Chapter Three

Lessons from the Argument from Illusion

At the outset of the last chapter, I pointed out that the common terms of debate here are that intentional properties of experience and subjective qualities are taken to be in competition in giving an account of what it is like for us to have sensory experiences. Intentional properties and subjective qualities are assumed to be exclusive of each other and to exhaust the range of options in play. We have not yet explicated why these assumptions should frame the debate. The problem here, however, is not so much that there are no evident grounds for contrasting intentional properties and subjective qualities, as that there are at least two obvious sources, and it is obscure so far which, if either, should be taken to be the more fundamental dividing point.

In as much as proponents of intentional theories, such as Harman and Tye, stress the transparency of perceptual experience, then the focus of disagreement would seem very much to be on the question of what I called the subject matter of sense experience, the kinds of presented elements and aspects that such experience can have. The intentional theorist insists that this at least includes, and possibly is exhausted by, candidates from the perceiver's mind-independent environment. The sense-datum theorist, on the other hand, appeals to non-physical elements when accounting for what the experience is like.

On the other hand, in as much as sense-datum theorists stress the actual presence of the object of sense in accounting for the nature of sense experience we seem to have another potential dimension of disagreement. For the sense-datum theorist insists that this element is present whenever one has such an experience, while the intentional theorist suggests instead that sensory awareness is an intentional phenomenon allowing for the non-existence of its subject matter.

Why should these two sets of issues fall together in this way: could one take differing attitudes towards either of these concerns. Could someone adopt an intentionalist perspective and yet suppose that the subject matter of experience is non-physical? Might someone moved by the sense-datum theorist's conception of what sense experience involves nonetheless hold with the intentional theorist that it must be the ordinary objects around us which are present in experience?

In the first chapter, I suggested that we could understand the shift in debate about perception from the latter to the former approach by reference to a third conception of perceptual experience, naïve realism, and the conflict between that and the argument from illusion. In this chapter I aim to address the questions raised above by attempting to formulate a valid form of the argument and hence define the two dimensions of difference between intentionalism and sense-datum theories as precisely as we can. That in turn, I shall argue, shows the ways in which the approaches are in competition or can be combined, and the possibility or lack thereof of alternatives.

I start the chapter by asking how we can formulate the argument from illusion in a way to make it valid. I suggest that the approach needs to focus on conditions which apply to the states of mind involved, the experiences, rather than any conditions imposed on the supposed objects of experience. This paves the way for explicating the principles we characterised informally in the first chapter, Actualism and Transparency. In what follows, I focus on the conception of Actualism employed and the alternatives to it. I will pursue in more detail the suggestion of the last chapter that we should understand the essence of intentionalism in terms of its rejection of this constraint. In addition we will formulate in what way the possibility of illusion or hallucination poses a challenge. In the second half of the chapter we will look at the connection between the commitment to Actualism and the supposed subjectivity of the objects of awareness. In turn we will be able to define precisely enough the commitment of Transparency. As a consequence, we will then be able to see the sense in which the two approaches really are exclusive of each other, and how they may or may not exclude any other possible approach to giving an account of experience.

1. How Not to Argue from Illusion

There are some five or six forms of argument enumerated in discussions of sense-datum theories: the argument from perceptual relativity; the argument from the status of secondary qualities; the argument from hallucination; the argument from differential certainty; the causal argument; the time-lag argument. Some of these arguments are variants of each other, offering different grounds towards the same lemma in a basic form of argument. Some of these arguments are manifestly less suasive than others. The argument to be offered here is a variant of the argument from

hallucination, although it combines with that aspects more commonly discussed under the head of the causal arguments. Yet there are two key aspects in which it differs from many discussions of the argument from illusion and related considerations.

First, these arguments are often considered as intended to secure the positive conclusion that there are non-physical objects of awareness. But as we saw in the first chapter, it is doubtful whether defenders of the sense-datum theory see their ontological commitments deriving from argument. Rather, reflection on experience is supposed to commit one to Actualism, the argument from illusion is then used to draw the conclusion that the objects in question must be non-physical. In this context, someone who rejects Actualism may yet exploit the same form of argument to a less ontologically profligate conclusion. Hence, the argument presented here contains merely the negative aspects of the argument from illusion: it is an argument against the truth of naïve realism.

Second, the argument presented here focuses on the conditions for the occurrence of episodes of being aware of entities rather than on the entities that one comes to be aware of. It is common to present the problem of perception as one concerning the nature of the objects of perception, and the contrast between direct and indirect perception. In contrast, the argument here is only secondarily concerned with the entities that one comes to be aware of, and is more concerned with the nature of states of awareness. This dramatically alters the possibility of offering a plausible argument for the relevant conclusions.

In general, arguments from illusion have a pretension to a certain generality. The strategy of argument is normally to draw the reader's attention to a certain target experience about which the relevant claim is established: that in that case we do not perceive physical objects or that we do perceive something non-physical. The argument must then seek to establish that what holds of the target case also holds more generally of sensory experience.

If we reflect on an objection of Austin's we can see how many of the standard formulations of these arguments have a significant problem in securing the generalizing move. In discussing the hypothesis that the indistinguishability of illusion and hallucination are relevant to the problems of perception, Austin remarks:

> But if we are prepared to admit that there may be, even that there are, *some* cases in which 'delusive and veridical perceptions' really are indistinguishable, does this

> admission require us to drag in, or even let in sense-data? No. For even if we were to make the prior admission (which we have so far found no reason to make) that in the 'abnormal' cases we perceive sense-data, we should not be obliged to extend this admission to the 'normal' cases too. For why on earth should it *not* be the case that, in some few instances, perceiving one sort of thing is exactly like perceiving another?[1]

Austin's point is correct if his opponent really does intend to rest an argument on a claim about the nature of indistinguishable *objects* of perception. First, consider a situation in which one has two distinct individuals which are nonetheless indistinguishable. For example, there may be identical twin ducks on the village pond. Looking at either on its own, a viewer might be unable to determine which of the two he or she is looking at. Indeed, it may be impossible to tell by sight alone which of the two one sees. The two ducks are visually indistinguishable, and are so in virtue of having exactly the same visible qualities and hence looking entirely alike.

In this case no one would be inclined to argue on this basis alone that one must see some third thing, distinct from both ducks, which is seen in both situations. Rather in each situation one sees a distinct thing which nonetheless has the same visible qualities as the thing in the other situation. One would not alter one's view, if one learned that, despite superficial similarities, in some of their hidden properties the ducks were very different. Perhaps the one duck has two hearts and three kidneys, while the other does not. Nonetheless, there is no surface mark of this distinction, so one could not tell by looking which duck it was that was over-coronally endowed. And at the extreme, one might concede that someone could build a non-duck, a decoy duck, exactly to resemble one of these ducks. The mere manufacture of such a decoy would not be sufficient to deprive one of the ability to look at one of these ducks. Nonetheless, the ducks and the decoy duck would be indistinguishable and would manifest the same visible properties. All that is required is that the ducks and the decoy duck should be the same shape and have the same range of colours and surface textures, and to interact in general with lighting conditions in just the same range of ways.

By extension, one might then ask, why if this can hold in the case of mallard ducks and decoy ducks, it should not also hold in the case of real ducks and non-physical sense-data 'ducks'? If what is visible to us are the colours, visible textures and shapes of entities, then why should not a physical object share the same such qualities as some

1. *Op. cit.* p.52.

sense-datum? Of course there would be gross metaphysical differences between the two entities – the one would be made of matter, have a certain genealogy, be destined for the Christmas table; the other might be momentary, absent from the physical world and purely physical laws. But there are also gross differences between real ducks and decoy ducks. This does not lead us to deny that one or even both of them are thereby rendered invisible. So, by parity, one should reason that as yet no reason has been given to suppose that the gross differences between ducks and sense-data should render either invisible.

In this case, the mere concession that in the rare cases of hallucination, one is aware merely of some sense-datum which is indistinguishable from a duck, does not show why in the case of seeing a duck one is also thereby aware of a sense-datum, rather than just aware of something indistinguishable from some sense-datum, but which is in fact a duck. In order to generalise here we would need to show something about the properties of either ducks or sense-data to show that if the one is ever perceived then it is always perceived or that the other cannot be.[2]

This strategy of argument would need to be supplemented, then, by justifiable principles about the objects of perception in general. On the one hand, one might argue for a kind of exclusion principle: only physical objects or non-physical objects could have any of a certain range of properties. Since non-physical objects must have them in cases of hallucination, physical objects cannot have them at all. Some philosophers have been inclined to accept some such claim about colours, although the strategy is a less plausible one to apply in the case of geometrical properties. On the other hand, one might claim that it would be implausible to suppose that the mechanisms of perception could really accurately select among the physical and non-physical objects of perception. Given the similarities in causal conditions between cases of veridical perception and hallucination, one might claim it then a simpler theory to

2. In effect, William Alston defends this position in 'Back to the Theory of Appearing'. Alston suggests that hallucinations are cases of being aware of mental images and that there is nothing to show that such images are mind-dependent. If Alston could establish such a position then he can rely on Austin's observation to deny the generalising move. As we shall see below, there are general reasons concerning the causal conditions of hallucination to deny that Alston's position should be thought to obtain across the full generality of cases that we would consider are hallucinatory.

suppose that the mechanisms always provide for perception of sense-data.

The need to supplement the argument in these ways weakens its force considerably. Neither of the proposed principles has the status of an obvious truth, and the claims about simplicity of causal mechanisms seem to rest on assumptions about the empirical conditions of perception most of which are unknown to us, and were the theory correct would presumably remain unknowable by us. Faced with this subsidiary argument, one might well wonder why one should not just reject the relevant starting assumption that in the case of hallucination there is some object which one is aware of with the relevant qualities in question. The point of arguing about the conditions of indistinguishability of the objects of perception would then fall by the wayside.

In contrast, the argument we will focus on here rests on a concern with the sensory episodes brought about. Moreover, since we are focusing on the causal conditions of bringing about such states, the concern is already inherently general. We do not need to supplement what is claimed about a particular episode of sensing, some further condition on what it is for some particular to have the same qualities as that. Rather, we are faced with the question, what is needed to bring about a sensory episode of just this kind.

In answering this question, we rely on empirical assumptions as well as aspects of *a priori* philosophical reasoning. But the relevant empirical assumptions are ones which we already have reason to think fairly secure, concerning as they do the likely extension of knowledge about the causal pattern of activity within the human cortex and the relative closure of physical causal activity as a whole. In this context, the concern is what kind of sensory episode the physical causes of hallucination can bring about.

With the approach taken here, the focus of discussion is on the kinds of mental episodes which occur when one is perceiving or seeming to perceive. We conceive of the stream of consciousness as composed of episodes or processes which we can generally label experiences. These episodes typically comprise one's awareness of one's environment and body, when one is awake; but we may also conceive of there being such episodes when one is asleep but dreaming; and potentially as being filled as a result of the activity of a Freudian unconscious. Our focus is on those episodes which comprise the conscious upshot of use of the senses: sensory or perceptual experience.

The first guiding assumption of the argument is the thought that whatever kind of experience occurs when one is veridically perceiving some object, event, or scene, that

same kind of episode can occur in a situation which we do not count to be a perception of any physical object or situation. It is easy to introduce someone to the idea of matching sensory episodes: suppose that at the moment you are staring at ripe orange sitting on a kitchen table under bright daylight; then it is quite conceivable that you should be in a position which from your introspective reflection on the circumstances couldn't be told apart from sitting here looking at the orange in daylight, but is in fact not a case of that. For example, it is quite conceivable that you should so have been hooked up to a mechanism which so stimulates your optic nerves, in the absence of inputs from your retinas, that the tectal pathways and primary visual areas of the visual cortex are stimulated just as they might be in seeing an orange, with the result that it is for you quite indiscriminable through reflection from the case of actually seeing the orange. This description of the circumstance does not as yet make any assumption about the natures of episodes when one perceives or merely hallucinates, nor the ways in which they are similar or different. Yet it is common, and may seem quite natural, to endorse what I shall call *The Common Kind Assumption*: that whatever kind of mental episode it is that is occurring when I am veridically perceiving – say when I am seeing the orange as it is – that same kind of episode can occur when I am merely having an hallucination, as when my optic nerves are suitably artificially stimulated. For such a view, although there can be all the difference in the world between a situation in which I am seeing an orange and one in which I am merely hallucinating one, there need not be a difference in the kind of experience or mental episode which occurs in both cases.

We will return shortly to the presuppositions of this assumption and its consequences – for, I shall argue, we can understand the significance of what I earlier labelled Actualism in its interaction with Common Kind Assumption. It is in relation to this claim that we can understand one of the fundamental disagreements between intentional approaches and sense-datum theories. Yet the Common Kind Assumption alone is not inconsistent with naïve realism as we initially construed it – that is one of the morals to be drawn from our discussion of Austin above. The further assumption needed is the relatively common sense thought that our perceptual experiences, like other mental events and acts, indeed like other events and phenomena within the natural order in general, are subject to the causal order. More exactly this requires that they be subject to broadly physical causal conditions (I say broadly here, because I wish here to include neurophysiological conditions and related macro-conditions which are

not obviously elements describable in the austere terms allowed with physical descriptions of micro-phenomena or the cosmological phenomena that physicists focus on) and psychological conditions, if these are disjoint from the physical causal conditions. On this assumption, all that it should take to produce a suitable mental episode that we think of as an hallucination is to manipulate suitably the broadly physical and psychological prior conditions of a subject. For example, it seems at least not a medical impossibility that a cognitive neuroscientist should construct the system described above to produce a perfect visual hallucination of an orange in a subject. This empirical assumption I call *Experiential Naturalism*.

As I shall argue below, it is the combination of Experiential Naturalism with the Common Kind Assumption which rules out the possible truth of Naïve Realism. And it is the combination of these two claims which narrows the options between intentional and sense-datum approaches in such a way that we can define explicitly how the idea of intentional and sense-datum aspects of experience are necessarily contrasting notions. Moreover, we can in this context see that the further assumption of exhaustion will hold to the extent that naïve realism is indeed ruled out as an option in the debate, that is to the extent that we are committed to holding both of the two assumptions introduced here.

In the next section, I shall explore the ontological commitments associated with the Common Kind Assumption and thereby define Actualism as a thesis affirmed by sense-datum theorists and necessarily rejected by intentional theorists. This, I suggest, illuminates some of the options available in discussing the relations between illusion and hallucination and the minimal elements that a sense-datum theorist should be focusing on. In the section after, I explain how acceptance of Experiential Naturalism moves us on from the position of the early sense-datum theorists, and in the light of it define what it would be for experience to be subjective in character.

2. Formulating Actualism

The sense-datum theorist is committed to the existence of non-physical entities in the case of hallucination not merely as a matter of definition but rather as a consequence of a more fundamental claim, which we labelled Actualism. Initially we framed this claim in terms of the objects of sense: whatever qualities one senses, some actual

instance of those qualities and the object which bears them must exist and be sensed. But the discussion of the last chapter showed how we could interpret theorists such as Price in terms of making claims about the nature of conscious experience, rather than just the objects of sense.

Price conceives of experience as a relational episode involving the perceiver, some relation of apprehension, and the sense-data apprehended. A description of the phenomenal character of a given sensory episode will then be a description of the sense-data which the subject apprehends in having that experience. For Price, it is constitutive of having a sensory experience that there are objects which one apprehends and that they have the qualities manifest to one in having the experience.

What is the force of this talk of its being constitutive of experience that there are such actual presented elements? At least in part, a consequence of this is a claim about what could or could not have been the case concerning this very episode. If it is constitutive of the episode of sensing that the given sense-data are apprehended, then one couldn't have had this very episode and the data not existed and been apprehended. Yet while this modal claim is a consequence of the constitutive claim, it does not exhaust its content. The modal claim could be true without the constitutive claim holding. For example, someone may claim that for any given event it is essential to it that it should have had the very causes that it did, and that it should have had the very effects that it does.[3] From this, it follows that the event could not have occurred had not some of its distal causes occurred. We can make such a claim without supposing that the causes in question are constitutive of having the event. Someone who accepts both this view of event identity and also accepts the causal theory of perception would therefore endorse the modal dependence of a state of seeing on the object seen. On that account, a necessary condition of being the object of perception is that an object be among the causes of the seeing of it. We may suppose that an object can be the cause of some event through itself being a constituent of some event which causes that event. Combining these two sets of commitments we end up with the view that a given perception could not have occurred without the object of perception existing. For had the object not existed, then the event of which it was constituent

3. If, that is, he or she was impressed by Davidson's original formulation of how to individuate events and more enamoured of talk of necessity and essence than Davidson himself.

would not have occurred, but then one of the causes of the seeing would not have existed, and hence that event too could not have occurred. So one may have reason to assert this conclusion without thereby claiming that it is constitutive of the episode of sensing that there is an object sensed.[4]

Secondly, it is plausible that where we are prepared to make such claims about constitution and essence, our claims are not grounded solely in claims made about particular objects or particular events. For example, it is common to claim that objects possess some of their essential properties in virtue of being a certain kind of object. If it is essential for me to have the DNA structure that I do, then plausibly this flows from my being a certain kind of thing, a human being. If it is essential to the desk at which I sit that it be made of metal rather than ice, then this too tells us something about the kind of thing it is, and what is involved in the constitution of such things. In that way, we may better see the force of claims about perceptual experience when we focus not just on particular episodes of sensing, but rather on kinds of sensory experience.

What sense are we to make here of talk of kinds? We can group objects together into a kind just in case there is some description true of all of them, and we can find some description or other which any two objects can share. Yet we also adopt a discriminatory attitude towards kinds as well. We suppose that some kinds are there for us to discover within the world, and that they may have a fundamental explanatory role; while others are merely creatures of convenience, reflecting nothing more about the world than where our interests lie. Samples of gold, or water, or whales, or human beings are grouped together into kinds in virtue of some natural similarities among them. An individual may fall under a number of distinct kinds: a sample will be both gold, and also a metal; a human being is both a member of the species *homo sapiens* and the general grouping mammal. We may think of some kinds as being more fundamental to an account of why an object is as it is, or what it is for it to be the thing it is.[5]

If individuals fall into natural or fundamental kinds, then so too may events. To claim of two events that they are of the very same fundamental kind is not merely to

4. JJ Valberg centres his discussion of the problem of perception precisely on claims about the modal dependence of particular episodes of perceiving in just this way, see (Valberg 1992). For reasons given in the text, I would claim that this unduly weakens the challenge that can be presented by sense-datum theorists or intentional accounts.

claim that there is some description in common between them. When we call some episode an imagining rather than a recalling, or one a judging rather than a feeling of pain, we are marking the fundamental divisions that we make among mental phenomena. In each case one may well find some description that holds of both that episode and some other event, for example perhaps one's imagining occurs on the same day as one's recalling. Relative to such a description one can introduce a classification: one might talk of Tuesday episodes, as opposed to Wednesday ones. Such a categorisation does not seem to mark the basic divisions within the mind that we are interested in when we insist that some event was an imagining and not a recalling. We are predisposed to see groupings of episodes as cases of imagining rather than recalling, or sensing rather than feeling, as picking out fundamental divisions within the mind which are given to us, and not just an echo of similarities which we happen arbitrarily to classify by.

In the case of objects, claims about what is essential or constitutive of a given object are normally grounded in claims about what is essential or constitutive for objects of that kind. Likewise, we can interpret claims about what is constitutive of experience in terms of claims about what is constitutive of episodes like this, a sensing of a brown table. We can then understand the debate here as focused on a question about what the fundamental categories for perceptual states and sensory experiences should be taken to be. We are asking what is involved in having a sensory experience of just this kind, and hence we can pursue the question by looking at other episodes of sensing which are of just the same kind. In this way, part of the debate will concern what the fundamental classifications of experiences into kinds should be.

The sense-datum theorist should be taken to be asserting something not only about the particular sensory experience he or she enjoys, but also about experiences of this kind. It is in the nature, or essence, of having such experiences that there should be some object or quality actually presented to the mind when so sensing. If I am now looking at a brown table, and my experience is as Price claims, then it is of the essence of having such experience that there must be some instance of brownness presented to me.[6]

5. There is of course much discussion and controversy over the nature of natural kinds and our thought about them. For the kind of Aristotelian conception of the relation of particulars to kinds see Wiggins, (Wiggins 1980) and (Wiggins 1996).

The person who claims that the causes of events are essential to them may claim that a given episode of perceiving could not have occurred without its actual object causing it. But in claiming this, they are as yet not committed to any claim about the essential nature of sensing. The sense-datum theorist, in contrast, can be interpreted as claiming that the particular episode of sensing could not have occurred without its object precisely because it is in the nature of sensing to be the sensing of some object. It is the latter concern which seems to be central to the debate about illusion. Hence Actualism should be framed in terms which reflect one's view about what is constitutive of, or what is essential to kinds of experience.

Typically, when we perceive something, it appears to us in some way, or even in a number of ways. When I look at an orange, it may both look to me to be a certain colour, a kind of mottled orange, and a certain shape, a squashed sphere. We may also perceive a number of objects as once, perceiving them together as belonging within a scene. This is true of vision, where seemingly we can be presented with an array of objects segregated out from a background; in touch, where we can simultaneously feel distinct aspects of objects tactually explored; in audition, where we can hear a number of voices or instruments clashing with each other. What the subject's experience is like for him or her in such a situation, its phenomenal character, is therefore complex. So Actualism should be framed in the first place with reference to any given aspect of an experience's phenomenal character, i.e. a given presented aspect and its corresponding phenomenal property.

To the extent that two experiences are similar in respect of what they are like, they share phenomenal properties. Two experiences will share a phenomenal property where the phenomenal characters of the two experiences are similar with respect to some given presented aspect of each phenomenal character. Each aspect of the phenomenal character of an experience is determined by some presented element possibly together with some other factor, such as the manner in which that element is presented. So two experiences will share a phenomenal property where the same presented aspects or similar presented elements are presented in the same manner.

We can now formulate Actualism as a claim about the phenomenal properties of

6. On the non-irreducibility of claims about essence or constitution here to simple claims of necessity see Fine…

experience:

> (ACT) Actualism holds of a phenomenal property *P* iff for any given experience with *P*, there is some actual object or quality-instance apprehended by the subject of that experience which is the presented element or aspect in virtue of which *P* is individuated.

When Price looks at the brown table and insists that there must be something brown there for him to be sensing, he is claiming that aspect of what his visual experience is like, the presentation of some brown, is an actual phenomenal property. For an experience like the one he has to occur, then there must be some instance of brown present to the subject's mind.

So formulated, the principle allows us to recognise a variety of responses available to a sense-datum theorist in the face of a familiar form of criticism. We are ordinarily quite happy to say that there are aspects of how things look to us which don't require any corresponding object being that way. For example, looking out from a slightly odd angle at a tuft of grass in a field, I may mistakenly suppose that there is a rabbit before me. Afterwards, I might explain my mistake by claiming that then it did look to me as if there was a rabbit there. Perhaps a moment later I might realise my mistake and see the tuft of grass for what it is, and then it may no longer looks to me like there is a rabbit present. *Prima facie*, it seems as if it was correct to describe how things looked to me initially as a case in which it was for me as if a rabbit was there and that how things looked to me changed between the two moments. But we would not be inclined to accept that in this case I saw some non-physical object, some ethereal rabbit, instead of the tuft of grass. Rather, it is natural to describe this case as one of simply misperceiving the tuft of grass as a rabbit.

In essence, this worry is a form of the familiar complaint that sense-datum theorists ignore the distinction between illusion and delusion or hallucination.[7] Our normal talk of seeing things, or hearing them or feeling them, allows that we can perceive something and yet misperceive it. In such cases, we allow that the proper characterisation of how we mistook something makes mention of some quality that it lacks. Whether one perceives something and whether one perceives it veridically dissociate. Perception without veridical perception occurs when one misperceives an

7. See (Austin 1962), pp.20-32.

object. Veridicality without perception occurs when one suffers an hallucination which happens to match the scene before one. Caused by suitable stimulation to have a visual hallucination of an orange, one is not thereby brought to see an orange simply through having one placed in just the spot it looks to one as if an orange inhabits.

Note too that the contrast between veridicality and perception/ non-perception can apply to the properties or qualities one perceives as well as to the objects one perceives. For example, in somewhat strange lighting, one might say, 'I can see the colour of the wall, I just can't quite tell what colour it is'. Likewise, we can imagine an experience where there is matching in terms of the qualities present in a scene, but we would not be inclined to suppose that there is perception of those qualities. Suppose, for example, a subject has merely achromatic visual perception caused by internal injuries to the visual cortex (say these occur in V2 and V4). Such a subject can only see objects around them in terms of contrast colours of shades of grey. We might imagine that someone could discover a way of stimulating the relevant areas of the visual cortex to give chromatic vision consistent with the contrast and brightness of the scene, but otherwise random. Such a subject would not be taken to perceive the chromatic colours of objects in their environment. Yet we could imagine a case in which the random chromatic display for them at a time might happen to coincide with the actual arrangement of colours in the scene before them. This coincidence, I take it, would not be sufficient for us to claim that on those occasions they had genuine chromatic colour perception. This would be a case, then, of veridical misperception in which one does not perceive the chromatic colours even though it looks to one as if colours are present which are in fact present.

A sense-datum theorist may insist that Actualism holds of some aspects of all our experiences. As we shall see below, the case of hallucination alone will then be sufficient to show the existence of some non-physical objects of awareness. Consistent with that, they can accept that there are other aspects of our experience for which this doesn't hold. This would allow both for entities or qualities to be presented elements of experience but still misapprehended, as the tuft of grass is; and for qualities to be presented aspects of experience without then being perceived.[8]

3. Intentionalism As Complement

In the last chapter we suggested that the intentionalist supposes that the phenomenal character of one's experience is constitutively determined by how one's experience represents one's environment as being. The motivation for this too we can see to lie in the Common Kind Assumption. Since one could have such an experience when one's environment is other than it is represented as being, one's experience having such a phenomenal character is not dependent on any object or quality-instance which the experience represents. In a case of veridical perception, when one is presented with a particular array of objects manifesting certain qualities, we may need to describe the phenomenal character of this episode, what this particular experience is like, by demonstrating the very objects perceived and picking out the qualities they manifest. Nonetheless, it is not the objects or quality-instances themselves which are constitutive of the phenomenal character of the experience. Rather the fact that the experience represents them as so constitutively determines the phenomenal character to be so.

To the extent that one denies that Actualism holds of some phenomenal property of one's experience, to that extent one attributes a representational property to it. A purely representational view of experience would claim that in all aspects, what is before the mind is so in virtue of the representational properties of the experience. Where one demurs from this, one is committed to the existence of at least some phenomenal properties of which Actualism is true.

In summary, the we should understand the motivation for intentionalism in terms of a response to the above argument for non-physical objects of sense given the truth of Actualism. In rejecting Actualism, without denying the introspective evidence for a phenomenal character of experience which involves the presentation of entities and

8. This contrasts with the suggestions of theorists such as Jackson who rely on a distinction among different senses of 'looks' – phenomenal, comparative and epistemic. For Jackson, descriptions of vision in terms of phenomenal looks will be true only where they pick out properties that non-physical sense-data might have such as colour and shape, and not properties such as being a rabbit. While there are different uses of statements about how things look – cf. 'It looks like the stock market is on the way down again', 'She has the look of a swan' – it is implausible that there is no phenomenal description of how things strike one in terms of being a rabbit. Jackson's response is a form of the distinction between sensory core and interpretation which is common among sense-datum theorists, although as we shall below, difficult to defend in itself.

qualities seemingly distinct from one's state of mind, an intentionalist must give some other account of how things can be present to the mind. The contribution that the intentional or representational content of experience makes to the phenomenology of experience is to constitute the presented aspects of experience. Since the experience can possess such representational content in the absence of the objects of sense, we can allow that experience with qualitatively the same phenomenal character can occur when hallucinating as when perceiving.

In taking this to be the essence of intentionalism, we can still remain neutral over many of the issues which divide proponents of this approach. For example, the commitment here is silent over the correct conception of content. One could hold that the relevant notion of content here is that of sets of possible worlds, or centred worlds which does not discriminate necessarily coincident states of affairs. On the other hand, following a suggestion of Peacocke's, one might argue that some aspects of content need to be more fine-grained. As Peacocke points out, visual experience of something as square is incompatible with visual experience of the same thing as a regular diamond. Although the two experiences are incompatible, every square is a regular diamond, so the two experiences do not distinguish possible ways the world might be. This suggests that there are at least some aspects of experience which require a finer grain of representational content than that provided by possible world semantics.[9]

Much the same point holds for the debate about the non-conceptual or conceptual nature of perceptual content. Here again, part of the input to arguments for the nonconceptual nature of the content turn on claims grounded in reflection on what experience is like – that it seems to us as if our experience is replete with a wider range of features than we have means at a time to articulate conceptually.[10] One moves from reflection on the introspectible character of experience to claims about its intentional

9. For possible world semantics in general see (Stalnaker 198?), (Lewis 1984). Peacocke argues for a similar notion of perceptual content, which he calls scenario content, in (Peacocke 1992), pp. 61-2. (In footnote 1 on pp.240-1, Peacocke notes the connections between his conception of scenario content for basic perceptual states and that of possible worlds accounts of propositional attitude content in general). His use of the above example as his solution in terms of 'protopropositional content' comes on pp. 74-90.

10. For debate on this matter see (Evans 1982), Ch. 5 & 7; (Peacocke 1990) and (Peacocke 1992), Ch. 3; (McDowell 1994) and exchange with Peacocke in PPR; (Martin 1992) and (Martin 1994); (Crane 1998).

content, having rejected the claim that the relevant aspects of what the experience is like are to be accounted for in terms of some non-intentional aspect of the experience.[11]

4. Subjectivity & the Causes of Experience

In looking at the consequences of actualism for sense-datum theories, we have seen how the case of hallucination gives one some reason to suppose that the presented elements in that case must be non-physical. For it seems that we can set up a case of perfect hallucination of a brown table, when we can determine that nothing brown or rectangular is present in the physical environment. Of course, unless we entertain the fiction of disembodied existence, we must still have present the physical body of the subject and of whatever equipment is needed to generate an hallucination. But none of this need be brown and rectangular, or exhibit any of the other properties we may induce to be apparent to the subject through causing an hallucination. So, if there must be something which instantiates the relevant qualities, that thing will be non-physical.

But what now is this contrast between physical and non-physical objects? In some ways it echoes the contrast within the sense-datum tradition between material objects and sense-data. J.L. Austin commenting on that debate was typically withering about the dichotomy. In general, he was critical of a philosophical tendency towards inappropriate abstraction and generalising away from a set of concrete cases, in which ordinarily we are capable of making subtle distinctions lost in philosophical terminology. This was certainly his view in relation to the debate about the argument from illusion. As he puts the point:

> One of the most important things to grasp is that these two terms, 'sense-data' and 'material things', live by taking in each other's washing—what is spurious is not one term of the pair but the antithesis itself. There is no *one* kind of thing we 'perceive' but many *different* kinds, the number being reducible if at all by scientific investigation and not by philosophy…[12]

11. At least one strategy employed by Peacocke in his argument for sensational properties in (Peacocke 1983), Ch. 1 where he assumes that the intentional content of experience is all conceptual is later abandoned by him when he endorses the existence of non-conceptual content of experience, see (Peacocke 1992) footnote 9, p.241.

12. Austin 1962), p.4.

We may often loosely talk in terms of physical objects or material objects to group together the diverse phenomena which we take ourselves to perceive in the world around us. Yet, if we take the etymology of these terms at all seriously we see that there is no obvious principle which can gather together all of the items and kinds of item we suppose perceptible. Sensibly a material object can only be one which is composed out of matter. If we are liberal with our conception of what can count as matter, then we can easily see how rocks, lumps of wood, tables, plants and animals should all count as material things. We are liable to exclude spirits and ectoplasm from among the perceptible elements of the common world, and again this fits reasonably well with intuition, since we do not suppose that we can apprehend such things through sense perception. But we also think that we can see holes, shadows and rainbows. None of these visible entities do we commonly think of as made out of any material, but this does not incline us to exclude them from the common, shared world open to perception by everyone.[13] Likewise we think that we can hear voices, and indeed other sounds, where our normal talk about these things treats them as objects rather than mere features. On the other hand we don't normally think of these things as made out of matter.[14] The same point can be extended to both tastes and smells. Insisting on things being matter, then, would cause a severe revision in our list of what we take to be perceptible.

One might hope instead then to rely on the notion of a physical object as being more liberal than that of a material object, and then hope that this will capture all before it. Yet, if one considers the debate about the definition of physicalism we can already see reason to be pessimistic about this strategy. As Austin himself indicates, we have no good reason to suppose that there is a uniform highest kind of thing which all the objects we encounter in the world around us fall under. Without that, the short hand we use in classifying all of these things is rather suspect.[15]

The alternative is to take the term 'sense-datum' as the one to be given an explicit definition. In that case we could simply treat the class of physical or material things as

13. Cf. here David Charles's discussion of what it is to be physical, (Charles 1992), pp. 280-1.
14. Some philosophers have suggested that a world occupied purely by sounds could not sustain our conception of a genuinely objective world, independent of our awareness of it. See, (Strawson 1959), Ch.2 and Evans's commentary on it, (Evans 1985).

simply the complement of this group, and have the two terms act as duals. If all we have to go on here, though, is that the entities in question are the objects of awareness and are non-physical, then we will have no more hope of supposing that they form some illuminating kind than we do with the external objects of perception.

Again, I suggest, that the way out of this cul-de-sac is to reflect on what we are prepared to claim about the origins of hallucinations. For if we think of the problematic class of objects of awareness as defined in relation to our episodes of awareness of them, then we can generate an appropriate general principle to group the various items together. To do this, however, we need to step beyond the kind of *a priori* reasoning which the early sense-datum theorists restricted themselves to, and admit to employing fairly substantial empirical and methodological principles in delimiting the relevant possibilities, that is we have to introduce the idea I labelled above as Experiential Naturalism.

Our initial starting point, the thought that for all I know it is possible for me to have an hallucination internally indistinguishable from this perception, does not specify anything about the causes of such states of mind. If anything, it expresses agnosticism about the restrictions on the causes of mental episodes. However, this agnosticism is easily combined with generally accepted views about how broadly physical and publicly detectable events can bring about hallucinations and other psychological events. More specifically, it is fairly generally accepted that one should be able to bring about a sensory experience through appropriate stimulation of the relevant parts of a subject's body. More boldly, one might insist that our knowledge of neuroscience is already sufficient to be confident that appropriate stimulation of the various sensory areas of the cortex should be sufficient to bring about a visual, auditory or tactual experience, or at least to fix the chance of its occurring. So, we may claim, as far as we know we should accept that an hallucination indistinguishable internally from this perception could be brought about by suitable stimulation of relevant areas of the cortex.

15.he problems here are magnified by the controversy about the definition of physicalism required in the formulation of physicalism or opposition to it. For contrary attitudes towards this problem see positively, (Snowdon 1989), (Pettit 1993), (Papineau 1993), and negatively (Crane and Mellor 1990), and (Crane 1995).

We should note, in passing, that there has been as yet no experimentation or experimentally derived evidence which directly confirms these assumptions. Since at least the First World War, we have evidence of localisation of function within the higher brain, and the occasion of, for example, visual episodes brought about through stimulation of areas of the occipital lobe known as the primary visual cortex or V1. Closely related are some twenty further regions in the posterior to mid brain the activity of which seems dedicated to visual perception. None of the artificially induced experiences yet produced can be claimed, as far as I know, to reach the level of indistinguishability from normal perception. So, to the extent that we are prepared to accept this claim – and I cannot imagine anyone working in the field of neuroscience or perceptual psychology who would sensibly deny it – the assumption is grounded much more in the general knowledge we have of the inter-relation between the psychological and the physical and certain aspects of methodological approach, than in conclusive experimental evidence.[16]

From this commitment to Experiential Naturalism, we can extract certain consequences for what someone who claims that Actualism holds of our hallucinations will have to say about the presented elements of such experiences. Now this is to adopt a very different approach from the original sense-datum theorists. For example, in Price we find for most of his discussion a studied neutrality about the nature of non-physical sense-data. The one thing he is prepared to insist on, however, is that the objects of apprehension must be mind-independent:

> It has often been thought that sense-data 'exist only *for* a mind'. My sense-data, it is said, exist only for me, and yours only for you. This phrase may be taken in two ways. It may mean that sense-data depend for their existence or for their qualities upon our awareness of them; this proposition is a gross absurdity, incompatible with the very connotations of the terms 'existent', 'awareness', and 'qualities'…[17]

In this he follows Moore's earliest pronouncements on the matter: Moore in 'The Refutation of Idealism' supposes that the objects of sensation must be independent of

16. Our knowledge of the organisation and function of the brain has extended dramatically beyond what it was at the turn of the twentieth century. But one might add that Broad was fairly happy to accept this assumption even then.

17. (Price 1932), p.126; cf. here (Moore 1922); and Prichard in 'The Sense-Datum Fallacy', in (Prichard 1950), where he argues from the non-independence of the objects of sensations, to our lack of knowledge or acquaintance with them.

the mind, and hence that absolute idealism is shown to be false by attention to one's consciousness of these things.[18] CD Broad devotes many pages to a careful examination of whether we must say that sense-data, what he calls sensa, can be existentially mind-dependent. His conclusion is that there is no decisive reason to claim this, nor to deny it for all cases. There is just a spectrum of examples, we are most inclined to suppose in the case of bodily sensations that sensa are mind-dependent, although this claim is not compelling, and to deny it in cases of visual sensa, such as awareness of something red.[19]

With this assumption in place, sense-datum theorists should agree with Austin that sense-data as such do not form a kind of thing. As Price insisted, to call something a sense-datum is just to indicate its role within an act of sensing: that it is whatever is presented to one or given to the mind in having that experience. It is quite consistent with this that objects of very different kinds might be given to one. Nonetheless, all of these theorists seem to assume that when it comes to clearly non-physical sense-data as present in hallucination, we can assume that there are general truths to be posited about the nature of these objects, albeit not necessarily ones to be discovered simply by philosophical theorising. Following Russell's terminology here, one might christen such things 'sensibilia', since the minimum they seem to have in common is that we know that they can play the role of being sensed.

For these philosophers, it would appear that the theory of sensibilia is not a matter of philosophical speculation alone. There would seem to be a possible science of these entities, aiming to determine their real nature. It is worth articulating here quite how unpalatable that position is to us now, and why, and indeed was to many of the sense-datum theorists' contemporaries.

Suppose, then, that the sense-data I am aware of in having an hallucination are independent of my mind. Given the assumption of actualism, it is nonetheless constitutive of my having such an experience that there should be something of which I am aware. Consider first the supposition that the objects in question are both

18. See (Moore 1922). In his response to Ducasse, Moore recants this extreme position, and allows that some sensations at least may be mind-dependent. See, (Moore 1942), Ch. II, sec. 10, p. 653.

19.Broad 1923), Ch. VIII.

metaphysically and causally independent of the occurrence of an episode of sensing. On the above assumptions about the causes of sensation, suitable stimulation of the central nervous system is sufficient to fix the chances of such an episode occurring. Yet, if there is no suitably placed object of awareness, then no such episode will occur. In such a case, then, the chance of such an episode occurring will be nil. But then in some situations, where a sensibile is suitably placed the chance will be greater than nil, in other cases it will be nil. Whether this is so or not will, *ex hypothesi*, be entirely independent of whether the bodily causes of sensation are present or not. But then, the bodily causes of sensation cannot be sufficient to fix the chance of sensation occurring, contradicting our initial assumptions.

If sense-data are metaphysically independent of acts of sensing and brain activity is sufficient to cause such acts of sensing, the two must at least be nomologically correlated with each other. There seem to be three options here. The first would be to suppose that we live within a universe which is entirely replete with suitably placed sensibilia, such that whoever is caused to have a sensing of a given character, there is bound to be an appropriately placed sense-datum for them to be aware of. Whether I take you to the top of Mount Everest and cause you there to have an hallucination of dancing pink elephants, or to the Sea of Tranquillity on the Moon and cause you there to have auditory hallucinations of a choir of angels, there are bound to be corresponding sense-data which match the way things then strike you as being.

Now, I doubt that this picture of the universe is actually contradictory. And I suspect that any attempt to use purely *a priori* reasoning to show it false will fail. But we should not set our standards for rejection of a hypothesis quite so high. It is clear by our standard principles for acceptance or rejection of some hypothesis or theory which posits the existence of a range of entities, that we should reject this account as being grossly extravagant in what it commits to given the evidential base that it can draw on. It is unlikely that we could both continue to hold on to the claim of actualism as applied to the experiences we have when hallucinating and accept this hypothesis.

This story posits a nomological correlation between sensibilia and sensings, given the laws of nature, whenever one has a sensing of a certain character there is a sensibile sensed which matches it, but requires no causal interaction between them. The two remaining options avoid the extravagance of positing a universe replete with sensibilia by introducing causal relations between sensibilia and sensings or the causes of

sensings. On the one hand, we could imagine that sense-data have the power to prevent the occurrence of the sufficient causes of sensings when they are absent. It may be true that whenever one suitably stimulates the visual cortex of a subject, a visual hallucination of a green disk is produced. It is consistent with this that one can only bring about that pattern of stimulation when a green sense-datum is suitably related to the subject who has the experience. On this picture, sensibilia act as a filter over the physical causes of cortical stimulation. On the other hand, and more commonly proposed, we should consider a picture on which the physical causes of acts of sensing are also causally active in bringing appropriate sensibilia into a position to be sensed. On this view, the causes of sensing are causally sufficient for them because they are also causally sufficient for the acts of sensings independent objects.

The first explanation requires that there should be causal intervention in the physical world from some non-physical realm. Such a commitment violates what may be called the causal closure of the physical realm: that every physical event has a sufficient physical cause (or one sufficient to fix its chance of occurrence, in a non-deterministic system). For on this story the chance of bringing about appropriate cortical stimulation is not independent of whether a non-physical sensibile is well placed for being sensed. Those who think that there is overwhelming reason for endorsing the causal closure of the physical world will then take this as sufficient grounds for rejecting the hypothesis as absurd. But even if one does not wholeheartedly endorse this strong principle, the hypothesis is an unconvincing one.

The causal closure of the physical world is sometimes taken to conflict with a belief in an irreducibly mental reality of such episodes and states as sensings and having beliefs. These we commonly suppose both to cause and to be caused by events in the physical world. If this were the right position to adopt, we should have to admit that physical events have causal powers which reach beyond the purely physical realm, and the disposition of physical events in the world is partly to be explained by the occurrence of mental causes. The basic evidence we would have for this picture is the broad pattern of interaction between mental events and physical events which are evidenced all around us. Whether or not this is in the end sufficient grounds for rejecting the closure of the physical realm, it is notable that the sense-datum theorist will lack a similar broad range of evidence of correlation between sensibilia and physical causes. While the hypothesis requires that there be causal interaction between

the potential objects of sensing and the physical causes of sensing, it need not posit any further interaction between the two realms in any other type of situation. Nonetheless, it is still claimed that the existence and behaviour of sense-data are entirely metaphysically independent of episodes of sensing. So there is at least the bare possibility that the physical world should come into causal interaction with sensibilia apart from our sensing of them. Given the total lack of evidence of this, we might wonder why it should be that such causal interactions occur only with the presence of a third party. We need to explain the presence of this correlation, or why it should be the case that the only detectable intervention in the physical world involves sensings. If sensibilia can interact with physical events, why cannot we devise measuring instruments to determine their presence in situations where no one can sense them?

The same worry attends the other hypothesis, which requires only that the causes of sensings should also cause sensibilia to be suitably located, or to cause their existence. This suggestion does not require that there be any reciprocal action by sensibilia on the physical world, and hence does not in itself violate the closure of the physical realm. Yet it still requires us to posit a set of causal powers for physical events with respect to this non-physical realm. Again, the only evidence for the existence of such causal powers comes from the occurrence of episodes of sensing, so we must suppose that only some physical events, those that cause sensings, have causal powers over non-physical sensibilia. The same question arises why interaction with this realm should occur only in this domain.

None of these three hypotheses is obviously inconsistent or incoherent. Nonetheless all of them now look absurd to us. Indeed they seem sufficiently absurd that we cannot help but see it as a deficit in a philosophical theory that it would commit one to accepting one of these theories. One might be tempted to elevate this feeling of absurdity into an argument based on general metaphysical principles intended to show that really none of the hypotheses makes sense. One might set out to show that they have failed to describe reality in an appropriate way to be contentful; or that the theories violate preconditions of our knowledge of an objective world. But it is best to resist any such temptation. For no metaphysical principles enjoy the consensual assent as does the sense of absurdity here. So no such explanation of why we are inclined to reject these stories will be satisfying. And we do not need such heavyweight backing to explain or justify our rejection of them. Our general conception of the physical world,

and the methodological principles we are inclined to accept lead us to reject these stories, and there is no clear to division to be drawn here between empirical assumption and metaphysical taste. We seem to have good reason already to believe that no such story does actually relate the facts as they are. The evidential base for the theory seems to be too shallow. When we allow that the objects of hallucination are independent of the sensings of them, we are then committed to supposing that there must be a whole set of natural laws which explains the correlation between them that the theory commits to. Hence the combination of the claims that actualism holds of all sensory experience, and the objects of such sensory experience are always mind-independent is just too ontologically extravagant to be confirmed. We end up with a picture of experience which looks like an entirely idle hypothesis. In just this sense each of the hypotheses lacks content: it does not describe things as they are. And that is as far as we need to go.

It is, of course, an interesting question why the sense-datum theorists, who, at least in Russell's and Broad's cases, had an interest in the sciences and do not seem that distanced from us in their picture of the world, should have been prepared to countenance such accounts of the world.[20] Why should the mere fact that we cannot show that there is an inconsistency in supposing non-physical objects of sense to be mind-independent be enough room either to insist that they are mind-independent or at that we should be agnostic about this? It is not clear how satisfying an answer we can give to this. In part, the explanation must be in the origins of Moore's and Russell's discussions of sensory phenomena in the first place: their repudiation of absolute idealism. Certainly, one motivating element is this: a concern with philosophical theory as 'first philosophy'. One should be able to describe the basic elements of our encounter with the world without having to presuppose any empirically grounded assumptions about the nature of that world. All of the sense-datum theorists take Actualism to be obvious. And they suppose that it is obvious that what is before the mind is an object when one senses. In this context, the demands of *a priori* argument and metaphysical principles may be taken to be prior to demands of general theoretical coherence.

20. And in Russell's case a form of neutral monism in which sensibilia are the elements out of which both physical and mental world are constructed.

Nonetheless, the absurdity which we feel now, and which was certainly expressed by many of their contemporary critics, in part explains the divide between recent talk of subjective qualities or sensational properties and this older talk of sense-data. In the earlier debate about sense-data, there is a focus on the possibility that these objects are mind-independent, and hence a concern with their proper natures. This is a concern which it seems difficult to settle by the means available to 'first philosophy', *a priori* reasoning and introspection of one's experience. In contrast, those who now talk of subjective qualities, or talk simply of sensations or sensational properties stress that these aspects of phenomenal consciousness are to be conceived as mind-dependent or internal to the act of sensing. This is no accident: one can hold to Actualism through denying the mind-independence of the objects of sense.

Consider a case which many take to be a paradigm of subjectivity: feelings of pain. It is common to claim that a feeling of pain is sufficient for there to be pain, and that there could not be a pain which is unfelt. Matters are more complex than these simple claims reveal: normally we feel pains at locations, and whenever we feel a pain to be located, it feels to one as if one's body extends to that location. Pain is associated with disturbance or distress to the body. But pains are often felt at locations other than where the disturbance is. This does not normally incline us to suppose that the pain is not really in the body part in which it is felt, although the damage is elsewhere. But for the point made here, I shall bracket these additional concerns.

If pain is subjective in this way, then we can avoid positing any of the three hypotheses which I claimed to be absurd. If there are physical causes sufficient to bring about, or to fix the chances of, mental effects which are the feelings of pain, then such causes and causal relations are all we need to explain how such feelings can come about even if actualism is true. The content of the idea here that what is felt is somehow subjective or internal to the mind is that the state of affairs felt, say the instance of hurting of which one is aware, is constituted by one's awareness of it. There is nothing more that needs to be the case in order for there to be such an instance than that one feels it. In which case, the physical causes of the feeling of pain will have brought about all that is necessary for the object of such feeling, and no more causal work needs to be done.

In abstract terms, we can state this as follows. Someone who endorses Actualism claims that there is a constitutive connection between the presented elements of

experience, what is sensed, and the experience itself, the sensing of it. But that in itself leaves open how that constitutive connection is realised. Clearly one condition that flows from this is that whatever account is given of this, it must be consistent with the variety of ways in which we know experiences can be brought about. This is particularly so in relation to hallucinations, where the only constraints on what need be present seem to relate to immediate physical causes. It is this which prompts the apparently extravagant pictures of the relation between objects of sense and experience discussed earlier. On the other hand, if the presented elements of such experience are constitutively dependent on the state of awareness of them, that additional constraint is easily met.

Against the background of our general empirical assumptions about the causal order, there is a strong presumption in favour of associating actualism as applied to hallucinatory experiences with the subjectivity or mind-dependence of their presented elements. For it is only if we assume that such entities and qualities come along as a consequence of the mental events physically caused that we can bracket the difficult questions which make the early sense-datum theorists seem so fanciful.

5. Subjectivity & Transparency

How then should we formulate this conception of experience as subjective? In answering this question, we will also be placed to formulate the principle of Transparency which, I've claimed, intentional theorists rely on. In much philosophical discussion the subjective–objective contrast plays two distinct roles, and it is important to bear in mind exactly which is in play in any particular debate. For our purposes only one, somewhat simpler or cruder contrast need be in play, focusing on relations of dependency among entities and states of mind.

This cruder contrast invokes a prior notion of the mental or of subjects, and extends out from that in terms of what is dependent for its existence on the mental. We might start out with a set of mental entities – subjects of experience or thought – mental events and states, such as feeling and thinking, knowledge and desire, and mental properties or qualities. Paradigm subjective facts are those which involve mental entities having mental properties or qualities. The realm of the subjective is extended from this by considering entities or qualities whose existence is dependent on the

paradigm mental. So, if there are entities which exist only in virtue of subjects of experience having feelings or thinking about them, then they too are subjective; likewise, if entities have certain qualities only because of the way we feel or think, then those qualities are subjective. The dependence here is intended to be metaphysical, or constitutive, and not merely causal. That I may cause a ball of clay to be shaped as a cube does not show that being a cube is subjective. Yet were it true that the statue formed is funny only because of how I respond to it, then its being funny would be subjective in this initial sense. In this way, the objective is simply that which is neither mental nor existentially dependent on the mental.

On this usage, being subjective and being objective are contraries. As long as there are some mental phenomena in the world, they are subjective and hence not objective. If physicalism is true, then all mental phenomena are physical, and hence some physical phenomena are subjective and not objective. In this case, simply saying that something is subjective is not a bar in itself to the truth of physicalism. For by definition the mental is subjective. Whether this is consistent with physicalism will turn first on the debate about other aspects of the mental which incline us in favour or away from physicalism. On the other hand, some challenge to physicalism may be thought to come from examples of entities which are not subjects of experience but dependent for their existence on such subjects. For it might be claimed that there are no such patterns of dependence among purely physical phenomena. Whether that is so takes us beyond our current concerns.

This needs to be sharply distinguished from a very different contrast that many philosophers have in mind when talking of subjective versus objective. The contrast is often employed not directly to mark the metaphysical dependence or independence of some phenomenon from our sensibility or cognition, but rather the extent to which we have gained an understanding of some aspect of reality independent of the peculiarities of our own sensibility and powers of cognition. With respect to this contrast, the notion of a point of view or perspective is central, albeit understood in a metaphorical way. We are to conceive of certain ways of apprehending the world or thinking about it as being tied to a point of view or perspective: this may mean literally a location in space, or one in time, or from being a certain agent, or of being a certain kind of creature, or possessing a certain sensibility or powers of thought. We can define modes of apprehension or thought as more subjective to the extent that they require one to

occupy a more limited range of points of view, and more objective to the extent that they are indifferent to the point of view that a subject occupies.[21]

The principal questions posed here are to what extent we have an understanding of a given phenomenon which is more or less objective. With respect to perceptions and cognitions, the contrast between subjective and objective is a continuum, rather than that of contraries; and it is not obviously correct to extend the contrast from our states of mind directed on phenomena to the phenomena themselves. Furthermore, there is no trivial connection here between the mental and the subjective. Nonetheless, the fact that we seem principally to have a subjective understanding of certain phenomena may be thought to pose a challenge for a physicalist conception of the world, and the aspiration of having as objective a grasp of the world as one might. It is arguable, though, that we have principally a subjective comprehension of mental phenomena: either through being the subject of the states of mind of which we have thoughts, or through imaginatively projecting oneself into the position of someone who has the thoughts in question. This reasoning can be extended to the broader range of subjective phenomena which are dependent on mind: for we have an understanding of these phenomena either through having the relevant states of apprehension, or imagining the relevant states of apprehension on which such phenomena depend. Given these close connections between the two sets of ideas, it is no surprise that one might be inclined to move from the one set of contrasts to the other, but nonetheless they are distinct and it is important to keep them apart.

In the last section we saw problems which arise from insisting that the objects of sense are independent of one's awareness of them even in cases of hallucination. The relevant alternative is to conceive of them as mind-dependent, and hence as subjective in the first sense. We can formulate the issue raised above as follows:

> (SUBJ) An object or quality-instance is subjective iff it is the presented element or aspect of some particular episode of sensing and the object or quality-instance is constituted by the occurrence of an episode of sensing with the phenomenal property corresponding to that presented element.

21.his conception is closely tied to Nagel's conception of these matters see (Nagel 1979b), (Nagel 1979a), and (Nagel 1986). See also (Williams 1978), Ch. 1 & 2; and in particular (Moore 1997), Ch. 1.

This is the narrowest definition of metaphysical subjectivity, tying the existence of a subjective phenomenon to the occurrence of a particular episode of awareness. Philosophers often discuss a broader, and consequently somewhat vaguer, notion of mind-dependence, where there is no explicit tie to just one episode of awareness or cognition, but rather a dependence on subjects or thoughts, or the possibility of thoughts. For example, some accounts of colours claim that surface colours of objects are mind-dependent, in that what it is for something to be red, say, is for it to be disposed to bring about particular kinds of experience in normal perceivers in standard conditions.[22] Such an account is phrased in a way to allow both for misperception of the colour of an object, and for objects to maintain their colours in the dark when not perceived. So, even if this is the correct account of colour, colours do not count as subjective according to (SUBJ). Likewise, one might think that in some sense shadows or rainbows are subjective phenomena, for the existence of such entities is bound up with human visual sensibility and the ways in which objects are segmented out from a background in the visual array. Nonetheless, unless one claims, implausibly, that the existence of a given rainbow or particular shadow is dependent for its existence on one's current awareness of it, then such entities will not count as subjective on the definition (SUBJ).

Although this narrows the range of subjective entities to a smaller set than those many philosophers have been interested in calling subjective, it does not exclude all. Berkeley's conception of ideas is such that they count as subjective in the sense here used, although it is arguable that objects, conceived as congeries of ideas, do not. Objects, as constituted out of ideas, might still be claimed to be subjective in some weaker sense. And one can find different strands of mentalism in Berkeley in different passages. But we can hold on to the strictest formulation of his mentalism, that everything that exists is either perceived or a perceiver, when we apply it to the fundamental constituents of the world, rather than to everything built up out of these things that we take the world to contain.

As with the definition of Actualism, one might question what the substance of the claim that the existence of presented elements is constituted by one's awareness of them. Again, we may make modal claims as a consequence: the object would not have

22.ee, for example, (McGinn 1983).

existed were I not aware of it. And again, this is symptomatic of the principal claim. For the counterfactual could be true without an object necessarily being constitutively dependent on one's awareness. (Imagine sheep fitted with explosives and an eye-tracker. Whenever one's shepherd's eye strays over the hill and away from a sheep, the sheep is destroyed.)

Here again, that there is further content to the claim is reflected in consequences for the kind of state of awareness that one has in such a case. If one's awareness of a flash of scarlet, say, is really constitutive of the flash of scarlet, then any other episode of awareness just like this one should also be constitutive of a flash of scarlet. In each such episode's being constitutive of the object or quality instance apprehended, the identity of the object or instance must depend on the episode of apprehension. Where one has two different episodes of awareness, then one has two different flashes of scarlet. For consider, suppose that two subjects are aware of the same flash of scarlet in the same way. If the one episode of awareness is constitutive of a flash of scarlet so too is the other. If the first episode is genuinely constitutive of the flash of scarlet, then that flash could not have existed without that awareness. Yet if the second episode of awareness is awareness of the very same flash, then it too is constitutive of the flash and so sufficient for its existence. But then, the flash would have existed if the first episode had not occurred as long as the second did. In that case, the first episode of awareness could not be constitutive of the flash of scarlet *per se*, but only constitutive of it jointly with the second episode of awareness. So, to the extent that episodes of awareness are by themselves constitutive of their objects, then such objects are private to that episode of awareness. The notion of privacy, so often associated with sensation and sensory objects, here flows simply from the commitment to strict mind-dependence of the objects of awareness.

It is clear that pain is conceived of as subjective in this sense when it is appealed to as a model of how the objects of sense might be mind-dependent. If the sense-datum theorist accepts that the presented elements of a given experience are subjective in this sense, then the bringing about of such an experience will thereby be sufficient for the existence of those presented elements without one having to posit any further causal connections between the physical causes of sensing and the objects of sensing. Likewise, problems relating to the individuation of sense-data can be treated as simply derivative of questions about the individuation of episodes of sensing. For if sense-data

are properly dependent existences on events of awareness of them, then there will be a mapping from objects of sense to acts of sensing, and the individuation conditions for the former will be as settled, or as unsettled, as those for the latter.

In turn, it is clear that the very least intentional theorists have wished to do is to insist that our experience of the world includes elements which are not private in this way. In fixing on trees, or bushes, or the Pacific Ocean, they highlight entities and features which we take to exist independently of us, to be there whether we catch sight of them or not. It is this aspect which such entities have in common with insubstantial items such as shadows, or rainbows, voices or smells. We are committed to the idea that these are things that we discover through coming to be aware of them and are not simply the upshot of our being brought to have experiences of one character or another.

Note that the disagreement here need not be interpreted as a disagreement about what kinds of object or quality can be present to the mind. When we focus on the example of pain and bodily sensations in general, it is tempting to suppose that there is something about the qualities present to the mind which marks them as subjective. It is in the nature of pain or hurting that there cannot be instances of such qualities without awareness of them. Yet, in general, the idea of mind-dependence that is in play here does not require that if any instance of a quality is mind-dependent then all instances of that quality should be mind-dependent.

For example, sense-datum theorists typically attribute to visual sense-data colour qualities and spatial properties. It is sometimes suggested that it could make no sense to attribute colours both to physical objects and mental objects, that these are just two kinds of entity are too far apart in metaphysical status to share any properties. The warrant for such scruples is unclear, and the position is far more difficult to maintain in relation to spatial properties. If we are committed to the existence of sense-data, and allow them to have any geometrical properties, then both physical objects and sense-data may be square. In such a situation objective and subjective entities will have a property in common. So it could not be the case that to be square is either a subjective or an objective aspect of an entity. In one case, an entity is square only in virtue of being apprehended to be square; in another an entity is square entirely independently of our awareness of it. Furthermore, if the notion of colour employed by a sense-datum theorist is not equivocal, then the range of properties and qualities visual sense-data

possess are just a subset of the properties or qualities that physical objects may possess. If this is right, then according to the sense-datum theorist there are no qualities which a visual sense-datum manifests to a subject presented with it which could solely be possessed by a mind-dependent entity. Although visual sense-data are, according to the sense-datum theorist, entities which could exist only given our awareness of them, this fact about them does not arise out of the other qualities they manifest.[23]

The essence of the disagreement here does not lie with a conception of the kind of objects or qualities that can be present to the mind. Rather, the disagreement must principally be one over the kinds of experience we have. What is at issue is whether one is having the kind of experience which is constitutive of the objects of awareness, of its presented elements. The theorist who wishes to assert that Actualism holds of our hallucinations must claim that the kind of experience we have when we hallucinate is one that is constitutive of its presented elements. So, if the intentionalist can show that some of the presented elements of some experience are mind- independent, then this kind of experience cannot be what the sense- datum theorist has in mind.

At this stage, we can see that in the context of both the Common Kind Assumption and Experiential Naturalism, the sense-datum theorist's commtiment to Actualism requires the affirmation of phenomenal properties which meet (SUBJ). Intentionalism, on the other hand, we suggested can be conceived as just the rejection of Actualism against the background of these two shared assumptions, and hence we can construe Transparency thinly just as the denial of (SUBJ) for some phenomenal property. That is to say:

> (TRANS) A phenomenal property is transparent iff for some particular experience with that phenomenal property, it is not the case that the presented element or aspect of the phenomenal property is constituted by the occurrence of an experience with this phenomenal property.

Any experience which has, as its presented elements, trees or shadows, or oceans, smells, or voices will be transparent in just this sense, since the relevant objects of sense are independent of our experiences of them.

23.his throws doubt on the strategy employed by McCulloch in (McCulloch 1993) against sensation based views, since he relies on the disanalogy between what sensory perception is like with bodily sensation and the latter's apparent manifest subjectivity.

What matters to us about such examples of awareness is that the objects of these states of awareness are familiar members of the world around us. They are things with which we interact, which we often value or despise, which we discuss with others and share pleasure and displeasure in with others. It is given the fact that we have such interests in these objects that we may react with dismay to the threat of a 'veil of perception'. If our experience is not as we initially take it to be, then we do not really have experiential contact with the things that we all care about. If it does matter to us that we have experiential contact with that which matters to us, this would be a conclusion to avoid.

But note that the general feature these objects share, that they are independent of the mind, is distinct from the fact that we care about or are interested in them. There are certainly possible mind-independent entities in which we would have no interest. Sense-data as conceived by Moore, Broad and Price are all independent of the mind and yet distinct from the familiar objects in the world around us. It would be as upsetting for us to learn that we experienced only such mind-independent objects and not the world around us as it would be to learn that our experiences were merely of subjective entities or states of affairs. It would be mistake to suppose that we can find some general feature which mind-independent sense-data need have in common which marks them out from the objects that we in fact have a concern about and take ourselves to experience. To this extent, Austin's complaint is quite justified. There is no general mark which divides sense-data and material objects.

On the other hand, given our background assumptions about the causal order, the only way in which a sense-datum theorist can plausibly maintain Actualism for experience is to insist on the subjectivity of experience. This does give us a general mark of experience (if not the types of object or quality experienced) which the intentionalist rejects. Transparency, as here construed, does articulate the appropriate issue in contention, but it does so only against the background of further assumptions and concerns we have.

In the case of hallucinations, insisting that Actualism holds of some aspect of one's experience will commit one also to supposing that in that case the presented elements of the experience are constituted by one's so experiencing. The paradigm examples of supposedly subjective experience, such as feelings of pain, are cases in which many are prepared immediately to treat in this way. Someone who supposes that all experiences

have actualist aspects is committed to generalising beyond this limited sample. In as much as there is an opposition between those who claim that the phenomenal properties of experience are representational or not, we can see why there is also a matching between the non-representational conception and the subjective, just as we find in current discussions of phenomenal consciousness.

6. Varieties in Phenomenal Property

Discussions of sensory experience focus on subjective or sensational qualities and representational content. Associated with this are the two assumptions I flagged at the beginning of this chapter: that the two sets of properties are exclusive and that they are exhaustive of the phenomenal character of experience. The discussion of Actualism and Transparency over the last few sections offers an account of the first of these assumptions.

In focusing on the nature of hallucination, we have articulated an account of what it would be for the phenomenal character of an experience to be representational. Someone who affirms that there are aspects of experience which are non-representational claims that actualism holds of some phenomenal properties. When we reflect on the causes of hallucination, we see that one can only plausible hold such a non-representational conception of hallucinations if one also supposes that the presented elements of such an experience are subjective. In this way, someone who emphasises the mind-independence of presented elements in the case of hallucination resists a non-representational treatment of these aspects of experience. While someone who insists on the non-representational nature of some aspects of experience is forced to concede their mind-dependence.

This suggests that we are on course to explain the second assumption, the exhaustive nature of the division between the subjective or sensational and the intentional aspects of experience. Yet even here we need to make explicit the role of our assumptions about the nature and origin of hallucination.

The debates about Actualism and Transparency indicate that there are two directions of dependence or independence in play between the presented elements of a given experience and its possession of the corresponding phenomenal property. The acceptance or rejection of Actualism turns on the question whether instances of the

phenomenal property are independent of the existence of the presented element of that phenomenal property. On the other hand, acceptance or rejection of Transparency turns on whether one supposes that the presented element of a given experience with a certain phenomenal property exists independently of that experience's having that property. If we take this seriously, then we must recognise that there are two distinct dimensions of variation here, and not just one. Hence, we cannot represent the options here simply in terms of positions along one continuum.

We can present the options here explicitly in terms of a matrix. On the one hand, we need to ask about the independence of presented elements from their corresponding phenomenal properties, and on the other, we need to ask about the independence of phenomenal properties from their presented elements. This gives us the following options:

Is Phenomenal Property Constituively Independent of Presented Aspect?

Is Presented Aspect Constitutively Independent ofPhenomenal Property	Yes	No
Yes	Intentional	
No		Subjective

In our discussion so far we have focused on phenomenal properties of experience which fit the two diagonal positions. Intentional phenomenal properties, as we may call them, are those which are two- ways independent of their presented aspects. We assume that what is presented to the mind in having such experience could exist whether we are aware of it or not, so our experience is not constitutive of the existence of these things. At the same time, reflecting on the possibility of hallucination, we accept that we can have instances of the phenomenal property independent of the existence of the corresponding presented element. With subjective phenomenal properties, on the other hand, we have the affirmation of dependence in both directions. In endorsing Actualism, one insists that one can have an experience with this phenomenal property only given the existence of some actual presented element; and yet, at the same time, reflecting on the causes of hallucination, one concedes that in having an experience with such a phenomenal property, the occurrence of an experience with that phenomenal property is constitutive of the existence of the

presented element, and hence that it could not have existed without one's awareness of it.

The empty slots indicate the logical possibility of affirming one dimension of independence, as with the intentional theorist, while rejecting the other, siding with the subjectivists. First, we can easily see how the top right cell of the matrix should be filled. This is to claim that the presented elements of one's experience are mind-independent, but yet to affirm that one can only experience so given the existence of the objects of awareness, and hence to deny the representational character of such experience. This just indicates precisely the position of what I called Naïve Realism in the first chapter. This is someone who insists first of all that our experiences present us with the world around us, the world with which we interact and which we suppose to be independent of our current states of awareness of it. But in addition, they insist that there is all the difference between feeling and thinking. If one is genuinely sensing such objects, as opposed merely to thinking about them or imagining them, then they really must be there in one's environment, present to one's mind. In claiming this, they reject a purely intentional construal of experience.

Conversely, we can imagine someone extrapolating from the case of pain to suppose that there may be qualities which we can apprehend which could only be instantiated were we to be aware of them, thereby making the instance of the presented aspects dependent on phenomenal properties. At the same time, the person may resist the supposition that any experience can be constitutive of its object, and so deny that having an experience is sufficient for such an object of awareness. To that extent, they would side with an intentional theorist and allow for the possibility of having an experience with the relevant phenomenal property but without the existence of the relevant presented aspect.

While it is more difficult to think of any actual theory of experience which commits to the existence of such phenomenal properties, we can perhaps see some theoretical motivation for it in discussions of supposedly subjective qualities. Someone might concede that were there genuinely any pains or hurts then they could exist only if we are aware of them, but wary of admitting to the existence of mind-dependent entities or qualities, they may go on to claim that all of our experiences of such qualities are purely erroneous and hallucinatory, it seems to us as if we are presented with such qualities, but no instances are realised.

We might then add labels to the additional cells so:

Is Phenomenal Property Constitutively Independent of Presented Aspect

Is Presented Aspect Constitutively Independent of Phenomenal Property?	Yes	No
Yes	Intentional	Instantial
No	Dependent	Subjective

Restricted just to the original options of intentional and subjective phenomenal properties, we can conceive broadly of three types of position, all familiar from recent debates. At one extreme we have purely subjective conceptions of experience. These affirm that experiences have subjective phenomenal properties and which denies that they possess any other type of phenomenal properties.[24] At the other extreme, we have purely intentional conceptions of experience.[25] These insist that experiences have intentional phenomenal properties and they deny that they possess any other types of phenomenal properties. In the middle, we have views which accept the existence of both subjective and intentional phenomenal properties. In many ways, this is the most popular position within the field.[26]

Yet we do not have only two types of property here, but four. So logical space seems to offer us not three positions to fill, but fifteen! The assumption that intentional content and subjective qualities exhaust our options here seems at best a simplifying assumption. Nevertheless, despite the appearance of potential variety here, we already have to hand materials to explain why debate should narrow down on just the two types of property and the three options that come with them. For it is here that the argument from illusion can be seen finally to fix the framework of debate.

7. The Argument against Naïve Realism

24. Such a position is endorsed by Jackson in his account of vision, see (Jackson 1977).

25. This is a position occupied by Harman, see (Harman 1990), and Tye in his most recent writings see, (Tye 1992) and (Tye 1995). Despite the equivocation in framing his position, Dretske is best interpreted as defending this kind of account as well in (Dretske 1995).

26. So we can attribute this to Peacocke in (Peacocke 1983), Chs. 1 & 2, and to Searle, see (Searle 1983), Ch. 2. This also offers the best interpretation of Price's position within this framework, (Price 1932).

At this point we need to turn to the argument from illusion again. The materials that we now have on offer give us a way of formulating what we might take to be the essence of the argument. The argument so constructed is valid, I suggest, and it contains premisses which are not obviously false nor question begging. In combining together the discussion of Actualism and that of Transparency we can see why one should think that there could be no naïve phenomenal properties.

As suggested at the outset of this chapter, we can represent the argument as a form of *reductio ad absurdum* in the context of our two assumptions, Common Kind (CKA) and Experiential Naturalism (EN). Suppose that you now are having an experience with some naïve phenomenal property. That commits you to the claim that for some aspect of what is present to your mind, it exists independently of your current awareness, yet you could only be so aware given the presence of such an item. For example, suppose like Price you are staring at a brown table. We might surmise that being presented with such a brown expanse is an example of a naïve phenomenal property. The particular brown expanse you are aware of exists independently of your awareness of it: it would still be there if you shut your eyes. At the same time, you could not so experience without such a brown expanse being before the mind. We admit that for all we know, you could have an experience indistinguishable for you by reflection from this current experience but which itself is an hallucination. Furthermore, given CKA that this is true because the very same kind of experience can occur when one is hallucinating as when one perceives. So now consider a possible case of hallucination which involves an experience of exactly the same kind as you now have. That is, one which possesses exactly the same phenomenal properties.

Given its possession of an instantial phenomenal property, Actualism holds of that property. So in the case of the perfect hallucination, one's experience has such a property only given the existence of a corresponding presented element or aspect. If you are now aware of a brown tabletop, and this aspect of your experience is instantial, then in the case of perfect hallucination you are presented with some other brown expanse. In addition, by EN, we are committed to the thought that we can bring about such perfect hallucinations just through appropriate stimulation of the subject's central nervous system. Appropriate physical causes fix the chance of the experience occurring. As we discussed above, the only appropriate conception of the experience to attach to this is to suppose that in the case of the perfect hallucination, the experience

so caused must be constitutive of any object which must exist in order for one so to experience. This means that in the case of the brown expanse which one is aware of in having the hallucination, the existence of that brown expanse is constituted by one's experience having the phenomenal property, and the expanse is dependent for its existence on one's awareness of it.

But now, that shows that the phenomenal property in question, in the case of the hallucination, is one which is constitutive of its object, and hence in any situation in which one has an experience with that phenomenal property, the experience is constitutive of its object. So in the case of veridical perception of the brown table as well, in being aware of the brown expanse one is aware of a brown expanse which is constituted through one's awareness of it and is, hence, dependent on one's awareness of it. But this contradicts our initial supposition that the brown expanse that one is aware of in the case of the veridical perception is one which is independent of the mind. Hence, there can be no instantial phenomenal properties of experience.[27]

Nonetheless, to the extent that it seems to us, on first reflection, as if our sensory experiences present to us a mind-independent world, as a naïve realist would affirm, then to that extent we will be inclined to posit intentional phenomenal properties. For the existence of such properties is quite consistent with the two key assumptions. Likewise, to the extent that one is convinced through introspection that one's experience is non-representational in some aspects of its phenomenal character, then one will be inclined to posit subjective phenomenal properties, and the existence of these too are quite consistent with the assumptions in play.

It does not, therefore, seem to be a matter of definition that in giving an account of the phenomenal character of experience we can appeal only to subjective qualities or

27. So Alston's position, mentioned earlier, should be seen as inconsistent with EN – he gives us no way of seeing how mental images could be the objects of awareness for all hallucinations consistent with the causal genesis of experience and the mind-independence of imagery. The same complaint can be made against Harold Langsam's defence of a form of disjunctivism in 'The Theory of Appearing Defended', when he suggests we can be neutral on the nature of hallucinations – perhaps they should be taken simply to be states of awareness of regions of space. The force of the argument here just turns on the causal conditions needed for certain hallucinations which nonetheless exemplify the same kind of state as perceiving. Nothing shows that these *must* be cases of being aware of something guaranteed to exist independent of the mind.

intentional properties. Given the fact that there are two dimensions of disagreement in play, these just cannot exhaust the options within logical space. Nonetheless, there are good reasons for supposing that these give us the only salient or relevant options in explaining what experience is like. For, in as much as reflection on experience first recommends naïve realism to us, then the realisation that our experience cannot be so, given the argument from illusion, leaves only these two options in play.

8. Terminological Disputes?

Is this the correct way of construing the relation between the original opposition of intentional theories and sense-datum accounts. From one perspective at least, this interpretation will seem misguided. John McDowell, who in many ways endorses a view of experience akin to what is here called Naïve Realism, emphasises the close ties between sensory experience and knowledge. According to him, sensory experience is conceptual, and there is no contrast to be drawn between the content of experience and the content of knowledge which is its upshot. He opposes equally sense-datum theories of experience and views which ascribe to experience a non-conceptual content of experience. So for him the key distinction does not seem to be between views which suppose experience to have a relational form and those which suppose it to have an intentional structure.

Moreover, if one's concern is with intentionality in general and propositional attitudes, then one may point out that it can hardly be a condition on a psychological state's being intentional that it is possible for such states to misrepresent. States of factual knowledge, qua knowledge, cannot misrepresent the world. In order to be knowledge, what one knows must be true. This feature of knowledge need not lead us to deny that states of knowledge are intentional states of mind, with an intentional or propositional content. That intentional content in general allows for correctness or incorrectness does not require that every state with intentional content allows for correctness and incorrectness in its content.[28] Now one might claim that knowledge is necessarily composite, and that its properly intentional component is belief, which

28. Indeed, as long as we reject the conception of these matters in the *Tractatus*, then we are committed to the idea that there are some contents which are necessarily true and others necessarily false.

does have the bipolarity in question.[29] But it would seem wrong to insist that those who deny the compositeness of knowledge here need also deny its intentionality.[30]

By analogy, one might insist that the mere fact that one thinks that certain sensory experiences can occur only when their contents are correct could not by itself show that such states of mind thereby have a non-intentional aspect. But doesn't this, just by the definitions offered above, involve the denial of intentionalism as given above?

There are two points to note in response. First, I am interested in intentionalism as a doctrine about the phenomenology of experience, as seeking to offer an account of the phenomenal character of our sensory states. What is distinctive here, I have claimed, is that the intentional content of the experience as opposed to the objects or qualities perceived, is constitutive of the phenomenal character of experience. Although we may need to refer to those objects or qualities in describing what the experience is like, in doing so we are indicating the intentional content which concerns those objects and qualities and which constitutes the experience being so. We are not thereby picking out any literal components of the experience.

It is therefore quite consistent with this position that one might attribute an intentional content to sensory experiences without thereby intending to explain the phenomenal character of such experience. Hence a commitment to the presence of intentional content in perceptual states is not sufficient to show that one is an intentionalist in the sense with which we are concerned here. One must, even if only implicitly, suppose that the intentional content has a bearing on what one says about the phenomenal character of experience.

Now it is clear that McDowell does suppose that the ascription of intentionality to perceptual experience does bear on the characterisation of the experience as experience of some aspects of the world and not of others. So in that case, one can ask does his ascription of intentional content thereby make him an intentionalist? By my lights, the answer will be no since for him intentional content does not explain how it is possible for such experience to lack an actual object.

This remaining disagreement is in part terminological. Should one talk of the

29. (Dennett 1969), pp. **-**.

30. Namely, McDowell in (McDowell 1982), (McDowell 1994), (McDowell 1995); (Williamson 1995).

intentionality of experience in a way which allows for experience to be incorrect as well as correct? Or should one rather mean by it just the thought that in having experience one's mind is directed on something?

Sense-datum theorists, of course, suppose that when we have sensory experiences our minds are directed on some subject matter distinct from the state itself: the non-physical objects of awareness. So, if we mean by intentionality merely the direction of the mind on something, then sense-datum theorists accept the intentionality of sensory experience. On the other hand, there does seem to be a genuine divide between sense-datum theorists and those like Harman and Tye who insist on the representational nature of experience. I have argued that the difference in question is best understood in terms of one's attitude towards Actualism.

That is to say, once we see the argument from illusion as the fundamental motivating problem of theories of perception, then the attitude taken towards Actualism defines the options for one in the context of our two assumptions, the Common Kind Assumption and Experiential Naturalism

9. Conclusion

I have argued that we can frame the debate about perception in terms of different responses taken towards the problem of perception. We can find a common framework for that debate in terms articulated out of a debate about the nature of phenomenal consciousness. That latter debate focuses on a contrast between intentional content and subjective qualities. The assumptions of that debate can be given form and justification in the light of the problem of perception. In that case, we do not have two entirely distinct debates, but rather a common set of overlapping concerns.

The issue here is given focus by three central claims. The first of these is that, if our sensory experiences require that there be some actual object of awareness when hallucinating, then such an object of awareness must be mind-dependent. The second of these is that the kinds of sensory experiences we have when veridically perceiving are of a kind which could have occurred were we hallucinating. These two claims together restrict the possible set of options for explaining the phenomenal character of our experiences. The third claim indicates the relevance or interest of the first two assumptions to our debate: that reflection on our sensory experience inclines us to

suppose that naïve realism is true; that for some aspect of our experience we are presented with mind-independent objects on which our awareness itself depends.

The three claims together lead us to contradiction. There can be no instantial phenomenal properties of experience if the first two claims are accepted as true. This is the fundamental problem of perception: introspection first inclines us to accept naïve realism; reflection on the argument from illusion leads us to reject it. In turn, the seeming truth of naïve realism can be seen to be the key reason to posit both intentional and subjective phenomenal properties for our normal sensory experience. The conception here of intentional phenomenal properties and subjective phenomenal properties articulate what is behind the opposition of intentional content and subjective qualities in the literature on phenomenal consciousness. If naïve realism is inconsistent, then only these two sets of properties can answer to the introspective support for naïve realism. So we can give content to, and provide justification for the guiding assumptions of the debate about phenomenal consciousness by seeing it as resting on the more traditional problems of perception.

While the history of both debates shows that this is the standard move to make, it does not show how it addresses the most fundamental problem. With the three assumptions in play, our experience must be other than it seems to us to be. No explanation of this falls out simply from claiming that experience has intentional phenomenal properties, subjective phenomenal properties, or some combination of the two. The significance of this in part turns on the assessment of the problems of perception. If we accept that it seems to us as if naïve realism is true, then we need some account of why it should seem correct to us, when in fact it is necessarily false. Furthermore, the possible consequences of this inherent error in introspection need to be addressed.

This is significant, of course, only if it really does seem to us as if naïve realism is correct with reference to perceptual experience: only if it does seem to us as if Transparency and Actualism hold jointly of some aspects of our experience. So far this claim has merely been put forward as a hypothesis of historical interpretation. We can make best sense of the sense-datum tradition by interpreting it as implicitly endorsing this claim. Nonetheless, as we have also noted, it is typical for proponents of intentional theories of perception to deny that there is any introspective support for this view of experience.

Moreover, we have noted that the implicit support for this view in the sense-datum tradition is also associated with a lack of argument or justification for the key moves. It is typically taken to be just obvious that the relevant principles hold of our experience. In the next chapter, we shall look at the prospects for advancing the claim that introspection does indeed support naïve realism, and that the traditional problem of perception is with us still.