs Effort Control Means [1] = [5]	(1) Control Mean	(2) Δ Positive Narrative	(3) Δ Negative Narrative	[2 = 3]	(5) Control Mean	(6) Δ Positive Narrative	(7) Δ Negative Narrative	[6 = 7]
Does lack of effort or bad luck generally have more to do with whether a person from each of the following groups is unsuccessful?									
		Bad luck				**Lack of Effort**			
Polish	[.000]	.270	-.008	.007	[.476]	.107	.005	.004	[.970]
		(.015)	(.021)	(.022)		(.010)	(.015)	(.016)	
WB = P		*[.167]*	*[.931]*	*[.923]*		*[.030]*	*[.895]*	*[.979]*	
Black African	[.036]	.166	-.015	.022	[.040]	.205	.005	-.002	[.698]
		(.013)	(.017)	(.019)		(.014)	(.020)	(.020)	
BC = BA		*[.901]*	*[.967]*	*[.843]*		*[.901]*	*[.956]*	*[.972]*	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. We report OLS regressions results of each outcome, a constant and treatment dummies. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile, and robust standard errors are reported. Respondents could answer the question with bad luck, a lack of effort, an equal mix of both or don't know.

Table C7: Labor Market Discrimination, Other Groups

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses
p-values in brackets

		(1) Control Mean	(2) Δ Positive Narrative	(3) Δ Negative Narrative	[2 = 3]
Imagine that the following men applied for a job, which they were qualified for. Please rank them based on how likely you think they would be to be turned down for the job.					
Polish		2.99	.172**	-.065	[.002]
		(.056)	(.077)	(.077)	
	WB = P	*[.000]*	*[.125]*	*[.080]*	
Black African		4.01	-.126	.045	[.050]
		(.060)	(.085)	(.088)	
	BC = BA	*[.641]*	*[.018]*	*[.939]*	
Imagine that the following women applied for a job, which they were qualified for. Please rank them based on how likely you think they would be to be turned down for the job.					
Polish		3.00	-.043	-.117	[.335]
		(.059)	(.079)	(.081)	
	WB = P	*[.000]*	*[.000]*	*[.000]*	
Black African		3.91	-.052	.028	[.357]
		(.061)	(.084)	(.089)	
	BC = BA	*[.000]*	*[.380]*	*[.311]*	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. We report OLS regressions results of each outcome, a constant and treatment dummies. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile, and robust standard errors are reported. Respondents could also answer the question with 'not sure'. The share of respondents that answered 'not sure' is .20 and .22 for Polish and Black African men, respectively, and .17, .21, .22, .23, .23 and .24 for White British, Polish, Indian, Black African, Pakistani and Black Caribbean women, respectively.

Table C8: Equal Opportunities Policy, Other Groups

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets

	(1) Control Mean	(2) Δ Positive Narrative	(3) Δ Negative Narrative	[2 = 3]	(4) Control Mean	(5) Δ Positive Narrative	(6) Δ Negative Narrative	[5 = 6]
Have attempts to give equal opportunities to the following groups gone too far or not gone far enough?								
		Not far enough				**Gone too far**		
Polish	.166	.004	.020	[.377]	.095	.031**	-.005	[.030]
	(.012)	(.017)	(.018)		(.010)	(.016)	(.015)	
WB = P	*[.490]*	*[.994]*	*[.912]*		*[.693]*	*[.961]*	*[.911]*	
Black African	.235	.013	.047**	[.106]	.215	.013	-.021	[.088]
	(.014)	(.020)	(.021)		(.014)	(.020)	(.020)	
BC = BA	*[.961]*	*[.837]*	*[.969]*		*[.610]*	*[.916]*	*[.871]*	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. We report OLS regressions results of each outcome, a constant and treatment dummies. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile, and robust standard errors are reported. Respondents could also answer the question with ‘about right’ or ‘don't know’.

Figure C1: Perceived Economic Outcomes, Other Groups

A. Men



Graduate Shares



Employment Shares

B. Women



Graduate Shares



Employment Shares

Notes: Each panel reports means for respondents in the Control arm and the estimates from constructed from Quarterly Labour Force Survey from April 2023-March 2024. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile.