



# The Role of Model Assumptions in Statistics

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## 1 “The Death of Homeopathy”

### **A standard random effects meta-analysis**

From Shang et al. “Are the clinical effects of homoeopathy placebo effects? Comparative study of placebo-controlled trials of homoeopathy and allopathy” (The Lancet, 2005)

Famous study,  
prompted Lancet-editorial “The Death of Homeopathy”.

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
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$\eta_i$  trial specific effect,  $\mathbf{e}_i$  within trial variation.  
 $\sigma_i$  standard error of  $L_i$  (small if  $n_i$  large),

# "The Death of Homeopathy"

Frequentist model assumptions  
Mathematical models and reality  
"Frequentism-as-model"  
Beyond classical frequentism  
Conclusions

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Shang et al. find  
 overall estimate  $\hat{\theta} = -0.13$ ,  
 95%-confidence interval  $[-0.43, 0.17]$  for  $\theta$ ,  
 conclude (because 0 is in CI)  
 “no evidence for homeopathy better than placebo.”

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## Model assumptions:

1. Independence of trials,  $\eta_i$  and  $\mathbf{e}_i$
2. Additive model for  $L_i$ .
3. Normal distribution for  $\eta_i$ .
4. Normal distribution for  $\mathbf{e}_i$ .

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How to check whether these are “true”?  
... or at least “approximately true”,  
“appropriate”, “helpful” etc.


## 2. Frequentist model assumptions

(more general, “aleatory”, incl. propensities etc.)

### 2.1 What do the model assumptions mean?

“We think of the situation as ...”

- ▶ Potentially infinite repetition (of experimental conditions)
- ▶  $P(A)$ : relative frequency limit of occurrence of  $A$   
(e.g., normal distribution is defined by  $P(A) \forall A$ .)



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This is obviously an idealisation -  
what constitutes a “repetition”?


“Whatever can be distinguished cannot be identical.”  
(B. de Finetti)

## 2.2 Independent repetitions (“i.i.d.”)

Frequentism relies on “repetitions of experiments”,  
e.g. results from different patients in clinical study.


Possible to *define* i.i.d. in terms of probabilities  
(in order to get results about distribution of  $L_i$   
from independent patients)  
but this cannot justify defining probabilities in terms of  
i.i.d. repetitions.

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Independent repetition is constructed by conscious decision  
to ignore potential dependencies and differences.

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For example, could “falsify” independence  
from data where patients examined on same day  
have similar results.

## 2.4 The goodness-of-fit paradox (H, 2007)

*Checking the model assumptions violates them automatically*  
because the *possibility* of unlikely events  
is constitutive part of the models.

## Frequentist model assumptions

Mathematical models and reality

"Frequentism-as-model"

Beyond classical frequentism


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
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







### 3. Mathematical models and reality

**General mathematical modelling** (broad and naive):  
mapping reality to mathematical objects.



Identification of items of perceived reality  
with mathematical objects  
and interpretation of results of mathematical operations  
in terms of the items.

## A constructivist view (H 2010, Foundations of Science)



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- ▶ Science: establishing agreement in open exchange.
- ▶ Mathematics is about creating a system that makes absolute agreement possible (but only *within mathematics*).
- ▶ Mathematical modelling is not about how things are, but about how we think and communicate about them. (Models communicate and change views of reality.)
- ▶ It cannot be formally analysed how formal models are related to informal reality.

## 4. "Frequentism-as-model"

$$L_i = \theta + \eta_i + \mathbf{e}_i, \quad i = 1, \dots, n,$$
$$\eta_i \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma_0^2), \quad \mathbf{e}_i \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma_i^2).$$

**Not:** is this (approximately) true?

**But:** can we learn what we want to learn  
about our subject matter (homeopathy)  
if we decide to look at the data "through" this model?

What does this view imply?

Is model consistent with our (agreed) perception of data?



(Frequentist) models are useful to...

- ▶ communicate researcher's perception of situation,
- ▶ inspire methodology,
- ▶ check quality of methodology  
in situations with known (made up) truth.  
(Tukey, Davies)

This is helped by...

**Model-based mathematical theory:**

- ▶ How well does method work under ideal conditions?
- ▶ How much variation to expect?
- ▶ Assume model, derive optimal method.
- ▶ Other properties of method (equivariance etc.)

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### **Model-based mathematical theory:**


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Also informs about

effects of model deviations, e.g., data outliers.

Some violations of assumptions harm interpretation of results

**Reasonable model checking:**  
Outliers not expected under  $\mathcal{N}$ ,  
affect  $\mathcal{N}$ -based statistics.



*Some* violations are *not* problematic  
(e.g., g.o.f.-testing, often).

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### **Re-formulation of "model checking":**

Find out whether data could lead  
statistical method (derived from model) astray.

## Aspects of homeopathy meta-analysis

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"Trial effect" is treated as result from i.i.d. repetition,  
 $\Rightarrow$  "effective sample size" is  $n = 8$ , not  $\sum n_i > 5,000$ ,  
bad power, i.e.,  
non-significance can easily happen under  $\theta < 0$ .

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Furthermore, trials apply homeopathy differently;  
only 2 trials treat "classical homeopathy".


Modelling all as i.i.d repetitions implies that  
how homeopathy is applied is not "difference of interest".  
 $\Rightarrow$  "Classical homeopathy" paradigm  
is not tested by this study.



## 5. Beyond classical frequentism

### 5.1 Bayesian philosophy and methodology

- ▶ Prior distribution on parameters  $\theta$   
allows posterior probability statements  $P(\theta \in B) = ?$
- ▶ Epistemological rather than aleatory probability  
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- ▶ Requires very similar idealisation;  
ultimately same modeling issues as frequentism.

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- ▶ generalisation theory still assumes frequentism/i.i.d.,  
(can be seriously harmed by bad data quality),
- ▶ implicit structural assumptions  
(e.g., class shapes, similarity).

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- ▶ Major role of model assumptions: understanding methods under idealised conditions
- ▶ Rather than "model check":  
Will data lead method astray?