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THE LIMITS OF SELF-AWARENESS

The disjunctive theory of perception claims that we should understand statements about how things appear to a perceiver to be equivalent to statements of a disjunction that either one is perceiving such and such or one is suffering an illusion (or hallucination); and that such statements are not to be viewed as introducing a report of a distinctive mental event or state common to these various disjoint situations.

When Michael Hinton first introduced the idea, he suggested that the burden of proof or disproof lay with his opponent, that what was needed was to show that our talk of how things look or appear to one to be introduces more than what he later came to call perception-illusion disjunctions:

I do not at present see how it can be, or could be, shown that there is such a thing as (Q) [a statement which reports the occurrence of a visual experience in contrast to expressing a perception-illusion disjunction]. Consequently I do not see how it can be shown that there is such a thing as my psi-ing for these and other statements to be about; and since one surely should not make statements without being able to show that they are about something, this means that as far as I can see no such statements should be made. Perhaps I just can't see far enough, but I should like to be shown that this is so. (Hinton, 1967, p. 220)

I suspect that many readers on encountering either Hinton's presentation of disjunctivism or the accounts of it available from Snowdon or McDowell, would find surprising this demand that the burden of proof for the existence of a non-disjunctive sensory experience. Surely we know what a sensory experience is in just the sense that Hinton is denying. What we don't know, the line of the thought may go, is quite what the disjunctivist is saying in its place. Doesn't the burden of proof lie, then, with the disjunctive theory of appearances: first to clarify further what it has to say, and then to offer some appropriate defence of these outlandish claims?



Philosophical Studies **120**: 37–89, 2004.

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The aim of this paper is to offer some of that elaboration, but also in turn to explain the way in which Hinton was correct in his challenge. Properly understood, the disjunctive approach to perception is the appropriate starting point for any discussion of the nature of perceptual experience. The key to the approach is not in its appeal to paraphrasing claims about experience in disjunctive form, but is rather in an appeal to the idea of indiscriminability in explicating the claims we accept about experience. The core thought is that we grasp the idea of sense experience as such, in contrast to sense perception, through recognising that there are things that we cannot know about ourselves just through reflection on the situation we find ourselves in. As I aim to explain below, a suitable modesty about what one can know about one's experiential state is the proper starting point for theorising about sense experience in general. Any theory which moves beyond such modesty and makes substantive claims about the properties that sense experiences possess needs to justify this boldness.

In what follows, there are two morals that I wish to draw. The first concerns the question of the conception of sense experience in general; the second concerns the claims that the disjunctivist is committed to concerning a special sub-class of hallucinations, those brought about through the same proximate causal conditions as veridical perceptions. It is in relation to the latter that the most striking (and many will find most implausible) claim that the disjunctivist makes, that there may be sensory states whose mental nature is characterisable in nothing but epistemological terms, in terms of their unknowable difference from cases of veridical perception. But the significance of this commitment can be understood only in the light of the former claim about experience in general. Before addressing those matters, I want briefly to raise two others: the prime motivation for endorsing disjunctivism, and the question of how we are to understand its formulations as provided by Hinton, Snowdon and McDowell.

1. The prime reason for endorsing disjunctivism is to block the rejection of a view of perception I'll label *Naïve Realism*. The Naïve Realist thinks that some at least of our sensory episodes are presentations of an experience-independent reality. When I sit here

writing this, I am conscious of the various elements that make up a North London street scene. The same objects and aspects of these objects which I can attend to as part of the environment beyond me are also aspects of what I can attend to when I pursue the question, ‘What is it like for me now so be staring out of the window rather than writing my paper?’ Mind-independent reality can form the subject-matter of sensuous experience. In affirming this the Naïve Realist finds common ground with those views of perception which attribute to it a representational or intentional content and seek to explain its phenomenal character in terms of that content – *Intentional Theories of Perception*. For it is common to support such theories by pointing out that our sense experience is transparent – that experientially we are presented with a mind-independent realm and not simply some array of mind-dependent qualities or entities whose existence depends on this awareness.¹

The Naïve Realist, however, claims that our sense experience of the world is, at least in part, non-representational. Some of the objects of perception – the concrete individuals, their properties, the events these partake in – are constituents of the experience. No experience like this, no experience of fundamentally the same kind, could have occurred had no appropriate candidate for awareness existed. In this, sense perception contrasts with imagining and thought. For one can certainly imagine objects in their absence, so the mind’s direction on an object does not require that it actually exist when one imagines. The same is true, arguably, of thought – we think of objects which in fact do not exist as well thinking of the existent. The Naïve Realist insists that sensing is not like this, and in that respect the Naïve Realist finds common ground with the Sense-Datum tradition, or what more broadly I will label *Subjectivism*. For Subjectivists have long insisted that what is distinctive of sensing as opposed to thinking is that one really cannot sense in the absence of an object of sensing.²

Whatever its other merits, Naïve Realism is inconsistent with two assumptions which are common to much of the philosophical discussion of perception. The first of these is *Experiential Naturalism*: our sense experiences, like other events or states within the natural world, are subject to the causal order, and in this case are thereby subject just to broadly physical causes (i.e. including neuro-

physiological causes and conditions) and psychological causes (if these are disjoint from physical causes). One can manipulate the world so as to induce an hallucination in someone, for example, by suitable stimulation of their sensory cortices and possible manipulation of their psychological condition. One does not, in addition, have to invoke any further influence over other super-luminary entities, something neither physical nor mental, in order to bring about the experience. The second assumption is *The Common Kind Assumption*: whatever kind of mental event occurs when one is veridically perceiving some scene, such as the street scene outside my window, that kind of event can occur whether or not one is perceiving. One may hold to this assumption for different reasons – it is tempting to suppose that it is obvious just because by ‘sensory experience’ we mean to pick out that event for which there is something it is like for the subject when they perceive or hallucinate, or whatever. And we are, of course, aware that from the subject’s point of view there may seem to be no difference at all between a case of hallucination and one of perception. So the event in question must be of the same phenomenal kind as the kind of veridical perception it matches. One may also eschew phenomenological evidence for the commitment in favour of an appeal to causal considerations – that reflection on how we can bring about perceptions and hallucinations should lead us to suppose that the immediate effects of appropriate brain stimulation, the experiences caused, must be the same whether or not a perception or an hallucination is brought about. Either way, the assumption is that when we are thinking of the mental or subjective aspect of perception we pick out a kind of event or state which is common to cases of perception and hallucination.

Naïve Realism together with these two assumptions leads to contradiction. For first, assume that we have some event which is as the Naïve Realist supposes a perception can be: it is an awareness of some lavender bush which exists independent of one’s current awareness of it. By the Common Kind Assumption, whatever kind of experience that is, just such an experience could have occurred were one merely hallucinating. By Experiential Naturalism, we know that there are sufficient appropriate physical and psychological causes of it. If the hallucinatory experience were relational in the manner that the Naïve Realist supposes the perception of the

bush to be, then the causes sufficient to bring about the hallucination must also have been sufficient for some appropriate object to be present in the experience. By our assumption about the causes, this is done without assuming any extra causal correlations between the causes of the experience and any non-physical object of awareness. Hence the bringing about of the experience must have been sufficient for the existence of its object – that is, the experience is of a kind sufficient for the existence of its object. If the experience alone is constitutively sufficient for this object of awareness in the case of hallucination, then the object in this case is not merely non-physical but dependent for its existence on the occurrence of this experience.^{3,4}

Since the experience which occurs when one is hallucinating is of just the sort that occurs when one is veridically perceiving, the experience one has when one is veridically perceiving is by itself sufficient to constitute the existence of its object of awareness. According to the Naïve Realist, the object of awareness is experience-independent, yet in this case we are to suppose that there is in addition an experience-dependent object sufficient to account for the nature of the experience. So, contrary to the Naïve Realist's starting assumption, if the hallucinatory experience is a relation to an object of awareness, it is to a mind-dependent one, and hence the perception is a relation to a mind-dependent object, not the mind-independent object that the Naïve Realist hypothesises.

What if one assumes instead that the hallucinatory experience is not the awareness of anything at all? From the subject's perspective it may seem as if there is a table there before him or her, but in reality there is nothing for them to be standing in such a relation of awareness. We have to describe the situation as if there is such an object – we say that the subject 'sees' a bush, or it is 'as if' there is an apparent bush. In doing so, though, we do not really indicate any acceptance of ontological commitment; rather we treat the experience rather as having an 'intentional object'.⁵ To make this move is to assume that the experience of the kind that the subject has when hallucinating does not need to have any objects of awareness as constituents of the experience – some experiences we treat as if they are the presentations of such objects, but they don't need any such objects to exist in order for them to occur. This position may

seem to have the ontological advantage of avoiding any commitment to mind-dependent entities, and for that reason has often been preferred. But despite this advantage, it offers no respite from the argument we are now considering. Since the experience in question, the hallucination, is of just the same kind as the veridical perception, then the same holds of the veridical perception as of the hallucination. That is, the veridical perception does not have the objects of perception as constituents, despite the Naïve Realist's claims to the contrary.

So, Experiential Naturalism imposes certain constraints on what can be true of hallucinatory experiences. Such experiences either can have only experience-dependent objects, or not be relations to objects at all. By the Common Kind Assumption, whatever is true of the kind of experience that one has when one is hallucinating, the same must be true of the kind of experience one has when perceiving. So either one's experience when veridically perceiving is of some mind-dependent object, or the experience is not essentially a relation to any object at all.

Hence, Naïve Realism is inconsistent with these two assumptions. One way of reading the history of philosophy of perception is to see it in terms of a conflict between Naïve Realism and the kind of commitments reflected in these two assumptions.⁶ Sense-datum theories hold on to one aspect of Naïve Realism, that experience is a relation between the subject and some object of awareness, yet reject the thought that such objects can be the objects in the world around us. Intentional theories of perception are often moved by the thought that one should hold on to the other aspect of Naïve Realism, that one is related to the world around us through perceptual consciousness, but thereby give up the element of Naïve Realism, that such awareness is genuinely a relation to such objects.

The motivation for disjunctivism, I suggest, is a desire to hold on to Naïve Realism. For reasons expanded on elsewhere, I suggest that we should think of Naïve Realism as the best articulation of how our experiences strike us as being to introspective reflection on them.⁷ It is common to complain against sense-datum theories that they deny that we have genuine awareness of objects in the world around us, to complain that they introduce a veil of perception. The best sense one can make of this complaint is really that sense-datum theories

are forced to say that the real nature of our sensory experience is not how it strikes us as being. But if Naïve Realism is the correct description of how our sensory experience strikes us, then an intentional theory of perception is no less revisionary than a sense-datum account. To hold on to our Naïve view of experience, though, we need to reject one of the starting assumptions: either Experiential Naturalism or the Common Kind Assumption.

Experiential Naturalism was implicitly rejected by the early sense-datum theorists who were sceptical of the completeness or unity of the physical world and open to positing the existence of many strange items.⁸ Such a rejection may not be *a priori* incoherent but it comes at high cost. So too does a rejection of this argument through embracing transcendental idealism, as Merleau-Ponty suggests, and as Jerry Valberg more recently has recommended.⁹ If we do not think of our experience of the world as itself being a part of the world, then we need not conceive it as having causal antecedents within the world – we then need not think of how such events can otherwise be brought about.

The disjunctivist response, however, remains committed to the broad empirical assumptions and methodological presuppositions which lead one to endorse Experiential Naturalism and hence the conclusions drawn from it about the nature of our experiences. It seeks to resist the rejection of Naïve Realism, therefore, simply by denying the Common Kind Assumption. That is, we hold on to Naïve Realism by insisting that the fundamental kind of event that one's sensory experience which is a veridical perception of the table in front of one is a kind of event which just could not occur were one hallucinating. Even if some matching hallucination would either have to be an awareness of some mind-dependent object or of no object at all, nothing follows from that alone about the status of one's veridical perception.

2. What does the denial of the Common Kind Assumption amount to? The three disjunctivists with which I started, Hinton together with Paul Snowdon and John McDowell, offer significantly different formulations of the view. Contrast Hinton in the first quotation, with Snowdon and then McDowell:

Even if few things are certain, it is certain that there are what I shall call perception-illusion disjunctions: sentences or statements like ‘Macbeth perceives a dagger or is having that illusion’, which you can compose by adding words like ‘. . . or x is having that illusion’ to a sentence which says that a particular person, x , perceives a thing of some particular kind. (Hinton, 1973, p. 37)

It looks to S as if there is an F : (there is something which looks to S to be F) *or* (it is to S as if there is something which looks to him (S) to be F). (Snowdon, 1980–1981)

. . . an appearance that such-and-such is the case can be either a mere appearance or the fact made manifest to someone . . . the object of experience in the deceptive cases is a mere appearance. But we are not to accept that in the non-deceptive cases too the object of experience is a mere appearance, and hence something that falls short of the fact itself . . . appearances are no longer conceived as intervening between the experiencing subject and the world. (McDowell, 1982)

In each case the disjunctive form is specified in significantly different ways. Hinton and Snowdon focus on locutions of object perception, ‘ S sees o ’, which are commonly taken to be transparent in the object position. Hinton contrasts on either side of his disjunction the seeing of a flash of light with the having of an illusion of a flash of light. Snowdon, in contrast, treats both veridical perception and illusion as belonging on the privileged side of the disjunction, since both involve perception of an object, and keeps only hallucination to the contrasted side. In contrast to both of these, McDowell is interested in locutions of factual perception: ‘ S sees/can see that p ’. Such locutions are typically opaque in the complement clause, and the relation between talk of object perception and fact perception is complex – not every object mentioned in a perceived fact need be an object of perception; even if some fact must be perceived concerning any object of perception, it is not clear that there is any specific fact which must have been perceived in perceiving an object. McDowell’s contrast case, then, is simply that of merely apprehending the appearance of p , rather than properly grasping the fact.¹⁰

Perhaps, then, rather than speaking in terms of *the* disjunctive theory of appearances, we should recognise a cluster of approaches, all of which have in common just a negative thesis: the thesis that we should not think that perceptual experience is to be analysed as a common factor of perception and either illusion or hallucination.

However, if we characterise the approach just in this negative way, then we are also liable to be misled. For this seems to offer merely an incomplete sketch of an account which needs further supplementation. First, one needs some further gloss of the ‘privileged’ disjunct – the reference to perception or veridical perception. That there is some idea at the back of these theories is often implicitly understood when one reads them – these accounts are supposed, somehow or other, to defend some form of direct realism. On the other hand, the negative construal as yet does not tell us what to say about the ‘underprivileged’ disjunct, the one that fails the condition to be counted as perception. Surely we need to know what more to say about these cases before we know what these approaches are telling us about perceptual experience in general. Jonathan Dancy offers a clear expression of this line of thought when he suggests:

The disjunctive account of perception really says that there are two quite different sorts of oasis-experience, which may none the less be indistinguishable to their owner. The first is the genuine article, and the second, though it is indistinguishable, has nothing in common with the first other than the fact that they are both oasis-experiences. In the standard formulation of the account, misleadingly, this is explicitly the way in which the second disjunct is characterized: we characterize it solely by saying that it is like what it is not. Presumably, however, there may be available a more direct characterization of the second disjunct, and in a totally explicit version of the theory it would indeed be characterized in that better way. The current characterization is just the sort of place-holder, showing what has to be said about the relation between the first and second disjunct. (Dancy, 1995)

Yet if we take Dancy’s concerns seriously and attempt to spell disjunctivism out in more detail, we encounter two further problems. According to Dancy, in the proper dress of the theory, we should surmise that the full account of perceptual experience offers a clause for the privileged case of perception and the underprivileged case of illusion or hallucination. Where other theories can hope to offer a common explanation of the phenomena that we look to perception and sensory experience to provide, the supplemented disjunctivism will need to offer two distinct accounts. As such the approach necessarily lacks the consilience of conjunctive accounts of sensory experience. Struck by this obvious thought, it is no surprise that opponents are liable to think that justification needs

to be provided for the disjunctivist position rather than vice versa – Hinton’s attitude is liable to seem mere complacency.

Behind this lies a deeper worry. Is there really a coherent supplementation to the disjunctive account? Suppose we do get a further specification of the kind of mental event that occurs in the non-privileged circumstances. If what marks these cases out in the first place is just that they involve the absence of perception, then one may worry that whatever fixes what they have in common with each other will apply equally to any case of perception. That is to say, the further specification of hallucination will be something which is present not only in all cases of illusion or hallucination but also in the case of perception. The disjunctivist will then be left in the unhappy position of conceding that there is a common element to all of the cases, while still insisting that there is something distinctive of perception. Now if the common element is sufficient to explain all the relevant phenomena in the various cases of illusion and hallucination, one may also worry that it must be sufficient in the case of perception as well. In that case, disjunctivism is threatened with viewing its favoured conception of perception as explanatorily redundant.

In what follows I will address both of these concerns. Hinton is right to say that the disjunctivist conception of perceptual experience in general should in fact be our default conception. And Dancy is wrong to think that the disjunctivist specification is incomplete, that we should supplement the account of experience with a non-relational gloss of what illusory or hallucinatory experiences are. Nonetheless, the remaining worry about explanatory redundancy does pose a serious challenge to disjunctivism, as we shall see, and in the end addressing this challenge brings out the most distinctive and surprising aspect of disjunctivism: the limits to the self-awareness we can have of our own sensory states.

Properly understood, disjunctivism offers us an epistemological perspective on how we should conceive the debate about sensory experience. It helps bring out how weighty one’s epistemological assumptions about the mind must be, if one is to advance beyond this epistemological stance.

3. How then should we think about sense experience? What gives us a grip on the notion? Contrast two different ways of thinking about the Cartesian story of lucid dreaming. Few of us have any problem grasping the idea of perfect hallucinations. At present, I have good reason to suppose that I am seeing a London street pretty much as it is. So I have a veridical perception of the unkempt lavender bush at the end of my road that marks the advance of late summer. Nonetheless, as far as I can tell, it seems a genuine possibility that I could have been in a situation which was not one of actually perceiving my environment for how it was but which I would not have been able to tell apart from this, my actual situation, just through introspection and reflection on my experience. Such a case would surely be a perfect hallucination of the kind of scene that I am perceiving, as things stand, for what it is.

On the first conception of experience, one that someone who endorses the Common Kind Assumption might endorse, this starting point is further elaborated so. A perceptual experience is a kind of event which has certain distinctive features $E_1 \dots E_n$. Not only is the possession of these features necessary and sufficient for an event to be an experience, but, in addition, an event's possession of them is introspectible by the subject of the experience. When I come to recognise the possibility of perfect hallucination just like my current perception, what I do is both recognise the presence of these characteristics, $E_1 \dots E_n$, in virtue of which this event is such an experience, and also recognise that an event's possessing these characteristics is independent of whether the event is a perception or not. So in accepting the Cartesian possibility I display a grasp of a positive piece of knowledge about the nature of certain mental events.

Note that to accept this much still leaves open what characteristics $E_1 \dots E_n$ are. For all that has been said we should construe these as an experience's being the presentation of such and such mind-dependent qualities, as a sense-datum theory supposes. Or we might instead take them to be representational properties, as an intentional theory would press. For our present purposes here, we can remain neutral about this matter. All that matters for our current purposes is that such views will attribute to subjects who grasp the concept of perfect hallucination both the power to identify the marks

of experience in having an experience and a recognition of their modal independence of the conditions of perceiving. To this extent, then, such theories are immodest in their attribution of epistemological powers that subjects have when they give an explanation of how we come to have a conception of sensory experience which can be employed from the first person perspective.

This is not the only way to elaborate the initial sketch. Instead one may insist that the original instructions to conceive of perfectly matching hallucinations are all that is needed to give one a conception of perceptual experience. This second way of thinking about the idea of sense experience, we might call a modest or minimal conception. We need not look for some further characteristics in virtue of which an event counts as an experience of a street scene, but rather take something to be such an experience simply in virtue of its being indiscriminable from a perception of a street scene. Nothing more is needed for something to be an experience, according to this conception, than that it satisfy this epistemological condition. Rather than appealing to a substantive condition which an event must meet to be an experience, and in addition ascribing to us cognitive powers to recognise the presence of this substantive condition, it instead emphasises the limits of our powers of discrimination and the limits of self-awareness: some event is an experience of a street scene just in case it couldn't be told apart through introspection from a veridical perception of the street as the street.

Does this second conception really capture what we need? Well a proponent of the immodest view cannot fault a modest account for failing to capture in its conception of what a sense experience is all those situations that the immodest account deems to be perceptual experiences of a street scene. After all, by immodest lights the kind of experience one has when seeing such a street scene is of just the same kind as any non-perceptual event which is not a perception but still an experience as of a street scene, namely an event with the properties $E_1 \dots E_n$. Since nothing can be discriminated from itself, the immodest approach will hold that the modest one should agree that these events are indiscriminable from a veridical perception of a street scene and hence are perceptual experiences as of a street scene. (Of course, by modest lights this consequence might not follow, but that would only be because the particular version of

the immodest account is inadequate and the properties $E_1 \dots E_n$ it specifies are not after all sufficient for an event's being a perceptual experience as of a street scene even in the case of veridical perception.) So immodest views may complain that modest ones fail to capture what defines an event's being an experience but not that their conception of experience is too narrow.

On the other hand, it is difficult for an immodest account to avoid complaining that modest ones are far too catholic in their conception of what can be an experience as of a street scene. Given all we have said so far, nothing rules out as possible a situation in which $E_1 \dots E_n$ are absent but in which a subject would be unable to discriminate through reflection this situation from one in which a street scene was really being seen. For the immodest view in question, this could not be a case of visual experience as of a street scene, while by modest lights that would be exactly what it is.

Now surely this result would be unfortunate for any immodest view, given our initial assumptions. For we supposed that reflection on experience offers support to a Naïve realist construal of sensory experience. When one reflects on one's experience it seems to one as if one is thereby presented with some experience-independent elements of the scene before one as constituents of one's experience and not merely as represented to one as in imagination. Even if the experience does also possess the characteristics $E_1 \dots E_n$, it need not manifest to the perceiver that these are present as opposed to Naïve realist aspects of experience. And it is at least not manifest that the experience is the kind of experience it is in virtue of the presence of these properties as opposed to being Naïve realist – for were it, then clearly it would not even seem to us as if Naïve realism is true. When we turn to a case of perfect hallucination, we know that the Naïve phenomenal properties which seem to be present in the case of veridical perception certainly cannot be present in the case of hallucination. Of course they may still seem to be present, and in as much as the hallucination is indistinguishable from the perception they will seem to be so. So, if the presence of $E_1 \dots E_n$ as opposed to the presence of Naïve phenomenal properties is not manifest to us in the case of veridical perception, and anyway is certainly not presented as definitive of that's being the experience it is, then it seems plausible that what links the case of hallucination to the

veridical perception is the seeming presence of Naïve phenomenal properties and not $E_1 \dots E_n$. In that case, common sense has no reason to discriminate against a case of perfect hallucination which lacks $E_1 \dots E_n$ but yet which seems to possess the properties relevant to its being an experience as of a street scene in the first place, the seeming presence of Naïve phenomenal properties.

If a modest account is too catholic in its conception of experience, immodest views will seem from a common sense perspective to be too restrictive. Even if the presence of $E_1 \dots E_n$ is sufficient to determine that one is having an experience as of a street scene, nothing has shown why it has to be necessary. Rather, if it really is possible to produce an experience lacking those features but otherwise being indiscriminable from a perception of a street scene, the account will offer just one way in which such an experience can occur. A proponent of an immodest view can only hope to offer necessary as well as sufficient conditions for having an experience – and hence to explain the having of experience in terms of its favoured conditions – if it can ensure that the modest approach and its favoured form of immodesty coincide in the extension they give the concept of experience.

In turn, this coincidence of extension can be guaranteed only if the proponent of the immodest account embraces a substantive epistemic principle. That will be achieved only if the situation sketched above turns out to be impossible: that there cannot be any situation which is indistinguishable for its subject from actually perceiving a street scene and yet which lacks the relevant properties. In turn, one must assume that a subject couldn't but be in a position to discriminate a situation which lacked $E_1 \dots E_n$ from one which possessed them. Here I just assume that for one situation to be indiscriminable from another requires only that it not be possible to know that it is distinct in kind.¹¹ Therefore to deny it is possible that a situation which is distinct in kind from an event possessing $E_1 \dots E_n$ is not possibly knowable as distinct in kind, is to claim that for any situation distinct in kind from an event possessing $E_1 \dots E_n$ it is possible to know that it is distinct.

Adopting this position is to attribute a privileged epistemic position to the subject of experience. For, according to it, a responsible subject who wishes to determine how things are with him or herself

through reflection must not only correctly identify phenomenal properties of a specific sort when they are present, but also they cannot be misled into judging them present when they are not. It is not merely that the properties which determine an event as an experience are held to be self-evident on this view – that the presence of such properties indicates to the subject that they are present when they are present. It must also be the case that the absence of such properties when they are absent is equally detectable by the subject, so that there is always some way that a subject could tell that he or she was not so experiencing when not doing so. It is to attribute to responsible subjects potential infallibility about the course of their experiences.

Of course, some philosophers have assumed that these epistemic properties are definitional of the mental, and so see nothing substantive in the additional assumption. But the doctrine of infallibilism about the mental is particularly problematic in relation to sensory states once we are forced to admit that appearances systematically appear to us other than they are. For if we can be misled with respect to some properties of sensory experiences, there is a question as to what can motivate the claim that we are infallible in other judgements about them. As I indicated above, part of the motivation for disjunctivism is precisely the thought that introspection of our sense experience supports Naïve Realism, and hence forces us to see both sense-datum and intentional theories as forms of error theory.

The assessment of this epistemological commitment I'll leave for elsewhere. For this discussion, the only point to note is that given the need to rely on this assumption, an immodest approach to perceptual experience carries more theoretical burdens than does a modest approach. The burden of proof is not on the disjunctivist to show that we should adopt a less than conjunctive theory of appearances, the burden is really on any common kind theorist, to show that the theory they propose is not really too restrictive; or that the added epistemological burdens which come with demonstrating that are ones that we should accept.

This points to where Dancy was misled. In fixing on the concept of perceptual experience in general we seem to have no more resources than that we need to pick out something indiscriminable

from veridical perception. So the most inclusive conception we can have here is an implicitly relational one. Any of the non-relational specifications that Naïve realist, or sense-datum, or intentional theories or some other approach can give us would seem just to offer at best a sufficient condition for meeting the relational specification. That would offer simply an account of one particular variant of experience, rather than an account of what experience must be. What most Common Kind theories (i.e. theories which endorse the Common Kind Assumption) ignore is that in giving an account of experience they normally succeed, if at all, only in giving sufficient conditions for one's experience to be a certain way, and fail to show that the conditions they offer are necessary. Without the latter being fulfilled, no such theory can claim to give a fully general account of experience.

Hence we can see that as long as our focus is on the concept of sensory experience in general, intended to cover all possible cases of what we would count as a sensory experience of a lavender bush, then our default position should be that of the disjunctivist. What we mean by this is no more than this is a situation which is indiscriminable through reflection from a veridical perception of a lavender bush.

4. So far, we have been looking at what the disjunctivist should say about perceptual experience in general. Its account of this is entirely minimal. For all that has been said, the account is not inconsistent with the view that there are some experiences among the non-veridical ones which fit the characterisations offered by sense-datum or intentional theories. The disjunctivist's general conception of experience does not have the resources to say that no such experiences can occur – as long as those experiences meet the relational condition of being indiscriminable from a veridical perception, then the disjunctivist is happy to count them as being among the perceptual experiences.

However, this cannot exhaust the content of an account of sensory experience which rejects the Common Kind Assumption. For, further reflection on the causal argument reveals that there is a specific range of experiences about which the disjunctivist is forced to say somewhat more. If disjunctivism is motivated along

the lines that we are concerned with, namely by the need to resist the problem of perception in a way that retains both Naïve Realism and Experiential Naturalism, then a variant of the causal argument presents the disjunctivist with a challenge. Experiences which share the proximate causal conditions as veridical perceptions but which lack the further conditions for being perceptions cannot have Naïve phenomenal properties. But, as we shall see, there is reason to think that whatever kind of event these experiences are, the very same kind of event occurs when one is perceiving. So the disjunctivist needs an account of these hallucinatory events, and one which remains consistent with the assertion of Naïve Realism concerning veridical perception.

The challenge develops in two steps. The first develops from the so-called causal argument for sense-data or against Naïve Realism. In that form causal considerations are appealed to in support of the Common Kind Assumption. Here however, we will be concerned with a variant of this argument with weaker assumptions to a conclusion that does not entail the Common Kind Assumption. Whether this conclusion is really consistent with disjunctivism is then the concern of the second step, which we shall reach below.

The argument we focus on here is based on the versions used by Howard Robinson.¹² It develops so:

- (1) When *S* sees a pine tree at *t*, call this situation *v*, there is in *S*'s body some complete causal condition just prior to *t* which determined the chance of this event of seeing occurring in *v*, call this condition *N*;
- (2) It is nomologically possible that *N* should occur in *S* even if no candidate object of perception is present and conditions necessary for the occurrence of a perception are not met, and an hallucinatory experience instead occurs; call one such situation *h*;
- (3) Where two situations involve the same proximate causal conditions, *and* do not differ in any non-causal conditions for the occurrence of some kind of effect, then the chances for the occurrence of such an effect are the same in both situations;¹³
- (4) No non-causal condition required for the occurrence of the effects of *N* is present in *h* but absent in *v*;

- (5) Whatever kind of experience occurs in *h*, there is the same chance of such an experience occurring in *v*;
- (6) Hence whatever kind of experience does occur in situations like *h*, it is possible that such a kind of experience occurs when one is veridically perceiving.

Our conclusion (6) is not equivalent to affirming the Common Kind Assumption, however (as Robinson sought to use the stronger initial version of this argument to establish). For (6) is consistent with claiming that for the fundamental kind of event which occurs when one is veridically perceiving, there is no echo in the case of the causally matching hallucination. But while the disjunctivist may be spared inconsistency in rejecting the assumption but embracing (6), the resulting position imposes quite severe constraints on what can be said about the nature of the kind of experiences which are common to hallucination and perception in these cases. Before reviewing that, the argument itself should be further elucidated and defended.

Premises (1) and (2) I take to flow from the general methodological concerns which render unappetising the rejection of the assumption of Experiential Naturalism. We have broad empirical grounds for supposing that altering the pattern of activity in an agent's visual cortex has consequences for what they can or cannot see. So there does seem to be a causal dependency of our visual perceptions on the activity of parts of the brain, even if we do not yet know the full pattern of this dependency. One may find questionable the metaphysical assumptions behind the idea of a complete causal condition for some state or event; but however suspect the notion is, it is unlikely that a rejection of it would provide suitable refuge for a defender of disjunctivism. Likewise, premiss (2) depends on the thought that neuroscientific methodology in general looks to local neurological causes in order to explain a given pattern of neurological activity. It may well not be excluded entirely *a priori* that there should be action at a distance within the neurological realm, but few neuroscientists with the hope of serious funding would pursue the hypothesis seriously. Hence a disjunctivist would be dialectically in a weak position, if their other commitments forced them to claim that action at a distance for neurological causes does in fact occur.¹⁴

However, one might still claim that the other aspect of (2), regarding what causal conditions produce, does not follow from our general empirical assumptions. The fact that visual perceptions depend causally on states of the visual cortex does not in itself show that the reproduction of those local causes in the absence of objects of perception would still produce experiences. Some sort of room is left open for a philosopher to claim that in the absence of conditions sufficient for perception, the causal preconditions of perception fail to produce any psychological effect at all. No one is yet in a position to falsify this hypothesis. So the argument for (6) is not demonstrative. Nonetheless, this would be a weak position for the disjunctivist to end up in: for it would commit them to determinate empirical consequences which they have insufficient evidence to predict.

Premiss (3) on the other hand looks like it is a purely metaphysical principle about the nature of causation, and not to be grounded solely in methodological concerns or broad empirical assumptions. This is a severe weakening of a causal principle employed by Howard Robinson when attacking disjunctivism, namely the doctrine of 'Same Cause, Same Effect'. On that view, where any situations involve the same proximate causal conditions then the very same kind of effects will occur. There are two modifications to this idea in premiss (3). First, 'Same Cause, Same Effect' is usually stated in a form which assumes causal determinism where causes are sufficient for their effects. So stated, one might think that one could escape the consequences of the principle by denying determinism – indeed, Robinson discusses the prospects of so doing. Yet is clear that in a world in which there are indeterministic causes, a form of 'Same Cause, Same Effect' can pose problems for a disjunctivist. After all, the Naïve realist thinks that there is a zero chance of a veridical perception occurring in a situation where there is no appropriate candidate to be the object of perception. If there are causal conditions for veridical perception, then they must give the occurrence of the event of perceiving a non-zero chance, hence the chances in the perceptual and hallucinatory circumstances must be different. Allowing for indeterministic causation alone won't provide space for such a consequence. We may as well, then, frame (3) in terms which allow for the causal connections to be chancy.

The more significant weakening, however, relates to the clause in (3) concerning non-causal constitutive conditions. In employing 'Same Cause, Same Effect' Robinson and Foster aim to show that disjunctivism is not consistent with our general thoughts about the nature of causation. They assume that effects must always be constrained by patterns of local causation, such that any difference in two effects must be reflected in a difference in their local causes. Given this, they plausibly argue that unless there is action at a distance, distal objects can play no essential role in the individuation of any psychological event. A parallel line of reasoning can be found in some discussions of singular thought and of externalism. Various authors have argued that where one can find no difference in the causal powers of two psychological states, no difference in their possible effects, then the two states ought to fall under all the same psychological kinds. Again no difference in distal conditions alone are allowed to make a difference in the nature of the psychological state itself.

If one is committed to this line of thought, then (3) reduces to an indeterministic version of 'Same Cause, Same Effect' since one is thereby committed to the view that no psychological effects have any interesting non-causal constitutive conditions attached. Of course, a disjunctivist who is also a Naïve realist will be ill inclined to accept 'Same Cause, Same Effect' when so formulated. On their conception of experience, when one is veridically perceiving the objects of perception are constituents of the experiential episode. The given event could not have occurred without these entities existing and being constituents of it; in turn, one could not have had such a kind of event without there being relevant candidate objects of perception to be apprehended. So, even if those objects are implicated in the causes of the experience, they also figure non-causally as essential constituents of it.

Indeed, setting the discussion within an indeterministic framework offers support to the idea that for the Naïve realist the object of perception must play a non-causal role in determining whether the experience is a perception or not, whatever causal role it has in addition. For when we think of objects or events as having causal powers, we conceive of them as having the capacity to raise the chance of an effect, and of inhibitors as lowering the chance that

would otherwise be there for the effect. In this way, causal influence is conceivable as coming in degrees. But the only sense in which we can account for the role for the object of perception as a constituent of the sensory episode is acting as a necessary condition on the occurrence of the perceptual event. Mere presence of a candidate object will not be sufficient for the perceiving of it, that is true, but its absence is sufficient for the non-occurrence of such an event. The connection here is not one of degrees of influence but that of a constitutive or essential condition of a kind of event.

So such theorists will be unimpressed by 'Same Cause, Same Effect' as pressed by Foster and Robinson, and they will seek to resist any ancillary reasoning designed to make one accept it. However, they do not have the same reason to reject premiss (3), since that allows for the possibility that there are such non-causal constitutive conditions for the occurrence of certain kinds of events. What (3) retains is one of the main motivations for 'Same Cause, Same Effect' and that is to suppose that where there is genuine causation, then there is a pattern of causes and effects which has an implicit generality. If a given causal condition has produced a certain kind of effect in one context, then there will be some general condition which differs between the two. It seems that to deny this would be either to claim that in the case of psycho-physical causation there need be no such determinacy of cause to effect, or to embrace in general a radical singularism about causation according to which the fact that particular causes were related to the effects that they had implied nothing at all about the general patterns of causation.¹⁵

Premiss (3) only has bite in this argument given premiss (4). If the disjunctivist can claim that there is a non-causal difference between the hallucinatory situation and the veridical perceptual situation with respect to the hallucinatory experience, then one will not be able to generalise back from what is true about this effect in the one situation to the other. As we noted above, they certainly do have reason to claim that there is such a non-causal condition in the case of veridical perception, for there is a candidate object of perception present which is absent in the hallucinatory situation. That would block the use of (3) to generalise from whatever is true of the veridical perception situation to what must be true of the

hallucinatory situation. In the context of this argument we need to know whether the converse move can be blocked as well.

Well, one might argue that given that the veridical perceptual experience could only occur were an object of perception present, then the absence of such an object is a necessary condition on the hallucinatory experience occurring, and hence is a non-causal condition on the occurrence of such a kind of event. Clearly, this condition isn't fulfilled when one perceives, and hence one could, consistently with (3), deny that what occurs when hallucinating occurs when perceiving. The problem with this response is that it relies on us conceiving of the psychological effects that the proximate causal conditions produce entirely in terms of their relation to other situations than the actual one: we specify the effect by saying it is not a perception. For of course it is true of any effect which is essentially not a perception that it requires the absence of conditions which are sufficient for perception. But one can surely demand that what is needed is a description of the effect produced relative just to the situation in which it is produced. In what sense can this simply be an effect which is not a perception? Surely there is some positive account of the kind of psychological effect it is. And it is for this that we need to ask whether any non-causal conditions must be met. Otherwise, one should have the suspicion that the non-causal conditions on the occurrence of a perception are somehow counting twice over: once in the situation where one does have a perception, and again in the situation where there is no perception and nothing at all to be perceived. Therefore I suggest that premiss (4) correctly reflects the thought that is expressed by saying that hallucinations are 'inner experiences'. We have the conception that the occurrence of such events imposes no additional condition on the world beyond the subject's putative state of awareness.¹⁶

But now with this conceded we end up with (5) and (6) and the question whether this result is really consistent with a disjunctive approach to perception. This takes us to the second step of the argument.

5. To deny that what is present in perception is present in hallucination is quite consistent with admitting that what is present in hallucination is also present in perception. Even if the disjunctivist

must grant that he or she is committed to (6), they have not yet been forced to endorse inconsistent assumptions. But is the position a coherent resting place? For there is a lingering worry that once one admits that the hallucinatory experience is common to the two situations, one undermines the motivations for disjunctivism in the first place by making the non-common element redundant to the explanation of the phenomenal aspects of experience.

There are two ways of spelling out the situation described in (6). One might claim that, when one perceives, two events occur: there is the genuinely perceptual experiential event, and this has no analogue in hallucination; then there is the purely experiential event, which also occurs when one is hallucinating. Given this model it is both true that something occurs only when one perceives, the genuinely perceptual experience, and something occurs which can also occur when one hallucinates, the purely experiential event. But is this a plausible model?

To answer this we need also to ask how we are to count experiences. If I hear a loud bang and see a bright flash there is a sense in which I have one experience, the experience of these two perceived events, a sense in which I have two experiences, a hearing and a seeing, and a sense in which I have three: the hearing, seeing and the event hearing-together-with-seeing. However we count these events, there is an intimate connection among them; perhaps some are constituents of others. What then of the relation between the supposed genuinely perceptual experiential event and the purely experiential event? If we ask of what happened in the subject's life such that they could reflect on and report it as such, then there seems to be just one thing to talk about. If one introspects a perfect hallucination of seeing a lavender bush, what seems to be available to introspection is just whatever would be available to introspection in actually seeing one. In the former case, all that one could introspect would be the one event, the purely experiential event. In the latter case, there are supposedly two events to introspect: the purely experiential event and the genuinely perceptual one. So, although there seems to be some questions to be settled anyway about the ways in which to count experiences, this proposal seems to double for us the number with which we answer that question.

If we say that in fact one can introspect both events in the perceptual case, then we need to explain why it should seem as if one cannot selectively attend to the one experience as opposed to the other. If we respond to this problem by suggesting that one can only introspect the genuinely perceptual event when perceiving, then one needs to explain why the purely experiential event, which is otherwise introspectible, should be screened out by the genuinely perceptual one. If we respond instead by saying that it is only the purely experiential event which one can introspect in both cases, then we lose the sense that the genuinely perceptual event is the experience one has when perceiving, that is a part of one's conscious life. If it is extruded from that, then the disjunctivist's position begins to look like nothing more than a linguistic variant on some Common Kind view: there is an introspectible element in perceiving which can be present in perception and hallucination; and there is a non-introspectible element which is only present when one is perceiving in virtue of which one counts as perceiving.

But this is not the only way in which one can accommodate (6). As we initially set the problem up we saw a need to talk not only of particular events but also the kinds of events that occur. Clearly events can be of more than one kind just as they can satisfy more than one description. In some sense no one denies that the one event, the perception, is of a kind which the other, the hallucination, is not. What is distinctive of the rejection of the Common Kind Assumption is the thought that the most fundamental kind that the perceptual event is of, the kind in virtue of which the event has the nature that it does, is one which couldn't be instanced in the case of hallucination. So we can accommodate (6) while rejecting the Common Kind Assumption by claiming that while the perceptual event is of a fundamental kind which could not occur when hallucinating, nonetheless this very same event is also of some other psychological kind or kinds which a causally matching hallucinatory event (i.e. one brought about by the same proximate causal conditions) belongs to.

Now this proposal faces at least the following formal difficulty. Presumably the hallucinatory event is fundamentally of some psychological kind. Whatever kind that is, the perceptual event is also of that kind. However, the perceptual event is not fundamentally of that kind, since we know that fundamentally it is of some kind

which does not occur when hallucinating. So the disjunctivist will need to explain how it can be that one thing can be fundamentally *F*, something else can be *F* and yet not be fundamentally *F*. This is an issue to which we shall return below.

More pressing yet, the objector may question whether the disjunctivist has not still made the kind of episode which is unique to the perceptual situation redundant in an account of consciousness and the mind. In formulating the acceptance of (6) in terms of kinds of events rather than in terms of the number of unrepeatably occurrences, the worry about the absence of a detectable difference between one event and two can now simply be reformulated in terms of a worry about the explanatory role of properties: two properties being present in one case, one property being present in the other.

First, a concern is that hallucinations and veridical perceptions will have in common certain phenomena that we associate with experience. Notably, hallucinations no less than perceptions are liable to coerce our beliefs and move to us action, and from a subject's perspective the situation will seem to be one in which they are doing the right thing by judging that that is a lavender bush when hallucinating one, if they have no ancillary information that reveals this not to be a case of perception. Likewise, as we have stressed throughout, reflection on experience or introspection of it is liable to lead to much the same judgements about how things are with the subject: that it looks to him or her as if there is a lavender bush there.

Some of these phenomena we may see as causal (and possibly rational) consequences of experience: given the nature of experience, a rational agent would come to make those judgements or act in this way. Other aspects we might think are partly constituted by so having an experience: what it is for things to seem one way to a subject rather than another is for them to be in such an experiential state. In the case of hallucination, to the extent that these phenomena do have any explanation, that explanation will derive from appeal to the kind of experience the subject is then having. And now, the objector will point out, given (6) above, we must concede that the very same kind of experience occurs when one is veridically perceiving. The phenomena which are in common between the hallucination and the perception are accompanied by a common kind of occurrence in both situations. So, the objector suggests,

those phenomena will have a common explanation in the two situations, namely the occurrence of a kind of experience common to both perception and hallucination and the kind of event which is unique to perceptual situations will be explanatorily redundant.¹⁷

Consider a parallel case. Suppose one has a machine for sorting pieces of coloured cloth. The input to the machine is a jumble of pieces of cloth which are either scarlet or some non-red shade of colour. All of the scarlet pieces are sorted by the machine into its left hopper, while all of the other pieces go into the right one. One might hypothesise that the machine works by discriminating scarlet samples from other shades, so the presence of a sample in the left hopper is explained by its being scarlet. However, now consider another machine of exactly the same model presented with a jumble of cloth samples some of which are red, not all scarlet, and some various shades of non-red colours. This machine sorts all of the red samples, whether scarlet or not into its left hopper and the other samples into its right hopper. Now the more plausible hypothesis is that both machines sort samples into their left hoppers because the samples are red. In the original situation I described, it is still right to say that the samples in the left hopper are there because they are scarlet. After all, being scarlet is a way of being red, so mentioning this shade of the samples does give some explanatory information. Nonetheless, it seems wrong to say that the samples are in the hopper because they are scarlet rather than because they are red. Being red is more highly correlated with being sorted into the left hopper than being scarlet. So the property of being red here seems to screen off the property of being scarlet from having an explanatory role.¹⁸

The objector's worry about perception and hallucination echoes these intuitions. We have the same resultant phenomena in introspectively matching cases of perception and hallucination, and we know from the conclusion (6) that where we have causally matching situations we have the same kinds of event in hallucination and in perception. So the common kind of event between hallucination and perception seems better correlated with these common phenomena than the kind of event unique to perception and so seems to screen off the purely perceptual kind of event from giving us an explanation.¹⁹

This concludes the second step in the argument. The disjunctivist is in a weak position to reject (6), even if the argument for it is not demonstrative. (6) as it stands is not inconsistent with the letter of disjunctivism, the rejection of the Common Kind Assumption, but this does not remove the worry that there is no way of accepting (6) while still insisting that there is a distinctive role for only veridical perceptual experiences to play. The disjunctivist cannot remain simply with the claim about the concept of sensory experience in general, therefore, but must address the problem that this subset of cases presents us with. It must find some account of hallucinatory experiences in cases of proximate causal matching with veridical perception which does not lead to the screening off of veridical perception. How are we to proceed?

6. One response to the challenge questions the commonality of phenomena among perception and hallucination. Just as one may be a disjunctivist about experience, so too one may be disjunctivist about the consequences of perception. There are at least two ways in which one might develop this. The first is to claim that some of the psychological consequences associated with perception cannot occur if one is hallucinating. For example, if one endorses an object-dependent conception of singular thought, then perceptual demonstrative judgements will not be available for a subject to make when suffering an hallucination.²⁰ Veridical perceptions may give rise to judgements such as that that is an orange, but no perfectly matching hallucination could do the same. One may extend this by suggesting that some of our intentions in action may be object-dependent too. Perhaps a subject moved to pick up a visible object intends that they should grasp that thing over there. But then no such intention could be present in a case of hallucination. If actions are individuated not by gross physical movements but by the intentions with which they are immediately performed, no action will be in common between a veridical perceptual situation and an hallucination either.

This mode of response seeks to find something implicitly relational among the phenomena consequent on perception – where acts of thinking are object-dependent, a subject can engage in such acts only given the truth of certain relational facts, that appropriate

objects exist and stand in a relevant relation to the subject to be thought about or acted on. A more direct response here would be to appeal explicitly to relational facts which perceptions can explain in a way that hallucinations can not. Why was John able to pick up the glass that was on the table? Because he could see it, and could see where it was. Both Christopher Peacocke and Timothy Williamson have insisted that the explanatory potential of such a relational explanans cannot necessarily be matched by a conjunction of a non-relational psychological fact and some non-psychological relational facts in addition.²¹ So the kind of relational facts which obtain when one is genuinely perceiving and not merely hallucinating (even veridically) may have an explanatory potential for relational facts which then obtain because of one's actions which could not be matched by the experiential properties common to perception and hallucination.

With these two responses one can at least rebut the challenge that the disjunctivist's conception of sensory experience is guaranteed to be explanatorily redundant. But they are not sufficient to lay the worries raised here to rest. For the responses block the conclusion through finding some implicitly or explicitly relational facts which are not in common between the two situations. This strategy does not address the question whether there are any common properties to the two situations which are distinctive of the subject's conscious perspective on the world. Nor yet the question whether, if there are any, why they can only be explained by what is common to perception and hallucination rather than what is distinctive of perception.

It would be a severe limitation on the disjunctivist's commitment to Naïve Realism, if the Naïve realist aspects of perception could not themselves shape the contours of the subject's conscious experience. Yet this aim would be frustrated if we rested with the above responses, since so far no reason has been offered to show why we must think of the fabric of consciousness as relational, and as not common to perception and hallucination. If we are to settle the concerns here, we need to make clear what can be, and what need not be, in common among matching perceptions and hallucinations. Here the notion of sense experience in general, that of being indiscriminable from veridical perception, plays a central role. It

provides an answer to this question, and in turn, as we shall see below, an answer to the problem we face about (6).

For, the concept of perceptual experience in general is that of situations indiscriminable from veridical perception and this imposes quite severe constraints on what properties an hallucinatory experience must possess, and what properties it must lack. In this way, the general condition of indiscriminability offers a guide to what properties we should expect perception and hallucination to share.

If the condition of indiscriminability is to be met, then a situation of experience must not lack any property necessary for veridical perception the absence of which is recognisable simply through reflection. Likewise no such situation may possess any property incompatible with veridical perception whose presence is recognisable through reflection. If the former condition were not met, the claim of not knowable difference from perception could not be met: a subject might recognise the absence of the property in question when possessing the background knowledge that the property in question is a necessary condition of veridical perception; such a subject could thereby know on the basis of reflection that this was not a case of veridical perception. In the second case, the recognisable presence of a property incompatible with perception would likewise stand witness to the fact that this situation is in fact discriminable from veridical perception.

It was claimed above that introspection of veridical perception provides evidence in favour of Naïve Realism. That is to say, when one introspects one's veridical perceptions one recognises that this is a situation in which some mind-independent object is present and is a constituent of the experiential episode. Not all matching perceptual experiences will possess this property. A case of hallucination brought about through suitable stimulation of the brain will either lack an object altogether or present a merely mind-dependent one. Given the conditions outlined above, the lack of this property is not recognisable in such a case of experience. This constraint might be met in either of two ways. First, one might claim that in the case of veridical perception, the presence of this property is not really recognisable, that one cannot, after all, introspect that mind-independent objects are constituents of the experiential situation. Taking this route would be to deny that there are after all any intro-

spective grounds for endorsing Naïve Realism. But this conclusion is not forced on us by the constraint in question. For the second route is simply to accept that although the hallucinatory situation lacks the property in question, one cannot know that the property is absent simply by reflection on this situation and hence that it at least *seems* to be present.

Note that we must take care in interpreting the use of ‘seems’ here. It is common for philosophers to remark that seems talk can be used in different ways, sometimes to introduce talk of sensory states or events and sometimes simply to indicate a subject’s evidential position or inclinations to believe.²² Certainly the former would be inappropriate here. The point of the claim is not that when the subject has the hallucination, they are in some sensory state of the seeming presence of a lavender bush. Though this would be true, it would not be an illuminating point to make. Rather, the aim is to explain the sense in which an hallucinatory state may match a perceptual state. In order for the claim to play this role, we need to understand ‘seems’ in a purely epistemological sense: to say that it seems to the subject as if this is a situation in which a lavender bush is a constituent of the experiential situation is just to say that the subject would be unable to tell this situation apart from one in which the subject would correctly recognise the presence of such a constituent. Whether this epistemological reading is sufficient to the task at hand is an issue to which we shall return.

Going in the reverse direction, we can determine of some particular matching hallucination that even if it possesses some distinctive feature not present in any veridical perception, one will not be able to recognise this feature of it just through introspection. Suppose, then, that an hallucination of a lavender bush may be realised in a situation where a subject is presented with a mind-dependent array of coloured patches, impressionistically resembling the light and form presented on a North London street. If this is to be a genuinely matching experience, reflection on and introspection of the scene presented cannot reveal its status as a mind-dependent array.

So in general we can claim the following: if any property of a veridical perception is introspectible – i.e. is recognisably present in perception through reflection – then such a property will either be present in all matching experiences, or will at least seem to be

present, i.e. will not be knowably absent. Likewise, no property of a matching experience which is not a perception will be recognisable as such through introspection. So the common properties of perception and all matching experiences, including hallucinations, will just be either introspectible properties which are shared, or properties which all the experiences seem to have (i.e. cannot be known to lack through introspection).

Correspondingly, we can determine which consequences of experiences will be co-present in cases of perception and matching hallucination through similar considerations. For example, if veridical perception gives rise to rational judgement about the environment, then an hallucinating subject will be equally inclined to judgement as a perceiving one. A propensity to make a judgement is one, one can normally detect through reflection on the situation. If an agent had no propensity to judge that a lavender bush is present when having the hallucination of one, then the absence of inclination here would be a detectable difference from the case of veridical perception and hence a ground for discriminating the two situations. In this way, we can say in the basic case it is not merely that an agent does not know that they are not perceiving when hallucinating, where this indicates something consistent with agnosticism on the matter. If an agent in the case of veridical perception can judge that there is a bush there, or that they are seeing a bush, then in a case of perfect hallucination they cannot be left with no inclination one way or the other to judge the presence of bushes or the sighting of bushes. Rather they must equally be inclined to judge that there is a bush there and that they see one. In this case then, positively it must seem to them as if a bush is there and the sighting of a bush is occurring. The matching of the rational consequences of perception and hallucination will thereby carry over to action and behaviour more generally.

Despite the minimal constraint that indiscriminability imposes on the match between perception and hallucination, it provides all we need to answer our question about the properties shared between perception and hallucination. Given an initial assumption that perception has certain detectible consequences, indiscriminability requires that either hallucinations possess the very same properties or at least that they have the property of seeming to reflection to have

those properties. Likewise, whatever properties an hallucination actually possesses, we must suppose them undetectable unless some veridical perception can also possess them or seem to possess them. These two consequences together tell us what we can assume are in common between perceptions and hallucinations in general.

7. With the answer to this question, we are just a step away from solving our problem. For we can also see that the fact that a perfectly matching hallucination is indiscriminable from a veridical perception is a fact potentially explanatory of several of the features of a situation. Why did James shriek like that? He was in a situation indiscriminable from the veridical perception of a spider. Given James's fear of spiders, when confronted with one he is liable so to react; and with no detectable difference between this situation and such a perception, it must seem to him as if a spider is there, so he reacts in the same way.

Is being indiscriminable from veridical perception really explanatory in this way? I argued above that being indiscriminable from veridical perception is the most inclusive conception we have of what sensory experience is. At best an intentional account or sense-datum view offers us an account of some sufficient condition for so experiencing, but there is no reason as yet to think any such account exhaustive of our conception. On an immodest conception of sensory experience, it comes as no surprise that an hallucination should have many of the same consequences as a veridical perception, and a common explanation will be sought in terms of the defining characteristics of such experience, $E_1 \dots E_n$, that both the perception and the hallucination are alleged to share. So for such a theorist, the idea that the property of being indiscriminable from a veridical perception should have an explanatory role would seem implausible – surely such a property would be screened off from being explanatorily useful since $E_1 \dots E_n$ will be present in both cases and adequate to the task. Once we recognise, however, that there is no reason to suppose that all hallucinations need have $E_1 \dots E_n$, we can see that even if in some cases the presence of $E_1 \dots E_n$ may explain the consequences of a sensory experience, we have no reason to think that that could be the only such explanation. There may be situations which possess characteristics $E'_1 \dots$

E'_n quite distinct from $E_1 \dots E_n$ yet equally indiscriminable from the veridical perception of a tree. We might then think of each of these sets of properties as ways of realising the property of being indiscriminable from a veridical perception. And then in that case, while each has some claim to explanatory potential, nonetheless an appeal to the determinable property of being indiscriminable from veridical perception may nonetheless be more explanatory precisely because it is present in a wider range of cases. Witness again our example of the sorting machine – an object is red through being scarlet or crimson or some other such shade. Nonetheless a swatch of cloth being red may be more explanatory of the machine's behaviour than the swatch being scarlet.

Nonetheless, the thought that the property of being indiscriminable from a seeing of a tree can have an explanatory role and have such in virtue of its relation to the property of seeing a tree generates a surprising conclusion in the light of our problem to do with screening off. Recall that any veridical perception of a tree is indiscriminable from itself, so the property of being indiscriminable from a veridical perception of a tree will be common to a case of veridical perception of a tree and a perfectly matching hallucination of the same. The indiscriminability property is, therefore, a common property across the situations with the potential to explain common consequences, while the property of being a veridical perception is unique to the one case. If we should just apply the principle of screening off universally without restriction, then we should conclude that being indiscriminable from a veridical perception of a tree screens off the property of being a veridical perception of a tree. But if that is so, then the property of being a veridical perception of a tree never has an explanatory role, since it is never instantiated without the property of being indiscriminable from such a perception being instantiated as well. But if the property of being a veridical perception lacks any explanatory role, then we can no longer show that being indiscriminable from a veridical perception has the explanatory properties which would screen off the property of being a veridical perception.

This puzzling consequence suggests either that we were wrong to assume that veridical perceptions do have a distinctive explanatory role, or that there must be some limitation to the intuitive prin-

ciple about cases of screening off. Surely the former option is not palatable: nothing about the structure of the case really exploits features special to the case of perception. For any property we like that has effects partly in virtue of being recognised to be what it is, we can consider the parallel property of being indiscriminable from that property and our above line of reasoning will go through. It is overwhelmingly more plausible to suppose that there are limitations to the range of application of the principle of screening off.

In fact, in relation to cases of causation, it is commonly noted that such tests provide the wrong result for what caused what when we have cases of pre-emption. If my bullet pierces the victim's heart before yours, then the victim is killed by me, even if in a parallel case without my bullet but still with yours, the victim would still have died. The fact that your bullet is present in both cases where the same effect occurs does not show that it must be the cause in both. Our present example indicates that there are parallel cases to pre-emption in the case of explanation. Moreover, one might tentatively suggest here why the limitation needs to be imposed on the test for screening off. In our present example, what seems key is the thought that the explanatory properties of the common property are derivable *a priori* from the special property. We can tell that the common property must be correlated with the outcome just from knowing what the special property can otherwise explain. Hence, there is a reason to think that the property of being indiscriminable from an *F* has an explanatory potential which is dependent on the explanatory potential of being an *F*. The same was not so in the case of scarlet and red, for while red has an explanatory potential deriving just from being the determinable of scarlet, its explanatory potential is not exhausted by that. So we may conclude that, as with cases of pre-emption, cases of inherited or dependent explanatory potential offer us exceptions to the general model of common properties screening off special ones.

8. Over the last few pages we have been pursuing the question whether one can coherently reject the Common Kind Assumption yet accept (6), the conclusion of the causal argument. The discussion of the last few pages should bring out quite how hard it is for the disjunctivist to maintain this position. For, suppose we accept that

causally matching hallucinations, those with the same proximate causes as veridical perceptions, have some positive characterisation in terms favoured by immodest approaches, then the disjunctivist will be forced to grant that they do not have a coherent position. For example, if we assume that the causally matching hallucination is an event which represents the presence of a tree – that is, its having such representational properties are taken to explain why the experience is as it is and has the consequences that it does – then the explanation we can give of the salient features of the hallucination, and of how it brings about its effects, should equally be applicable to the case of veridical perception. After all, the explanatory potential of such properties is surely independent of whether the veridical perception of a tree independently could provide an explanation of these phenomena. On this assumption, the problem of explanatory screening off would certainly be pressing, and so granting that the perception and the hallucination possess these representational properties would imply that the Naïve realist aspects of the perception are explanatorily idle. The same conclusion should be drawn if we account for the causally matching hallucination in terms of being the presentation of some mind-dependent array of colour patches. So while the disjunctivist can be agnostic about the nature of many hallucinations – they may be representational or subjective as long as they meet the condition of indiscriminability – when it comes to causally matching experiences, they are forced to reject any such positive characterisation.

At the same time, we have seen a range of properties which causally matching hallucinations can share with veridical perceptions without threatening the explanatory role of being a veridical perception: namely properties of being indiscriminable from the veridical perception. So this suggests that the disjunctivist can coherently hold on to the denial of the Common Kind Assumption and the truth of (6) by insisting that for just such experiences: i.e. causally matching hallucinations, the only mental properties that such events possess are those of being indiscriminable from veridical perceptions and any properties which follow from their being so indiscriminable. For these events alone, there is nothing more to characterise them than what can be said about the concept of perceptual experience in general.

But what does this restriction amount to? At the very least, it leads us to deny Dancy's assumption when he writes, 'there may be available a more direct characterization of the second disjunct'. On the account proposed here, the disjunctivist is committed to saying that, at least when it comes to a mental characterisation of the hallucinatory experience, nothing more can be said than the relational and epistemological claim that it is indiscriminable from the perception. There is a sense, then, in which the disjunctivist insists that there is only a negative characterisation of causally matching hallucinatory experience: it is nothing but a situation which could not be told apart from veridical perception. This fact links with the formal concern mentioned at the start of our discussion of (6): how could it be that the veridical perception is fundamentally of one kind and yet also of some other kind which it shares with the hallucination, where the hallucination must fundamentally be of that kind. Clearly for a veridical perception, being a veridical perception of a tree is a better candidate for being its fundamental or essential kind than being indiscriminable from being such a veridical perception. When we turn to the case of the hallucinatory experience, there are no other candidates for the kind of mental event it is – at least according to the disjunctivist – other than its being indiscriminable from the veridical perception; *faute de mieux* this is then the fundamental mental character of the event.

The essentially negative and relational characterisation here bears also on a criticism Timothy Williamson has made of disjunctive theories of mental states.²³ Focusing on McDowell's account of knowledge, Williamson raises the question whether resistance to traditional analyses of knowledge as 'justified true belief *plus*' should frame itself as a form of disjunctivism. In the case of knowledge, the disjunctivist would seem to be forced to analyse belief in terms of a disjunction of either knowledge or some other state, 'mere opinion', as we might say. Williamson presses the disjunctivist to give an account of the other state, mere opinion, in a manner which will hold only of non-knowledge cases and not equally apply to the case of knowledge itself. The conclusion he reaches is that there is no good candidate for this: and that we should allow that the situation of knowledge and the contrast cases both satisfy conditions for the common presence of belief: the concept of belief is autonomous

and not reducible to the idea of knowledge or failed knowledge. As a result, Williamson suggests that the heart of resistance should be a form of non-conjunctivism: even if belief is an independent notion always present with knowledge and non-knowledge, knowledge is not to be analysed as belief *plus* something else.

I don't want to comment here on the success of Williamson's discussion of knowledge but rather to emphasise the difference of situation in relation to perception and sensory appearances, at least according to the position we have been concerned with here. As we have seen, Williamson is right that the notion of sensory experience that we end up with is one we are happy to say is equally present in cases of veridical perception and hallucination. When we specify cases of hallucination we do not do so therefore in terms of something which is only present in cases of hallucination – the presence of a mere or inner experience which couldn't occur in a case of genuine veridical perception. While some hallucinations might have a nature incompatible with being a veridical perception – hallucinations for which a sense-datum or intentional account were directly appropriate – we have seen that there are some hallucinations whose nature would have to be consistent with that kind of event occurring when one perceives veridically as well. So the label 'disjunctivism' would be misleading if it had to indicate that what occurs in the two kinds of case is necessarily incompatible. At the same time, though, there is still something appropriate about expressing the view in disjunctive form. For all that can be said about the hallucination at a mental level is by contrast with the case of veridical perception, and that is just to indicate how the event is not as the veridical perception is. The notion common to perception and hallucination, that of sensory experience, lacks explanatory autonomy from that of veridical perception. And isn't that just what we express by saying that either this is a case of veridical perception, in which case certain consequences follow, or it is merely one of being indiscriminable from such a perception, in virtue of which certain other consequences follow?

Still, this leaves us with a striking consequence of disjunctivism: there are certain mental events, at least those hallucinations brought about through causal conditions matching those of veridical perceptions, whose only positive mental characteristics are negative

epistemological ones – that they cannot be told apart by the subject from veridical perception. I'll return briefly below to what one might identify as the core of resistance here, but in concluding I want finally to spell out just a few of the key features of indiscriminability that as we have seen, need to be relied on heavily by a disjunctive account.

9. It is a nice question how exactly the disjunctivist should articulate the way in which indiscriminability is employed in the positive account of the notion of perceptual experience in general. First, there seem to be some obvious counter-examples to the claim that indiscriminability provides sufficient conditions for an event's being a sensory experience. Second, there are some problem cases generated by the seeming non-transitivity of apparent sensory indiscriminability. Finally, endorsing indiscriminability as a criterion of sameness across sensory experiences itself imposes certain restrictions on how things can seem to one to be when one suffers an hallucinatory experience.

Suppose John is inclined to inattention, or hastiness in judgement. When presented with an elm he is liable to treat the situation as one of being presented with a beech. When presented with a sample of scarlet he treats indifferently with being presented with a sample of vermillion. It is not inappropriate for us to describe John's situation by saying that he can't discriminate a beech from an elm, nor scarlet from vermillion. But saying that for John there is no discriminable difference between these things is surely not to say that he experiences them all the same. So here indiscriminability would seem to be insufficient for sameness of experience.

The point seems more acute when we consider animals other than humans. To discriminate two things is to judge them non-identical. If one is to judge two experiences as of different kinds, one needs a concept of experience with which to make this judgement. We are inclined to ascribe to many creatures sentience where we withhold the attribution of sufficient sapience for self-consciousness. In that case, these creatures lack concepts of experience, as with other mental states. They cannot therefore judge that one experience is of the same or of different kind from any other experience. Does this not mean that all of their experiences are indiscriminable from each

other for them, since they cannot judge them to be distinct? In turn, does that then have the consequence according to the disjunctivist that all of their experiences are the same?²⁴

In response, we need to note an importance difference between ascribing capacities or incapacities to a particular individual, or group of individuals, and more impersonal ascriptions of such capacities or incapacities which are not relativised to individuals at all. For example, contrast the claim that the fretwork on the screen is invisible to Mary with the claim that the fretwork is invisible *simpliciter*. The former claim implicates to the audience that Mary's sight is in some way deficient – perhaps she is short sighted, or perhaps her sight is not good in low lighting. Quite consistently with this claim, one may insist that the fretwork is perfectly visible, that it is visible to John, Alan or the normally sighted viewer. In contrast to talk of something's being visible or invisible *per se* without relativising to a viewer indicates that it cannot be seen by normally sighted people, and in certain contexts the claim may indicate that it couldn't even be seen by a creature with abnormally acute vision.

In general, where we ascribe an incapacity to someone, we indicate not only that they have failed to do something, but also that there is some ground in virtue of which they so fail. When we think of an individual's incapacity in relation to the specific ground for his or her incapacity – a ground which explains not only why they do not do *F*, but would not even do *F* in similar circumstances – we can still recognise that this impossibility or incapacity is quite consistent with the possibility that others do do *F* or at least could do it. On the other hand, when we talk of an incapacity or inability without indicating a subject lacking the capacity or incapacity, then we need not think in terms of a ground relative to an agent in virtue of which the act cannot be carried out. To say that something is invisible is not to indicate some specific lack in certain viewers, but rather to indicate something about it, that it cannot be seen. In parallel, when we talk of two things being indiscriminable, we need not mean that there is something about a given agent in virtue of which they cannot be told apart, but simply that it is not possible to know that they are distinct.

When the disjunctivist appeals to the idea of two things being indiscriminable through reflection in explicating the concept of

sensory experience, it is this impersonal form of an incapacity or inability ascription that must be intended. What is being claimed is that, *ex hypothesi*, in a circumstance of perfect hallucination, matters are such that it is just not possible to know through reflection alone that this is not a situation of veridically perceiving some scene. So, it is entirely consistent with this appeal to indiscriminability to grant that two experiences might be indiscriminable through reflection for some particular agent, John, without the two experiences thereby being of the same kind. For John may be unable to know the difference between them due to some specific incapacity on his part – the excess of alcohol or lack of interest in the matter – which would not generalise to other individuals. In contrast, the disjunctivist explains sameness of experience by appealing to the unrelativised or impersonal sense of incapacity. That we can conceive of situations in which two experiences are different but not such as to be noticed by a given individual, does not show that we have access to the idea of experiences which are genuinely different but not noticeably so impersonally.

Likewise, when we turn to the experiences of sentient but unself-conscious creatures, to the extent that we do have a positive grip on the kinds of experience that they can have, and which can differ one from the other, we also have a grip on how such experience would be discriminable through reflection or not. As self-conscious creatures, we cannot help but classify experiences as they would be available to reflection as the same or different. So that a dog might fail to discriminate one experience from another, making no judgement about them as identical or distinct at all, that is not to say that we cannot judge, in ascribing them such experience, that there is an event which would or would not be judgeably different from another experience.

A different kind of challenge to the sufficiency of indiscriminability for identity of kind of experience comes from the alleged non-transitivity of indiscriminability for some observable properties. Certainly, given observers on particular occasions may fail to detect the difference in shade between sample *A* and sample *B*, and also fail to detect the difference between sample *B* and sample *C*, and yet be able to detect the difference between sample *A* and sample *C*. If this leads us to the conclusion that experiences

of *A* are indiscriminable from experiences of *B*, and experiences of *B* are indiscriminable from experiences of *C*, then we face a problem supposing that there are kinds of event which are sensory experiences of colour shades on the disjunctivist proposal. The indiscriminability of experience of *A* and experience of *B* would require us to suppose that these are just the same kind of experience; likewise for the experience of *B* and of *C*. By transitivity of identity, this requires that the kind of experience one has of *A* is of the same kind as the experience one has of *C*, but this contradicts the observation that the experience of *C* is discriminable from the experience of *A* since kinds of experience are discriminable only where distinct.

There are broadly two responses the disjunctivist can make here. On the one hand, they can point out that the contradiction derives from assuming that we can indeed talk about kinds of perceptual experience as I have throughout this paper, indifferently among perceptions, illusions and hallucinations. But the examples of distinct but indiscriminable shades could be taken to show that since our notion of perceptual experience is just grounded in the unknowability of distinctness of perception and hallucination there is no well-founded notion of kind of perceptual experience. All the facts about experiences in general are to be stated just in terms of whether a subject could know the distinctness of these experiences through reflection on their circumstance. This pattern of facts is just not well enough behaved to ground the existence of kinds.

On the other hand, despite the appeal of apparent examples of indiscriminable but distinct shades, one can seek to resist the argument and hold on to the idea of perceptual experience as forming kinds. One might follow Graff's suggestion that there is simply no good reason to believe in the existence of phenomenal continua and hence insist that if two samples really do look alike then they share a look.²⁵ Even if a subject may on occasion fail to notice the difference in look between adjacent samples, and indeed may be bound to fail to notice such a difference, nonetheless there is a difference to be noticed and which could be noticed. Alternatively, one may follow Williamson's suggestion that while in a given context a subject may fail to discriminate two samples, this does not show that there is no context in which the samples are discriminable and hence one can

hold on to the claim that distinct samples are discriminable in at least some context.²⁶ By suitable application of the idea of impersonal indiscriminability, we can then insist that the experiences of *A* and of *B* are in fact discriminable, even if in the given context a subject fails to discriminate *A* from *B* and consequently fails to discriminate the experience of *A* from the experience of *B*.

In fact, the disjunctivist will need to avail themselves of the latter response in any event to deal with sensory margins for error where the dimensions of variation do not even appear to generate a continuum. If I can tell by looking that there are fifty people in the room, give or take five, then I can't discriminate just by looking fifty people from forty-five or from fifty-five, yet I can discriminate forty-five from fifty-five. If we gloss this by saying that the experience of forty-five people is indiscriminable from the experience of fifty people, and appeal to indiscriminability through reflection as the criterion of sameness of experience we end up with the same inconsistency as above – the experience of fifty-five will both be identical and not identical with the experience of forty-five. Here, the disjunctivist will need to emphasise the difference between the scene actually present on a given occasion, which may contain fifty people, from the kind of veridical experience this gives rise to. For if there are limited powers of visual discrimination here, then we need to recognise that the very same type of situation can give rise to different kinds of experience – a presentation of fifty people may give rise to the same kind of experience as a presentation of forty-five people, but it may also give rise to the same kind of experience as a presentation of fifty-five people. The perception of forty-five people never gives rise veridically to the same kind of experience as the veridical perception of fifty-five people, and these two distinct kinds of experience are discriminable, as indeed they are when occasioned by seeing forty-five people and then fifty-five people. But since someone who is seeing fifty people may have either one of these experiences, it need not be that in all circumstances an experience of the kind one has when viewing forty-five people will always be noted as different by one from one in which one views fifty-five people. For example, on repeated presentation of fifty people, it may be that one has the one kind of experience and then the other without

being able to tell that there is any seeming difference in the number of people present to one.

We should note one more consequence of taking indiscriminability as the criterion of sameness: the importance of the contrast between perceptions as individual events of particular situations, and perceptions as kinds of event, experiences which the individual perceptions fall under. For a given perception of a scene, it makes perfect sense to suppose that that very experience, i.e. the individual event, is a presentation of some particular individual object or some particular unrepeatable event. If we are to ask about the kind of experience it is, where we include by this the experience that one could have were one hallucinating, then we appeal to the indiscriminability of one experience from another. But now identical twins can be perceptually indiscriminable, so presumably the experiences of them will be reflectively indiscriminable. By this criterion, such perceptions give rise to the same kind of experience. Hence as a kind of experience, the particular objects or events drop out of the individuation of the experience.

Now this conclusion may seem puzzling. For we can certainly make sense of the idea of suffering an hallucination of the presence of Winston Churchill in the room. So it might look as if the disjunctivist is forced to press a surprising and substantive claim about what one can or cannot have an hallucinatory experience of. However, what I think this really brings out is that we can contrast two ways in which a given individual or event can feature in relation to our experience of the world. In one way, a particular object can be a part of one's experience of the world just in virtue of being the thing that one is currently aware of as presenting the particular visible appearance one attends to. One need have in this case no recognitional capacity for just that individual in order to be able to experience just them. But we do also have recognitional capacities and we certainly talk as if our recognitional capacities reflect sameness and difference in how we experience the world. A given individual can look to me to be Winston Churchill, as long as I am both acquainted with Churchill (perhaps only through descriptions, photographs or other representations) and have an appropriate sensitivity to ways in which Winston Churchill can look. Now this latter way in which Winston Churchill can enter my experience is certainly something

independent of the actual presence of Churchill: on some occasion I may see someone appropriately dressed such that in seeing them it looks to me as if Churchill is in the room. So, if I have such a capacity targeted on Churchill, it may yet be true that when I hallucinate, the experience I have is as of Churchill in that it brings to bear this recognitional capacity.

Now note, that in a case in which one really sees someone who one sees as Churchill, i.e. one sees an individual and experiences them as recognisably being Churchill, there are two dimensions to talk about the appropriateness of the experience. Is this really a case of looking like Churchill (or has one mistaken an appearance, say of De Gaulle for Churchill in haste)? And, is the person who looks this way really Churchill, or someone who just looks the way Churchill looks? The import of the disjunctivist view of hallucination is just this common sense thought. When we consider a case of hallucinating Churchill, although the first question can still be raised, is this really a case of something's having the look of Churchill, the second question cannot be raised at all. There is no distinction to be drawn between really hallucinating Churchill to be a certain way and hallucinating an individual with Churchill's look. And that there should be no answer to this latter question is hardly contrary to our common thoughts about perception and hallucination.

In closing this section, I need to mention a couple of limitations in our discussion which need to be removed before we have a complete account of the matter.²⁷ Throughout I have written as if we are concerned solely with cases of perfect hallucination in which the scene hallucinated matches a situation of veridically perceiving some scene for what it is. Now a first concern with this is that we may question whether every conceivable hallucination has a corresponding veridical perception for it to match. Consider an hallucination of an Escher-like scene with an impossible staircase, for example; or the non-perception of Mark Johnston's example of supersaturated red. How does the account so far offered deal with these? We need first to highlight another limitation. Few, if any hallucinations, are perfect hallucinations: rather a subject may perceive some aspects of a scene and hallucinate or misperceive other aspects. So how is the account to be extended to these cases? One move would be to discuss not experiences *per se* but rather the

various aspects of an experience, the different entities which one can experience and the ways in which they can appear to one. On a given occasion, seeing a lavender bush may involve the occurrence of a state of awareness whose specific character involves the awareness of various of the leaves and branches of the bush, the steely light of a London sky, the intricate patterns of dirt that line a city street. But there are other ways to see a lavender bush, and such seeings need have nothing particular in common with this viewing, other than they are all the perceptions of a lavender bush. To generalise the account, we would need to fix on the various aspects of a state of perceptual awareness, the ways in which it may be the same or different from other such states of awareness. Focusing just on cases of veridical perception, we can say that these aspects will all involve the presentation of that entity as it is. In turn, a sensory experience of that sort is the occurrence of a situation which is indiscriminable in this particular respect from a perception of the element in question.

The beginning of an approach to partial hallucinations is then to explain those aspects of the experience which are not perceptual in terms of that aspect of experience's indiscriminability from the corresponding aspect of a perceptual awareness of that element. In turn, one may seek to explain certain impossible experiences not by direct appeal to the idea of a veridical perception of that scene, but rather by explaining how an experience with each of the constituent elements is indiscriminable in that respect from a perception of that element. More needs to be said here – not least to accommodate aspects of the phenomenal character of experience which arise from global properties of a scene, the combination of elements, rather than just atomic elements of the presentation of objects or colour points in a given scene. That detailed elaboration belongs elsewhere, here I aim only to sketch how one might set about developing such an account.

10. Over the course of this paper, I've tried to fill out in some more detail what disjunctivism about perception needs to be committed to. There is a common thought that disjunctivism is a counter-intuitive thesis about sensory experience and that such an approach has so far been only incompletely specified, since we need to know more about the case of illusory or hallucinatory experience than disjunctivists

are wont to say. What I've argued here is that the focus of discussion should rest with opposing views about the relation between phenomenal character or properties of experience and some of its epistemological properties, how it can be known to be the same or different from some other mental event simply through reflection on one's circumstance.

In the first part of the paper, I argued that there is good reason to think that the disjunctivist is right to suppose that our broadest conception of perceptual experience is simply that which the disjunctivist uses – namely that of being indiscriminable through reflection from veridical perceptions. However, as the latter part of the paper presses, this agnosticism is not where the disjunctivist can rest. At least when such a view is motivated in part by a concern to recognise the place of mental events within a natural causal order, it needs to take into account the possibility of hallucinations brought about through proximally causally matching circumstances to veridical perceptions. In such cases, I've argued, the disjunctivist really has no option other than to claim that such experiences have no positive mental characteristics other than their epistemological properties of not being knowably different from some veridical perception.

I take it that it is at this point that the resistance to the disjunctive approach will be at its most acute. Can it really be that in a case of perfect hallucination there is no more to how things are with me, than that I cannot and could not tell this situation apart from genuine veridical perception? Surely that epistemological property of the circumstance is simply grounded in the positive presence of the phenomenal properties which are manifest to me when I reflect on my situation. Press this intuition further. We will be most convinced of this idea if we suppose that we do have insight into what it takes for one to have a sensory experience, that we can identify the relevant non-epistemological mental features which act as a ground to the facts of indiscriminability that the disjunctivist appeals to.

The issue here touches on some yet deeper concerns. Most, I suspect, think the kind of subjectivity we have as finite beings requires the presence of phenomenal consciousness. Moreover, there is some temptation to think of phenomenal consciousness as something conceivable independently of our self-awareness or

self-conscious reflection on our situation and as something prior to such self-consciousness which acts as the ground for it. So, one might think, the presence or absence of phenomenal consciousness can be determined independently of the presence of self-conscious awareness or reflection on it, and only given its presence do we have a subject with genuine subjectivity. From this perspective, the disjunctivist's conception of these cases seems to introduce a form of philosophical zombie: a subject who may have thoughts and possess the ability to make judgements about phenomenal consciousness but who lacks phenomenal consciousness proper. In that case, one's intuition will be that the subject so described is not properly conscious and lacks genuine subjectivity or point of view on the world.

Of course, given that we have the strong intuition that an unfortunate subject who is subject to a total hallucination must still be conscious (after all this is the force of the objection to the disjunctivist), this picture forces us to think of phenomenal consciousness as constitutively independent of any relation to the world. In somewhat overblown terms, one might then think of phenomenal consciousness as some special stuff which gets added to the thoughts and other mental elements in order to engender subjectivity. In contrast, the Naïve realist is moved by the thought that phenomenal consciousness, as we are initially inclined to think of it in first reflection, is not any such stuff, but instead simply the presence to us of the ordinary world around us. Such presence is, *ex hypothesi*, absent when a subject suffers a total hallucination. Holding on to this relational conception of phenomenal conscious requires us, therefore, to think of the hallucinatory case in a different way from the story told above.

And the disjunctivism we have spelled out here suggests a more complex link between phenomenal consciousness and self-conscious awareness than the story told immediately above. What we do, the disjunctivist suggests, is to exploit our own self-conscious awareness and memory of experience in conceiving of how it would be to be presented with a lavender bush or how it would be to be in a situation indiscriminable from this. In our conception of the situation we exploit elements of self-consciousness and self-awareness, and in this we can see being so self-conscious is quite

sufficient for subjectivity. This is not to say that self-consciousness supports subjectivity independent of phenomenal consciousness, as if a philosophical zombie had a point of view on the world but lacked phenomenal feel. Rather in managing to conceive of how things are from the subject's perspective in the case of total hallucination in terms of its being indiscriminable from veridical perception, we thereby imagine phenomenal consciousness too. What we don't have, though, is a grasp of what phenomenal consciousness in general must be like in a way that is prior to and independent of epistemological concerns: what we can and cannot know of one's own position through introspective reflection.

At this point there are two morals from our discussion above that it is important to keep in mind. The first is that we really should be sceptical of having any grasp on a necessary condition for how an event should be in order to be sense experience, apart from the modest criterion of indiscriminability from perception through reflection. For, as was remarked earlier, that could be so only if we have such powers of introspection that we not only successfully detect the presence of certain self-intimating properties when they are instantiated, but are sensitive to their absence when they are not. Few are now prepared to endorse the existence of the kind of infallibility of judgements about the mind which this position requires. The point of our discussion is really to draw out how far reaching the consequences of that reluctance can be.

The second moral concerns the initial motivation for disjunctivism. I've suggested that we should be moved to this position in defence of a natural conception of how our veridical perceptual experience relates us to the world around us. That is what leads us to Naïve Realism. Hence, taking that view seriously forces one to acknowledge that both sense-datum and intentional theories of perception amount to error-theories of sense experience. For if ordinary reflection leads to the acceptance of Naïve Realism, then such ordinary reflection cannot disclose the real nature of sense experience according to these views. If one is convinced that reflection on appearances is misleading, on what basis can one insist that nevertheless one is bound to be accurate about the presence or absence of phenomenal properties? If one cannot tell what it really takes for experience to be one way rather than another, why should

we think that one can still always tell that some mental presentation or other must be responsible for things to seem the way that they are? So the epistemological commitments of Common Kind views seem to be in tension with the reasons for accepting them. If all views must concede that some sensory appearances seem other than they are, then the disjunctivist has the simplest account of how this can be.

Nonetheless, clearly there is still work to be done to explain why this stopping off point may seem so incredible to us. That is work for elsewhere. The aim in this paper has simply been to identify exactly where that stopping off point should be, and to delimit what disjunctivism need and need not be committed to.²⁸

NOTES

¹ Recent defenders of intentionalism include Harman (1990), Peacocke (1983, 1992), Searle (1983), Tye (1995). In the analytic tradition its popularity can be traced back to Firth's discussion of the percept theory in the mid-century (Firth, 1965), on the one hand, and Anscombe's critique of both sense-datum theorists and their ordinary language opponents (Anscombe 1962), on the other. With some caveats, one can also see it as dominant within the phenomenological tradition.

² To this purpose, the term 'sense-datum' was introduced first by Moore in Moore (1905) and made public in Russell (1912). Though out of favour in recent years, one can find defences of sense-data in Jackson (1977), O'Shaughnessy (1980), Foster (1986), and Robinson (1994). Subjectivism as here conceived captures a broader range of theories than just this, though, and includes for example the appeal to sensational properties in Peacocke (1983).

³ William Alston has recently defended a theory of appearing while claiming of hallucinations that we can consider them to be awarenesses of mental images, see Alston (1999, pp. 191–192). He suggests that nothing positively shows that mental images are dependent on our awareness of them, and if one could maintain this conclusion, the argument of the text would be blocked. However he does not discuss what model of the causation of hallucination we would then need to adopt: can the local conditions for producing mental images be sensitive to the absence of an external object of perception? If not, which is the overwhelming plausible conclusion to draw, then if the veridical perception is the same kind of mental state, we will get the conclusion drawn in the text.

⁴ Harold Langsam, who endorses disjunctivism, seeks to block the argument from hallucination by suggesting that there are possible accounts of hallucination on which an hallucination is, for example, a relation to the region of physical space where an object appears to be (Langsam, 1997, p. 47). However, Langsam's agnostic stance about the nature of hallucinations is misleading about the force of

the argument against the Naïve Realist. Of course there may be some hallucinations which are examples of awareness of the mere air around us. But the pressing question is whether there are any which take the form indicated in the text and which are of the same kind as veridical perceptions. Langsam does nothing to show that such experiences are impossible, nor does he discuss the consequences of the possibility of their existence.

⁵ Such talk of intentional objects can be traced at least to Anscombe (1962), who claims Medieval authority for it, and this way of expressing the view is echoed in Harman (1990). Nonetheless, critics tend to read the talk as involving a commitment to a special kind of entity, which unsurprisingly leads to a dismissal of mystery mongering. No such ontological profligacy need be, or was intended by those who chose to talk in this way.

⁶ As I propose at greater length in Martin (2001).

⁷ See in particular Martin (2002).

⁸ This is true of Moore and Russell, who insisted that the objects of sensing must be independent of our awareness of them (see Moore, 1922; Russell, 1912; Broad, 1925; Price, 1932). For an early criticism of precisely this aspect of the sense-datum tradition (Prichard, 1950).

⁹ Merleau-Ponty (1942); Valberg (1992).

¹⁰ However, Hannah Ginsborg reminded me that Hinton does discuss fact perception in the later monograph, *Experiences*, see pp. 101–124; so the contrast is perhaps not as stark as I present it here.

¹¹ Here I follow the approach to indiscriminability found in Williamson (1990); see below for further discussion of the relevant properties of indiscriminability.

¹² See, Robinson (1985, 1994) and also Foster (1986), but note the recantation of this in Foster (2000, Pt Two, p. 2). Other recent versions of the argument can also be found in O’Shaughnessy (1980, Ch. 5) and Valberg (1992).

¹³ That is to say, $\forall e \forall s \forall s' \forall C \forall N [[[\text{In}(s,e) \ \& \ \text{In}(s,C) \ \& \ \text{In}(s,N) \ \& \ K(e)] \ \& \ [\text{CausCond}(C,e,s) \ \& \ \text{NcausCond}(N,e,s)] \ \& \ [[\text{In}(s',C) \ \& \ \text{In}(s',N)]] \ \rightarrow \ [\exists e' K(e') \ \& \ \text{In}(s',e')]]]$, taking quantification over the events to have widest scope. (Thanks to Susanna Siegel for pointing out the need to disambiguate.)

¹⁴ Nicholas Nathan in unpublished work has sought to challenge the causal argument in just this way.

¹⁵ Perhaps no one has ever really endorsed such singularism about causation which would be to suppose that the truth of some singular causal statements had no implications whatever for general truths about what general circumstances occur with what other general circumstances, yet Anscombe (1981), is often credited with such a position.

¹⁶ John Foster in his most recent discussion of these matters suggests that the causal argument can be blocked by claiming that the object of perception acts as a direct cause in addition to any role it has in producing intermediary causal steps which can be replicated in the case of hallucination. The principle of ‘Same Causes, Same Effects’ would therefore not be violated by the Naïve Realist. In response to the arguments considered here, Foster in addition needs to claim that the hallucination has a cause which is not replicated in the case of veridical

perception, and indeed this is what he does, see Foster (2000, p. 41). For all that, Foster's suggestion here does just seem to be of the form of double counting, allowing the absence of a specific causal factor itself to count as a distinctive causal factor.

¹⁷ Just such a worry seems to be moving Scott Sturgeon in Sturgeon (1998, 2000, Ch. 1).

¹⁸ One of the classical discussions of this is Mill's principle of difference in *A System of Logic*, III, viii, 2. For an interesting discussion of the limits of this strategy of explanation see Gendler (2002).

¹⁹ Someone might object that the most determinate property has to explain and not any of its determinables, but for a convincing exposition of the opposing view see Yablo (1992, 1997).

²⁰ This is a theme familiar from Evans (1982), and McDowell, see in particular McDowell (1986). It is not clear whether Evans himself would have endorsed disjunctivism about perception, unlike McDowell he certainly did not think the content of perceptual experience object-dependent.

²¹ See Peacocke (1993) and Williamson (1995, 2000).

²² See Chisholm (1959) and Jackson (1977) for two such discussions.

²³ See Williamson (1995, 2000, Ch. 1).

²⁴ Just such worries are expressed by Williamson in Williamson (1995).

²⁵ See Graff (2001).

²⁶ See Williamson (1990).

²⁷ In the version presented at Oberlin, these last few comments were omitted. The suggestions made here may address some of the concerns that Susanna Siegel raises in the first part of her paper.

²⁸ This paper originated as a twenty minute talk at CREA in Paris and a written draft was produced during a visit at the RISS of the ANU; versions of the paper have been read to audiences in Paris, Canberra, Dubrovnik, Edinburgh, London, Leeds, Helsinki and Oberlin. I am grateful in particular for comments on this material to Tim Crane, Alan Hajek, Jen Hornsby, Véronique Munoz-Dardé, Panu Raatikainen, Susanna Siegel, Paul Snowdon, Maja Spener, Charles Travis, and above all to Scott Sturgeon for provoking much of the second half of the paper.

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