

Between Philosophy of Science and Medicine:

Mechanism, Reduction and Homeostasis

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How can we talk about causation in an homeostatic mechanism?

- Reductive causal explanations
- Mechanistic causal explanations
- Statistical causal explanations
- Russo-Williamson thesis
 - Possible improvements?



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Russo-Williamson thesis


Russo and Williamson, 2007.

- Epistemic causality supported by both mechanistic and statistical evidence
- But how do these two types of evidence interact to provide evidence for causation?
- Might we be able to strengthen this account by showing how this interaction happens?



"What maintains the level of thyroid hormone?"








What is the cause of X's x-ing?

Machamer, Darden and Craver. 2000. Craver, 2007.



Uppercase – entity Lowercase – activity




- B pituitary gland
- C TSH level
- D thyroid gland
- E T3 level

Each entity (B—E) has an associated set of potential activities $\{b_{1..n}\}, \{c_{1...n}\}, \{e_{1...n}\}$.

So we have a range of potential activities within our mechanism.

But which activities actually happen?





Statistical causal explanations

Salmon, Jeffrey and Greeno. 1971 ; Salmon, 1984; Salmon, 1989

- An [SR] explanation is an assembly of facts statistically relevant to the explanandum...
 [Salmon, 1984: 45]
- We give conditional probability distributions for the chance of each activity occuring based upon its antecedants...
- p (b₁ | e₁) > p (b₁ | ¬e₁) means that e₁ is SR to b₁, hence b₁ occurs because of e₁



Advantages of this approach

- Reflects interdependant nature of mechanistic and statistical evidence in making causal claims or supporting causal explanations
- SR already takes account of some difficult causal situations (screening off relations, partition inhomogeneity, confounding factors...)
- Hopefully tie to mechanism may ameliorate the need for a priori judgements of causal relevance



Suggested methodology

- Formulate mechanism
- Epistemically partition data using entity/activity pairs derived from the mechanism for both explanandum and explanans
- Determine associated probability relations
- (Potentially) reformulate mechanism
- Repeat



References

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