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Global virtual water trade and the hydrological cycle: Patterns, drivers, and socio-environmental impacts

Paolo D’Odorico¹, Joel Carr², Carole Dalin³, Jampel Dell’Angelo^{4,1}, Megan Konar⁵, Francesco Laio⁶, Luca Ridolfi⁶, Lorenzo Rosa¹, Samir Suweis⁷, Stefania Tamea⁶, Marta Tuninetti⁶

¹ Department of Environmental Science, Policy, and Management, University of California, Berkeley;

² Patuxent Wildlife Research Center, U.S. Geological Survey, Beltsville, MD,

³ Institute for Sustainable Resources, University College, London, UK

⁴ Department of Environmental Policy Analysis, Institute for Environmental Studies, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, NL

⁵ Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

⁶ Department of Environment, Land and Infrastructure Engineering, Politecnico di Torino, Turin, IT

⁷ Dipartimento di Fisica “G. Galilei”, Università di Padova, Padua, IT

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17 Abstract

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20 The increasing global demand for farmland products is placing unprecedented pressure on the
21 global agricultural system and its water resources. Many regions of the world, that are affected by
22 a chronic water scarcity relative to their population, strongly depend on the import of agricultural
23 commodities and associated embodied (or *virtual*) water. The globalization of water through
24 virtual water trade is leading to a displacement of water use and a disconnection between human
25 populations and the water resources they rely on. Despite the recognized importance of these
26 phenomena in reshaping the patterns of water dependence through teleconnections between
27 consumers and producers, their effect on global and regional water resources has just started to be
28 quantified. This review investigates the global spatiotemporal dynamics, drivers, and impacts of
29 virtual water trade through an integrated analysis of surface water, groundwater, and root-zone soil
30 moisture consumption for agricultural production; it evaluates how virtual water flows compare to
31 the major “physical water fluxes” in the Earth System; and provides a new reconceptualization of
32 the hydrologic cycle to account also for the role of water redistribution by the hidden ‘virtual water
33 cycle’.
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48 1. Introduction

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50 The water cycle, the global-scale pattern of water circulation through, atmosphere, land masses,
51 and oceans that strongly controls life on Earth, has been altered by human action since the onset
52 of civilization as a result of water withdrawals from streams, lakes, and aquifers, river diversions,
53 and damming. This disruption, however, has been exacerbated by the Industrial Revolution, the
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3 subsequent technological innovations of the Green Revolution, and the associated socio-economic
4 dynamics. Not only climate change but also processes associated with shifts in land use and land
5 cover - such as deforestation, large-scale irrigation, and dam construction - have strongly altered
6 the water cycle (Postel et al 1996, Poff et al 1997, Gleick and Palaniappan 2010, Gordon et al
7 2005, Oki and Kanae 2006, Rost et al 2008, Rockström et al 2009, Runyan and D’Odorico 2016).

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12 Freshwater resources are critical. Renewable, yet finite, they are central for ecosystem functions,
13 human wellbeing, and societal development (Ammerman and Cavalli-Sforza 1984, Falkenmark
14 and Rockstrom 2004, Allan and Castillo 2007, D’Odorico et al 2010a). As a consequence of
15 increasing human pressure, in some regions, water use is exceeding sustainable levels (Rosa et al.,
16 2018a). Therefore, we are living in what has been described as an era of water scarcity in which
17 water resources available to agriculture may limit the planet’s ability to meet the growing crop
18 demand by human societies (Falkenmark & Rockstrom 2004, Postel 2003, Rodell et al 2018,
19 D’Odorico et al 2018). This fundamental and increasingly scarce resource (relative to increasing
20 human demand) is crucial to agriculture, mining, energy production, manufacturing, and
21 households (Vörösmarty et al 2010, Brauman et al 2016, Mekonnen and Hoekstra 2016).

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31 The complex interdependence between human societies and water, which tends to be thought of
32 and treated as a socio-environmental dynamic between human needs and local hydrological
33 resources, often occurs through distant interconnections that result through the globalization of
34 water resources (Hoekstra and Chapagain 2008). Indeed, humanity affects and interacts with the
35 global water cycle by modifying water stocks and moving substantial amounts of water, both
36 spatially and temporally. Traditionally, though, scientists have evaluated the alterations to the
37 water cycle focusing only on its physical water flows and stocks. Yet, this approach fails to account
38 for an important aspect of the socio-hydrological interactions that shape the global water cycle,
39 namely the existence of “hidden” virtual water fluxes that should be accounted for in addition to
40 the physical water flows. Understanding the drivers, processes and impacts of what we define as
41 the ‘virtual water cycle’ becomes a constitutive aspect of understanding and redefining the notion
42 of the global hydrologic cycle.

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52 This paper aims at deepening the understanding of key elements of the main socio-hydrological
53 dynamics that are associated with an increasingly interdependent globalized world. At the center
54 of this endeavor, lies the study of the main drivers, processes and impacts of Virtual Water Trade

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3 (VWT). Specifically, the goal of this article is to (1) review the impact of virtual water trade on
4 water resources (e.g., Pfister and Bayer, 2014, Lutter et al., 2016) by looking at global patterns of
5 surface water, groundwater, and root-zone soil moisture consumption and trade; (2) analyze how
6 virtual water flows fit into the "natural" hydrological cycle by comparing their magnitude to those
7 of major "physical water fluxes" in the Earth System; (3) evaluate to what extent VWT establishes
8 teleconnections (also known as "telecoupling") in the global water system through dependencies
9 on water resources available in other regions of the world; (4) review gaps in current knowledge,
10 discuss about possible future research directions, and highlight emerging research trends related
11 to VWT.
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19 After an introduction of the general concept of VWT and its importance, we highlight the dynamics
20 of global market integration and illustrate the main features of contemporary trade policies and
21 their development. We then illustrate the key patterns of virtual water trade; discuss the different
22 resolutions at which the analysis of virtual water transfers occur; and reflect on the epistemological
23 implications of the analysis of VWT and how these lead to a new analytical reconceptualization
24 of the global water cycle that accounts also for a hidden 'virtual water cycle'. We then review the
25 main drivers and models of VWT and discuss the major socio-environmental consequences of
26 VWT. Finally, we conclude highlighting the key contribution of this review and point at new areas
27 of research that we believe deserve more attention.
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Box 1: Definitions

Virtual water content (VWC) is the amount of water required to produce a good, considering all the steps involved in its production. The term ‘virtual’ emphasizes that the water is conceptually embedded though not physically present in the good. In this sense the term ‘content’, though commonly used, can be misleading and in contradiction with the adjective ‘virtual’ because virtual water is not really contained in the commodity. The VWC is generally expressed as the water volume per unit mass of product (in m^3/ton or l/kg). For example, in the United States of America, the actual average water content of wheat is $\sim 0.13 \text{ m}^3/\text{ton}$ whereas the VWC is $\sim 1961 \text{ m}^3/\text{ton}$.

Crop water footprint (CWF) is the same as the VWC but specifically refers to crops. CWF is calculated as the ratio between total crop evapotranspiration in the growing season and crop yield and is expressed as a water volume per unit mass of product (in m^3/ton or l/kg). The footprint can be calculated either through a production-based accounting (PBA) or, most commonly, through a consumption-based accounting (CBA). PBA refers to impacts and resource inputs associated with production activity. CBA reallocates those produced goods to final consumers. In the case of crops, however, most of the water footprint is contributed by water losses by evapotranspiration in the course of the production process, while the water cost of processing and transportation is negligible. Therefore, there is no need to conceptually distinguish PBA from CBA and in this review the water costs of crop production will be simply expressed in terms of CWF (see Box 2 for more details)

Water footprint (WF) identifies the volume of water associated with a certain (not unit) mass of a good and/or to a set of goods. Computation may follow different approaches, as detailed in Box 2.

Green water footprint is the fraction of the WF that is contributed by green water (i.e., precipitation water directly contributing to the soil water balance in the crops’ root zone in the absence of irrigation).

Blue water footprint is the fraction of the WF that is contributed by the consumptive use of blue water (i.e., irrigation water withdrawn from surface water bodies and aquifers).

Grey water footprint is an indicator of freshwater pollution defined as the water volume required to dilute pollutants to a concentration that meets the water quality standards.

Virtual water trade (VWT) is the (international or intra-national) trade of goods evaluated in terms of virtual water. Through the trade of goods, water resources that are physically used in the area of production are virtually transferred to the consumption region. This transfer generates a virtual water flux that links production to consumption. Sometimes, it is also referred to as the water footprint of trade.

Box 2. The Water Footprint calculation

The **water footprint** is the amount of water needed to produce a commodity or a set of (produced or consumed) commodities. When associated to the consumptive water use (i.e., water returned to the atmosphere as water vapor during the production process), it may include both rainwater (green water) and surface water or groundwater (blue water). For instance, crop production consumes both green water and, in the case of irrigated agriculture, blue water (see Box 1). These consumptive uses of water by crops are due to evapotranspiration. Water footprint studies have used different approaches:

- 1) The biophysical approach, most widely used for crops and agricultural goods, estimates CWF as the ratio between evapotranspiration and the crop yield (see Table 3). To estimate VWT (Box 3), the CWF is then multiplied by the mass of product traded and the resulting volume of water is then summed across different goods. VWT is generally computed with the CWF of the country of origin of the trade flow, (see box 3 and section 5). Such an approach is usually named the “bottom-up” approach (e.g. Feng et al 2011).
- 2) Life Cycle Analysis (LCA) approaches use LCA datasets that include a “water footprint” library of products. The LCA approach includes multi-stage supply chains, so it would attribute cotton water use to the final purchaser of a t-shirt not to the textile producer country, and corrects for re-exports (e.g. Netherlands forwarding goods to Germany).
- 3) Top-down approaches refer to input-output analyses which have been used largely in economics to investigate the water use and allocation in countries or regions. Top-down approaches calculate the WF by tracing water use in regional, national or global supply chains using a Leontief demand-pull model. Multi-Regional Input-Output (MRIO) analyses in particular use global supply chains and allow for an estimate of national totals (e.g., Arto et al 2016, Yang et al 2012). The product resolution, however, is often low as highlighted in Feng et al (2011) and for example all agricultural goods are usually considered as a bulk or classified in few categories. Recent efforts in the MRIO analyses of water footprint are oriented to improving the product resolution (Lutter et al 2016).
- 4) Finally, a good compromise between top-down and bottom-up approaches could be found in the development of combination methods that use both a monetary MRIO to track embodied goods and a physical model (e.g., based on FAOSTAT) to track physical flows (Bruckner et al 2015; de Koning et al 2015, Giljum et al 2015).

Box 3. Calculation of virtual water trade

The Virtual water trade for a single crop c , from a given location (e.g. country) i , to another location j , $VWT_{c,ij}$ (m^3/yr) depends on both the virtual water footprint of crops from that location, $VWF_{c,i}$ (m^3/ton) and the trade amount of that crop $T_{c,ij}$ (ton yr^{-1}) or

$$VWT_{c,ij} = VWC_{c,i} T_{c,ij}.$$

Thus, in order to attempt to understand global patterns of virtual water trade, resolution of virtual water content of a crop from a given location and trade volume is required. Water use of a specific crop, both green (rain) and blue (water withdrawals from ground or surface water), is necessary to constrain the virtual content, or water footprint, of that crop for a specific location and growing season.

Biophysical approaches (Box 2) use a variety of grid based models, including, H08 (Hanasaki et al. 2010), AquaCrop (Steduto et al. 2009; Raes et al. 2009), CROPWAT 8.0 (Allen et al. 1998) and WaterStat (Mekonnen & Hoekstra 2010), LPJmL (Bondeau et al. 2007; Rost et al. 2008), that calculate potential evapotranspiration and the soil water balance at resolutions as fine as 5 arc minute by 5 arc minute scales using on global climate and soil datasets. There are differences in approaches and assumptions among these models, such as use of crop specific evapotranspiration (ET) coefficients (Allen et al. 1998; Mekonnen and Hoekstra 2011), versus calculating ET based on crop functional types (Bondeau et al. 2007; Rost et al. 2008), or the inclusion of calculations of a grey water footprint (Mekonnen and Hoekstra 2011). However, there are also similar underlying assumptions and databases, such as leveraging MIRCA2000 (Portmann et al. 2010) to help ascertain rain fed versus irrigated agricultural areas and thus discriminate between blue and green water. In all of these models, water use and plant production over a growing season can then be summed over a given year, and crop yield estimates can be derived. Modeled yield can then be adjusted based on reported values, as in the case of Hoekstra and Mekonnen (2011). Yields and water use thus provide both the production volume, P (tons yr^{-1}), and the blue and green water use, WU ($\text{m}^3 \text{yr}^{-1}$)

necessary to calculate the VWC of a given crop as: $VWC_{c,i} = \frac{WU_{c,i}}{P_{c,i}}$. This provides a

single year estimate, however, interannual variability can be high and temporally-averaged (1996-2005) values are typically used (Mekonnen & Hoekstra 2010). As agricultural production and trade data are, broadly speaking, estimated and reported, at the country scale (FAO), VWC of a given crop is typically calculated as a country average value. Consequently, most studies to date have focused on international, rather than subnational trade. MRIO-based approaches go beyond the reconstruction of a trade matrix, tracing commodity flows across countries and across sectors, therefore allowing for a finer resolution in space (e.g., subnational trade).

2. Virtual Water Trade: What is it and why does it matter?

Globalization increases the exchange and transfer of materials, energy and resources among distant countries. Through the integration of markets, systems of production and societal demands, globalization typically creates teleconnections (i.e., distant socio-environmental interactions) between coupled natural and human systems (Liu et al 2013, Oberlack et al 2017). Of all resources, water, is virtually rather than physically mobilized (Allan 1996).

Water is too heavy and bulky and not valued enough to justify its transport costs. There are exceptions, like the South-to-North Water Diversion Project in China, where 9.5 billion $\text{m}^3 \text{y}^{-1}$ of freshwater are transferred to meet the burgeoning water demand in the North China Plains (Zhao et al 2017). Other examples of megaprojects with inter basin water transfers are the California State Water Project, which roughly transport 3 billion $\text{m}^3 \text{y}^{-1}$ (Cohen et al 2004) and the Great Man-Made River Project in Libya, which roughly transport 1.34 billion $\text{m}^3 \text{y}^{-1}$ (Sternberg 2016). There are about 155 inter-basin water transfer schemes in 26 countries around the world, with a total capacity of 490 billion $\text{m}^3 \text{y}^{-1}$ of which, 138 billion $\text{m}^3 \text{y}^{-1}$ are for water transfers in Canada alone, and 30 billion $\text{m}^3 \text{y}^{-1}$ in the rest of the Americas, 181 billion $\text{m}^3 \text{y}^{-1}$ in Asia, and 120 billion y^{-1} in Europe (Verma et al 2009). Moreover, about 60 new projects are under study (e.g., Verma et al 2009, Shumilova et al 2018). Sometimes drinking water is carried by truck, boat, or pipelines – as in the case of the Botswana North-South Carrier project (16 million $\text{m}^3 \text{y}^{-1}$) – to supply water-stressed communities either on a regular basis or in periods of scarcity (Bevanger 1994, Lewis and Miller 1987). Drinking water can be available as bottled water, which is increasingly transported over long distances around the world (Gleick and Coley 2009, Cohen and Ray 2018). Moreover, humans have also tried to divert precipitation artificially through cloud seeding (Bruitjies, 1999) and to harvest fog and dew (e.g., Cereceda et al., 1992; Kaseke and Wang 2018).

However, the total volume of water consumed to produce traded commodities (Table 1) is by far greater (and travels longer distances) than the volume of water that is physically transferred in the world (Oki et al 2017). Indeed, water remains a resource physically available mainly for local use (Konar et al 2016a, Hoekstra et al 2018) because transporting crops or other goods is considerably easier than transporting the water required for their production. For this reason, particularly important to the understanding of water resources in a globalized world is the contribution of Allan (1996, 1998, 2002), which elaborates on how water resources are

appropriated through the transnational trade of agricultural commodities. The adjective “virtual” is used to describe how such water is not physically present in the commodities that are traded but is embedded in their production (see Box 1).

Trade of crops and other goods existed even in early civilizations. Estimates of the associated virtual water flows indicate that even in the Roman Empire water resources were shared through trade and the water costs of crop production were often externalized beyond regional boundaries (Dermody et al 2014). In the modern world, trade has greatly intensified, particularly in the last few decades (Figure 1). Contemporary globalization dynamics have greatly enhanced the spatial and temporal dislocation of production and consumption through virtual water trade (D’Odorico et al 2014, Porkka et al 2017).




Figure 1. Globalization over 5 centuries (1500-2011 period). Shown as the world exports and imports expressed as a share of world GDP (%) (after Ortiz-Ospina and Roser 2018).

The assessment of the net virtual water imports for a given nation, compared to the national consumption (Figure 2), can be used to measure that country’s reliance on trade for the food and water resources they consume (Tamea et al 2013, Winter et al 2014). In the course of the last century, the intensification of trade has led some regions of the world to become strongly dependent on food, energy, and materials produced or extracted with water resources existing elsewhere. This raises concerns about issues of national water security and control over the hydrological resources that are necessary for societal development (Carr et al 2012). Indeed, many countries are not self-sufficient and depend on imports from other regions to meet their needs (Chapagain and Hoekstra 2008, Carr et al 2013, Nesme et al 2016). Because of their reliance on

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3 trade, the populations of some of these countries often exceed their ability to feed themselves with
4 their limited agricultural resources (D’Odorico et al 2010a, van Ittersum et al 2016). For example,
5 the scarce water resources existing in the Middle East are currently insufficient to meet the food
6 demand of the local populations (Allan 1998).
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10 Water is a vital resource controlling production, particularly in agriculture. Virtual water
11 is embedded in agricultural, forestry, industrial, and mining products (Marston et al 2018,
12 D’Odorico et al 2018). In particular, large volumes of water are required by agriculture, the largest
13 water consumer globally (e.g., Rosegrant et al 2009, Falkenmark and Rockström 2004, Richter
14 2014). Virtual water flows (Table 1) have also been investigated in the context of specific subsets
15 of agricultural products used for biofuels (Rulli et al 2016), food aid (Jackson et al 2015), seafood
16 (Gephart et al 2017), and natural rubber production (Chiarelli et al 2018). In 2005, virtual water
17 transfers associated with food aid (Jackson et al 2015), accounted for only 0.5% of the water
18 footprint of all food trade. Water is also required to produce electricity (Macknick et al 2012,
19 Meldrum et al 2013) as well as to extract and process minerals (Northey et al 2016) and both
20 conventional (Mielke et al 2010, D’Odorico et al 2017) and unconventional fossil fuels (Nicot and
21 Scanlon 2012, Rosa et al 2017, Rosa et al 2018b, Rosa and D’Odorico, 2019).
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32 Water is seldom explicitly accounted for in commodity trade analyses. Typically, labor,
33 economic value, geographic location, and access to capital are the main inputs in trade models (see
34 Section 7). Recent trade analyses have considered environmental impacts such as those associated
35 with CO₂ emissions (Deng et al 2016, Vora et al 2017, Meng et al 2018), however, the study of
36 environmental and social footprints of international trade (Wiedmann and Lenzen 2018) and
37 associated spillovers (Liu et al 2015) has often failed to explicitly account for the impacts on water
38 resources. Recent work has explicitly incorporated water as a factor of production into a theoretical
39 trade model (Lenzen et al 2013, Lutter et al 2016, Dang et al 2016). This work incorporates key
40 tradeoffs in agricultural production and decision making.
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Physical Water Fluxes




Figure 2. Physical and virtual water fluxes. Interval bars are computed by using different values from previous studies (see Tables 1 & 4). Note: The horizontal scale is logarithmic.

Table 1. Global virtual water flows.

Virtual Water Flows	Annual flow ($\times 10^9 \text{ m}^3 \text{ y}^{-1}$)	Year	Source
Industrial Products (Blue+Gray Water)	282	1996-2005	(Hoekstra & Mekonnen 2012)
Agricultural Products (Green+Blue Water)	2038 (1386+652)	1996-2005	(Hoekstra & Mekonnen 2012)
Agricultural Products	2810	2010	(Carr et al 2013)
Biofuels (Green+Blue water)	7.31	2015	(Rulli et al 2016)
Virtual water trade of energy production (coal, oil, natural gas, and electricity) (Blue water)	6	1992-2010	(Zhang et al 2016a)

TOTAL	2333-3105		
Physical Water Transport (Inter-basin water transfers)	490		(Verma et al., 2009)
Groundwater Depletion Embedded in Crop Trade	25	2010	(Dalin et al 2017)
Water Savings through trade	220	2007	(Dalin et al 2012)
	352	1997-2001	(Chapagain et al 2006)
Food aid	10	2005	(Jackson et al 2015)
Water Grabbing (appropriation through land investments)	380	2013	(Rulli & D'Odorico 2013)

Most water scarcity indicators only account for local water consumption and local water availability (Liu et al 2017), while an important share of water consumption and pollution is due to global and regional trade (Vörösmarty et al 2015). With virtual water transfers affecting local water scarcity in importing and exporting regions, there is a need to integrate virtual water flows in water stress assessments (Lenzen et al, 2013; Pfister and Bayer, 2014, Lutter et al 2016) and shed light on how water scarcity is embodied in international trade (Liu et al 2017). In this sense the virtual water concept has been criticized as a tool to advise policy-makers because it lacks relevant economic and environmental information about water resources (Gawel and Bernsen 2013). Indeed, the quantitative analysis of water footprint and virtual water trade focuses on water consumption and therefore does not inform about the sustainability of water resource exploitation (Gawel and Bernsen 2013). Thus, water footprint and VWT analyses need to be integrated with a water balance approach to compare the consumption rates with locally available water resources (Lenzen et al., 2013; Mekonnen and Hoekstra, 2016; Soligno et al., 2017; Rosa et al., 2018a). Indeed, literature on the globalization of water resources often misses a description of the phenomenon of virtual water trade in the context of its hydrological implications.

In order to understand the relevance and magnitude of the global VWT it is particularly important to appreciate recent developments of international trade. We will here synthesize some of the key moments of contemporary trade patterns and its policies.

3. Recent history of virtual trade and trade policies

In the last several decades, the global patterns of agricultural production often co-evolved with the international trade of agricultural goods and related policies. The distinctive aspect of food trade in the period after World War II with respect to the trade of other commodities was the absence of a general international agreement for liberalization and barrier removal. In fact, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1947), which promoted liberalization of markets, elimination of trade barriers and expansion of international trade, did not include agricultural commodities. Trade of food products was included only in the 1994 Agreement on Agriculture (Clapp 2016). Between 1947 and 1972, the world's agriculture saw a big gap between national and international regulations, which led to the establishment of the so-called "food regime", whereby the US protected its domestic economy (Friedmann 1993) following policies that were put in place after the Great Depression. To increase farmers' incomes, the New Deal (1933-1938) set minimum prices for commodities and maintained these prices constant through government purchases. This encouraged farmers to produce more, with a consequent problem of surpluses that needed to be disposed of, often by favoring exports through foreign aid and export subsidies (Friedmann 1993).

In addition to the effects of economic policies, major changes in global food production and trade resulted from the adoption of modern agricultural technology. After World War II production (and surpluses) further increased as a result of technological advances, and the industrialization of agriculture (e.g., Erisman et al 2008, D'Odorico et al 2018). Many agri-food corporations engaged themselves in intensive livestock operations as well as maize and soy farming sustained by the use of fertilizers, irrigation, new crop varieties, and other innovations of the Green Revolution (e.g., Delgado et al 1999, Pingali 2012). This transition in the agricultural production system significantly threatened the Natural Capital by inducing loss of biodiversity, soil erosion, freshwater pollution, and increased greenhouse gas emissions (e.g., Ward 1993, Montgomery 2007). It also provided an unprecedented excess in the supply of crops that were used as animal feed, thereby dramatically increasing livestock production often in concentrated operations, a phenomenon known as the *livestock revolution* (Delgado et al 1999, Davis and D'Odorico 2015). The intensification of crop production came at the cost of environmental damage (e.g., Ward 1993) and of a specialization in the production of a narrow range of products, which further increased the reliance on international trade of agricultural goods (Friedmann 1993).

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3 The Marshall Aid to Europe (1947) was one of the cornerstones of the “food regime”. In
4 fact, the Marshall Plan was the first example of big foreign aid, which boosted the Atlantic agro-
5 food relations; funds from the Marshall Aid Europe were used to purchase US surplus commodities
6 (maize and soybean, mostly) at rates 50% below domestic price and, at the same time, investments
7 in the European livestock sector made it reliant on the US industrial feedstuffs. Thus, the Marshall
8 Plan promoted an integration between the US and European agricultural economies. In the same
9 period, Marshall Aid also replicated the US model in Japan for rice production and in South Korea
10 and Taiwan, but without achieving an integration with the US agro-food sector as in Europe.
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17 The strict linkages between US and Europe did not hamper the European protection policy
18 for some goods. In particular European wheat and dairy products were under import controls
19 through the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP 1962), which made Europe less dependent on
20 wheat imports from the U.S. Therefore, the U.S. had to find other wheat importers outside Europe,
21 targeting particularly developing countries in Asia and Africa (Friedmann 1993). By the 1970s,
22 the developing world became therefore dependent on cheap wheat imports from the US, while
23 tropical crops from developing countries (i.e., sugar and vegetable oils) were replaced by new
24 industrial substitutes made in the US using subsidized maize and soybean surpluses (Friedmann
25 1993).
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32 In the 1972-1973 period, the Soviet Union, taking advantage of the *Détente* period with the US
33 (i.e., easing of the strained relations), bought 30 million tonnes of grain from the US (Brada, 1993).
34 The consequence was a sudden food scarcity worldwide (e.g., Gerlach 2015). This food shortage,
35 combined with the concomitant oil crises (Yergin 2011), and the beginning of the multidecadal
36 Sahel drought (Wang et al 2000, Nicholson 2000, Dai et al 2004) increased the cost of food in the
37 world (Friedmann 1993). Therefore, the international market became unreliable for a number of
38 import-dependent countries, which started to look for new suppliers (e.g., Japan found new
39 suppliers in the developing world). The subsequent decades then saw a gradual decrease in the
40 leading role of the US in the global agricultural trade and the end of the US-centered “food regime”
41 with the emergence of multiple new pivots. Countries of the developing world and of the former
42 socialist block joined the multilateral trade negotiations at the GATT. A noteworthy example of
43 the end of the “food regime” can be found in the case of the soybean market. By the late 1980s’,
44 the US lost the control of this market (Figure 3), while Brazil started to become a major exporter
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of soybeans and soy meals (FAOSTAT 2009). Overall, Brazil and other major agricultural countries such as Argentina and India, were then able to compete with the US for export markets.




Figure 3. Global patterns of major virtual water trade in 1986 (top) and 2011 (bottom). In purple: net VW exporters. In pink: net VW importers.

The emergence of new suppliers and new trade partnerships greatly enhanced international trade and the globalization of food, as reflected by the increase in the number of trade relationships

and in the amount of food traded (D'Odorico et al 2014). Between 1986 and 2011 international food trade and the associated trade of virtual water almost tripled (Figure 4) (Carr et al 2012, Dalin et al 2012). In 2010 international trade accounted for 24% of global food production and associated virtual water (Carr et al 2013). Major changes in the recent history of agricultural trade include the ever increasing presence of the People's Republic of China as a major food importer (in year 2005), particularly from South America, the increase of soybean exports from Brazil and Argentina to southeast Asia (da Silva et al 2016, Zhang et al 2016), and the escalating exports of palm oil from Indonesia and Malaysia to China, India, Pakistan, and Europe (Porkka et al 2013, MacDonald et al 2015,) (Figure 3).




Figure 4. A) VW Production of 150 primary and B) subsequent VW Trade of 266 primary and secondary major food commodities removing feed and seed. (Analysis based on FAOSTAT data).

The end of the US-centered agricultural trade era left some developing countries in conditions of strong food dependency, stagnating export revenues, and debts (Friedmann 1993, Ward 1993). Decades of access to subsidized agricultural surpluses from the US impeded the development of domestic commercial farming (e.g., Ward 1993, IAASTD 2009, Yu and Nin Pratt 2011). In importer countries, local farmers, whose crops instead of being subsidized were taxed, were often run out of business by cheaper subsidized imports from the US (Ward 1993, IAASTD 2009). Thus, import dependency was often both a cause and an effect of limited agricultural development rather than of a shift to a more profitable non-agricultural economy (OECD 2013). In response to import dependency, debt, and import restrictions in developed countries, developing countries had to export non-traditional products such as exotic foods and flowers, which often

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3 contributed to land degradation, destruction of local food systems, and social inequality
4 (Friedmann 1993, Hale and Opondo 2005, Mena-Vasconez et al 2016, Lanari et al 2018). At the
5 same time, overproduction in developed countries often occurred at huge environmental cost in
6 terms of pollution by fertilizers and pesticides, loss of habitat and biodiversity in intensive
7 monocultures, and topsoil erosion (Ward 1993, Montgomery 2007). Thus, export subsidies
8 benefited exporting companies but had environmentally harmful impacts in production regions
9 and socio-economically detrimental effects on the receiving markets (Ward 1993).

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15 Through their investments in multiple regions of the world, multinational agro-food
16 corporations – whose interests were often neither aligned with those of producing nor importing
17 countries – strongly contributed to determine the global patterns of transnational food trade
18 (Murphy 2008).

23 24 *3.1 Geography of trade routes and their vulnerability*

25 Commodities are traded by road, rail, and sea, often through vulnerable routes (Bailey and
26 Wellesley 2017). Disruption of these routes may cut off supplies while raising prices. Bailey and
27 Wellesley (2017) identified 14 potential bottlenecks (or chokepoints) worldwide (Table 2 & Figure
28 5). These chokepoints might be enhanced by intensifying meteorological events, underinvestment
29 in infrastructure, increase in trade volumes, and conflicts.

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34 The increasing importance of international trade is also seen in the efforts to build new
35 trade infrastructures. The Chinese government is developing the Belt and Road Initiative to
36 connect Eurasian countries (Weidong 2015). For some time, there has been plans to build the
37 channel of Nicaragua as an alternative of the Panama Canal (Heilmann et al 2014). The Turkish
38 government with the Channel Istanbul is planning to build an artificial waterway channel to
39 connect the Aegean and Mediterranean seas (Dogan and Stupar 2017). A new railroad is planned
40 to connect Brazil to the Pacific Ocean (Müller and Colloredo-Mansfeld 2018). Climate warming
41 is creating new routes in the Arctic that could reduce shipping time and pressure on the congested
42 Turkish Straits (Patel and Fountain 2017). United States and Ukraine are building new capacity
43 and expanding grain terminals (Bailey and Wellesley 2017).

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53 **Table 2.** Food infrastructures chokepoints and percentage of global total key crops exported
54 through each chokepoint (year 2015). Source: Bailey and Wellesley 2017

	Wheat	Rice	Maize	Soybean
Brazil's Ports	-	-	18%	33%
US Gulf Ports	4%	5%	20%	17%
Black Sea Ports	26%	-	18%	-




Figure 5. Major maritime chokepoints of agricultural commodity international trade. Redrawn from: Bailey and Wellesley (2017).

4. Patterns of Virtual Water Trade

The globalization of water (Hoekstra and Chapagain 2008) associated with the transport of virtual water resources from one region to another is an interesting case of embedded complex systems. It results from the intertwined nature of production, distribution and consumption of products that leverage freshwater. Large scale food systems, alongside production, consumption and population changes, also incorporate virtual water flows associated with trade (Hoekstra and Chapagain 2008), large-scale land acquisitions (Rulli et al 2013), food waste (Gustavsson et al 2011), and more in general cultural behaviors (Ingram 2011).

The conversion of diverse elements (i.e., trade, land acquisitions, or waste) to a common currency (e.g. virtual water or virtual water per capita) allows us to explore the combined effect of the redistribution and disposal of agricultural commodities on the global food system and its

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impact on the global freshwater resources. Translation for a single year of detailed trade data of 58 major crop commodities from the Food and Agricultural Organization to the network of virtual water trade allowed for the analysis of the topological properties of this network using methods from network theory (Konar et al 2011). The fluxes of virtual water associated with international trade follow a power law relationship with nodal degree (e.g., the number of export links a country has). Interestingly, VW flows remain concentrated to a small number of links and country nodes (or ‘hubs’) (Konar et al 2011). The structural properties of the VW network can be explained by geographic factors such as rainfall on arable land and economic indicators such as the gross domestic product of the nation’s participating within the network (Suweis et al 2011).





Figure 6. Relative contribution of different food commodities to virtual water trade. (Analysis based on FAOSTAT data).

The temporal reconstruction of the virtual water trade network (Carr et al 2012, Dalin et al 2012) has allowed for examination of changes in the geographic distribution of virtual water trade and network properties in the last few decades. These analyses have highlighted that cereal grains tend to comprise the largest proportion of virtual water fluxes with soybeans, vegetable oils, and luxury goods such as coffee and chocolate also accounting for large portion of the traded virtual water (Figure 6; Carr et al 2013). Simple virtual water trade balances reveal that countries such as the United States, Brazil, Argentina, India, and Australia act consistently as net exporters, and

Germany, Italy, Russia, and Japan act as net importers of virtual water (Carr et al 2013). Some regions, such as the Middle East have increased their importation of virtual water resources, while other regions such as Central Africa and China have switched from being net exporters to net importers of virtual water (Carr et al 2013). Interestingly, increased exports from South America, specifically Brazil and Argentina have decreased North American share of trade to both Asia and Europe from 1986 to 2007, which reflect historical changes in global trade and the loss of centrality of the US in agricultural exports (Section 2).

The analysis of VWT by commodity classes (i.e., plant, animal, and luxury products, see Carr et al., (2013)) shows completely different VWT patterns across class (Figure 7). Interestingly, many developing countries are net exporters of VW associated with luxury goods but importers of crops and animal products. In the 1986-2011 period, Brazil gained increasing importance as exporting countries of animal and plant-based products.



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3 **Figure 7.** Major importers and exporters of luxury goods, animal products, and plant-based products in
4 1986 and 2011. Red countries are net exporters, blue countries are net importers. I, E, and P are imported,
5 exported, and produced quantities of luxury, animal and plant-based commodities in each country,
6 respectively. (Based on data analyses in Carr et al., 2013).
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11 Carr et al (2012) investigated the global trade of 309 crop commodities using data from the
12 Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO 2017) and showed that the associated total virtual water
13 flux doubled from 1986 to 2008, and concurrently the number of links in the virtual water network
14 increased 92%. Similarly, Dalin et al. (2012) leveraging the H08 model (Box 3) also showed a
15 doubling in both total virtual water flux and number of links among 58 major commodities. Both
16 of these studies showed an almost doubling in average node strength (total flux) and degree
17 (number of trade partners) over a similar 22-23 year period.
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20 The VWT network is overall extremely dynamic and even links which carry large volumes
21 of virtual water display intermittent behavior in the sense that their strength is not consistent from
22 year to year (Carr et al 2012). Further, countries with few connections tended to remain less
23 connected over time as exemplified by the broad lack of engagement of African nations in the food
24 trade network. D'Odorico et al (2012) examined the temporal changes in community structure of
25 the virtual water network demonstrating an increase in clustering of virtual water trade, and that,
26 while the network is highly variable, trade tends to be organized within communities.
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30 The analysis of VWT has also led to ethical considerations regarding the inequalities in
31 the distributions of water, and population (Seekell et al 2011). It was found that virtual water
32 trade tends to reduce inequalities among countries in water use for food relative to wellbeing
33 thresholds (Carr et al 2015). Moreover, international food trade provides access to nutrients and
34 enables some poorer countries to be able to nourish hundreds of millions of people (Suweis et al
35 2013, Wood et al 2018). In these studies, it is unclear what the null model of trade equality might
36 look like. Dang et al (2015) quantified the inequality within the US virtual water flow network.
37 The US network is relatively homogeneous and social (e.g. normal node degree distribution,
38 clustered (Pennock et al 2002)), making it a suitable null model for global virtual water trade.
39 The US virtual water flows have a Gini coefficient of 0.51 while the Gini Coefficient of global
40 VWT is 0.63 (Dang et al 2015).
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5. Refining resolution of virtual water transfers

When quantifying virtual water trade (VWT), there are two main inputs: the water footprint (or virtual water content, VWC, See Box 1) and trade (T). The resolution of each variable restricts the resolution of VWT estimates. This section analyzes the resolution in space, time, water source, water boundary, and commodity coverage that have been used in global reconstructions of virtual water trade (see Box 3).

The literature on VWT began by tracking the water embodied in international trade. Early studies assumed that the virtual water content (VWC) of a product was constant within a country (Hoekstra and Hung 2002). This assumption is problematic for large countries, due to their high spatial heterogeneity in both climate and production patterns. In those countries internal redistribution of food and the attached virtual water can be significant and some studies have begun to examine this internal flow of virtual water (Guan and Hubacek 2007, Dang et al 2015). Data on trade initially included only agricultural and food commodities, ignoring non-food items that may also consume large volumes of water. Similarly, early research used temporal averages of VWC (Hoekstra and Chapagain, 2007). This ignores the large interannual fluctuations in climatic conditions over time, as well as productivity trends, such as those induced by increasing demand or technological changes. Additionally, in initial VWT studies water use was lumped across source (i.e. rainfall, surface water, groundwater). In this way, differences in the source of water being used to produce commodities were ignored. Similarly, early work did not use naturally occurring hydrologic boundaries (i.e., watershed boundaries) to define the system, making it difficult to link to water resources management.

Water footprint and virtual water transfer estimates have seen recent advances to address all of the shortcomings outlined above. Here, we detail the state of the literature in terms of refining our estimates of VWT in space, time, commodity coverage, water source, and water body.

5.1 Spatial resolution

Initial VWT studies combined estimates of VWC at the national scale with trade data that was also national in spatial scale. Recently, great strides have been made in refining the spatial resolution of VWC (i.e. typically to a grid covering the globe, see Figure 8) and then combined with national trade data. Now, the current frontier is in further resolving trade flows in space.

To estimate crop water footprint, or virtual water content, VWC, most studies utilize a crop water model to calculate the consumptive water requirements (i.e., evapotranspiration, ET). CROPWAT (Allen, 1998) is a commonly used model (Mekonnen and Hoekstra, 2011, Tuninetti et al., 2015), though models such as the Global Crop Water Model (GCWM) (Siebert and Doll 2010, Hoff et al 2014), H08 (Hanasaki et al 2010, Dalin et al 2012), and AQUACROP (Zhuo et al 2016) have been widely utilized as well. These models perform a calculation of potential and actual evapotranspiration relying on a simplified soil water balance. Their use of finer spatial scales is only limited by the availability of fine-grain information on crops, soil properties, and atmospheric variables, as well as by the computational time (e.g., Figure 8). To date most of the global analyses of the water footprint of crops have been performed at resolutions ranging between 5 and 30 arc min (or between ~10 km and ~50 km)(See Table 3; Tuninetti et al 2015).

Table 3. Studies about the global VWC of crop production at high spatial resolution (after Tuninetti et al 2015).

Study	Scale	Resolution	Period	Crop Yield
Rost et al 2008	Global	30 arc min	1971-2000	Country Average
Hanasaki et al 2010	Global	30 arc min	1985-1999	Country Average
Liu and Yang 2010	Global	30 arc min	2000	Country Average
Siebert and Doll 2010	Global	5 arc min	1998-2002	5 arc min
Mekonnen & Hoekstra 2010	Global	5 arc min	1996-2005	5 arc min
Zhuo et al 2014	Local	5 arc min	1996-2005	5 arc min
Tuninetti et al 2015	Global	5 arc min	1996-2005	5 arc min
Rosa et al 2018a	Global	5 arc min	2000	5 arc min

Most studies on VW trade quantify international flows with commodity group resolution typically limited by the Harmonizing Commodity Description and Coding System (HS code) and the FAO food groups, since trade data is predominantly available at this spatial scale (e.g. FAOSTAT, COMTRADE) and the paucity of detailed sub-national trade data is a major limiting factor. Sub-national VW trade studies typically pair VWC with modeled estimates of sub-national commodity transfers (e.g., Verma et al 2009, Zhang and Anadon 2014, Dalin et al 2014, 2015, Rushforth and Ruddell 2015, Hoekstra and Mekonnen 2016) or multi-regional input–

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3 output (MRIO) models (Guan and Hubacek 2007, Dong et al 2014, Deng et al 2016, Serrano et
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5 al 2016, Zhang and Anadon 2014, Ren et al 2018).
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8 Recently, sub-national studies of VWT based upon empirical sub-national commodity
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10 transfers (i.e. using Commodity Flow Survey (CFS) or Freight Analysis Framework (FAF) data)
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12 have been introduced for the United States (Lin et al 2014, Dang et al 2015). Sub-national studies
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14 based upon modeled domestic transfers have also been developed (e.g. Brazil in Flach et al 2016;
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16 China in Dalin et al 2014).
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20 VW trade estimates that are highly resolved in space provide the greatest opportunity to
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22 evaluate links between water scarcity, water resources sustainability, and complex supply chains
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24 (Flach et al 2016). For example, VWT resolved to the urban spatial scale enables the quantification
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26 of exposure and resilience of cities to direct and indirect water stress (Rushforth and Ruddell 2016).
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28 There is significant potential to evaluate high spatial resolution VWT within the United States, due
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30 to the availability of sub-national empirical transfers (e.g. CFS and FAF databases), however these
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32 databases are limited in commodities and temporal resolution when compared to the international
33
34 trade databases. Improvements in the spatial refinement of VW trade in other countries, however,
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36 will continue to be limited by a lack of data, making commodity flow modelling essential.

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38 In hydrology, the watershed is the landscape unit typically used in the analysis and
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40 management of water resources. Increasingly, VWT studies are attempting to relate to this
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42 hydrologic unit of analysis. In this way, VWT studies will be more able to link with watershed
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44 scale hydrologic flows and management issues. Hoekstra and Mekonnen (2012) used the river
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46 basin as the unit of analysis to assess water scarcity globally. They found that roughly half of all
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48 basins evaluated are subject to severe water scarcity at least one month per year. Wang and
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50 Zimmerman (2016) quantified the impacts of VWT for water use and stress at both the national
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52 and watershed scale. To do this, they analyzed over 12,000 watersheds. Their study concluded that
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54 VWT mitigates water stress in some of the world's most stressed watersheds. VWT for the Great
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56 Lakes (Mayer et al 2016), Yellow River basin (Feng et al 2012), and major aquifers of the United
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58 States (Marston et al 2015) have been evaluated. These are examples of VWT studies at the
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60 watershed scale that provide information at a scale that is meaningful for water resources
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62 managers.




Figure 8. Comparison of the spatial distribution of the crop water footprint (CWF, also referred to as “virtual water content”, VWC) of wheat in 1961 and 2013 based on the “fast-track” method from Tuninetti et al (2017b) using national yield data from years 1961 and 2013 (from FAOSTAT). The spatial distribution of wheat cultivations is kept constant in time and equal to the cultivated areas in the reference year (2000). Irrigation variability in time is indirectly accounted for as it contributes to the definition of national yields.

5.2 Temporal resolution

The temporal variability of VWT depends on the annual trade patterns and on the VWC variability. While annual trade patterns are easily available from open dataset (e.g., FAOSTAT, COMTRADE), VWC values need to be estimated typically through an analysis of the consumptive use of water by crops and crop yields (Mekonnen et al. 2010). A number of studies (e.g., Carr et al. 2012, Konar et al 2012; Tamea et al. 2014; Tuninetti et al. 2017a) adopted constant values of

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3 the VWCs to reconstruct the VWT network and its changes through time. This means that in these
4 analyses temporal changes in VWT result from changes in trade patterns but not in VWC, which
5 corresponds to considering constant crop yields and climate conditions. These studies showed a
6 trend of increasing VWT, as globalization led to increased trade connections and exchanged
7 volumes (Carr et al 2012, Dalin et al 2012). These results point to the important role of temporal
8 variability but only encapsulate time trends in T (i.e., trade) and not VWC (see also Box 3).
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13 Improvements to the temporal resolution of VWT, accounting for the interannual
14 variability of the VWC would permit exploration of changes in time and in response to specific
15 events (e.g. drought, political disruption, agricultural advances). For instance, Dalin and Conway
16 (2016) show how socio-economic change and climatic variability in southern Africa propagated
17 through the global VWT network. Importantly, implementing the temporal variation in the VWC
18 is essential to evaluate sustainability issues that may not be evident when average values are
19 considered.
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22 Recently, a “fast-track” approach to deal with the temporal dimension of the VWC has been
23 introduced and validated (Tuninetti et al. 2017b). Accordingly, the VWC temporal variability is
24 solely ascribed to the yield change, while the effect of evapotranspiration is assumed to be
25 negligible compared to the yield effect. A comparison between the VWC of wheat in 2013 and
26 1961 (Figure 8) shows a decrease in crop water requirement in the last 50 years, which reflects a
27 concurrent improvement in crop yields. The sensitivity of virtual water trade estimates to the
28 temporal variability in virtual water content of the main staple crops shows how, when the temporal
29 variability of VWC is accounted for, the corresponding volumes of virtual water trade in the last
30 few years are smaller than in the case with average VWC for the 1996-2005 period (Figure 9).
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33 Other studies on the temporal variability of VWT estimated annual values of VWC, allowing for
34 both yields and the evapotranspiration to change (Hanasaki et al 2008) in global (Dalin et al 2012,
35 Konar et al 2012) and local (Dalin et al 2014, Dalin and Conway 2016, Marston and Konar 2016)
36 scale VWT assessments. For instance, to evaluate the impact of the California drought, Marston
37 and Konar (2016) estimated annual VWT values. To do this, they calculated annual values of both
38 trade and VWC. This study highlights the importance of time trends in both variables and provides
39 a methodology for future time varying VWT studies to emulate.
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


Figure 9. Virtual water trade of wheat, maize, rice, and soybean as in Tuninetti et al (2017b). Dashed line refers to VWT estimates based on a constant (i.e., time-averaged in 1996-2005) crop water footprint (or virtual water content). The solid line refers to estimates using time-varying crop water footprint.

5.3 Commodity coverage

The VWT literature began by quantifying the water embodied in agricultural and food trade (Hoekstra and Hung 2002) with commodity group resolution typically limited by the Harmonizing Commodity Description and Coding System (Harmonized System, HS) and the FAO food groups. Now, studies are increasingly including non-food commodities (both from agriculture and mining) as well, due to the realization that these commodities also use significant volumes of water. Virtual water flows have been assessed for industrial products (Hoekstra and Mekonnen 2012, Hassan et al 2017), biofuels (Rulli et al 2016), natural rubber production (Chiarelli et al 2018) (Tab. 1). Virtual water flows have also been estimated for energy sources such as fossil fuels (Tab. 1). Zhang et al 2016a estimated that 10% of the water needed to extract oil, natural gas, coal, and produce electricity is embodied in energy that is internationally traded. Chini et al (2018) quantified VWT related to electricity production in the US. Holland et al. (2015) quantified the telecoupling between global energy demand and pressure on freshwater scarce resources in regions distant from the areas of energy consumption. Quantification of non-food VWT is possible due to recent advances in the calculation of non-food VWC (Hoekstra and Mekonnen 2012, Mielke et al 2010,

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3 Gerbens-Leenes et al 2012, Meldrum et al 2013). Commodity specific trade information is
4 available for international trade. However, empirical information on sub-national commodity
5 transfers typically lump commodities into groups (e.g. the CFS and FAF databases) (Lin et al 2014,
6 Dang et al 2015). In this way, there is currently a tradeoff in the spatial resolution and commodity
7 resolution/coverage available to VWT studies.
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13 *5.4 Water source*

14 Identifying the water source is crucial to investigate its availability, opportunity cost, and potential
15 variability under a changing climate. For this reason, it is increasingly important to distinguish
16 'blue' and 'green' components of VWT. Blue water (Box 1) is comprised of water flowing through
17 and stored in surface water bodies (streams, rivers and lakes) and aquifers, or, more simply, surface
18 water and groundwater (Falkenmark and Rockstrom 2006). This water can be withdrawn (e.g.
19 pumped through wells, or diverted from rivers and lakes), transported through channels and
20 pipelines, and then used for municipal, industrial, and agricultural (i.e., irrigation) needs. Green
21 water (Box 1) refers to water in the root zone from precipitation supplies. In other words, green
22 water refers to water stored in the soil and used by plants in both rainfed and irrigated agriculture
23 (of course irrigated agriculture uses also blue water).
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32 Recent studies have investigated the impact of water use in agriculture on the water source.
33 Environmental flows describe the quantity, quality, and patterns of water flows required to sustain
34 freshwater ecosystems and the ecosystem services they provide (Acreman et al 2014). Thus, blue
35 water use can be analyzed based on its environmental and sustainability impacts (Mekonnen and
36 Hoekstra 2016, Zhuo et al 2016, Yano et al 2016, Rosa et al 2018a).
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43 *5.4.1 Green and blue virtual water trade*

44 Green and blue water uses have different socio-environmental effects in terms of competition with
45 other water needs and cost, though these two different water reservoirs are inter-connected (e.g.
46 when the soil is filled to field capacity - with potential for green water use - excess water undergoes
47 gravity drainage to the underlying aquifer and may eventually reach streams or other surface water
48 bodies - potential for blue water use).
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53 First, there is generally more competition for blue water use than for green water use. Competition
54 may be particularly high for water resources stored in reservoirs, rivers, and lakes, as this water
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3 can be used for irrigation but also for hydropower generation, drinking water, energy extraction
4 and production, mining, and other industrial purposes (Rosa et al 2018a,b, D'Odorico et al 2018).
5 Likewise, groundwater reserves are also often used for agriculture as well as industrial and
6 drinking needs. The main competition that may arise for green water use is actually attached to the
7 land. If no crops were planted, the soil moisture would have different fates depending on the land
8 use type (forest, grassland, or built-up land), but once crops are planted, there is no other potential
9 use of green water. Second, beside the cost of land, using green water in agriculture is a natural
10 process and does not come with any additional direct operational cost. Indeed, green water
11 becomes available at no cost through precipitation, though its productive use by crops requires
12 indirect costs to prepare the soil (e.g., ploughing, mulching, seeding, and weed removal) for rainfed
13 agriculture. Conversely, the use of blue water comes with a direct cost, which is that of building,
14 maintaining and powering irrigation infrastructure, such as canals, pumps, wells, and drip or
15 sprinkler irrigation systems.
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27 Much of the VWT literature has focused on trade of agricultural products, which not only are the
28 main water consumers [about 90% of blue water consumption by human activities globally, (Postel
29 et al 1996, Falkenmark and Rockstrom 2006)] but also are the only products that may have both a
30 blue and green VWC. Indeed, green water is only used in the agricultural and forestry sectors,
31 while all other goods and services that are not related to agroforestry may only have a blue VWC.
32 It should be noted that aquaculture and livestock use of agroforestry products (e.g. feed) accounts
33 for the green water footprint associated with fish and animals. Interestingly, most cropland is
34 rainfed (about 80%) and globally, blue water represents 12% of total (blue+green water) annual
35 water consumption over cropland (Rosa et al 2018a), but irrigated land is twice as productive,
36 accounting for 30-40% of the global food calorie production (Rosa et al 2018a).
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46 Some global studies have tried to separate blue and green water used in agriculture (Rost et al
47 2008, Aldaya et al 2010, Siebert and Döll 2010, Rosa et al 2018a). Blue and green water are
48 virtually traded via crops with a similar ratio: Konar et al 2012 estimate that 12% of the global
49 VWT is contributed by blue water, and this ratio has been stable over time, based on a study on 5
50 crops and three livestock products between 1986 and 2006 (Konar et al 2012). However, the shares
51 of blue and green water in crop production significantly vary across products and locations. For
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3 instance, there is relatively more irrigation in some regions like South Asia than in other regions
4 of the world. Likewise, the production of some commodities such as poultry uses much more blue
5 water than others (Konar et al 2011). The share of blue and green water sources contributing to the
6 total VWC of the same commodities may also greatly vary within countries. For instance, in China
7 irrigation on average contributes to roughly 25% of the VWC of crops but in Xinjiang, Ningxia,
8 and Inner Mongolia, crop production more strongly depends on irrigation (85%, 69%, and 49% of
9 their VWC, respectively) (Dalin et al 2014). Similarly, the country-average blue water footprint of
10 livestock accounts for 16% of its VWC, while in Ningxia the blue water share of the VWC of
11 livestock is about 54%. This greater reliance on blue water reflects an arid climate with scarce
12 growing-season precipitation. Conversely, other provinces, such as Chongqing and Guizhou, rely
13 almost exclusively on rainfall with only 2% and 3% of water inputs from irrigation, respectively
14 (Dalin et al 2014). These differences are then reflected in VW exports from these regions, and
15 explain, for example, why Asia exports relatively more blue water than South America (Konar et
16 al 2011).

30 5.4.2 Surface water vs groundwater

31 Key distinctions also exist within different sources of blue water, such as groundwater and surface
32 water, which can both be used by all economic sectors (e.g., irrigation, industrial, and municipal
33 uses).

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39 A handful of studies have partitioned blue water into surface and groundwater, since the
40 implications of using each is different (Aldaya and Llamas 2008, Aldaya et al 2010, Schyns and
41 Hoekstra 2014, Schyns et al 2015, Yano et al 2015, Marston et al 2015). Now, several studies
42 further distinguish between various types of surface and groundwater resources (e.g. renewable
43 groundwater, groundwater depletion, small reservoirs, large reservoirs) (Hanasaki et al 2010, Dalin
44 et al 2017).

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51 Greater attention has recently been drawn to groundwater use, as it has been increasingly used for
52 irrigation in many regions (Wada et al 2010, Siebert et al 2010, Gleeson et al 2012, Konikow and
53 Kendy 2005, Scanlon et al 2012). The overuse of groundwater can lead to multiple environmental
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3 damages, including land subsidence, salt intrusion in coastal aquifers, or die-off of phreatophytes
4 (Konikow and Kendy 2005, Taylor et al 2013). A few studies have recently focused on
5 groundwater resources embedded in food trade. In the US, 46 km³ of groundwater per year is
6 withdrawn from three major aquifers and 13% of blue VWT from US (and 35% of blue water use
7 for US production) come from three aquifers (Marston et al 2015).
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13 As groundwater depletion becomes a more alarming issue in several regions across the world
14 (Gleeson et al 2012), studies have analyzed the unsustainable use of groundwater due to
15 withdrawal rates exceeding the rates of natural recharge. In some extreme cases, the recharge rates
16 are very small (e.g., the Nubian aquifer in North Africa - see Konikow 2011) and non-renewable
17 water resources accumulated during wetter epochs are “mined”.
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22 Wada et al (2012) found that unsustainable groundwater abstraction contributes to approximately
23 20% of the global gross irrigation water demand for the year 2000. The greatest rates of
24 groundwater depletion are occurring in India (68 km³ yr⁻¹) followed by Pakistan (35 km³ yr⁻¹),
25 the United States (30 km³ yr⁻¹), Iran (20 km³ yr⁻¹), China (20 km³ yr⁻¹), Mexico (10 km³ yr⁻¹),
26 and Saudi Arabia (10 km³ yr⁻¹). In addition, globally, this contribution more than tripled from 75
27 to 234 km³ yr⁻¹ over the 1960–2000 period.
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35 In many countries, some aquifers are unsustainably mined as a result of crop production for the
36 export market (Dalin et al 2017). Unsustainable groundwater use is not a local problem only,
37 because increasingly global markets, companies and consumers worldwide depend on the products
38 derived from unsustainable water supplies (Hoekstra et al 2018). Dalin et al (2017) estimated crop-
39 specific groundwater depletion associated with irrigation globally, and determined the amounts of
40 groundwater depletion embedded in international food trade in years 2000 and 2010. They found
41 that global groundwater depletion for irrigation increased by 22% from 2000 to 2010 (240 to 292
42 km³ yr⁻¹), mainly in China (+102%) and the United States (+31%). About 11% of non-renewable
43 groundwater use for irrigation is embedded in international food trade, of which two-thirds are
44 exported by Pakistan, the United States, and India alone. The trade of groundwater depletion by
45 top crop exporters have greatly increased from 2000 to 2010 (100% increase in India, 70% in
46 Pakistan and 57% in the United States), and the largest increase in the imports of groundwater
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3 depletion occurred in China (tripling), and were mainly associated with imports from the United
4 States and India.
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8 *5.4.3 New vs ancient water*

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10 Water can be either physically or virtually transferred not only in space (through pipelines, trade,
11 or foreign direct investments) but also in time. For instance, in some regions groundwater depletion
12 (see previous section) may be contributed by the mining of ancient (or fossil) water that
13 accumulated in aquifers during wetter epochs. .
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17 Groundwater mining (Konikow 2011, Taylor et al 2013) is an example of a physical use of ancient
18 water. Water from a geological past can also be used in a virtual sense, by using commodities that
19 were produced using ancient water. A notable example is the case of fossil fuels, which formed
20 from the decay of biomass from organism that existed several millions of years ago. Such a
21 biomass contains energy from ancient photosynthesis and its growth relied on the consumptive use
22 of water. An indirect estimate of the ancient water virtually embodied in fossil fuels used
23 worldwide (D'Odorico et al 2017) has shown how one year of fossil fuel use by human societies
24 corresponds to a virtual consumption of an amount of ancient water of roughly $7.4 \times 10^{13} \text{ m}^3 \text{ y}^{-1}$,
25 which is close to the total annual evapotranspiration from terrestrial ecosystems. These results
26 highlight how, to meet its present energy needs, humanity is borrowing water from a geological
27 past. Constraints imposed by the global water cycle (in addition to land availability and food
28 production) do not allow humanity to meet its energy demand by replacing fossil fuels with
29 bioenergy (D'Odorico et al 2017). The reliance on ancient water is an example of highly
30 unsustainable use of virtual water resources. Like in the case of groundwater depletion, such
31 resources will not be available to future generations and will not be replenished.
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44 *5.5 Grey virtual water trade*

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46 The notion of grey water was recently introduced by Hoekstra and Chapagain (2008). Grey water
47 quantifies the theoretical volume of water polluted by agricultural production (see also Section
48 8.4). It represents the volume of water needed to dilute pollutants (namely, nitrogen and
49 phosphorous) to a given water quality standard. Estimates of grey VWT have not been as
50 widespread as blue and green water (O'Bannon et al 2014). This is because it is a theoretical rather
51 than an actual consumptive measure, making it difficult to combine directly with blue and green
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3 values. Moreover, the calculation of the grey water footprint depends on the number and type of
4 pollutants that are accounted for, and the quality standards, which are both pollutant- and country-
5 specific. To date, most studies on the grey water footprint (e.g., Hoekstra and Mekonnen 2012)
6 have concentrated on nitrate from fertilizer applications with nitrate concentrations in drainage and
7 runoff water from agricultural field calculated as a fixed fraction of nitrate applications without
8 modeling the underlying soil biogeochemical processes and their variability. It is still unclear how
9 the greywater footprint associated with multiple pollutants (including other fertilizers and
10 pesticides) would need to be calculated (i.e., as the sum of the grey water footprints of each
11 pollutant or accounting also for their interactions?).
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20 Grey water flows have been used as a proxy for the pollution left in the production region. Thus,
21 by importing a certain agricultural commodity from country A, country B is virtually exporting
22 pollutants to country A. Environmental degradation is avoided by diluting those pollutants with an
23 amount of water defined as grey water footprint. Thus, country A needs to allocate a fraction of
24 its freshwater resources for the dilution of pollutants. A global analysis (O'Bannon et al 2014) of
25 grey water flows associated with pollution from nitrogen fertilizers has highlighted the countries
26 bearing the bigger shares of the planetary grey water footprint (Figure 10). Interestingly, most of
27 the burden is supported by more developed agricultural countries that make a relatively heavier
28 use of fertilizers. However, the grey water concept has some limitations because it does not entirely
29 describe pollution as a result of production processes. For instance, soybeans imported by Europe
30 from Brazil are used as feed for pigs that are subsequently exported. This causes a manure and
31 NO_3 excess that pollutes groundwater and surface water in Europe, not in Brazil. Thus, part of the
32 environmental costs caused by fertilizers used in Brazil are exported to Europe, but the analysis of
33 grey water footprints does not show this effect. Moreover, international food trade may have also
34 negative environmental impacts in importing countries. For example, because of its reliance on
35 imports, China is converting soybean croplands into corn fields and rice paddies with consequent
36 increase in nitrogen pollution (Sun et al 2018). A related concept was developed by Galloway et al
37 (2007), with the notion of 'virtual nitrogen' (or 'embodied nitrogen'). When applied to a
38 geographic analysis of that scale (e.g., at the country scale) the nitrogen footprint of that region
39 represents the nitrogen pollution (both of water bodies and of the atmosphere) caused by the
40 consumption habits of the people living in that region. Like its water and ecological counterparts
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(Wackernagel et al 1999, Hoekstra and Chapagain 2008), part of the nitrogen footprint of a country falls outside the boundaries of that country, meaning that pollution is partly exported to other regions of the world (Oita et al 2016). Thus, the external component of the nitrogen footprint represents a virtual nitrogen export or, equivalently, a virtual import of grey water. Likewise, other authors have investigated the global phosphorus (and embodied phosphorus) flows associated with agricultural trade (MacDonald et al 2012, Nesme et al 2016, Hamilton et al 2018).




Figure 10. Share of total nitrogen pollution burden from agricultural trade on exporting countries in 2008 (based on analyses in O'Bannon et al 2014).

6. Reconceptualizing the global water cycle: accounting for the 'virtual water cycle'

The previous sections have highlighted some important patterns and properties of virtual water trade. But to what extent is VWT redistributing (virtual) water resources around the globe? How do virtual water flows (Table 1) compare to the major physical water fluxes in the water cycle (Table 4)? We define 'virtual water cycle' a representation of the hydrologic cycle that highlights the virtual water fluxes. Like the physical water cycle, its virtual counterpart includes water stocks (e.g., ocean, land, terrestrial water bodies, and glaciers), and (virtual) water fluxes. The virtual

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3 water cycle is powered not by solar energy and gravity forces as the physical water cycle, but by
4 trade and the energy sources (for most part fossil fuels) used for transport by trucks, trains, and
5 ships (Figure 11). An integrative representation of the global water cycle, should take into account
6 both the physical water fluxes (traditionally the ‘natural water cycle’) and the virtual ones (the
7 ‘virtual water cycle’). Early insights about the mutual presence and inter-dependence of the
8 physical and virtual water can be found in a local case study about Egypt (Abdelkader et al 2018).
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15 In this framing it is important to consider the distinction between the different types of water that
16 are consumed. All consumptive water uses entail a loss of water to the atmosphere as water vapor
17 fluxes due to evaporation and transpiration. Thus, blue water consumption accounts for only part
18 of water withdrawals from water bodies, with the remaining part being returned to water bodies
19 by drainage and runoff processes. The blue water consumption (BWC) of humanity is dominated
20 by water use in irrigation ($0.85\text{-}1.28 \times 10^{12} \text{ m}^3 \text{ y}^{-1}$), which by far exceeds BWC by industrial
21 production ($0.038 \times 10^{12} \text{ m}^3 \text{ y}^{-1}$), and municipal uses ($0.042 \times 10^{12} \text{ m}^3 \text{ y}^{-1}$). Collectively, these blue
22 water uses account for $0.93\text{-}1.37 \times 10^{12} \text{ m}^3 \text{ y}^{-1}$ (Figure 11). Even though these estimates of BWC
23 are only a small fraction (2.4%) of global surface and groundwater runoff, water withdrawals for
24 agriculture and other uses are known for having strongly depleted several rivers, aquifers and other
25 water bodies around the world – such as the Rio Grande or Colorado River in North America –
26 with consequent destruction of aquatic habitat (e.g., Jägermeyr et al., 2017) and depletion of
27 groundwater resources ($0.14\text{-}0.28 \times 10^{12} \text{ m}^3 \text{ y}^{-1}$). Blue water withdrawals, however, are a much
28 bigger fraction of global runoff. In the case of agriculture (Figure 12) blue water withdrawals
29 account for $2.56 \times 10^{12} \text{ m}^3 \text{ y}^{-1}$, or roughly 5% of surface and groundwater runoff. Interestingly,
30 according to these estimates, about 65% of these withdrawals are not consumed and are
31 subsequently returned to aquifers and surface water bodies. Based on estimates for the year 2000,
32 evapotranspiration from agroecosystems ($7.0 \times 10^{12} \text{ m}^3 \text{ y}^{-1}$) – i.e., sum of blue water consumption
33 and crop uptake of root-zone soil moisture (or green water consumption, $\text{GWC} \approx 6.15 \times 10^{12} \text{ m}^3$
34 y^{-1}) – is roughly 10% of global evapotranspiration from continental land masses (Figure 12).
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51 Thus, agriculture contributes to the consumption of 2.4% of the blue water flows and 10% of the
52 green water flows from the global land masses (Figure 12). In other words, in 2000 human
53 appropriation of water resources (blue and green) for agriculture accounted for 10% of terrestrial
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3 evapotranspiration, which is not a trivial amount of water if we consider that large land areas are
4 not suitable for agriculture (e.g., D'Odorico et al 2018, Rosa et al 2018a). These estimates,
5 however, are very conservative because they are based on a limited set of major crops (16 crops
6 in Rosa et al 2018a, accounting for 73% of the planet's cultivated areas and 70% of global crop
7 production) and do not account for many non-food crops, such as fibers, which would increase the
8 total water consumption (i.e., evapotranspiration) by agroecosystems to $7.4-7.7 \times 10^{12} \text{ m}^3 \text{ y}^{-1}$ in the
9 year 2000 (Oki and Kanae, 2006, Mekonnen and Hoekstra 2011, Carr et al 2013). If we include
10 also water consumption for grazing (i.e., pastures) and direct water consumption by livestock, the
11 total water consumption by agroecosystems in the 1995-2005 decade becomes $8.4 \times 10^{12} \text{ m}^3 \text{ y}^{-1}$
12 (Mekonnen and Hoekstra, 2012), or 11.5% of terrestrial evapotranspiration. About 20-24% of the
13 water consumed by agriculture is virtually traded internationally ($1.4 \times 10^{12} \text{ m}^3 \text{ y}^{-1}$ in the year 2000
14 and $2.04 \times 10^{12} \text{ m}^3 \text{ y}^{-1}$ in 1996-2005 see Figure 5 & Table 1).

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26 How have these figures been recently changing? Between 2000 and more recent years agricultural
27 production has increased along with the blue and green water consumption by agroecosystems [up
28 to $10.2-11.8 \times 10^{12} \text{ m}^3 \text{ y}^{-1}$ in 2010, according to some estimates (see Figure 5 and Carr et al 2013)],
29 while the changes in total terrestrial evapotranspiration associated with climate warming and land
30 use change impacts on the water cycle have likely been much smaller. Thus, the share of terrestrial
31 evapotranspiration contributed by agroecosystems has increased since 2000 (up to 14-16% by
32 2010; see Figure 12). Likewise, trade volumes have dramatically increased in the last few years
33 (see Section 4), reaching about $2.1-2.8 \times 10^{12} \text{ m}^3 \text{ y}^{-1}$ in 2010 (see Figure 4 and D'Odorico et al
34 2018), which is again close to 20-24% the more recent estimates of water consumption in
35 agriculture, while the share of terrestrial evapotranspiration that is virtually traded internationally
36 has increased from 1.9-2.4% to 2.8-3.8% between 2000 and 2010 and is expected to escalate in
37 the near future as a result of the increasing water demand by agriculture.

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39 Future increase in human appropriation of freshwater resources will likely continue to be
40 dominated by agriculture. Should the increasing crop demand be met through agricultural
41 intensification (i.e., by enhancing crop yields on currently cultivated land) the green water
42 consumption by agroecosystems would likely remain substantially unchanged. However, blue
43 water consumption would increase as a result of the expansion of irrigation on farmlands that are
44 currently rainfed. Recent estimates have shown that irrigation water (i.e., blue water) consumption
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can sustainably increase at most by 48%, thereby increasing total water consumption (blue + green) for agriculture by 5% (Rosa et al., 2018). This 48% increase would bring irrigation water consumption close to 5% of global runoff. Therefore, unless agriculture is expanded to non-agricultural areas (an approach that has often led to soil degradation, ‘dust bowls’, and habitat loss) agriculture will not be able to appropriate a much greater share of the water cycle than what we see today.




Figure 11. Comparison between physical and virtual water fluxes in integrative depiction of the global water cycle (based on data from Table 4).




Figure 12. Global physical and virtual water fluxes in agriculture for the year 2000 (left) and 2010 (right) (source: Tables 1&4, Figure 4 and references cited in the text; all values are expressed in $10^{12} \text{ m}^3 \text{ y}^{-1}$).

Blue water flows are reported both as consumptive uses and blue water withdrawals (between

parentheses). The asterisk (*) denotes average values for 2000-2010. In red are values that have changed between 2000 and 2010.

Table 4. Physical fluxes in the water cycle.

	Annual flow (m ³ y ⁻¹)	Year	Source
Precipitation over land	120 × 10 ¹²		(Chow, 1988)
Evapotranspiration from land (Green water flows)	73 × 10 ¹²		
Global runoff (Blue Water flows)	47 × 10 ¹²		
Blue Water Withdrawal for irrigation	2.56 × 10 ¹²	2000	(Sacks et al., 2009)
	2.41 × 10 ¹²	1980-2009	(Jägermeyr et al., 2017)
	2.66 × 10 ¹²	2000	(Oki and Kanae 2006)
Blue Water Consumption for irrigation	0.90 × 10 ¹²	1996-2005	(Hoekstra & Mekonnen, 2012)
	1.28 × 10 ¹²	2000-2010	(Siebert et al., 2010)
	0.85 × 10 ¹²	2000	(Rosa et al 2018a)
Green Water consumption in croplands			
For 16 major crops	6.15 × 10 ¹²	2000	(Rosa et al 2018a)
For 150 crops	6.79 × 10 ¹²	2000	(Carr et al 2013)
Unsustainable Blue Water Consumption for irrigation	0.34 × 10 ¹²	2000	(Rosa et al 2018a)
Water consumption Industrial production	0.038 × 10 ¹²	1996-2005	(Hoekstra & Mekonnen, 2012)
Water consumption domestic supply	0.042 × 10 ¹²	1996-2005	(Hoekstra & Mekonnen, 2012)
Groundwater Consumption for irrigation	0.54 × 10 ¹²	2000-2010	(Siebert et al., 2010)
Groundwater Withdrawals	0.73 × 10 ¹²	2000	(Wada et al., 2010)
Groundwater Depletion	0.14 × 10 ¹²	2001-2008	(Konikow et al., 2011)
	0.28 × 10 ¹²	2000	(Wada et al., 2010)
	0.29 × 10 ¹²	2010	(Dalin et al., 2017)

7. Models and drivers of VW trade

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3 Modelling the virtual water trade enables the understanding of governing mechanisms, the
4 identification of driving factors determining network topology and trade flows, and the prediction
5 of future VW trade. The first models of virtual water trade (Suweis et al 2011, Dalin et al 2012)
6 were fitness models, which generated synthetic networks with similar properties to the observed
7 patterns of VW trade (e.g., Sartori et al 2018). Suweis et al (2011) used country-specific values of
8 gross domestic product (GDP) and average rainfall on agricultural areas to reproduce the
9 undirected VW trade network (obtained by summing bilateral flows exchanged on the same link).
10 Dalin et al (2012) considered the directed VW trade network and included the population of each
11 country as an additional explanatory variable, with rainfall being a determinant of agricultural
12 production and exports, and population a determinant of food (and water) consumption and
13 imports. Sartori et al. (2018) identified country GDP, water endowment (or total renewable water
14 resource), and precipitation per capita as drivers of the VW trade network structure. In all cases,
15 the comparison of the real and reconstructed VW trade network is based on network's statistical
16 properties, such as the degree distribution or trade flux distribution, while no attempt is made to
17 evaluate the agreement on individual fluxes between model and data.
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31 A different set of studies focused on the estimation of real fluxes using multi-regression, or gravity
32 models. Tamea et al (2014) developed a gravity-like model establishing multi-regressive linear
33 relations for the imports and exports of each country. Despite some differences among countries,
34 a widespread significant dependency is found between VW flows, and drivers such as population,
35 GDP, geographical trade distances, and the agricultural production of exporting countries (e.g.,
36 Wang et al., 2016). A similar model was recently developed to describe the presence or absence
37 of trade links between pairs of countries (Tuninetti et al 2017a) who highlighted that population,
38 geographical distances and agricultural efficiency (e.g., due to fertilizers use) are the main factors
39 driving the activation and deactivation of trade links over time. Multi-regression models have also
40 been used to investigate the global relationship between VW trade, cultivated land and water
41 resources. Kumar & Singh (2005) identified the cropped land as a relevant factor, although
42 agricultural land appears to have a minor role in other studies (e.g., Tamea et al 2014, Tuninetti et
43 al., 2017b). Irrigated land is found to be relevant for net VW flow associated with specific traded
44 crops, even when they are produced in rainfed conditions (Chouchane et al 2018a). Many authors
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3 highlight that (blue) water scarcity is not a driver of VW trade (Kumar & Singh 2005, Fracasso
4 2014, Chouchane et al 2018a).


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8 Gravity models have also been used to investigate to what extent VW trade is affected by the water
9 endowment and water scarcity of countries (Fracasso 2014, Fracasso et al 2016, Lenzen et al 2013).
10 In addition to determinants of bilateral trade flow such as country-specific values of population,
11 GDP, distance and dummy variables about country-pair relationships, Fracasso (2014) found other
12 possible drivers such as per capita water endowment (measured by water volumes available for
13 agriculture, freshwater availability of exporting countries, and the ratio of dietary requirement over
14 total available water) and water demand (expressed as the ratio of water withdrawals and
15 renewable water). Relevant drivers vary if one considers specific regions instead of the global
16 trade network (Fracasso 2014). For example, in Mediterranean countries large water endowments
17 do not lead to large VW exports, while exports may be hindered by high irrigation water prices
18 (Fracasso et al 2016).
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32 At the global scale, water-intensive goods across many different sectors tend to be exported by
33 countries with relatively abundant water resources, in terms of per-capita freshwater resources, as
34 shown by an econometric analysis of country exports by sector (Debaere 2014). Water is found to
35 induce an international specialization of production and is a source of comparative advantage
36 among countries (Wichelns 2004, Debaere 2014). However, virtual water trade reflects more (and
37 is possibly driven by) the opportunity cost of water, i.e. the cost of the best alternative, rather than
38 its comparative advantage, i.e. the lower opportunity costs relative to other countries (Wichelns
39 2001). For a holistic view of international agricultural trade it is important to consider different
40 metrics, i.e., monetary, nutritional and environmental resource metrics. Such metrics may offer
41 complementary information on causes and implications of trade as well as on how countries'
42 allocation of water and cropland resources determine the globalization patterns of agriculture and
43 trade (Galli et al 2013, MacDonald et al 2015, Wiedmann and Lenzen, 2018).
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53 Other frameworks used to describe VW trade include general equilibrium models of trade
54 economics that have been used, for example, to analyze the changes of VW trade induced by
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modifications (reductions) of local water availabilities (Berrittella et al 2007). Water reductions are expected to shift trade patterns of VW and induce large welfare losses, although possibly inducing an improvement of water use/allocation efficiency. Yet another model setup is based on complex system dynamics, exemplified by El-Gafy (2014) who proposed a multi-sector model including population, crop production, land use, water footprint of crop production and consumption, and VW balance. The model enables the accounting of sector dynamics and inter-sector feedbacks at the county level and the development of scenarios to support decision-making. Likewise, partial equilibrium framework has also been proposed by (Dang et al 2016) to describe the effects of policies and decision-making on water use in agriculture. This literature on the modeling of the impact of shocks on food prices and trade will be reviewed in the context of resilience analyses of VW trade (Section 8.5.).

Figure 13 summarizes the drivers identified in the publications on VWT reviewed in this section. Many of the models presented above enable the development of future projections of the structure of the VWT network and/or of VW flows. Both fitness models and gravity models can be run with projected inputs to assess the possible evolution of trade network and flows (e.g., Suweis et al 2011, Sartori et al 2018, Abdelkader et al. 2018). Equilibrium models as well can be applied to assess different future scenarios.



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3 **Figure 13.** Drivers of VW trade identified in the publications reviewed in Section 7. The radial coordinate
4 expresses the number of publications reporting a significant dependence on each variable. Details are
5 provided in the Supplementary Information (Table S1).
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10 11 **8. Socio-environmental consequences of VWT**

12 Research on VWT has highlighted the existence of regional and global benefits for societies and
13 the environment (Allan 1998). Virtual water transfers are often used for famine relief and to
14 mitigate the effects of regional food crises. VWT prevents massive migrations from arid regions
15 of the world where water resources would be insufficient to meet the needs (food security) of local
16 populations and for this reason it has been argued that they prevent conflict and wars (see Section
17 8.2 & 8.3) (Allan 1993, 1998). VWT is also associated with important water savings because the
18 overall patterns of agricultural production and trade show that crops are planted in areas with in
19 which they have higher water use efficiency and the export to areas in which their production
20 would require more water. This suggests that VWT entails a more efficient use of water resources,
21 which results in a water saving (Section 8.1). Other studies have also highlighted how trade might
22 either decrease the inequality existing among countries in their access to water for food production
23 (Seekell et al 2011, Carr et al 2015, 2016). However, trade decisions are seldom directly driven by
24 water needs, as many other factors (including the availability of capital, raw materials, labor,
25 technical knowledge, and policies) contribute to determine the global patterns of production and
26 trade (see Section 7).
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38 On the other hand, even though virtual water trade can reduce local water deficits by virtually
39 redistributing water resources (Suweis et al 2013), it is not a real long-term solution to water
40 scarcity (Suweis et al 2013, Jia et al 2017) because water remains a globally limited resource that
41 is subjected to increasing pressure from agricultural, industrial, and municipal uses (Figure 12).
42 As noted in Section 6, human appropriation of freshwater resources for agriculture can sustainably
43 increase in presently cultivated land only by up to 48% (Rosa et al 2018a), which would enhance
44 total water consumption in agriculture by 5%. The projected increase in water demand for food
45 production by midcentury is expected to be an order of magnitude greater (e.g., Falkenmark and
46 Rockstro, 2006). Thus, curbing water demand by using water more efficiently – through soil water
47 conservation, “more crop per drop” methods, and adoption of water efficient diets –, while
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3 reducing food demand and food waste, appears to be a much needed approach for long-term water
4 sustainability.
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8 Virtual water trade may have some negative impacts on societies and the environment (e.g., Carr
9 et al 2013). Recent research has highlighted the impact of the globalization of water (and
10 agricultural products) through trade on the resilience of the global food system (D'Odorico et al
11 2010b, Tamea et al 2016, Marchand et al 2016). The establishment of teleconnections between
12 people and the resources they rely on, may distance consumers from the environmental impact of
13 their decisions with the effect of undermining the ethic of environmental stewardship (Chapin et
14 al 2009, Carr et al 2013, D'Odorico and Rulli 2014). Some of the environmental externalities of
15 trade have only recently started to be investigated (see Section 8.4).
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22 In the following sections we review some of the benefits and impacts of virtual water trade.
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25 *8.1 Water savings*

26 International trade can save national water resources by importing water-intensive commodities
27 from other countries. National water saving through trade can imply saving water at a global level
28 if the flow is from sites with high to sites with low water productivity (Chapagain et al 2006,
29 Martinez-Mendez and Bennett 2016, Brindha 2017). It has been estimated that virtual water trade
30 saves $352 \text{ km}^3 \text{ y}^{-1}$ that would be otherwise consumed to produce agricultural products in the
31 importing countries (Chapagain et al 2006) (Tab. 1). Other studies found smaller savings and
32 reported the existence of a growing trend, from roughly $50 \text{ km}^3/\text{y}$ in 1986 to $240 \text{ km}^3/\text{y}$ in 2008
33 (Dalin et al 2012).
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40 Water scarce nations and regions on average save water resources by importing food commodities.
41 For example, it has been estimated that VWT alleviates water stress and promotes water
42 sustainability in China (Zhao et al 2018). Moreover, virtual water trade alleviates water scarcity in
43 importing wealthy countries, while it has limited effects on water scarcity alleviation in poorer
44 countries (Distefano and Kelly 2017). In some cases, international trade can also increase water
45 consumption of agricultural commodities production if crops are grown where they are produced
46 in less environmentally efficient and in more unsustainable ways (Martinez-Mendez and Bennett
47 2016). Many countries produce commodities at the cost of additional pressures on their water
48 resources. For example, agri-food products are sometime traded from an area with low water
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3 productivity to and area with higher water savings in production (Lamastra et al 2017). However,
4 regional trade in Africa is much more efficient in terms of embodied water resources than any
5 other region in the world. Thus, internal African trade patterns may be compensating for poor
6 water productivities in their domestic production systems (Konar et al 2013a).
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11 Konar et al (2013b) have shown that the volume of water savings is likely to increase under a
12 changing climate (see also Dermody et al (2014) for the case of the Roman Empire). This is despite
13 the fact that the total volume of VWT is projected to increase under climate change, due to
14 increased crop prices. Water savings occur under climate change because crop trade re-organizes
15 into a more water-efficient structure (Konar et al 2013b). When free trade policies are enabled, the
16 volume of global water savings increases even more under a changing climate (Konar et al 2016b).
17 This indicates that trade liberalization leads to water resources being efficiently used in the global
18 trade system, making it a potentially important adaptation measure to climate change (Konar et al
19 2016b). These findings are supported by recent causal inference work that shows that trade
20 openness leads nations to use less of their domestic water resources on average (Dang and Konar
21 2018).
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32 *8.2. Hydropolitics of virtual water trade*

33 VWT is a concept that has radically influenced the development of hydropolitical theories. Allan
34 introduced this concept as the result of several years of research on the role of embedded water in
35 agricultural commodities to understand key questions on food security and social stability in water
36 scarce countries, such as the ones in the Middle East and North Africa (Allan 1996, 1998, 2002).
37 One of the key theoretical implications, is in its power to dispel the myth of future water wars.
38 The analytical definition of water wars, which should not be confused with the general notion of
39 water conflicts, has several operational categorizations (Dell'Angelo et al., 2018b). A key
40 characteristic of the formal definition is that a water war occurs when violence is at the State level,
41 specifically when there is interstate military confrontation (Wolf 1998, 2007). Referring to this
42 precise analytical definition, many scholars have coherently worked to debunk the 'water leads to
43 war thesis'. One of the strongest arguments in the literature that contributes to this theory of water
44 peace is the one that derives from the VWT assessment. Allan explained how several water stressed
45 countries such as the ones in the Middle East do not have enough water to grow locally the food
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3 that would be necessary to satisfy the needs of their populations (Allan 1996, 1998, 2002). This
4 condition of hydrological scarcity should lead to expected social tensions, unrest and competition
5 with neighboring countries which could lead to violent escalations and potentially to formal
6 military engagement among different countries.
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11 What the work of Allan demonstrates, is that international trade allows countries to circumvent
12 their local physical water scarcity restrictions. His studies showed that countries' dependence on
13 agricultural production, which on average is the most water intensive sector in society, can be
14 almost entirely satisfied by the import of agricultural commodities (Allan 1996, 1998). Historical
15 evidence about North Africa and the Middle East for example shows that the virtual water flows
16 associated with grain imports from North America are larger than the actual water flows of the
17 Nile river (Allan 1998). It is on the bases of these kinds of hydrological assessments and his
18 observation of trade and agricultural policies, that Allan developed a coherent theory about the
19 irrelevant likelihood that countries could go at war because of water. The underlying logic that
20 Allan highlights is that for water scarce countries it is much more convenient to benefit from virtual
21 water through agricultural commodities importation than to compete and fight with other countries
22 for direct control of physical water resources.
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33 Despite some criticism (see Ansink 2010), the role of virtual water trade represents one of the
34 fundamental arguments that are invoked to refute the 'water leads to war' thesis. This perspective
35 has been recently confirmed by quantitative tests. De Angelis et al (2017) analyzing data on virtual
36 water trade, found that bilateral and multilateral trade openness reduce the probability of interstate
37 war. This is coherent with the theories that show how trade openness, in general and not only of
38 virtual water, reduces the likelihood of interstate conflicts (Dorussen 2006, Hegre 2010). A
39 concern that has been raised though, is that the de-escalation of the risk of interstate water wars
40 produced by virtual water trade could have other, neglected, yet important social implications.
41 Dell'Angelo et al (2018b) discuss the notion of the 'neglected costs of water peace' pointing the
42 attention to the issue that the hydropolitical understanding of virtual water trade might be ignoring
43 some hidden but important social consequences. They raise the hypothesis that "as water is a
44 limited resource – both in local and global terms –, when competition over water is resolved by
45 fetching it from abroad, the social tensions that can consequently emerge or escalate, are shifted
46 elsewhere rather than being dissolved." (Dell'Angelo et al 2018b). Their central message is that
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3 the social tensions, that are believed to be dissolved by virtual water imports are in reality
4 transferred to the countries where water is appropriated. This, is described by the authors as a
5 specific typology of environmental cost-shifting, that takes place in an increasingly telecoupled
6 world and that they describe as “hidden socio-environmental costs of virtual water transfers”. It is
7 clear then that virtual water trade has strong societal influences, many that still need to be
8 understood.
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14 15 *8.3 Virtual water trade and population growth*

16 The study of human demographic growth in relation to the resources available on Earth has been
17 at the center of important debates since Malthus developed his theory that human population grows
18 faster than increase in resource availability, a condition that should eventually limit population
19 growth (Malthus 1789). This theory has been subsequently criticized on the grounds that
20 technological innovations have historically allowed humanity to tremendously increase food
21 production (Boserup 1981) and there is no evidence that food availability has constrained
22 population growth at the global scale (Sen 1981). Therefore, most demographic models do not
23 even account for resource limitation as a determinant of fertility and mortality rates (Lee 2011). In
24 recent years, however, the question of whether the planet has enough natural resources to feed its
25 increasing population (Cohen 1995) has resurfaced (Godfray et al 2010, Foley et al, 2011, Warren
26 et al 2015). Because crop production requires water, a finite resource, and contributes to roughly
27 85% of freshwater use by humanity, the same question about resource limitation has been
28 explicitly reformulated in terms of water (Falkenmark and Rockstrom, 2006; Suweis et al 2013).
29 Specifically, there have been concerns as to whether the planet had enough water resources to meet
30 the increasing needs of the growing and increasingly demanding human population (e.g., Smil
31 1994). This challenge, however, is not only about a near future. Many countries today are already
32 in conditions of water deficit and need to import food because they consume more virtual water
33 than their water balance is able to provide (Allan 1998, Hoekstra and Chapagain 2008). This means
34 that trade has allowed their population to grow way beyond the limits imposed by the locally
35 available water resources (Suweis et al 2013). In other words, part of the global demographic
36 growth has been sustained by virtual water trade and would have not been possible without an
37 increasing reliance on food imports in water scarce regions such as North Africa and the Middle
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3 East (*sensu*, Allan 1998). It is unclear, however, to what extent trade patterns have historically
4 been shaped by demographic dynamics or, vice versa, population growth affected by trade.
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8 In recent years a number of studies have combined projections of population growth with
9 predictions of water availability and agricultural productivity under a variety of climate change
10 and land use scenarios (Rosegrant et al 2001, Foley et al 2011). These predictions have been used
11 to assess whether mankind will run out of water in the next few decades, and to investigate possible
12 strategies to deal with the global food-water-energy nexus (Hoekstra and Wiedmann 2014). These
13 studies have highlighted how, to be effective, water management strategies and policies need to
14 account for both global and local water resources. Suweis et al (2013) expressed the country-scale
15 carrying capacity as a function of both local and virtual water resources on the basis of water
16 footprint and trade calculations. Using these carrying capacities in country-specific logistic growth
17 models fitted to population records, they highlighted the existence of a global water unbalance. In
18 fact, they found that the long-term demographic growth of net exporter countries relies on local
19 water resources, while in trade dependent countries it relies also on virtual water imports. Thus,
20 both water-rich and water-scarce populations are counting in the long run on the same pool of
21 water resources (Suweis et al 2013). Therefore, there are some concerns that exporter countries
22 might at some point reduce their exports as it happened during recent food crises (e.g., Fader et al
23 2013). Moreover, exporters might have to reduce their exports if new policies impose a more
24 sustainable use of water resources that prevents the depletion of groundwater stocks or
25 environmental flows. Thus, while trade and globalization are crucial to increase the carrying
26 capacity of water-scarce countries and improve their present food security, they also induce a
27 dangerous loss in long-term resilience (see Section 8.5) of the coupled water-food system which
28 may even lead in the long run to social unrest (D'Odorico et al 2010b, Orłowsky et al 2014, Puma
29 et al 2015).
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46 47 *8.4 Water pollution and other environmental externalities of VWT*

48 The environmental impacts of trade have been at the center of decades of research on trade policies
49 (e.g., Zaelke et al 1993). One of the corollaries of the theory of comparative advantage – i.e. that
50 in a free trade scenario every country specializes in the goods it can produce most efficiently – is
51 that production is expected to shift to regions of the world in which socio-environmental
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3 regulations are loose, absent or poorly enforced (e.g., Wathen 1993, Daly 1993). Even though free
4 trade does not necessarily require environmental deregulation, its combination with low socio-
5 environmental standards (e.g., poor regulations on pollution or labor rights) may have detrimental
6 effects on local environmental conditions because firms can relocate to countries where they would
7 need to comply to lower standards. Alternatively, they could be outcompeted by those who are
8 already operating under weaker environmental policies with consequently lower production costs.
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10 Therefore, there have been calls for the inclusion of environmental and worker protection
11 standards in international trade agreements (e.g., Bailey 1993, Charnovitz 1993). The General
12 Agreement of Trade and Tariffs (GATT, 1948 see Section 3), did not adopt environmental
13 regulations but recognized the right of countries to ban imports of goods made with prison labor
14 (e.g., Charnovitz 1993). The same notion could be extended to environmental standards through a
15 process of ‘environmental harmonization’ of trade policy with the adoption of similar product and
16 production standards by different countries (Charnovitz et al 1993).
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27 In the case of mining, manufacturing, or other industrial productions the avoidance of strict
28 environmental laws often coincides with a shift of production to regions of the developing world,
29 where it can occur at a lower cost because of unaccounted environmental externalities. The
30 associated costs are often borne by the entire society or future generations, while profits remain
31 with the corporations that invest in these systems of production and export (Ward 1993). This
32 outcome is in agreement with the theory of ‘ecological unequal exchange’, whereby core
33 industrialized countries disproportionately use natural resources of less developed countries and
34 force them to sustain negative environmental costs (e.g., Rice 2007, Moran et al 2013, 2015,
35 Dorninger et al 2015).
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42 The case of agricultural commodities, however, is different because they are not necessarily
43 produced in the developing world for export to more developed countries (Figure 10). Rather,
44 these commodities – which have a bigger water footprint than their industrial counterparts and
45 therefore are major contributors to VWT – are often exported by developed countries, such as the
46 US that have historically dominated the global production and trade of agricultural products. In
47 the US agricultural exports contribute to $6.9 \times 10^9 \text{ m}^3 \text{ y}^{-1}$ of groundwater depletion. As noted in
48 Section 3, the negative foreign impacts of the US export policy have been more of economic nature
49 (through their impact on agricultural development) than environmental.
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3 The main environmental costs of agricultural production are associated with soil and water
4 pollution from pesticide applications and fertilizer overuse, as well as groundwater depletion, land
5 use change, habitat destruction, and soil erosion (Montgomery 2007, Meyfroidt et al 2013). These
6 environmental effects are often difficult to relate to virtual water trade, except for the case of
7 pollution because its impact can be expressed in terms of the grey water footprint, the amount of
8 water that is needed to reduce the pollutant concentration within acceptable environmental
9 standards. In Section 5.5 we have already highlighted some of the limitations of the grey water
10 framework (particularly in the case of multiple pollutants). Its applicability requires the
11 homogenization of the environmental standards among countries operating under the same trade
12 agreement.
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15 A global assessment of grey water trade has highlighted patterns of externalization of agricultural
16 pollution from net importing countries (O'Bannon et al 2014). Interestingly, this research found
17 that agricultural exports from the US are virtually associated with a substantial importation of
18 pollution and other environmental costs that remain in the production country (Section 5.5). The
19 more developed countries have promoted agricultural policies that have favored intensified models
20 of production to enhance crop yields at the expenses of habitat and soil loss and environmental
21 pollution (Ward 1993). In the US export subsidies have promoted surplus production and exports
22 of agricultural commodities and other land-based resources (e.g., water and topsoil) to the benefit
23 of agribusiness corporations while the remediation costs are or will be borne by the entire society
24 (see Section 3).
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27 There are also other environmental externalities associated with water overuse. For instance,
28 importing goods irrigated from overexploited water sources (e.g. lakes and aquifers), may have
29 detrimental impacts on the aquatic habitats and water sustainability. Recent research has
30 investigated the extent to which the closure of the yield gap of major crops collides with
31 environmental health because it threatens environmental flows (Soligno et al 2017, Rosa et al
32 2018a). In these conditions the overexploitation of water resources may lead to increased pollution
33 and irreversible losses of biodiversity (e.g., Postel and Richter 2003). Some studies have
34 highlighted the existence of hotspots of water overuse, which are partly induced by trade exports
35 (e.g., Dalin et al 2017).
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38 Unlike fossil fuels as input to energy production, which can technically be replaced by solar or
39 wind energy, there is no alternative to water as an essential input for agricultural production.
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Therefore, a sustainable use of water resources could be attained by adapting both supply and demand of water consumption in agriculture to acceptable rates. For example, crop production could be optimally distributed across the planet to maximize efficiency of land and water use (e.g., Davis et al 2017), while national policies favoring food self-sufficiency in regions without adequate renewable water resources may need to be abandoned and replaced to enable food imports via multilateral trade agreements.

8.5 Virtual water trade and resilience in the global food system

As noted in the previous sections, the global food system strongly relies on international trade because there is a mismatch between the rates of food production and consumption in different regions of the world, which explains the existence of areas with excess and deficit in food availability (Fader et al 2013, D’Odorico et al 2014). Because of the non-uniform distribution of resources (e.g., land, water, and energy) and population density only 15% of the world’s countries are fully self-sufficient while the others rely on imports of agricultural goods (Puma et al 2015). Food imports allow countries to overcome resource limitations, compensate for temporary reductions of food supply, and partly adapt to changes in productivity induced by climate change (Huang et al 2011). International trade, however, exposes countries to possible shocks in food supply in response of production crises occurring in other regions of the world. In fact, countries tend to decrease their exports during crises, thereby decreasing the overall amount of food (and virtual water) available for trade (Puma et al 2015, Tamea 2016). The expansion and intensification of international trade, thus, raises some concerns about the vulnerability of water-food system and its resilience to shocks.

While food production shocks are well studied, the response to them and the complex dynamics leading to larger-scale food crises are less understood (Jones and Hiller 2017). Network analysis tools have been applied to investigate the structure and dynamics of food trade. Scaling properties of food flow networks from the village to the global scale were found to have consistent statistical distributions, indicating that similar governing mechanisms may be driving the redistribution of food across spatial scales (Konar et al 2018). Other work concludes that the network is becoming more connected, but not necessarily less stable (Sartori and Schiavo 2015) and that shocks induce long-term structural changes leading to an evolution in the network’s capability to absorb shocks (Fair et al 2017). At short time scales, the vulnerability, and resilience, of countries to external

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3 shocks has been analyzed using shock propagation models. These range from parsimonious ones,
4 assessing only the direct effects of – partial or total – export reductions as in (Puma et al 2015), to
5 more complex models mimicking the cascade effect of a crisis propagating in the trade network,
6 for example applied to single commodity trade (Gephart et al 2016, Distefano et al 2018, Fair et
7 al 2017), global food trade (Marchand et al 2016) or virtual water trade (Tamea et al 2016). These
8 models mimic the trade redistribution following a local crisis, i.e. a decrease in food supply,
9 according to simple dynamics and a limited number of parameters. The number of network
10 connections and the corresponding imported volumes are found to be determinant for country
11 vulnerability, which can be offset by the country adaptive capacity through governance,
12 infrastructure, and socio-economic factors (Gephart et al 2016), as well as food reserves
13 (Marchand et al 2016) or redundancies in the food production system (Fader et al 2016). The shock
14 propagation model applied to virtual water trade with data-based country-specific parameters
15 reproduces well the propagation of observed shocks, such as the 2008-2009 crisis in Argentina
16 (Tamea et al 2016). The analysis reveals that countries with largest water resources have the
17 strongest impact on international trade, while water-scarce trade-dependent countries are among
18 the most exposed to external crises. The analysis of shock propagation of single commodities
19 highlighted that least developed countries are likely to suffer more from import losses when they
20 strongly depend on food imports (Distefano et al 2018).
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34 Local food production and economic capacity (expressed as the ratio of low income levels and the
35 cost of food) are the major factors determining the resilience of a country, defined as its ability to
36 respond and adapt to food supply disruptions (Seekell et al 2017). Local agriculture also
37 contributes to the accumulation of food reserves, which modify the short-term response to food
38 supply shocks (Fader et al 2016, Marchand et al 2016). Food reserves, or stocks, have a key role
39 in the dynamic balance between food demand and food supply, with the former being quite rigid
40 and the latter undergoing high variability (Laio et al 2016). During food crises, stocks buffer the
41 temporary food shortage caused by a loss of local production or a decrease of imports, and limit
42 the effects on food availability to the local population. Therefore, the spatial distribution of food
43 stocks is as important as international trade in determining the impact of food supply shocks and
44 must be taken into account when developing food crises propagation models (Marchand et al 2016,
45 Headey 2011).
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3 The dynamics of international food trade are tightly connected to the international economics of
4 agricultural commodities and the dynamics of food prices. Trade shocks, together with other non-
5 trade-related factors (e.g., crop failures due to droughts or pests), are likely to trigger food price
6 spikes (Headey 2011), which in turn may cause food shortages (Bren d'Amour et al 2016) and
7 socio-political instability, e.g. (Lagi et al 2011). Studies developed in the economics literature use
8 global -or partial- equilibrium models to infer a system's response to alterations at longer time
9 scales (to allow for the establishment of "equilibrium conditions"), based on the behavior of
10 rational individuals. An example is the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) that provides a
11 dataset and a modeling framework to simulate the global system of household behaviors,
12 international trade and investments, in response to a change in policy, technology, population or
13 endowments. Specifically for water resources, a GTAP-W global equilibrium model has been
14 developed, considering (Calzadilla et al 2010) or not (Berrittella et al 2007) the separate role of
15 irrigated and rainfed agriculture. This model allows for the assessment of the global effects of
16 water-crisis or sustainable-water-use scenarios (Calzadilla et al 2010). Konar et al (2016b) applied
17 the GTAP model in conjunction with a global hydrological model to investigate changes in trade
18 under climate and policy scenarios. Konar et al (2016b) show that trade liberalization leads to more
19 water savings under a changing climate.

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21 Unlike global equilibrium models, partial equilibrium models focus on single sectors of the
22 economy – which are described with greater accuracy – but do not consider the effects of
23 perturbations outside the considered sector. For instance, the IMPACT model (Rosegrant et al
24 2002, Rosegrant and IMPACT Development Team, 2012) mimics the link between food
25 production and food demand. This model includes a hydrologic module with multiple water uses,
26 and explicitly accounts for the availability of water and its role in food production. The IMPACT
27 model was first applied to virtual water trade to assess the water savings associated with
28 agricultural trade (de Fraiture et al 2004). While these equilibrium models are suitable to predict
29 trends in food prices, access to food and population dynamics over medium-to-long term time
30 scales, they may offer an incomplete picture about real crises and food shortages (Distefano et al
31 2018) when the dynamics of food supply, availability and related prices are extremely fast and not
32 well reproduced by equilibrium conditions (Headey 2011, Lagi et al 2015). In these conditions,
33 non-equilibrium approaches based on shock propagation and conservation of mass appear to
34 provide a more realistic description of the food system's response to a crisis.

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3 An alternative approach to investigate the long-term response of the system to perturbations uses
4 a framework based on linear stability analysis of the coupled resource-population dynamics, with
5 resources becoming available both through local production and global trade. The stability analysis
6 uses mathematical tools developed by Lyapunov (e.g., Strogatz 2014) in non-linear systems
7 theory, to explain how their dynamics behave around an equilibrium state (or a local stationarity).
8 Suweis et al (2015) applied this approach to the global food trade network coupled with a delayed
9 logistic model for country-specific population dynamics. They found that globalization (increasing
10 number of trade links) decreases the system's resilience and increase their fragility to perturbations
11 (Suweis et al 2015, Porkka et al 2016, 2017).
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20 *8.6 Governing the invisible or invisible governance?*

21 Virtual water is “economically invisible and politically silent” (Allan, 2003), while it has been at
22 the center of hydropolitical theorization, it received less attention in policy development. Studies
23 on VWT often result in policy recommendations and point at the desired or undesired policy
24 implications that emerge when opening the black box of water globalization (e.g., Kumand and
25 Singh 2004, Hoekstra and Hung 2002). Virtual water strategies have also been presented as
26 possible solutions for water-scarce countries in international water meetings such as the World
27 Water Forum (Kumand and Singh 2004) or as a way to influence consumption and production
28 behavior through tools such as virtual water labeling (Mori 2003, Leach et al 2016). However, the
29 awareness of the potential power of virtual water trade to address issues of water scarcity and food
30 security is difficult to translate in direct concrete policies and governance priorities. While the
31 hydrological and environmental effects of VWT have a clear local biophysical manifestation, the
32 governance of the phenomenon goes beyond the sphere of water management and enters other
33 realms of political economy. Very relevant are the agricultural trade and transnational land
34 investment dimensions. Virtual water trade is ultimately governed by the politics of agricultural
35 trade and land investments which tends to play out with little or no consideration of hydrological
36 conditions such as water stress or other important social dimensions such as those associated with
37 food security and malnutrition (Dell'Angelo et al 2018a).
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53 The framework of “virtual water hegemony” (Sujamo et al 2012) developed on the approach of
54 hydro-hegemony (Zeitoun and Warner 2006), is useful to understand that rather than a ‘visible’
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3 governance of an ‘invisible’ socio-hydrological phenomenon, what happens is the opposite. It is
4 the supposedly ‘invisible hand’ of neoliberal markets that impacts the direction, magnitude and
5 dynamics of virtual water flows thorough transnational investments in land and agricultural
6 commodities. Powerful agribusiness actors compete and cooperate in hydro-hegemony dynamics
7 of persuasion, co-optation, and compromise that can include coercive leverages or incentives on
8 multiple levels of politics (Sujamo et al 2012) with strong influence from powerful actors beyond
9 the States (Selby 2007). The contemporary global land rush (Rulli et al 2013, Dell’Angelo et al
10 2017) is a good example of how the politics of virtual water trade can be concretely studied. In
11 this context, the study of the global governance of land grabbing (*see* Special Issue in
12 *Globalisations* (Margulis et al, 2013)) provides deeper understanding of what ultimately impacts
13 the governance of global water appropriation and water grabbing (Rulli et al 2013, Dell’Angelo
14 2018b). The main notion here is that in order to engage with the governance dynamics of virtual
15 water trade, we need to move our focus on the politics of the different sectors that are associated
16 and more visibly addressed by governance and transnational regulations such as industrial exports,
17 trade, agribusiness and transnational land acquisitions.

18
19 Moreover, there can be some concerns with the ‘virtual’ aspect of VWT and the associated attempt
20 to apply an abstract model to reality. By abstracting water from its material context, which includes
21 the traded commodities as well as the dynamics of human labor and environmental resources,
22 virtual water ignores important functions of the human-water interaction (Barnes 2013). While
23 virtual water studies point at problematic aspects of water globalization which might justify a call
24 for a global water governance based on ethical and normative grounds (Hoekstra 2006) the
25 concrete actionability of global governance approaches continues to raise several concerns (Gawel
26 and Bernsen 2013). The validity of the VWT as a governance tool, should also be considered in
27 the context of neoliberal globalization where the dominant impositions of markets and profits puts
28 in the shade many important needs for stronger socio-environmental regulation.

51 **9. Conclusions**

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53 Modern society has enabled the spatial and temporal dislocation of production and consumption.
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55 A community (e.g., a village, province or country) no longer has to consume only what it is able

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3 to produce but different locations specialize in commodities for which they have the comparative
4 advantage, given the local resources and policies. Virtual water trade allows societies to feed
5 people in areas where there are not enough water resources to produce sufficient food to feed
6 everyone. The emergence of trade dependencies can be ascribed to a number of factors that are not
7 necessarily related to water scarcity but include drivers of comparative advantage, trade policies,
8 demographic dynamics, historical patterns of agricultural development and related legacies.
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11 The notions of virtual water and virtual water trade were developed more than 20 years ago (Allan
12 1998). In recent years these concepts have been investigated in the context of food and water
13 security with an approach that has led not only to the quantification of traded virtual water volumes
14 but also to the analysis of the topological properties of the virtual water network and how they
15 have changed through time. Recent research has clarified to what extent the traded (virtual) water
16 comes from rainfed or irrigated agriculture, or from surface water bodies and aquifers, thereby
17 allowing for a better evaluation of the hydrologic implications of this phenomenon and its impacts
18 on local and global water systems.
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21 Through an analysis of the ‘virtual water cycle’ we have related physical water flows in the
22 hydrologic cycle to virtual water flows, which allows for an evaluation of the magnitude of the
23 virtual water trade phenomenon. This integrative analysis completes a more comprehensive
24 assessment of human impacts on and appropriation of the water cycle. Agriculture, consumes 2.4%
25 of global runoff for irrigation and contributes to more than 10-16% of the global evapotranspiration
26 from terrestrial ecosystems; about *one fourth* of these water resources are virtually traded as water
27 embodied in agricultural goods. Because the major physical water fluxes in the hydrologic cycle
28 are changing at a much slower rate (e.g., as an effect of climate warming or land use change) than
29 water consumption in agriculture or other uses, the share of water resources appropriated by human
30 activities is expected to increase. Likewise, as international trade in commodities increases without
31 changes in water productivities, the amount of water virtually (but not physically) transferred
32 around the world will also increase. However, a changing climate and geo-politics will also impact
33 this complex system.
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36 What are the socio-environmental key aspects of the globalization of water resources? The
37 literature has often highlighted the benefits of virtual water trade as an approach to deal with local
38 or regional water scarcity (either through trade or food aid) and feed populations living in water
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3 stressed areas without engendering massive migrations or water wars. In this review we have
4 critically discussed some of the socio-environmental impacts of an increasing reliance on virtual
5 water trade and associated dependency on water resources existing in other regions of the world.
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9 A recent body of literature on the role played by trade on the resilience of the food system, has
10 shown how the globalization of food and water through trade has increased the likelihood of global
11 crises. Some authors have also re-examined the relationship existing between virtual water trade
12 and demographic growth, water inequalities, environmental externalities, and the societal and
13 political implications of virtual water trade, particularly with respect to conflict and food or energy
14 security. Collectively, these results provide an integrated perspective on the phenomenon of the
15 globalization of water.
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22 This review has highlighted some major gaps in the analysis and understanding of global Virtual
23 Water Trade (VWT). More specifically, (1) more work needs to be done to investigate VWT at
24 subnational scales, including both agricultural and industrial water uses. Therefore, there is the
25 need to identify new data sources or proxies that can improve our understanding of the VWT and
26 its hydrological consequences at subnational scales; (2) likewise, previous studies have assessed
27 the environmental consequences of VWT considering a “well mixed” system of production within
28 each country. This review has shown that to improve the analysis of the local environmental
29 impacts of VWT there is a need to study intra-regional VWT and identify the exact location of
30 production of exported commodities; (3) the analysis of the environmental impacts of VWT
31 requires improved process-based tools for the estimate of grey water flows, based on mechanistic
32 models of non-point source pollution from nitrates, phosphates, fungicides, pesticides and other
33 chemicals; (4) while a relatively large body of literature has quantified the environmental impacts
34 of exporting countries, the environmental effects of international trade on importing countries
35 remain for most part unexplored (Sun et al 2018); (5) there are also more direct environmental
36 impacts of VWT associated with the intensification of trade and the establishment of new and/or
37 more frequently used shipping routes. These effects have only started to be evaluated (Stephenson
38 et al 2018); (6) it is not clear to what extent VWT is contributing to the unsustainable use of water
39 resources at the expense of environmental flows. Therefore, there is a need to evaluate the
40 unsustainable fraction of crop production and the associated VWT; (7) with population growth and
41 climate change exacerbating water scarcity in some region of the world, it is not clear how VWT
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3 will evolve in the coming decades and whether it will be able to meet the growing demand for
4 agricultural products (Chouchane et al 2018); (8) The effect of VWT on water scarcity remains
5 difficult to evaluate. In fact, adding net virtual water import to domestic production and subtracting
6 water demand results in an overly simplistic approach that assumes that the demand (due to
7 economic and population growth) does not depend on trade itself. Therefore, analyses based on
8 integrated assessment modeling are likely needed to backcast past development with and without
9 trade and evaluate the effect of VWT on water scarcity; (8) directly addressing a critical, yet
10 “invisible” phenomenon such as a virtual water trade remains a governance challenge where
11 research has to play a key role in informing policy decisions. There is a growing need for actionable
12 research that translates knowledge on the VWT phenomenon into policies aiming at an
13 environmentally more sustainable and socially more equitable water governance.
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Supplementary Materials

Table S1. Summary of explanatory variables used by different models of Virtual Water Trade.

	<i>Suweis et al (2011)</i>	<i>Dalin et al (2012)</i>	<i>Sartori et al (2018)</i>	<i>Tamea et al (2014)</i>	<i>Tuninetti et al (2014)</i>	<i>Chouchane (2018)</i>	<i>Kumar, Singh (2005)</i>	<i>Fracasso (2014)</i>	<i>Fracasso et al (2016)</i>
Population		x	x	x	x	x		x	x
WF of demand					x				
Rainfall	x	x	x					x	
Water endowment			x					x	
Availability ratio								x	x
Temperature									x
Agricultural area					x		x	x	x
WF of production				x	x				
Agricultural efficiency					x				x
Irrigated land						x			
GDP	x	x	x	x	x	x		x	x
Distance				x	x			x	

Dummies				x		x	
Water price							x
	(a)	(a)	(b,c)	(g)	(e)	(d,f,0)	(f,g,h)

NOTES: (a): rainfall on agricultural area; (b): rainfall per capita; (c): total renewable water resources; (d): water for agriculture, per capita; (e): gross and net cropped area; (f): arable land per capita; (g): efficiency as N-fertilizers; (h): efficiency as tractors; (0): all variables are per capita