

Appendix I
Sample instructions ($\pi = 2/3$)

Introduction

This is an experiment in decision-making. Research foundations have provided funds for conducting this research. Your payoffs will depend partly only on your decisions and partly on chance. It will not depend on the decisions of the other participants in the experiments. Please pay careful attention to the instructions as a considerable amount of money is at stake.

The entire experiment should be complete within an hour and a half. At the end of the experiment you will be paid privately. At this time, you will receive \$5 as a participation fee (simply for showing up on time). Details of how you will make decisions and receive payments will be provided below.

During the experiment we will speak in terms of experimental tokens instead of dollars. Your payoffs will be calculated in terms of tokens and then translated at the end of the experiment into dollars at the following rate:

2 Tokens = 1 Dollar

A decision problem

In this experiment, you will participate in 50 independent decision problems that share a common form. This section describes in detail the process that will be repeated in all decision problems and the computer program that you will use to make your decisions.

In each decision problem you will be asked to allocate tokens between two accounts, labeled x and y . The x account corresponds to the x -axis and the y account corresponds to the y -axis in a two-dimensional graph. Each choice will involve choosing a point on a line representing possible token allocations. Examples of lines that you might face appear in Attachment 1.

[Attachment 1 here]

In each choice, you may choose any x and y pair that is on the line. For example, as illustrated in Attachment 2, choice A represents a decision to allocate q tokens in the x account and r tokens in the y account. Another possible allocation is B , in which you allocate w tokens in the x account and z tokens in the y account.

[Attachment 2 here]

Each decision problem will start by having the computer select such a line randomly from the set of lines that intersect with at least one of the axes at 50 or more tokens but with no intercept exceeding 100 tokens. The lines selected for you in different decision problems are independent of each other and independent of the lines selected for any of the other participants in their decision problems.

To choose an allocation, use the mouse to move the pointer on the computer screen to the allocation that you desire. When you are ready to make your decision, left-click to enter your chosen allocation. After that, confirm your decision by clicking on the Submit button. Note that you can choose only x and y combinations that are on the line. To move on to the next round, press the OK button. The computer program dialog window is shown in Attachment 3.

[Attachment 3 here]

Your payoff at each decision round is determined by the number of tokens in your x account and the number of tokens in your y account. At the end of the round, the computer will randomly select one of the accounts, x or y . For each participant, account y will be selected with $1/3$ chance and account x will be selected with $2/3$ chance. You will only receive the number of tokens you allocated to the account that was chosen.

Next, you will be asked to make an allocation in another independent decision. This process will be repeated until all 50 rounds are completed. At the end of the last round, you will be informed the experiment has ended.

Earnings

Your earnings in the experiment are determined as follows. At the end of the experiment, the computer will randomly select one decision round from each participant to carry out (that is, 1 out of 50). The round selected depends solely upon chance. For each participant, it is equally likely that any round will be chosen.

The round selected, your choice and your payment will be shown in the large window that appears at the center of the program dialog window. At the end of the experiment, the tokens will be converted into money. Each token will be worth 0.5 Dollars. Your final earnings in the experiment will be your earnings in the round selected plus the \$5 show-up fee. You will receive your payment as you leave the experiment.




Rules

Your participation in the experiment and any information about your payoffs will be kept strictly confidential. Your payment-receipt and participant form are the only places in which your name and social security number are recorded.



You will never be asked to reveal your identity to anyone during the course of the experiment. Neither the experimenters nor the other participants will be able to link you to any of your decisions. In order to keep your decisions private, please do not reveal your choices to any other participant.

Please do not talk with anyone during the experiment. We ask everyone to remain silent until the end of the last round. If there are no further questions, you are ready to start. An instructor will approach your desk and activate your prog


Attachment 1



Attachment 2



Attachment 3



















Appendix II
















Individual-level data
















The portfolio choices (x_1, x_2) as points in a scatterplot (left panel); the relationship between $\ln(p_1/p_2)$ and $x_1/(x_1 + x_2)$ (middle panel); and the relationship between $\ln(p_1/p_2)$ and p_1x_1 (left panel).
















Symmetric treatment ($\pi=1/2$)





































































































































































Asymmetric treatments ($\pi=1/3$ and $\pi=2/3$)




















































































Appendix III

Testing rationality

Let $\{(p^i, x^i)\}_{i=1}^{50}$ be the data generated by some individual's choices, where p^i denotes the i -th observation of the price vector and x^i denotes the associated portfolio. A portfolio x^i is *directly revealed preferred* to a portfolio x^j , denoted $x^i R^D x^j$, if $p^i \cdot x^i \geq p^i \cdot x^j$. A portfolio x^i is *revealed preferred* to a portfolio x^j , denoted $x^i R x^j$, if there exists a sequence of portfolios $\{x^k\}_{k=1}^K$ with $x^1 = x^i$ and $x^K = x^j$, such that $x^k R^D x^{k+1}$ for every $k = 1, \dots, K-1$. The Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference (GARP), which requires that if $x^i R x^j$ then $p^j \cdot x^j \leq p^j \cdot x^i$ (i.e. if x^i is revealed preferred to x^j , then x^i must cost at least as much as x^j at the prices prevailing when x^j is chosen). It is clear that if the data are generated by a non-satiated utility function, then they must satisfy GARP. Conversely, the following result due to Afriat (1967) tells us that if a *finite* data set generated by an individual's choices satisfies GARP, then the data can be rationalized by a well-behaved utility function.

Afriat's Theorem If the data set $\{(p^i, x^i)\}$ satisfies GARP, then there exists a piecewise linear, continuous, increasing, concave utility function $u(x)$ such that for each observation (p^i, x^i)

$$u(x) \leq u(x^i) \text{ for any } x \text{ such that } p^i \cdot x \leq p^i \cdot x^i.$$

Hence, in order to show that the data are consistent with utility-maximizing behavior we must check whether it satisfies GARP. Since GARP offers an exact test, it is desirable to measure the *extent* of GARP violations. We report measures of GARP violations based on three indices: Afriat (1972), Varian (1991), and Houtman and Maks (1985).

Afriat (1972) Afriat's *critical cost efficiency index* (CCEI) measures the amount by which each budget constraint must be adjusted in order to remove all violations of GARP. For any number $0 \leq e \leq 1$, define the direct revealed preference relation $R^D(e)$ as $x^i R^D(e) x^j$ if $e p^i \cdot x^i \geq p^i \cdot x^j$, and define $R(e)$ to be the transitive closure of $R^D(e)$. Let e^* be the largest value of e such that the relation $R(e)$ satisfies GARP. Afriat's CCEI is the value of e^* associated with the data set $\{(p^i, x^i)\}$. It is bounded between zero and one and can be interpreted as saying that the consumer is 'wasting' as much as $1 - e^*$ of his income by making inefficient choices. The closer the CCEI is to one, the smaller the perturbation of the budget constraints required to remove

all violations and thus the closer the data are to satisfying GARP. Although the CCEI provides a summary statistic of the overall consistency of the data with GARP, it does not give any information about which of the observations (p^i, x^i) are causing the most severe violations. A single large violation may lead to a small value of the index while a large number of small violations may result in a much larger efficiency index.

Varian (1991) Varian refined Afriat's CCEI to provide a measure that reflects the minimum adjustment required to eliminate the violations of GARP associated with each observation (p^i, x^i) . In particular, fix an observation (p^i, x^i) and let e^i be the largest value of e such that $R(e)$ has no violations of GARP within the set of portfolios x^j such that $x^i R(e)x^j$. The value e^i measures the efficiency of the choices when compared to the portfolio x^i . Knowing the efficiencies $\{e^i\}$ for the entire set of observations $\{(p^i, x^i)\}$ allows us to say where the inefficiency is greatest or least. These numbers may still overstate the extent of inefficiency, however, because there may be several places in a cycle of observations where an adjustment of the budget constraint would remove a violation of GARP and the above procedure may not choose the 'least costly' adjustment. Varian (1991) provides an algorithm that will select the least costly method of removing all violations by changing each budget set by a different amount. When a single number is desired, as here, one can use $e^* = \min \{e^i\}$. Thus, Varian's (1991) index is a lower bound on the Afriat's CCEI.

Houtman and Maks (1985) (HM) HM find the largest subset of choices that is consistent with GARP. This method has a couple of drawbacks. First, some observations may be discarded even if the associated GARP violations could be removed by small perturbations of the budget constraint. Further, since the algorithm is computationally very intensive, we were unable to compute the HM index for a small number of subjects (ID 211, 324, 325, 406, 504 and 608) with a large number of GARP violations. In those few cases we report upper bounds on the consistent set.

Table AIII1 lists, by subject, the number of violations of the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (WARP) and GARP, and also reports the values of the three indices. Subjects are ranked according to (descending) CCEI scores. We allow for small mistakes resulting from the imprecision of a subject's handling of the mouse. The results presented in Table AIII1 allow for a narrow confidence interval of one token (i.e. for any i and $j \neq i$, if $d(x^i, x^j) \leq 1$ then x^i and x^j are treated as the same portfolio).

[Table AIII1 here]

Figure AIII1 compares the distributions of the Varian efficiency index gen-

erated by the sample of hypothetical subjects (gray) and the distributions of the scores for the actual subjects (black). The horizontal axis shows the value of the index and the vertical axis measures the percentage of subjects corresponding to each interval. The histograms show that actual subject behavior has high consistency measures compared to the behavior of the hypothetical random subjects. Figure AIII2 shows the distribution of the HM index. Note that we cannot generate a distribution of this index for random subjects because of the computational load.

[Figure AIII1 here]

[Figure AIII2 here]

Table AIII1: WARP and GARP violations and the three indices by subject
(sorted according to descending CCEI)

ID	WARP	GARP	Afriat	Varian	HM
205	0	0	1.000	1.000	50
213	0	0	1.000	1.000	50
215	0	0	1.000	1.000	50
216	0	0	1.000	1.000	50
219	0	0	1.000	1.000	50
303	0	0	1.000	1.000	50
304	0	0	1.000	1.000	50
306	0	0	1.000	1.000	50
314	0	0	1.000	1.000	50
316	0	0	1.000	1.000	50
317	0	0	1.000	1.000	50
320	0	0	1.000	1.000	50
326	0	0	1.000	1.000	50
508	0	0	1.000	1.000	50
509	0	0	1.000	1.000	50
604	0	0	1.000	1.000	50
411	2	4	0.999	0.978	48
416	1	1	0.999	0.979	49
405	2	2	0.999	0.933	48
417	1	1	0.998	0.996	49
301	3	11	0.997	0.951	48
505	1	1	0.996	0.995	49
501	2	2	0.995	0.985	48
605	5	5	0.992	0.982	45
323	3	3	0.991	0.978	47
302	2	7	0.990	0.943	48
414	1	1	0.990	0.951	49
413	5	7	0.989	0.979	47
210	1	1	0.988	0.967	49
408	1	1	0.987	0.986	49
415	4	5	0.987	0.934	47
402	5	7	0.987	0.834	47
311	3	3	0.986	0.804	48
313	2	2	0.986	0.970	48
217	7	14	0.986	0.935	46
410	4	4	0.984	0.954	47
515	5	6	0.984	0.973	46

ID	WARP	GARP	Afriat	Varian	HM
407	3	3	0.984	0.972	48
503	2	5	0.982	0.961	49
512	8	8	0.982	0.960	43
207	3	15	0.981	0.941	47
601	1	1	0.981	0.981	49
516	4	4	0.981	0.975	46
520	8	9	0.979	0.907	46
412	7	12	0.976	0.928	46
514	2	3	0.975	0.952	49
204	4	10	0.973	0.970	47
318	4	6	0.972	0.809	48
502	5	17	0.971	0.880	47
609	3	5	0.969	0.880	47
202	6	12	0.968	0.944	46
203	4	14	0.966	0.946	48
319	3	20	0.966	0.727	48
327	2	5	0.965	0.915	49
519	4	5	0.963	0.944	47
315	10	33	0.959	0.795	45
312	4	13	0.957	0.952	47
513	10	37	0.957	0.822	45
309	4	17	0.952	0.890	48
218	5	10	0.951	0.907	48
214	8	21	0.949	0.916	45
206	9	147	0.948	0.855	47
602	6	11	0.947	0.861	45
510	8	13	0.946	0.914	45
409	6	15	0.943	0.935	46
208	8	14	0.942	0.912	45
308	2	6	0.938	0.930	49
511	16	231	0.936	0.472	42
507	16	39	0.929	0.843	44
209	15	94	0.929	0.825	46
307	5	12	0.916	0.914	46
403	8	27	0.916	0.724	46
404	26	117	0.915	0.729	42
517	13	32	0.911	0.845	43
322	8	96	0.905	0.768	47
506	5	294	0.892	0.568	48
401	3	3	0.874	0.838	49

ID	WARP	GARP	Afriat	Varian	HM
607	37	179	0.870	0.712	37
212	5	111	0.866	0.697	47
305	17	182	0.852	0.695	45
608	23	549	0.847	0.570	29
324	18	453	0.840	0.657	29
606	18	241	0.839	0.470	44
518	26	121	0.816	0.732	43
201	16	147	0.797	0.526	42
321	27	375	0.757	0.356	44
325	27	702	0.739	0.398	32
328	21	559	0.705	0.401	33
504	29	794	0.697	0.355	33
310	22	241	0.690	0.366	43
603	12	322	0.686	0.229	47
406	39	881	0.653	0.225	30
211	83	669	0.611	0.361	34

Figure AIII1: The distributions of GARP violations Varian (1991)





Figure AIII2: The distributions of GARP violations Houtman and Maks (1985)



Appendix IV

Constant relative risk aversion (CRRA)

ID	α	Std(α)	ρ	Std(ρ)	R^2
201	1.000	0.044	0.522	0.082	0.589
202	1.000	0.036	1.033	0.105	0.700
203	3.551	0.704	0.048	5.690	0.848
204	2.858	0.683	0.058	1.415	0.625
205	1.003	0.010	0.000	0.003	0.911
206	1.000	0.002	3.741	1.148	0.258
207	1.244	0.137	0.142	0.030	0.913
208	1.238	0.417	0.446	0.147	0.765
209	1.044	0.204	0.521	0.134	0.625
210	1.179	0.318	3.871	2.367	0.340
211	1.000	0.341	0.810	8.121E+14	0.161
212	1.382	1.416	0.466	0.339	0.615
213	2.106	0.687	0.165	0.166	0.681
214	1.000	0.000	1.304	0.210	0.609
215	1.437	0.326	0.179	0.075	0.681
216	1.126	0.081	0.259	0.029	0.892
217	1.460	0.333	0.403	0.144	0.754
218	1.013	0.020	0.002	0.009	0.849
219	2.876	0.355	0.019	0.029	0.894
301	1.302	0.705	0.542	0.275	0.773
302	1.121	0.077	0.159	0.039	0.813
303	1.641	0.476	0.284	0.169	0.615
304	1.477	0.476	66.632	1.279E+21	0.252
305	1.282	0.181	0.430	0.079	0.759
306	1.000	0.073	3.382	1.006	0.444
307	1.043	0.088	0.076	0.030	0.875
308	1.821	0.354	0.451	0.121	0.521
309	1.000	0.025	0.686	0.048	0.812
310	1.387	0.188	1.770	0.720	0.141
311	1.050	0.084	0.070	0.031	0.788
312	1.885	0.583	0.170	0.081	0.727
313	1.044	0.091	0.712	0.126	0.808
314	1.047	0.126	0.103	0.041	0.850
315	1.000	0.001	0.794	0.128	0.598
316	1.535	0.139	0.772	0.183	0.802
317	1.179	0.106	1.009	0.217	0.899


ID	α	Std(α)	ρ	Std(ρ)	R^2
318	1.056	0.124	0.173	0.059	0.761
319	1.281	0.297	0.239	0.041	0.824
320	1.013	0.002	0.002	0.001	0.943
321	1.000	0.045	1.485	0.298	0.267
322	1.000	0.009	0.760	0.092	0.562
323	1.000	0.000	1.555	0.187	0.609
324	1.000	0.130	0.145	0.032	0.595
325	1.000	0.276	0.417	0.109	0.397
326	1.541	0.701	0.252	0.244	0.620
327	1.000	0.012	0.965	0.136	0.580
328	1.000	0.130	0.340	0.140	0.339
401	1.120	0.078	0.638	0.088	0.616
402	1.085	0.151	0.375	0.088	0.583
403	1.027	0.423	0.302	0.084	0.710
404	1.000	0.591	2.716	2.046E+15	0.121
405	1.087	0.087	0.560	0.079	0.804
406	1.531	0.419	1.936	4.663E+15	0.088
407	1.000	0.260	3.865	1.279E+21	0.127
408	2.506	0.794	0.764	8.812E+14	0.330
409	1.206	0.330	0.701	0.167	0.547
410	1.000	0.066	1.145	0.146	0.603
411	1.605	0.231	0.037	0.036	0.882
412	1.265	0.124	0.236	0.054	0.746
413	2.347	1.428	0.209	4.277	0.634
414	1.195	0.155	0.495	0.145	0.666
415	1.009	0.112	0.109	0.037	0.737
416	1.211	0.254	0.717	0.173	0.625
417	1.000	0.016	0.432	0.057	0.810
501	1.035	0.361	0.596	0.205	0.628
502	1.029	0.217	1.826	0.567	0.527
503	1.729	0.064	0.006	0.015	0.982
504	1.778	0.337	0.266	0.232	0.321
505	1.543	0.248	0.230	0.052	0.724
506	1.000	0.002	0.336	0.048	0.470
507	1.004	0.101	0.409	0.091	0.593
508	1.000	0.004	0.004	0.003	0.948
509	1.297	0.220	0.792	0.250	0.809
510	1.120	0.261	0.609	0.116	0.767
511	1.000	0.036	0.990	0.204	0.450
















ID	α	Std(α)	ρ	Std(ρ)	R^2
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513	1.000	0.041	1.126	0.170	0.652
514	1.239	0.198	0.557	0.116	0.530
515	1.110	0.844	3.693	1.279E+21	0.148
516	1.302	0.788	5.672	3.806E+21	0.047
517	1.000	0.004	0.290	0.047	0.617
518	1.453	0.300	0.390	0.120	0.621
519	2.333	0.791	0.131	0.298	0.560
520	1.000	0.042	0.250	0.054	0.633
601	1.000	0.029	0.080	0.021	0.751
602	1.068	0.158	0.633	0.168	0.685
603	1.000	0.176	4.630	1.629E+17	0.001
604	1.000	0.065	1.076	0.204	0.454
605	1.000	0.000	0.585	0.048	0.759
606	1.000	1.209	3.515	1.807E+21	0.095
607	1.656	0.373	1.465	1.807E+21	0.141
608	1.000	0.114	0.741	0.202	0.192
609	1.081	0.111	0.288	0.047	0.699






Appendix V
















The relationship between $\ln(p_1 / p_2)$ and $\ln(\hat{x}_1 / \hat{x}_2)$



Symmetric treatment ($\pi=1/2$)











Appendix VI

Risk measures and OLS expected-utility model

ID	$r(1)$	ρ (OLS)	α	Std(α)	β	Std(β)	R^2	#obs.
202	0.516	1.038	0.071	0.075	0.963	0.091	0.701	50
203	0.577	4.799	-0.019	0.044	0.208	0.088	0.112	46
204	0.504	5.348	0.011	0.052	0.187	0.090	0.087	47
205	0.001	0.651	-0.466	0.198	1.535	0.258	0.425	50
206	1.870	3.596	0.062	0.040	0.278	0.064	0.280	50
207	0.179	0.375	0.098	0.118	2.666	0.315	0.672	37
208	0.327	0.715	0.035	0.084	1.398	0.131	0.714	48
209	0.282	0.656	-0.019	0.110	1.523	0.192	0.573	49
210	2.005	5.034	0.053	0.029	0.199	0.042	0.316	50
212	0.387	1.132	0.122	0.075	0.883	0.105	0.606	48
213	0.428	1.533	-0.058	0.099	0.653	0.184	0.226	45
214	0.652	1.301	0.035	0.054	0.769	0.088	0.612	50
215	0.266	1.019	-0.208	0.130	0.982	0.227	0.348	37
216	0.188	0.489	0.005	0.058	2.045	0.101	0.916	40
217	0.381	0.700	-0.018	0.088	1.429	0.110	0.782	49
218	0.008	0.807	-0.372	0.204	1.239	0.240	0.358	50
219	0.491	1.124	0.065	0.030	0.890	0.063	0.837	41
301	0.397	0.904	0.036	0.057	1.107	0.094	0.745	49
302	0.136	0.370	0.081	0.086	2.701	0.243	0.765	40
303	0.376	1.011	0.004	0.003	0.989	0.005	0.999	46
304	32.275	132.740	-0.001	0.001	0.008	0.002	0.219	50
305	0.335	0.562	0.082	0.122	1.779	0.151	0.744	50
306	1.691	3.318	0.076	0.035	0.301	0.046	0.476	50
308	0.497	1.231	-0.087	0.061	0.812	0.083	0.673	49
309	0.343	0.674	-0.112	0.060	1.483	0.099	0.825	50
312	0.384	1.434	0.158	0.062	0.697	0.120	0.446	44
313	0.377	0.827	-0.040	0.050	1.210	0.070	0.864	49
314	0.074	5.448	0.004	0.021	0.184	0.103	0.122	25
315	0.397	0.795	0.004	0.121	1.258	0.153	0.586	50
316	0.580	1.285	0.063	0.050	0.779	0.075	0.692	50
317	0.583	1.249	-0.050	0.025	0.801	0.040	0.895	50
318	0.114	0.492	-0.112	0.093	2.034	0.177	0.819	31
319	0.241	0.742	0.089	0.108	1.348	0.170	0.662	34
320	0.008	0.797	0.047	0.209	1.255	0.268	0.314	50
322	0.380	0.756	0.121	0.146	1.322	0.167	0.568	50
323	0.777	1.588	0.066	0.059	0.630	0.074	0.599	50

ID	$r(1)$	ρ (OLS)	α	Std(α)	β	Std(β)	R^2	#obs.
326	0.334	0.895	-0.050	0.061	1.118	0.127	0.627	48
327	0.483	0.924	0.178	0.097	1.083	0.126	0.607	50
401	0.375	0.706	0.180	0.113	1.417	0.158	0.626	50
402	0.228	0.660	0.290	0.056	1.515	0.079	0.896	45
403	0.164	0.579	0.362	0.076	1.726	0.130	0.824	40
404	1.358	2.601	0.059	0.093	0.384	0.145	0.128	50
405	0.321	0.630	0.242	0.083	1.588	0.099	0.846	49
407	1.933	2.479	0.461	0.042	0.403	0.053	0.543	50
408	0.741	2.544	0.634	0.054	0.393	0.060	0.469	50
409	0.441	0.875	0.682	0.079	1.143	0.099	0.737	50
410	0.573	1.294	0.431	0.058	0.773	0.071	0.710	50
411	0.250	0.633	1.194	0.042	1.579	0.134	0.823	32
412	0.233	0.439	0.199	0.109	2.277	0.182	0.801	41
413	0.490	3.707	0.464	0.031	0.270	0.049	0.412	45
414	0.334	0.732	0.331	0.077	1.365	0.113	0.757	49
415	0.059	0.458	0.638	0.212	2.181	0.749	0.298	22
416	0.451	1.018	0.600	0.040	0.983	0.057	0.862	50
417	0.216	0.505	0.199	0.062	1.981	0.117	0.862	48
501	0.315	0.822	-0.189	0.060	1.216	0.103	0.749	49
502	0.927	1.896	-0.060	0.059	0.528	0.072	0.527	50
503	0.270	0.620	-0.411	0.068	1.614	0.231	0.596	35
505	0.323	0.531	-0.772	0.084	1.884	0.123	0.849	44
506	0.168	0.547	0.002	0.131	1.828	0.194	0.707	39
507	0.207	0.683	-0.121	0.097	1.465	0.156	0.667	46
509	0.519	1.090	-0.084	0.047	0.918	0.068	0.790	50
510	0.360	0.648	-0.363	0.099	1.544	0.106	0.814	50
511	0.495	1.202	-0.255	0.084	0.832	0.093	0.631	49
512	0.420	0.944	-0.329	0.068	1.059	0.097	0.723	48
513	0.563	1.088	-0.200	0.069	0.919	0.087	0.699	50
514	0.382	0.764	-0.900	0.069	1.308	0.092	0.807	50
515	1.894	5.158	-0.478	0.032	0.194	0.036	0.382	50
516	2.919	4.672	-0.391	0.022	0.214	0.031	0.492	50
517	0.145	0.345	-0.149	0.246	2.897	0.401	0.537	47
518	0.373	0.829	-0.504	0.113	1.207	0.172	0.518	48
519	0.455	1.725	-0.923	0.077	0.580	0.133	0.306	45
520	0.125	0.477	-0.611	0.113	2.098	0.171	0.820	35
601	0.040	0.542	-0.877	0.111	1.846	0.482	0.495	17
602	0.349	0.815	-0.010	0.091	1.227	0.118	0.696	49
604	0.538	0.991	-0.730	0.025	1.009	0.034	0.949	50

ID	$r(1)$	ρ (OLS)	α	Std(α)	β	Std(β)	R^2	#obs.
605	0.293	0.597	-0.328	0.115	1.674	0.129	0.778	50
606	1.758	3.455	-0.020	0.083	0.289	0.128	0.096	50
607	0.935	5.569	-0.394	0.100	0.180	0.128	0.039	50
608	0.371	1.426	-0.473	0.148	0.701	0.202	0.215	46
609	0.183	0.498	-0.204	0.117	2.007	0.288	0.543	43

Appendix VII

Constant absolute risk aversion (CARA)

ID	α	Std(α)	A	Std(A)	R^2	RRA	Mean x
201	1.067	0.091	0.019	0.005	0.608	0.576	30.518
202	1.000	0.030	0.046	0.006	0.517	1.415	30.450
203	2.772	0.895	0.003	0.020	0.730	0.093	32.834
204	1.000	0.870	0.056	0.047	0.288	1.846	33.022
205	1.002	0.001	0.000	0.016	0.582	0.001	38.530
206	1.000	0.000	0.129	0.036	0.195	3.839	29.798
207	1.029	0.050	0.010	0.001	0.858	0.390	37.216
208	1.000	0.073	0.029	0.003	0.642	1.020	35.542
209	1.000	0.017	0.024	0.003	0.586	0.821	34.720
210	1.000	0.219	0.221	0.099	0.274	6.390	28.864
211	1.000	0.140	0.043	1.666E-02	0.157	1.367	31.478
212	1.000	0.111	0.037	0.006	0.627	1.217	32.830
213	1.000	0.259	0.030	0.008	0.566	1.140	37.560
214	1.000	0.000	0.051	0.008	0.449	1.700	33.130
215	1.443	0.324	0.009	0.005	0.705	0.388	42.890
216	1.000	0.000	0.016	0.002	0.927	0.612	37.686
217	1.083	0.100	0.028	0.005	0.762	0.958	33.920
218	1.000	0.005	0.034	0.018	0.227	1.331	39.150
219	1.051	0.080	0.025	0.004	0.875	0.798	31.668
301	1.000	0.044	0.034	0.006	0.764	1.171	34.684
302	1.000	0.010	0.011	0.001	0.863	0.419	39.238
303	1.000	0.058	0.033	0.004	0.886	1.082	33.180
304	1.299	0.355	4.159	8.121E+14	0.124	141.050	33.912
305	1.000	0.124	0.029	0.004	0.743	0.121	33.780
306	1.000	0.003	0.144	0.039	0.335	1.144	29.278
307	1.066	0.089	0.006	0.002	0.890	0.110	45.100
308	1.929	0.291	0.023	0.009	0.776	0.283	31.368
309	1.000	0.002	0.026	0.003	0.682	0.119	36.470
310	1.000	0.103	0.114	0.035	0.194	1.124	32.268
311	1.049	0.089	0.006	0.002	0.800	0.084	35.176
312	1.261	0.481	0.023	0.009	0.696	0.282	31.806
313	1.000	0.007	0.036	0.004	0.847	0.120	31.968
314	1.152	0.129	0.004	0.003	0.885	0.106	42.018
315	1.000	0.000	0.032	0.006	0.475	0.176	31.932
316	1.415	0.139	0.038	0.020	0.723	0.675	33.786
317	1.000	0.005	0.050	0.004	0.877	0.125	35.594

ID	α	Std(α)	A	Std(A)	R^2	RRA	Mean x
318	1.077	0.087	0.009	0.003	0.874	0.308	36.008
319	1.024	0.058	0.021	0.002	0.870	0.707	33.332
320	1.000	0.003	0.032	0.018	0.219	1.186	36.626
321	1.000	0.002	0.071	0.016	0.230	2.227	31.404
322	1.000	0.002	0.035	0.005	0.488	1.172	33.422
323	1.000	0.000	0.064	0.011	0.432	1.812	28.276
324	1.000	0.114	0.013	0.003	0.614	0.600	47.072
325	1.000	0.106	0.028	0.005	0.390	0.914	33.128
326	1.140	0.082	0.028	0.007	0.757	1.049	37.804
327	1.000	0.004	0.039	0.007	0.464	1.272	32.988
328	1.000	0.142	0.024	0.009	0.372	0.737	30.232
401	1.005	0.071	0.037	0.004	0.530	1.111	30.428
402	1.000	0.031	0.024	0.002	0.774	0.760	31.394
403	1.000	0.026	0.019	0.002	0.818	0.581	29.940
404	1.000	0.232	0.112	8.121E+14	0.063	3.569	31.974
405	1.036	0.067	0.028	0.005	0.737	0.809	29.282
406	1.375	0.339	0.085	1.809E+15	0.079	2.446	28.716
407	1.000	0.061	0.159	1.147E+15	0.072	3.762	23.684
408	1.787	0.562	0.055	3.034E-02	0.161	1.167	21.298
409	1.000	0.173	0.042	0.007	0.352	0.911	21.522
410	1.000	0.033	0.049	0.006	0.431	1.119	22.628
411	1.197	0.142	0.008	0.003	0.643	0.176	21.564
412	1.315	0.140	0.005	0.004	0.827	0.188	35.378
413	4.771	1.625	0.002	0.046	0.634	0.039	23.530
414	1.000	0.062	0.032	0.004	0.634	0.918	29.044
415	1.332	0.132	0.000	0.003	0.802	0.000	35.004
416	1.123	0.172	0.036	0.007	0.440	0.790	22.058
417	1.000	0.001	0.015	0.003	0.788	0.475	31.122
501	1.000	0.003	0.034	0.006	0.522	1.219	35.726
502	1.000	0.071	0.085	0.020	0.441	2.665	31.354
503	1.472	0.145	0.003	0.002	0.886	0.141	46.664
504	1.193	0.433	0.024	0.009	0.225	1.255	52.670
505	1.428	0.232	0.014	0.004	0.691	0.593	42.060
506	1.000	0.009	0.010	0.005	0.596	0.398	39.532
507	1.000	0.037	0.022	0.005	0.639	0.773	35.802
508	1.003	0.003	0.000	0.000	0.961	0.001	35.892
509	1.000	0.057	0.050	0.006	0.722	1.619	32.442
510	1.000	0.198	0.031	0.005	0.710	1.041	33.694
511	1.000	0.017	0.050	0.008	0.414	1.827	36.214

ID	α	Std(α)	A	Std(A)	R^2	RRA	Mean x
512	1.096	0.267	0.029	0.006	0.669	1.181	40.214
513	1.000	0.011	0.051	0.009	0.482	1.678	33.022
514	1.000	0.196	0.029	0.006	0.387	1.403	47.722
515	1.060	0.428	0.196	8.121E+14	0.076	6.447	32.932
516	1.047	0.487	0.305	3.386E+15	0.024	11.358	37.258
517	1.000	0.037	0.007	0.002	0.666	0.271	41.264
518	1.346	0.164	0.022	0.005	0.556	0.917	42.064
519	1.000	0.021	0.031	0.007	0.318	1.514	48.892
520	1.110	0.095	0.006	0.004	0.701	0.226	39.314
601	1.000	0.048	0.004	0.002	0.692	0.230	51.758
602	1.000	0.006	0.034	0.004	0.671	1.136	33.444
603	1.000	0.231	0.040	1.147E+15	0.084	2.338	58.358
604	1.000	0.003	0.043	0.007	0.333	1.861	42.784
605	1.000	0.000	0.009	0.006	0.632	0.403	43.414
606	1.000	1.051	0.153	2.672E+15	0.092	4.689	30.668
607	1.506	0.270	0.080	2.545E+15	0.073	2.846	35.574
608	1.000	0.010	0.043	0.008	0.212	1.716	39.786
609	1.016	0.068	0.016	0.003	0.712	0.670	41.794

Appendix VIII
Maximum likelihood estimation (ML)

Constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) In order to have a well defined likelihood function, we need to define the error structure. To this end, we assume the power form $u(x) = x^{1-\rho}/(1-\rho)$ and consider the following stochastic utility function,

$$\min \left\{ \alpha \frac{x_1^{1-\rho}}{1-\rho} e^{\varepsilon_1} + \frac{x_2^{1-\rho}}{1-\rho} e^{\varepsilon_2}, \frac{x_1^{1-\rho}}{1-\rho} e^{\varepsilon_1} + \alpha \frac{x_2^{1-\rho}}{1-\rho} e^{\varepsilon_2} \right\}.$$

Recall that the data generated by an individual's choices are $\{(\bar{x}_1^i, \bar{x}_2^i, x_1^i, x_2^i)\}_{i=1}^{50}$, where (x_1^i, x_2^i) are the coordinates of the choice made by the subject and $(\bar{x}_1^i, \bar{x}_2^i)$ are the endpoints of the budget constraint, (so we can calculate the relative prices $p_1^i/p_2^i = \bar{x}_2^i/\bar{x}_1^i$ for each observation i). The first-order conditions that must be satisfied at each observation $(\bar{x}_1^i, \bar{x}_2^i, x_1^i, x_2^i)$ can thus be written as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} \ln \left(\frac{\bar{x}_2^i}{\bar{x}_1^i} \right) &\geq \ln \alpha + \rho \ln \left(\frac{1}{\omega} \right) + \varepsilon^i \text{ for } \frac{x_1^i}{x_2^i} = \omega, \\ \ln \left(\frac{\bar{x}_2^i}{\bar{x}_1^i} \right) &= \ln \alpha + \rho \ln \left(\frac{x_2^i}{x_1^i} \right) + \varepsilon^i \text{ for } \omega < \frac{x_1^i}{x_2^i} < 1, \\ -\ln \alpha + \rho \ln \left(\frac{x_2^i}{x_1^i} \right) + \varepsilon^i &\leq \ln \left(\frac{\bar{x}_2^i}{\bar{x}_1^i} \right) \leq \ln \alpha + \rho \ln \left(\frac{x_2^i}{x_1^i} \right) + \varepsilon^i \text{ for } \frac{x_1^i}{x_2^i} = 1, \\ \ln \left(\frac{\bar{x}_2^i}{\bar{x}_1^i} \right) &= -\ln \alpha + \rho \ln \left(\frac{x_2^i}{x_1^i} \right) + \varepsilon^i \text{ for } 1 < \frac{x_1^i}{x_2^i} < \frac{1}{\omega}, \\ \ln \left(\frac{\bar{x}_2^i}{\bar{x}_1^i} \right) &\leq -\ln \alpha + \rho \ln(\omega) + \varepsilon^i \text{ for } \frac{x_1^i}{x_2^i} = \frac{1}{\omega}, \end{aligned}$$

where $\varepsilon^i \equiv \varepsilon_2^i - \varepsilon_1^i$. When the first order condition is an equation, it defines a unique value of ε^i that satisfies the expression and hence the likelihood $\varphi(\varepsilon^i)$ is well defined, where $\varphi(\cdot)$ is the p.d.f. of ε^i . When the first order condition is an inequality, there is an interval of values of $[\underline{\varepsilon}^i, \bar{\varepsilon}^i]$ that satisfy the first order condition and the probability $\Phi(\bar{\varepsilon}^i) - \Phi(\underline{\varepsilon}^i)$ is well defined, where $\Phi(\cdot)$ is the c.d.f. of ε^i . Further, we assume that ε^i is distributed normally with mean zero and variance σ^2 .

With these terms we can define the likelihood function:

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathcal{L} \left(\{(\bar{x}_1^i, \bar{x}_2^i, x_1^i, x_2^i)\}_{i=1}^{50}; a, \rho \right) &= \prod_{\frac{x_1^i}{x_2^i}=\omega} \Phi \left[\ln \left(\frac{\bar{x}_2^i}{\bar{x}_1^i} \right) - \ln \alpha - \rho \ln \left(\frac{1}{\omega} \right) \right] \\
&\times \prod_{\omega < \frac{x_1^i}{x_2^i} < 1} \varphi \left[\ln \left(\frac{\bar{x}_2^i}{\bar{x}_1^i} \right) - \ln \alpha - \rho \ln \left(\frac{x_2^i}{x_1^i} \right) \right] \\
&\times \prod_{\frac{x_1^i}{x_2^i}=1} \left[\Phi \left[\ln \alpha + \rho \ln \left(\frac{\bar{x}_2^i}{\bar{x}_1^i} \right) \right] - \Phi \left[-\ln \alpha + \rho \ln \left(\frac{\bar{x}_2^i}{\bar{x}_1^i} \right) \right] \right] \\
&\times \prod_{1 < \frac{x_1^i}{x_2^i} < \frac{1}{\omega}} \varphi \left[\ln \left(\frac{\bar{x}_2^i}{\bar{x}_1^i} \right) + \ln \alpha - \rho \ln \left(\frac{x_2^i}{x_1^i} \right) \right] \\
&\times \prod_{\frac{x_1^i}{x_2^i}=\frac{1}{\omega}} 1 - \Phi \left[\ln \left(\frac{\bar{x}_2^i}{\bar{x}_1^i} \right) + \ln \alpha - \rho \ln(\omega) \right].
\end{aligned}$$

We incorporate the boundary observations $(\bar{x}_1, 0)$ or $(0, \bar{x}_2)$ into our estimation using strictly positive portfolios where the zero component is replaced by a small consumption level such that the demand ratio x_1/x_2 is either $1/\omega$ or ω , respectively. The minimum ratio is chosen to be $\omega = 10^{-3}$. Table AVIII1 presents the CRRA results of the ML estimation for the full set of subjects. Table AVIII2 displays summary statistics, and compares the results of the ML and nonlinear least squares (NLLS) estimations.

[Table AVIII1 here]
[Table AVIII2 here]

Constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) We assume the exponential form $u(x) = -e^{-Ax}$ and consider the following stochastic utility function,

$$U(x_1, x_2; a, A) = \min\{-ae^{-Ax_1 - \varepsilon_1} - e^{-Ax_2 - \varepsilon_2}, -e^{-Ax_1 - \varepsilon_1} - ae^{-Ax_2 - \varepsilon_2}\}.$$

The first-order conditions that must be satisfied at each observation $(\bar{x}_1^i, \bar{x}_2^i, x_1^i, x_2^i)$ can be written as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}
\ln \left(\frac{\bar{x}_2^i}{\bar{x}_1^i} \right) &\geq \ln a + A\bar{x}_2^i + \varepsilon^i \text{ for } 0 = x_1^i < x_2^i, \\
\ln \left(\frac{\bar{x}_2^i}{\bar{x}_1^i} \right) &= \ln a + A(x_2^i - x_1^i) + \varepsilon^i \text{ for } 0 < x_1^i < x_2^i, \\
-\ln a + \varepsilon^i &\leq \ln \left(\frac{\bar{x}_2^i}{\bar{x}_1^i} \right) \leq \ln a + \varepsilon^i \text{ if } x_1^i = x_2^i, \\
\ln \left(\frac{\bar{x}_2^i}{\bar{x}_1^i} \right) &= -\ln a + A(x_2^i - x_1^i) + \varepsilon^i \text{ for } x_1^i > x_2^i > 0, \\
\ln \left(\frac{\bar{x}_2^i}{\bar{x}_1^i} \right) &\leq -\ln a - A\bar{x}_1^i + \varepsilon^i \text{ for } x_1^i > x_2^i = 0.
\end{aligned}$$

With these terms we can define the likelihood function:

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathcal{L} \left(\{(\bar{x}_1^i, \bar{x}_2^i, x_1^i, x_2^i)\}_{i=1}^{50}; a, A \right) &= \prod_{0=x_1^i < x_2^i} \Phi \left[\ln \left(\frac{\bar{x}_2^i}{\bar{x}_1^i} \right) - \ln a - A\bar{x}_2^i \right] \\
&\times \prod_{0 < x_1^i < x_2^i} \varphi \left[\ln \left(\frac{\bar{x}_2^i}{\bar{x}_1^i} \right) - \ln a - A(x_2^i - x_1^i) \right] \\
&\times \prod_{x_1^i = x_2^i} \left[\Phi \left[\ln \alpha + \ln \left(\frac{\bar{x}_2^i}{\bar{x}_1^i} \right) \right] - \Phi \left[-\ln \alpha + \ln \left(\frac{\bar{x}_2^i}{\bar{x}_1^i} \right) \right] \right] \\
&\times \prod_{x_1^i > x_2^i > 0} \varphi \left[\ln \left(\frac{\bar{x}_2^i}{\bar{x}_1^i} \right) + \ln a - A(x_2^i - x_1^i) \right] \\
&\times \prod_{x_1^i > x_2^i = 0} 1 - \Phi \left[\ln \left(\frac{\bar{x}_2^i}{\bar{x}_1^i} \right) + \ln a + A\bar{x}_1^i \right].
\end{aligned}$$

Table AVIII3 presents the CARA results of the ML estimation for the full set of subjects. Table AVIII4 displays summary statistics, and compares the results of the ML and NLLS estimations.

[Table AVIII3 here]

[Table AVIII4 here]

Table AVIII1: CRRA ML estimation

ID	α	Std(α)	ρ	Std(ρ)	σ	Log_lik
201	1.737	0.198	0.102	0.050	0.471	-33.298
202	1.267	0.131	0.540	0.139	0.454	-33.810
203	1.496	0.103	0.000	0.015	0.469	-34.210
204	1.596	0.142	0.000	0.000	0.569	-43.318
205	1.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.004	-2.161
206	1.746	0.131	0.000	0.025	0.429	-31.145
207	1.672	0.145	0.022	0.033	0.310	-13.525
208	1.209	0.073	0.341	0.042	0.364	-24.471
209	1.700	0.114	0.066	0.064	0.358	-20.335
210	2.924	0.370	0.000	0.041	0.500	-20.776
211	1.377	0.132	0.000	2.5E-02	0.608	-46.537
212	1.300	0.119	0.364	0.090	0.451	-33.128
213	1.697	0.101	0.000	0.028	0.367	-21.944
214	1.535	0.118	0.279	0.133	0.377	-25.523
215	1.419	0.117	0.000	0.031	0.539	-35.061
216	1.186	0.067	0.255	0.034	0.230	-2.717
217	1.633	0.174	0.285	0.062	0.351	-22.599
218	1.854	0.156	0.000	0.029	0.599	-45.895
219	1.390	0.065	0.137	0.031	0.261	-5.842
301	1.398	0.081	0.387	0.062	0.299	-16.397
302	1.192	0.044	0.103	0.025	0.188	6.232
303	1.499	0.093	0.246	0.079	0.345	-20.486
304	7.2E+03	1.7E+09	0.370	6.6E-02	0.771	0.000
305	1.520	0.126	0.243	0.059	0.378	-24.368
306	1.703	0.235	0.472	0.281	0.540	-42.207
307	1.355	0.067	0.000	0.000	0.166	-12.881
308	3.414	0.515	0.000	0.102	0.509	-16.593
309	1.147	0.058	0.453	0.065	0.280	-13.710
310	1.929	0.193	0.000	0.092	0.662	-49.812
311	1.391	0.080	0.000	0.000	0.182	-17.148
312	1.644	0.141	0.063	0.057	0.432	-29.981
313	1.263	0.071	0.466	0.102	0.286	-10.664
314	1.287	0.058	0.000	0.000	0.179	-8.202
315	1.595	0.204	0.195	0.086	0.513	-38.510
316	2.749	0.618	0.223	0.166	0.376	-10.254
317	1.177	0.042	0.901	0.069	0.191	5.470

ID	α	Std(α)	ρ	Std(ρ)	σ	Log_lik
318	1.612	0.099	0.000	0.009	0.291	-11.953
319	1.5271	0.1224	0.0762	0.0456	0.3931	-19.821
320	1.022	0.023	0.000	0.001	0.202	-12.417
321	2.564	0.308	0.000	0.032	0.686	-43.976
322	1.485	0.131	0.254	0.083	0.524	-39.095
323	1.629	0.198	0.383	0.155	0.478	-34.686
324	1.455	0.124	0.000	0.000	0.445	-31.919
325	1.872	0.161	0.000	0.000	0.569	-36.295
326	1.566	0.083	0.158	0.108	0.239	-7.804
327	1.901	0.251	0.082	0.104	0.526	-37.594
328	2.169	0.258	0.000	0.000	0.557	-32.030
401	1.108	0.073	0.376	0.074	0.452	-32.856
402	1.346	0.134	0.188	0.086	0.408	-27.310
403	1.255	0.091	0.135	0.067	0.390	-22.482
404	1.172	0.092	0.145	0.153	0.632	-51.468
405	1.202	0.088	0.397	0.050	0.386	-26.395
406	1.437	0.127	0.000	0.047	0.695	-54.193
407	1.239	0.143	0.176	0.199	0.784	-62.199
408	1.155	0.118	0.380	0.176	0.800	-62.311
409	1.000	0.000	0.457	0.062	0.547	-40.756
410	1.000	0.053	0.691	0.080	0.516	-37.868
411	1.000	0.000	0.047	0.026	0.296	-7.482
412	1.155	0.096	0.164	0.072	0.409	-26.765
413	1.075	0.073	0.048	0.081	0.631	-45.415
414	1.109	0.062	0.401	0.091	0.400	-28.779
415	1.076	0.044	0.000	0.001	0.273	-11.217
416	1.000	0.000	0.533	0.056	0.453	-31.389
417	1.000	0.030	0.403	0.047	0.227	1.856
501	1.253	0.078	0.335	0.101	0.329	-18.405
502	1.936	0.311	0.310	0.177	0.561	-41.182
503	1.135	0.052	0.035	0.033	0.255	-3.867
504	1.000	0.061	0.115	0.041	0.623	-46.354
505	1.000	0.044	0.273	0.040	0.468	-32.542
506	1.714	0.116	0.000	0.025	0.459	-31.670
507	1.282	0.111	0.175	0.087	0.404	-26.630
508	1.000	0.004	0.000	0.000	0.018	-1.875
509	1.211	0.072	0.674	0.085	0.313	-16.094
510	1.240	0.106	0.411	0.045	0.459	-34.829
511	1.725	0.173	0.218	0.118	0.577	-43.279

ID	α	Std(α)	ρ	Std(ρ)	σ	Log_lik
512	1.569	0.124	0.233	0.086	0.508	-38.865
513	1.320	0.159	0.477	0.133	0.471	-35.505
514	1.000	0.000	0.366	0.050	0.515	-37.726
515	1.067	0.074	0.494	0.239	0.835	-63.991
516	1.242	0.139	0.000	0.086	0.713	-57.577
517	1.198	0.159	0.109	0.052	0.413	-25.961
518	1.193	0.094	0.272	0.082	0.526	-41.748
519	1.117	0.108	0.071	0.056	0.553	-39.230
520	1.462	0.128	0.000	0.033	0.500	-31.365
601	1.043	0.027	0.000	0.000	0.219	-8.631
602	1.308	0.103	0.375	0.083	0.410	-27.791
603	1.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	25.532	-34.642
604	1.141	0.095	0.385	0.085	0.571	-46.962
605	1.000	0.000	0.444	0.046	0.439	-29.735
606	2.662	0.434	0.000	0.022	0.820	-43.676
607	1.280	0.159	0.000	0.124	0.774	-59.579
608	1.920	0.186	0.000	0.006	0.581	-41.397
609	1.242	0.055	0.120	0.038	0.291	-12.707

Table AVIII2: Summary statistics of individual-level CRRA estimation
ML and NLLS

ML				NLLS			
α	All	$\pi=1/2$	$\pi \neq 1/2$	α	All	$\pi=1/2$	$\pi \neq 1/2$
Mean	1.423	1.602	1.266	Mean	1.315	1.390	1.248
Std	0.432	0.474	0.323	Std	0.493	0.584	0.388
p5	1.000	1.355	1.075	p5	1.000	1.000	1.000
p25	1.155	1.177	1.000	p25	1.000	1.000	1.000
p50	1.287	1.520	1.196	p50	1.115	1.179	1.083
p75	1.595	1.644	1.282	p75	1.445	1.477	1.297
p95	2.662	2.924	1.920	p95	2.427	2.876	2.333

ρ	All	$\pi=1/2$	$\pi \neq 1/2$	ρ	All	$\pi=1/2$	$\pi \neq 1/2$
Mean	0.219	0.189	0.246	Mean	1.662	2.448	0.950
Std	0.202	0.207	0.196	Std	7.437	10.736	1.206
p5	0.000	0.000	0.048	p5	0.053	0.048	0.080
p25	0.000	0.000	0.000	p25	0.233	0.165	0.290
p50	0.188	0.137	0.226	p50	0.481	0.438	0.573
p75	0.380	0.285	0.397	p75	0.880	0.794	0.990
p95	0.540	0.540	0.533	p95	3.803	3.871	3.693

We omit the nine subjects with CCEI scores below 0.80 (ID 201, 211, 310, 321, 325, 328, 406, 504 and 603), the three subjects (ID 205, 218 and 320) who almost always chose a minimum level of consumption of ten tokens in each state, the subject (ID 508) who almost always chose a boundary portfolio, and the subject (ID 304) who always chose nearly safe portfolios.

Table AVIII3: CARA ML estimation

ID	α	Std(α)	A	Std(ρ)	σ	Log_lik
201	1.770	0.207	0.004	0.003	0.483	-34.096
202	1.491	0.178	0.012	0.006	0.553	-42.138
203	1.496	0.108	0.000	0.001	0.469	-34.210
204	1.596	0.137	0.000	0.000	0.569	-43.318
205	1.145	0.000	0.135	0.000	0.135	-2302.6
206	1.746	0.131	0.000	0.000	0.429	-31.145
207	1.573	15.876	0.000	0.096	0.190	-0.073
208	1.294	0.167	0.010	0.075	0.437	-31.267
209	1.765	1.463	0.001	0.025	0.368	-20.725
210	2.924	0.324	0.000	0.000	0.500	-20.775
211	1.377	0.116	0.000	5.9E-04	0.608	-46.537
212	1.290	0.139	0.014	0.004	0.485	-35.718
213	1.697	0.116	0.000	0.000	0.367	-21.944
214	1.760	0.473	0.000	0.012	0.413	-27.406
215	1.419	1.220	0.000	0.027	0.539	-35.061
216	1.097	0.232	0.013	0.097	0.244	-2.990
217	1.733	0.203	0.010	0.004	0.416	-28.160
218	1.854	1.256	0.000	0.144	0.599	-45.895
219	1.287	0.074	0.012	0.003	0.242	-3.294
301	1.423	0.105	0.014	0.004	0.340	-21.456
302	1.131	0.042	0.005	0.001	0.178	9.010
303	1.259	0.078	0.021	0.005	0.265	-11.086
304	8.7E+07	1.1E+09	0.357	1.1E-01	1.845	0.000
305	1.529	1.521	0.011	0.034	0.414	-28.695
306	1.871	0.195	0.002	0.009	0.565	-43.379
307	22.331	22.390	0.205	0.097	0.107	-1519.7
308	3.408	1.637	0.000	0.039	0.508	-16.593
309	1.245	0.120	0.012	0.043	0.364	-24.604
310	1.929	9.879	0.000	0.021	0.662	-49.812
311	8.146	948.780	0.266	0.041	0.078	-1197.3
312	1.661	0.127	0.000	0.001	0.426	-28.140
313	1.180	0.067	0.025	0.003	0.294	-13.915
314	1.287	0.059	0.000	0.000	0.179	-8.202
315	1.929	0.352	0.000	0.104	0.559	-40.579
316	3.330	18.036	0.002	0.013	0.447	-11.080
317	1.135	0.045	0.036	0.003	0.228	-4.195

ID	α	Std(α)	A	Std(ρ)	σ	Log_lik
318	1.612	0.968	0.000	0.110	0.291	-11.953
319	1.4667	0.8425	0.0048	0.1086	0.3911	-19.734
320	1.077	0.007	0.000	9.545	2.506	-33.833
321	2.564	0.273	0.000	0.000	0.686	-43.976
322	1.574	0.157	0.008	0.003	0.561	-42.233
323	1.930	0.204	0.002	0.004	0.521	-37.084
324	1.455	14.383	0.000	0.117	0.445	-31.919
325	1.868	0.653	0.000	0.016	0.593	-38.274
326	1.509	0.085	0.010	0.006	0.238	-8.436
327	2.050	3.845	0.000	0.059	0.540	-37.802
328	2.169	0.272	0.000	0.000	0.557	-32.030
401	1.114	0.107	0.016	0.004	0.497	-37.515
402	1.065	0.084	0.016	0.069	0.379	-23.427
403	1.132	0.072	0.010	0.003	0.378	-22.060
404	1.227	0.124	0.000	0.002	0.646	-51.829
405	1.229	1.602	0.016	0.102	0.460	-35.108
406	1.437	0.154	0.000	0.001	0.695	-54.193
407	1.305	2.691	0.000	0.140	0.800	-62.424
408	1.335	1.060	0.003	0.089	0.852	-64.069
409	1.000	0.032	0.015	0.077	0.645	-48.983
410	1.150	0.277	0.016	0.064	0.615	-46.597
411	1.051	0.000	0.368	0.000	0.135	-2302.6
412	1.083	0.069	0.009	0.002	0.390	-24.925
413	1.069	0.071	0.003	0.037	0.630	-45.377
414	1.103	0.221	0.016	0.085	0.441	-32.902
415	1.076	0.089	0.000	0.031	0.273	-11.217
416	1.000	0.020	0.017	0.049	0.539	-40.046
417	1.000	0.061	0.014	0.142	0.275	-6.291
501	1.511	0.110	0.002	0.003	0.400	-25.484
502	2.165	0.314	0.002	0.006	0.604	-42.509
503	1.111	0.756	0.002	0.100	0.252	-3.687
504	1.000	0.047	0.005	0.114	0.618	-45.959
505	1.000	0.022	0.013	0.002	0.482	-32.260
506	1.655	0.174	0.000	0.109	0.432	-28.562
507	1.270	1.690	0.007	0.130	0.417	-27.602
508	1.051	0.000	0.368	0.000	0.135	-2302.6
509	1.199	0.103	0.028	0.005	0.370	-24.452
510	1.275	4.328	0.017	0.144	0.512	-39.865
511	2.067	0.701	0.000	0.074	0.619	-45.170

ID	α	Std(α)	A	Std(ρ)	σ	Log_lik
512	1.610	0.171	0.008	0.004	0.535	-40.113
513	1.637	0.240	0.006	0.005	0.543	-41.054
514	1.000	0.072	0.012	0.175	0.582	-43.844
515	1.113	0.134	0.010	0.007	0.867	-65.332
516	1.242	0.126	0.000	0.176	0.713	-57.577
517	1.433	0.174	0.001	0.174	0.427	-27.158
518	1.218	0.116	0.008	0.021	0.537	-41.326
519	1.104	0.064	0.003	0.179	0.552	-39.079
520	1.462	1.613	0.000	0.099	0.500	-31.365
601	1.043	0.294	0.000	0.108	0.219	-8.631
602	1.326	0.132	0.014	0.004	0.462	-33.040
603	1.051	0.000	0.368	0.000	0.135	-2302.6
604	1.232	0.158	0.009	0.020	0.627	-50.312
605	1.063	0.111	0.013	0.164	0.583	-43.989
606	2.662	0.521	0.000	0.000	0.820	-43.676
607	1.280	0.134	0.000	0.001	0.774	-59.579
608	1.920	0.189	0.000	0.000	0.581	-41.397
609	1.200	0.081	0.005	0.032	0.266	-9.597

Table AVIII4: Summary statistics of individual-level CARA estimation
ML and NLLS

ML				NLLS			
α	All	$\pi=1/2$	$\pi \neq 1/2$	α	All	$\pi=1/2$	$\pi \neq 1/2$
Mean	1.815	2.395	1.303	Mean	1.154	1.121	1.182
Std	2.501	3.573	0.353	Std	0.488	0.332	0.595
p5	1.000	1.294	1.076	p5	1.000	1.000	1.000
p25	1.132	1.131	1.000	p25	1.000	1.000	1.000
p50	1.305	1.573	1.209	p50	1.000	1.000	1.000
p75	1.655	1.765	1.335	p75	1.083	1.066	1.110
p95	3.330	8.146	2.067	p95	1.787	1.929	1.506

ρ	All	$\pi=1/2$	$\pi \neq 1/2$	A	All	$\pi=1/2$	$\pi \neq 1/2$
Mean	0.017	0.019	0.016	Mean	0.043	0.038	0.047
Std	0.055	0.054	0.056	Std	0.052	0.042	0.059
p5	0.000	0.000	0.000	p5	0.003	0.004	0.003
p25	0.000	0.000	0.000	p25	0.014	0.016	0.014
p50	0.005	0.002	0.008	p50	0.029	0.029	0.031
p75	0.013	0.012	0.014	p75	0.046	0.038	0.050
p95	0.036	0.205	0.017	p95	0.159	0.144	0.159

We omit the nine subjects with CCEI scores below 0.80 (ID 201, 211, 310, 321, 325, 328, 406, 504 and 603), the three subjects (ID 205, 218 and 320) who almost always chose a minimum level of consumption of ten tokens in each state, the subject (ID 508) who almost always chose a boundary portfolio, and the subject (ID 304) who always chose nearly safe portfolios.